Transcription
First, I'd like to thank everyone for coming. We were very pleased by the turnout. Above all, I want to welcome Professor Jeffrey Sachs and his wife, Sonia. I apologize; I seem to have forgotten my notes, making a proper introduction difficult. Professor Sachs has accomplished so much. He's advised three Secretary-Generals, is a Columbia University professor, founded the Earth Institute—correct me if I'm wrong—and now directs the Center for Sustainable Development Solutions. There's much more, Sonia, but I'll keep it brief.
Personally, I've known Jeff for some time. In my extensive international work, I've never met anyone so well-connected globally, in both religious and political circles. Jeff is known worldwide, from the Middle East and China to Moscow and, hopefully soon, Kyiv again, as well as Africa and Latin America. His experience is vast, spanning decades. What's special about Jeff, at least in my view, is his consistent role as an advisor, never entering politics or aligning with any party. This independence adds to his credibility, making him a respected voice in economics, sustainable development, the environment, and politics. Today, Jeff is perhaps the world's leading advocate for peace—a concept encompassing all those areas. I'm delighted he's here and grateful for his acceptance of our invitation to speak on the geopolitics of peace.
Jeff's visit comes at a difficult time for the European Union, particularly given the Ukraine war. Europe, despite the war's impact on its soil, isn't leading the response, which I see as an American initiative. We're in a challenging situation, unsure of the path forward. In my six months here, I've been shocked by this Parliament's focus solely on war, a stark contrast to my UN experience. In the UN, and in every war-torn country I’ve visited over my 34 years working in such regions, the approach to conflict resolution differed. My views are often unpopular here, but I believe we need to rethink our strategy. I hope the European Union will prioritize peacebuilding and creating a peaceful Europe, and I believe Jeff can offer valuable insights. Thank you. [Applause]
Michael, thank you. Thanks to all of you for this opportunity to share thoughts in these complicated, rapidly changing, and dangerous times. Clear thinking is essential. I'll strive for brevity and clarity. I've closely followed events in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Russia for 36 years. I advised the Polish government in 1989, President Gorbachev in 1990-91, President Yeltsin in 1991-93, and President Kuchma of Ukraine in 1993-94. I helped introduce the Estonian currency and assisted several former Yugoslav countries, particularly Slovenia. Following the Maidan, I was invited to Kyiv and learned much firsthand. I've also maintained contact with Russian leaders for over 30 years and know the American political leadership well; our previous Secretary of the Treasury was my macroeconomics professor 51 years ago. My perspective isn't secondhand or ideological; it's based on direct observation and experience.
My understanding of events affecting Europe, including the Ukraine crisis, the 1999 Serbian conflict, Middle Eastern wars (Iraq and Syria), and African wars (Sudan, Somalia, and Libya), reveals a startling truth: These wars, to a significant degree, were led and caused by the United States—a pattern spanning over 40 years, or more precisely, over 30 years. After 1990-91 and the Soviet Union's collapse, the US believed it ruled the world, disregarding others' views, red lines, security concerns, international obligations, and the UN framework. I tried to secure aid for Gorbachev in 1991, but the National Security Council dismissed my proposal, as documented in archived memos. The prevailing view, exacerbated after the Soviet Union's dissolution, was: "We run the show." Cheney, Wolfowitz, and others genuinely believed this was a US-dominated world where they could act unilaterally. We've experienced this foreign policy for 33 years.
Europe paid dearly, lacking a discernible foreign policy—no unified voice, clarity, or defined interests, only American loyalty. There were exceptions, like the 2003 Iraq War, when France and Germany opposed the US bypassing the UN. That war, orchestrated by Netanyahu and his US Pentagon colleagues, marked Europe's last significant voice. After that, especially since 2008, Europe lost its voice entirely. Post-1991, the US decided that unipolarity meant NATO expansion from Brussels to Vladivostok. Neutrality was deemed "subversive," a "dirty word." The decision was formalized in 1994 when President Clinton approved eastward NATO expansion. In February 1991, Genscher and Baker assured Gorbachev that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. This is documented extensively; the National Security Archive at George Washington University offers proof. The 1994 decision to expand NATO to Ukraine was a long-term project, not a matter of individual administrations. In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski's *The Grand Chessboard* outlined this US government strategy. Brzezinski, despite his intelligence and kindness, was wrong. He underestimated Russia's reaction, believing Russia could do nothing to counter NATO and European eastward expansion.
