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Why did Russia attack Ukraine in February 2022? The staggering price paid over the past two and a half years suggests a compelling reason. The war, expected to last days, has become a prolonged conflict with no end in sight.
As of summer 2024, American sources estimate Russian casualties at 350,000, while British sources cite a higher number—500,000—and casualties are mounting. In May alone, Russia lost an estimated 1,000 men daily, according to Western intelligence. Russia is replacing these losses, recruiting 25,000–30,000 men monthly. Material losses, however, are harder to replace. By mid-July 2024, Russia lost at least 3,219 tanks, 9,702 other vehicles, 283 command and control centers, 1,164 tube artillery pieces, 390 MLRS systems, 259 surface-to-air missile systems, 119 aircraft, 138 helicopters, 76 radar systems, and 83 electronic warfare platforms. Its Black Sea Fleet suffered the loss of 26 vessels. The economy is shackled by extensive sanctions—more than those imposed on Iran and North Korea combined—resulting in the loss of much geopolitical autonomy and increased dependence on China. American sources estimate the war's economic cost to Russia at over $1 trillion. What could justify such a price? Why was Putin willing to pay it?
This video explores possible motivations. Since Russia is a dictatorship, Putin's worldview is crucial. Informed opinion considers him a Russian revanchist. As early as 2005, Putin hinted at this ideology, calling the fall of the Soviet Union one of the 20th century's worst tragedies. In Munich two years later, he criticized the post-Cold War order, deeming it a U.S. attempt at global dominance, a situation Russia wouldn't constructively participate in.
The following year, NATO's Bucharest Declaration stated that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance, although no timetable was set. This was a compromise between the U.S., which wanted immediate admission, and France and Germany, who feared antagonizing Russia. Putin, present in Bucharest, lobbied against their admission. Did Putin invade Ukraine primarily to prevent its NATO membership?
Putin's actions after the Bucharest Declaration suggest this. Months later, he invaded Georgia, exploiting NATO's rules against admitting countries with territorial disputes. His invasion created the unrecognized breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, ensuring Georgia's exclusion. Ukraine, under ineffective or pro-Russia leaders, was unlikely to join NATO, but the Ukrainian people were dissatisfied.
In November 2013, Ukrainians revolted when President Viktor Yanukovych rejected a deal aligning Ukraine closer to the European Union, favoring closer ties with Russia instead—unpopular due to Russia's limited desirable exports beyond oil and gas. Remember this.
The subsequent Euromaidan protests culminated in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, ousting Yanukovych's pro-Russia regime. Putin, mirroring his 2008 playbook, supported separatists in Ukraine's Donbas region, establishing the unrecognized Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. He annexed Crimea, justifying it with a flawed referendum. The 2015 Minsk agreements brought a ceasefire, though sporadic fighting continued. The West found the agreements disappointing but tolerable, while Putin considered them a success, downplaying the limited sanctions resulting from the annexation. He presented it as a major foreign policy achievement, strengthening his control of Crimea with new military bases and a bridge to the Russian mainland. He effectively prevented Ukraine from joining NATO, as he had done with Georgia.
This suggests NATO expansion wasn't the sole reason for the 2022 invasion. While it clearly annoyed him, it doesn't explain the eight-year delay. So, what else?
Putin's revanchist ideology played a significant role. In July 2021, he published "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," claiming Ukrainians and Russians were "one people," and accusing Ukraine's post-Maidan government of denying this historical reality and fostering neo-Nazism. This, along with Russia's military buildup, signaled a likely invasion. In December 2021, he stated the Soviet Union's collapse ended "historical Russia," a millennium-old entity, creating a humanitarian tragedy that separated 25 million ethnic Russians from their homeland.
This reveals a motivation beyond preventing NATO membership. The Soviet Union's collapse reversed Russia's traditional foreign policy of acquiring naturally defensible borders. Russia's vast expanse on the European Plain makes this difficult, explaining its centuries-long expansion. The Soviet Union's collapse left Russia with a long, undefended border. Putin's invasion partially aimed to restore pre-1991 borders. This complements the ideological motivation. He also lamented the cultural diaspora following the Soviet Union's collapse.
