Transcription
Translator: Nora Mohammad
Reviewer: Ahmad Ragab
Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no. I was not born there. Here is where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of cultural richness. My grandmother told me that she heard the sound of gunfire alongside my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained to me everything I needed to know about humanity. And it went like this. All human societies evolve in a linear progression, starting with the primitive society, then the slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we ended up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, and nationality, will reach this final stage of political and social evolution. All the peoples of the world will be united in this earthly paradise and will live in perpetual happiness. But before we get there, we are engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism versus the evil of capitalism, and victory for good. And these, of course, were the grand human ideas derived from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were also taught that grand story day after day. It became part of us, and we believed it. And the story was a bestseller. About one-third of the entire world population lived under those grand theories. And then, the world changed overnight. For me, due to my disillusionment with the religion I believed in during my youth, I went to America and became a "hippie" in Berkeley. (Laughter) And now, as I was approaching adulthood, something else had happened. As if one grand story was not enough, I was told another story. And this story is also a grand story. It also claims that all human societies evolve in a linear progression toward an individualistic end. This story went like this: all societies, regardless of culture, whether Christian, Muslim, or Confucian, must progress from traditional societies where groups are the basic units to modern societies where atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all those individuals, by definition, are rational and all want one thing: the vote. And because they are all rational, when one of them is elected, they produce a good government and live in perpetual happiness. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we are engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The good belongs to the democratic countries tasked with the mission of spreading democracy around the world, sometimes by force, against the evil of those countries that do not hold elections. George H.W. Bush: A New World Order... George W. Bush: ...Ending tyranny in our world... Barack Obama: ...A single standard for all who hold power. Eric X. Li: Now -- (Laughter) (Applause) This story also became one of the most popular stories. According to Freedom House, the number of democratic countries rose from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. For the last twenty years, Western elites have been trotting around the world, tired and bored, to sell this statement: the struggle of multi-party parties for political power and everyone's vote is the only way for the salvation of the long-suffering developing world. Whoever buys that statement is destined for success. And whoever doesn't buy it is doomed to failure. But this time, the Chinese did not buy it. Don't fool me twice... (Laughter) The rest is history. In just thirty years, China has gone from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to the second-largest economy in the world. Six hundred and fifty million people have been lifted out of poverty. 80% of the world's poverty reduction during that period occurred in China. In other words, all new and old democratic countries combined have achieved only a fraction of what a single-party state without voting has done. As you can see, I grew up with this thing: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at a specific time. Needless to say, I ate all of my grandmother's rations. So I asked myself, "What's wrong with this picture?" I am here in my hometown, my business is growing rapidly. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. The middle class is growing rapidly and at an unprecedented scale in human history. However, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could do. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, "the Party," and they do not hold elections. There are three assumptions that it makes according to the prevailing political theories of our time. Such a system is functionally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, these assumptions are wrong. The opposite is true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three distinguishing characteristics of the Chinese one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. And it will not last long because it is incapable of adaptation. And here are the facts. In the sixty-four years of ruling the world's largest country, the Party's policy domain has been broader than any other country in modern memory, from the radical collective farm establishment project to the Great Leap Forward project, then the privatization of agricultural land, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reforms, then, his successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening Party membership to private businessmen, something unimaginable during Mao's rule. The Party self-corrects in rather interesting ways. Institutionally, new laws are enacted to correct previous imbalances. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to hold their positions for life and used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rule. Mao was the father of modern China, but his long rule led to catastrophic mistakes. Therefore, the Party set term limits by setting a mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One of the things we hear is, "Political reforms have slowed down considerably compared to economic reforms," and "China desperately needs political reform." But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind political bias. As you can see, some have already decided the types of changes they want to see, and only those changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared to thirty years ago, twenty years ago, or even ten years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is managed, from the most local levels to the highest center, cannot be easily understood today. Such changes are now completely impossible without political reforms of a more fundamental nature. Now I dare to suggest that the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power is concentrated in the hands of a few people, leading to mismanagement and corruption. Indeed, corruption is a big problem. But let's just look at the bigger context. Now, that may be contrary to your expectations. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. Its highest governing body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the last Politburo, only five of them came from privileged backgrounds, called "princelings." The remaining twenty members, including the President and Prime Minister, came from completely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger Central Committee of 300 or more members, the proportion of those born into wealthy and influential families was smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders have worked and competed to reach the top. Compare that to the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, and I think you will find the Party close to the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how can this be possible in a system run by a single party? And now we come to a powerful political institution that Westerners are not very familiar with: the Organization Department of the Party. The department acts as a giant human resources engine that would be envied by some of the most successful companies. It manages a rotating pyramid of three elements: the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like universities or community programs. These elements form separate but integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit university graduates into low-level positions in all three paths, and they start from the bottom, called "Keyuan" [Editor]. They may be promoted through four increasingly distinct ranks: Fuke [Deputy Section Chief], Ke [Section Chief], Fuchu [Deputy Division Chief], and Chu [Division Chief]. And these are not movements from the movie "Karate Kid," okay? This is hard work. The scope of jobs is broad, from managing healthcare in a village to foreign investment in a city district to a director in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, peers, and subordinates. They examine their personal conduct. And they conduct public opinion polls. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move across or out of all three paths. And over time, the good ones surpass the four basic levels to the levels of Fuju [Deputy Bureau Chief] and Ju [Bureau Chief]. There, they enter the senior official class. At that stage, the typical task will be managing a region with millions of inhabitants or managing a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. And just to show you how competitive this system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 Fuke and Ke levels, 600,000 for Fuchu and Chu, and only 40,000 levels for Fuju and Ju. After the Ju levels, the best few ascend to several ranks, and finally succeed in reaching the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does nepotism play a role? Yes, of course. But meritocracy remains the primary driver. Essentially, the Organization Department uses a modern version of the Chinese examination system followed for centuries. China's new leader, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, who was exceptional, the first of his kind to reach the highest position. Even in his case, his career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and over time entered the Politburo, and he managed regions with a total population of 150 million people and a combined GDP of $1.5 trillion. And now, please don't misunderstand me, okay? This is not to belittle anyone. It's just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not humiliation. (Laughter) Before he became governor of Texas, or before Barack Obama ran for president, they couldn't even manage a small county in the Chinese system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the others. Well, he clearly hadn't heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party elections by universal suffrage are the only source of political legitimacy. I was once asked: "The Party was not nominated by elections. So where is the source of legitimacy?" I said: "What about competence?" We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party came to power, China was engulfed in civil wars, torn apart by foreign aggression, and life expectancy at the time was 41 years. Today, it is the second-largest economy in the world, an industrial power, and its people live in increasing prosperity. The Pew Research Center surveyed Chinese public opinion, and here are the figures in recent years. Satisfaction with the country's direction: 85%. Those who believe they are better off than they were five years ago: 70%. Those who expect the future to be better: a staggering 82%. The Financial Times conducted a survey of global youth trends, and these figures, very recent, came out last week. 93% of China's millennials are optimistic about their country's future. And if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world suffer from poor performance. I don't need to explain to this audience how dysfunctional that system is, from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral systems still suffer from poverty and civil wars. Governments are elected, then public approval of them drops to below 50% in a few months, and they remain in office and perform worse until the next election. Democracy has become a perpetual cycle of election and decline. At this rate, I fear that this is democracy, not the Chinese one-party system, that is at risk of losing legitimacy. Now, I don't want to give the wrong impression that China is perfect, and that it is on its way to achieving some kind of superpower status. The government faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with such violent change are mind-boggling. Pollution is one problem. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the disease. They say that corruption is a result of the one-party system, and therefore, to cure it, you have to get rid of the entire system. But a closer look will show us otherwise. Transparency International has ranked China between 70th and 80th in recent years out of 170 countries, and it is improving. India, the world's largest democracy, is ranked 94th and declining. Of the roughly 100 countries ranked lower than China, more than half of those countries are electoral democracies. So, if elections are the cure for corruption, why can't those countries cure it? Currently, I am a venture capitalist. I make bets. It would be unfair to end this talk without taking a risk and making some predictions. And here they are. In the next ten years, China will surpass the United States and become the world's largest economy. Per capita income will approach the top rank for all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed but not eliminated, and China will advance ten to twenty places higher than sixty in the Transparency International ranking. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold its ground. We live in dark times. The grand stories that claim universality have failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st century. Grand stories are the cancer that is destroying democracy from within. Now, I want to clarify something. I am not here to accuse democracy. On the contrary, I believe that democracy has contributed to the rise of the West and the formation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western elites make about their political system, the arrogance, which is the root of the West's current ailment. If they spent a little time trying to make their way to others, and a little more time on political reform at home, they might give their democratic system a better chance. China's political model will never displace the electoral democratic system, because unlike the latter, it does not pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is precisely the point. The importance of the Chinese example is not that it offers an alternative system, but that it proves that alternatives exist. Let us approach the end of this era of grand stories. Communism and democracy may both be benign models, but the era of their definitive totalitarianism has ended. Let us stop teaching people and teaching our children that there is only one way to govern ourselves and only one future that all societies must evolve towards. This is wrong and irresponsible. And worse, it is boring. Let universality give way to pluralism. A more exciting era may be upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you. (Applause) Thank you, thank you, thank you. Thank you. Bruno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for two minutes, because I want to ask you some questions. I think many here, and in Western countries generally, will agree with your statement about the analysis of the dysfunction in democratic systems, but at the same time, many will find it somewhat disturbing to have an unelected ruling authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the mechanism in the Chinese model that allows people to say, in fact, the national interest as defined by you is wrong? Eric: You know, Francis Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive authoritarianism." This is not entirely accurate, but I think it's close. I know the largest public opinion polling company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? It's the Chinese government. Not just from the central government, city government, provincial government, down to the most local neighborhood. They are constantly conducting polls. Are you satisfied with garbage collection? Are you satisfied with the general direction of the government? So, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism for responding to the demands and thinking of the people. My idea is, we should not cling to the idea that there is only one political system -- elections, elections, elections -- that can make it a responsive system. I'm not sure, in fact, that elections produce a sufficiently responsive government in the world. (Applause) Bruno Giussani: It seems many agree with you. One characteristic of a democratic system is to provide space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and authorities enjoy in China. But then you mentioned other elements such as, you know, huge challenges, and there is, of course, a lot of data that goes in a different direction: tens of hundreds of disturbances, demonstrations, environmental protests, etc. It seems you are implying that the Chinese model does not have space outside the Party for civil society to express itself. Eric Li: There is a vibrant civil society in China. Whether it's in the environment or other matters. But it's different. You won't be able to understand it. Because, by Western definitions, what is called civil society must be separate from or even opposed to the political system, but that concept is alien to Chinese culture. You have had civil society for thousands of years, and yet they are consistent and cohesive and form part of the political system, and I think this is a major cultural difference. Bruno Giussani: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. Eric: Thank you.