This project, stemming from a 19th-century British imperial strategy (Lord Palmerston's Black Sea encirclement of Russia), aimed to block Russia's access to the Eastern Mediterranean. From Clinton to Bush to Obama to Trump to Biden, the strategy remained consistent, perhaps worsening under Biden due to his alleged cognitive decline. American politics is a system of image management and media manipulation. The project continued from the 1990s. The 78-day bombing of Belgrade in 1999, the South Sudan conflict, and others were part of this unipolarity strategy. NATO's eastward expansion began in 1999 with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, provoking Russia. After 9/11, despite Putin's support, the US launched seven wars in five years—Netanyahu's wars, aiming to eliminate Soviet allies and opponents of Hamas and Hezbollah. This reflected Netanyahu's one-state vision: Israel controlling all territory. This is documented in the 1996 "Clean Break" document. Further NATO expansion occurred in 2004, causing increased Russian anger. In 2007, Putin demanded an end to expansion. In 2008, the US forced NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, prompting war.
In 2010, Yanukovych's election on a platform of neutrality was met with US efforts to overthrow him—a regime change operation. The intercepted phone calls between Victoria Nuland and Peter Pyatt are evidence. The Maidan revolution was not spontaneous; the US funded it. Minsk II, aiming for autonomy in eastern Ukraine, was supported by the UN but ignored by the US and Ukraine. Trump increased armaments, leading to many deaths. In late 2021, Putin proposed security agreements with Europe and the US. My call with Jake Sullivan failed to prevent war; the US refused to publicly commit to not expanding NATO into Ukraine. NATO's "open door" policy is absurd; no country would tolerate such a policy on its border. Putin's goal was to force Zelensky to negotiate neutrality, which almost happened within days of the invasion. This was about keeping NATO (the US) off Russia's border. The US abandonment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and the subsequent placement of missile systems in Poland and Romania exacerbated tensions. Blinken's assertion of the right to place missiles anywhere was a provocation.
Zelensky's willingness to negotiate was thwarted by the US and UK. A proposed agreement mediated by Turkey was rejected. A million Ukrainians have died or been injured since then. American senators view this as acceptable, as no Americans are dying. The project's failure stemmed from the US underestimation of Russia's resolve. The US believed sanctions and military actions would force Russia to yield. I urged Ukraine to negotiate neutrality, citing Kissinger's warning: "To be an enemy of the United States is dangerous; to be a friend is fatal."
The war will likely end because Trump doesn't want to be associated with a lost cause. This is good for Ukraine and Europe. Europe should engage directly with Russia. The US likely blew up Nord Stream. Trump's administration is imperialist, prioritizing its own interests. Europe needs its own foreign policy, not just Russophobia, but a realistic one that recognizes Russia's and Europe's situations and America's actions. Europe must prevent US military intervention. Negotiate with Russia; russophobia serves neither Ukraine nor Europe. American policy in the Middle East, dictated by the Israel lobby, is dangerous. A two-state solution is vital for Middle East peace, hindered only by the US veto at the UN. Europe should pressure the US to drop the veto. Europe's silence on the JCPOA and Iran is concerning. Netanyahu desires war with Iran. China, not an enemy, is simply a success story that the US perceives as a threat. [Applause]
Now for questions. Please keep them concise; time is limited. I'll start on the left.