Putin adheres to a civilization-state model, prioritizing historical, cultural, and linguistic ties over national borders. He argued that Ukraine's post-Maidan government denied its past. Though historians rejected his claims, Putin likely believed them, providing an ideological justification for the invasion and a convenient pretext for the Russian people.
Demographic factors might also have played a role. The International Criminal Court's March 2023 arrest warrant for Putin for the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children highlights a demographic motivation. The Soviet Union had a large population; its collapse left Russia with roughly half. Russia's current population is 144 million, but its fertility rate is below replacement level, leading to a projected population drop to 112 million by the century's end. The deportation of Ukrainian children could be an attempt to reverse this decline. Putin's invasion might be about reclaiming the Soviet population base as much as restoring its borders. Ukraine's own population decline makes transferring its younger population attractive. This might buy Putin time to address Russia's demographic issues.
However, these ideological, geopolitical, and demographic reasons don't explain the timing of the 2022 invasion. A 2014 invasion would have been advantageous; Ukraine's military was unprepared. Merkel described the Minsk agreements as buying Ukraine time to strengthen its military. This, along with Russia's modernization efforts, led to the belief that Ukraine couldn't withstand a Russian assault. Instead, Ukraine performed better than expected, and Russia worse. The delay gave Ukraine time to strengthen its military and ties with the West. Putin's delay might have been due to fears of sanctions, but if conquering Ukraine was his goal, he missed his best chance.
The answer might lie in the global economic shift. Russia's economy relies heavily on oil and gas, which constituted 45% of its federal budget and 54% of its exports in 2021. Climate change mitigation, particularly in the EU (Russia's largest energy customer), poses an existential threat. The EU's commitment to reducing carbon emissions necessitates a shift to alternative energy sources. The rise of electric vehicles exemplifies this shift.
This shift poses an existential threat to the Russian economy. While Saudi Arabia is diversifying its economy (Vision 2030), Russia lacks a similar plan, except perhaps the war itself. Ukraine possesses valuable minerals, particularly lithium, crucial for electric vehicle batteries. Ukraine has substantial lithium deposits in its Donetsk and Kirovohrad Oblasts. In 2021, the EU and Ukraine formed a strategic partnership around Ukraine's mineral ores, intending to reduce reliance on China for lithium. Ukraine holds significant lithium reserves (up to 10% of world reserves), and its proximity to the EU enhances their value. Europe could obtain most of its lithium needs from Ukraine.
Putin now leverages this European priority. Tapping these mineral deposits could fund the Russian military, though rebuilding the devastated grid is necessary. The resources also disincentivize territorial concessions in a negotiated settlement and hinder post-war investment. Demand for lithium will increase significantly by 2050.
Russia also produces minerals vital for a decarbonized economy, but exploration has decreased since the war began. Exploitation of Ukrainian resources could compensate for this shortfall. By controlling Ukraine's minerals, Russia also benefits China, forcing the EU to remain reliant on China. Ukraine's mineral wealth (lithium and rare earths) is estimated at $3–$11 trillion, potentially making the war self-funding. This would strengthen the Russo-Chinese axis, influencing Western decarbonization goals. They could charge exorbitant fees for the materials. A free and democratic Ukraine is crucial for a stable energy transition. Putin's attacks on civilian infrastructure aim to clear the land for resource extraction. The deportations in eastern Ukraine are also part of this strategy.
Many experts downplay the role of Ukraine's natural resources in Putin's decision. However, the timing is suggestive. The surge in demand for lithium and other decarbonization elements coincided with the invasion. Putin had ideological and geostrategic motivations, but the economic reality might have been the catalyst for the 2022 invasion. What do you think? How significant were Ukraine's minerals in Putin's decision? Let us know in the comments. Like and subscribe for more military analysis!