Brussels Times: Um, thank you for the fascinating talk, Jeffrey. Um, I just wanted to ask you about Trump's statements about wanting NATO members to increase their spending by 5%. We're now seeing lots of countries scrambling to prove they're going to do that, including Belgium. Given that Belgium is also the NATO headquarters, I wanted to ask you what would be the appropriate response to those statements by NATO members.
Thanks. Uh, we don't see eye to eye on this question, so let me give you my own view. My first recommendation, with all respect to Brussels, is move the NATO headquarters somewhere else. I mean it seriously. One of the worst parts of European policy right now is a complete confusion of Europe and NATO. These are completely different, but they became exactly the same. Europe is much better than NATO, in my opinion. NATO isn't even needed anymore. I would have ended it in 1991, but because the US viewed it as an instrument of power, not as a defense against Russia, it continued afterwards. The confusion of NATO and Europe is deadly because expanding Europe meant expanding NATO, period. These should have been completely different things. So this is the first point—my own view again, with all respect. We only had a brief conversation about it. Europe should have its own foreign policy and its own military security, its own strategic autonomy, so-called. I'm in favor of that. I would disband NATO, and maybe Trump is going to do it anyway. Maybe Trump's going to invade Greenland; who knows? Then you're really going to find out what NATO means. So I do think that Europe should invest in its security. 5% is outlandish, ridiculous, absurd—completely absurd. No one needs to spend anything like that amount. 2 to 3% of GDP, probably, under the current circumstances. What I would do, by the way, is buy European production because, actually, strangely, weirdly, unfortunately in this world—and it's a true truism, but it's unfortunate, so I'm not championing it—a lot of technological innovation spins off from the military sector because governments invest in the military sector. So Trump is an arms salesman; you understand that. He's selling American arms; he is selling American technology. Vance told you a few days ago, don't even think about having your own AI technology. So please understand that this increase of spending is for the United States, not for you. In this sense, I'm completely against that approach, but I wouldn't be against an approach of Europe spending 2 to 3% of GDP for a unified European security structure and invested in Europe and European technology and not having the United States dictate the use of European technology. It's so interesting; it's the Netherlands that produces the only machines of advanced semiconductors, extreme ultraviolet lithography—it's ASML—but America determines every policy of ASML. The Netherlands doesn't even have a footnote. I wouldn't do that if I were you—hand over all security to the United States. I wouldn't do it. I would have your own security framework so you can have your own foreign policy framework as well. Europe stands for lots of things that the United States does not stand for. Europe stands for climate action, by the way, rightly so. Our president is completely bonkers on this. Europe stands for decency, for social democracy as an ethos—I'm not talking about a party, I'm talking about an ethos of how equality of life occurs. Europe stands for multilateralism. Europe stands for the UN Charter. The US stands for none of those things. You know that our Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, cancelled his trip to South Africa because on the agenda was equality and sustainability, and he said, "I'm not getting into that." That is an honest reflection of deep Anglo-Saxon libertarianism. Egalitarianism is not a word in the American lexicon. Sustainable development? Not at all. You probably know, by the way, that of the 193 UN member states, 191 have had SDG plans presented as voluntary national reviews—191. Two have not: Haiti and the United States of America. The Biden administration wasn't even allowed to say "sustainable development goals." The Treasury had a policy not to say "sustainable development goals." Okay, I mention all of this because you need your own foreign policy. I issue two reports each year: one, the World Happiness Report, and 18 of the top 20 countries, if I remember correctly, are European. This is the highest quality of life in the whole world. So you need your own policy to protect that quality of life. The United States ranks way down. And the other report—where's my colleague, Gom? He's somewhere in the room here. There he is. Gom Laforon is the lead author of our annual Sustainable Development Report, and almost all of the top 20 countries are European countries because you believe in this stuff, and that's why you're the happiest—except in geopolitics—but quality of life. So you need your own foreign policy, but you won't have it unless you have your own security. You just won't. And, by the way, 27 countries cannot each have their own foreign policy. This is a problem. You need a European foreign policy and a European security structure. And by the way, although Michael assures me it's dead, I was the greatest fan of OSCE and believe that OSCE is the proper framework for European security. It could really work. Thank you very much.
Yeah, okay. Uh, well, uh, thank you, Professor. I'm from Slovakia, and my Prime Minister, Robert Fico, was almost shocked because the opinions you had were similar to his.
Yes, we are—as a Slovak government—one of the few countries in the European Union we are talking to Russians. Two months ago I was talking with Mr. Medvedev. In two weeks I will be talking in the Duma with Mr.Slutsky, who is the chairman of the Russian Foreign Affairs Committee in Moscow. Maybe my question is, what would be your message to Russians in this moment? Because, as I heard, they are on a victorious wave. They have no reason not to conquer the Donbas because that's their war aim. And what can Trump offer them to stop the war immediately? What would be your message for Russians from your side? Thank you very much.
Lots of important things are now on offer and on the table, and I believe that the war will end quickly because of this. This will be at least one blessing in a very difficult time. Exactly what the settlement will be, I think, is now only a question of the territorial issues—and that is whether it is the complete four oblasts, including all of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, or whether it is on the contact line and how all of this will be negotiated. I'm not in the room of the negotiations, so I can't really say more, but the basis will be: there will be territorial concessions; there will be neutrality; there will be security guarantees for Ukraine, for all parties; there will be, at least with the US, an end of the economic sanctions. But what counts, of course, is Europe and Russia. I think that there are, and maybe there will be, a restoration of nuclear arms negotiations, which would be extraordinarily positive. I think that there are tremendously important issues for Europe to negotiate directly with Russia. And so I would urge President Michel and the leadership of Europe to open direct discussions with President Putin because European security is on the table. I know the Russian leaders, many of them quite well. They are good negotiators, and you should negotiate with them, and you should negotiate well with them. I would ask them some questions. I would ask them, "What are the security guarantees that can work so that this war ends permanently? What are the security guarantees for the Baltic states? What should be done?" Part of the process of negotiation is actually to ask the other side about your concerns—not just to know what they know, as you think is true, but actually to ask, "We have a real problem; we have a real worry. What are the guarantees?" Well, I want to know the answers also. By the way, I know Mr. Lavrov, Minister Lavrov, for 30 years. I regard him as a brilliant foreign minister. Talk with him; negotiate with him; get ideas; put ideas on the table; put counter-ideas on the table. I don't think all of this can be settled by pure reason because of oneself. You settle wars by negotiating and understanding what are the real issues, and you don't call the other side a liar when they express their issues. You work out what the implications of that are for the mutual benefit of peace. So the most important thing is stop the yelling, stop the warmongering, and discuss with the Russian counterparts. And don't beg to be at the table with the United States. You don't need to be in the room with the United States. You're Europe; you should be in the room with Europe and Russia. If the United States wants to join, that's fine, but to beg? No. And, by the way, Europe does not need to have Ukraine in the room when Europe talks with Russia. You have a lot of issues, direct issues. Don't hand over your foreign policy to anybody—not to the United States, not to Ukraine, not to Israel. Keep a European foreign policy. This is the basic idea.
H. Noof, from the Souverainistes political group in this Parliament, Alternative für Deutschland as a political party: First of all, let me thank you, Mr. Sax, for being here and sharing your ideas with us, and be assured that many of your ideas and of your colleague, John Mearsheimer, have been well received by political groups here and have been integrated into our agenda. I widely share your views. Yet there's one question regarding the historical account that you gave where I would like to go into some detail. This concerns the beginning of NATO expansion. You reported from—what garbage I heard—that there are many quotations from Gorbachev, for example, that NATO will not move one inch eastwards. Now, the 2+4 Treaty has been signed in September 1990, right, in Moscow. So at that point in time, the Warsaw Pact still existed, and countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czechia were not part of the negotiations for the 2+4 Treaty. So the Warsaw Pact actually dissolved in July 1991, and the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. So nobody who was present in the negotiations could speak for Poland, could speak for Hungary, could speak for Slovakia that they would not try to become a member of NATO once the overall situation has changed. So the counter-argument, which we have to counter, is that it was on the will of these countries—of Poland, of Hungary, of Slovakia—that they wanted to join NATO because of the very history they had with the Soviet Union. And, of course, Russia was still perceived in a way as a follower of the Soviet Union. So how do you counter that argument?
I have no doubt of why Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia wanted to join NATO. The question is what is the US doing to make peace because NATO is not a choice of Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, or Slovakia. NATO is a US-led military alliance. And the question is how are we going to establish peace in a reliable way? If I were making those decisions back then, I would have ended NATO altogether in 1991 when those countries requested NATO. I would have explained to them what our Defense Secretary, William Perry, said; what our lead statesman, George Kennan, said; what our final ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, said. They said, "Well, we understand your feelings, but it's not a good idea because it could provoke a new Cold War with Russia." So that's how I would have answered it when those countries joined in the first wave. I don't think it was that consequential, in fact, except that it was part of a bigger project, and the project was spelled out already in 1994. There's a very good book by John J. Mearsheimer, Harvard University Press, called *Hubris*, which gives a detailed historical documentation of step by step what happened, and it's really worth reading. So this is a now, but the point I would really make is that Ukraine and Georgia were too far. This is right up against Russia. This is in the context of the complete destabilization of the nuclear framework. This is in the context of the US putting in missile systems on Russia's borders. If you listen to President Putin over the years, probably the main thing, if you listen carefully, that he's concerned about is missiles—seven minutes from Moscow is a decapitation strike, and this is very real. The US not only would freak out but did freak out when this happened in the Western Hemisphere. So it's the Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse. And fortunately, Nikita Khrushchev did not stand up and say, "Open door policy of the Warsaw Pact—that's we can go wherever we want. Cuba's asked us; it's none of America's business what Cuba said." Is war! My God, we don't want war; we end this crisis; we both pull back. That's what Khrushchev and Kennedy decided in the end. So this is the real consequential. Russia even swallowed, with a lot of pain, the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia. It is Ukraine and Georgia, and it's because of geography; it's because of Lord Palmerston; it's because of the First Crimean War; it's because of the missile systems that this is the essence of why there was this war.
Thank you very much, Professor Sax, for coming here. Um, you've mentioned that the European Union needs to formulate its own foreign policy. Um, in the past, the German-French alliance was a big driver for those policies. Now, with the Ukraine war, arguably that received a crack. Um, do you think that in the future, when the European Union is going to formulate this new foreign policy, that they're going to be again in the front seat, or uh, should it be other countries or other blocs trying to make that change? Thank you very much.
Oh, it's hard. It's hard because, of course, you don't yet have a constitution for Europe which really underpins a European foreign policy, and it can't be by unanimity. There has to be a structure in which Europe can speak as Europe, even with some dissent, but with a European policy. I don't want to oversimplify how to get there exactly, but even with the structures you have, you could do a lot better with negotiating directly. The first rule is your diplomats should be diplomats, not secretaries of war, honestly. That would go halfway, at least, to where you want to go. A diplomat is a very special kind of talent. A diplomat is trained to sit together with the other side and to listen, to shake hands, to smile, and to be pleasant. It's very hard; it's a skill; it's training; it's a profession; it's not a game. You need that kind of diplomacy. I'm sorry; we are not hearing anything like that. I'll just make a couple of complaints. First, Europe is not NATO, as I said. I thought Stoltenberg was the worst, but I was wrong; it just keeps getting worse. Could someone in NATO stop talking, for God's sake, about more war? And could NATO stop speaking for Europe, and Europe stop thinking it's NATO? This is the first absolute point. Second, I'm sorry, but your High Representative/Vice Presidents need to become diplomats. Diplomacy means going to Moscow, inviting your Russian counterpart here, discussing this. Doesn't happen till now. So this is really my point. Now, I believe that Europe should become more integrated and more unified in the years ahead. I'm a strong believer in subsidiarity, so we were discussing—I don't think housing policy is really Europe's main issue. I think this can be handled at the local level or at the national level. I don't see it as a European issue, but I don't see foreign policy as being a 27-country issue. I see it as a European issue, and I see security being at a European level. So I think things need to be readjusted, but I'd like to see more Europe for truly European issues and maybe less Europe for things that are properly subsidiary to Europe at the national and the local level. And I hope that such an evolution can take place. You know, when the world talks about great powers right now, they talk about US, Russia, China. I include India, and I really want to include Europe and I really want to include Africa as an African Union, and I want that to happen. But you'll notice on the list, Europe doesn't show up right now, and this is because there is no European foreign policy. Okay, thank you very much.
And thank you very much, Professor, for this very courageous speech, very clear speech also that you made. I'm an MEP from Luxembourg. My question is the following: What are the long-term consequences of this lost war? We lost the war. Now we have an uncertain future for NATO. We have also, clearly—and you referred to it—the marginalization of Europe. We have a strengthening of the BRICS countries, which can be rivals in many respects. So will there be a future for a Collective West over the next 20 or 30 years? Thank you very much.
I don't believe there is a Collective West. I believe that there is a United States and Europe that are, in some areas, in parallel interests and in many areas not in parallel interests. I want Europe to lead sustainable development, climate transformation, global decency. I believe if the world looked more like Europe, it'd be a happier, more peaceful, safer world—and long longevity and better food, by the way. But just saying… in any event, Europe has a vocation that is rather different from the American tradition and frankly from the Anglo-Saxon tradition because it's been 200 years of Anglo-Saxon hegemony, or aspirational hegemony. The British still believe they run the world. It's amazing what nostalgia means. They don't even stop; it's almost like a Monty Python skit, actually. But in any event… where was I? I'm thinking of Monty Python when the knight gets all his limbs cut off and says, "Everything's fine; I'm victorious." That's Britain, unfortunately. And so it's… it's… it's really terrible. So no, I don't believe in the Collective West. I don't believe in the Global South. I don't believe in… all these geographies don't even make sense because, actually, you know, I look at maps a lot, and the Global South is mostly in the north, and the West is not even west. And so I don't even understand what this is about. I do believe that we could be in a true age of abundance if we got our heads on straight. We're in the biggest technological advance in human history. It's truly amazing what can be done right now. You know, I marvel at the fact that somebody who knows no chemistry won the Nobel Prize for chemistry because he's very good at deep neural networks—a genius, Demis Hassabis. They figured out protein folding that generations of biochemists spent their whole lives on, and now DeepMind figured out how to do it—you know, by the thousands of proteins. We have friends that spent their entire life on one protein—brilliant friends—and now what we can do. So if, actually… same with renewable energy, as everybody knows, the prices come down by more than two orders of magnitude—the costs. We could transform the planet; we could protect the climate system; we could protect biodiversity; we could ensure every child gets a good education; we could do so many wonderful things right now. And so what do we need to do that? In my view, we need peace, most importantly. And my basic point is there are no deep reasons for conflict anywhere. As every conflict I study is just a mistake. It's not… we are not struggling for Lebensraum. That idea that came from Ratzel and that became a Nazi idea was always a wrong idea. It was a mistake—a fundamental intellectual mistake, an intellectual mistake, by the way, because leading scientists adopted the idea that we had race wars, we had national wars, we had wars of survival because we don't have enough on the planet. As an economist, I can tell you we have plenty on the planet for everybody's development—plenty. We're not in a conflict with China; we're not in a conflict with Russia if we calm down. If you ask about the long term, the long term is very good. The long term, if we don't blow ourselves up, is very good. And so this is what we should aim for—a positive, shared vision under international law. Because of our technology, things operate at a regional scale now. It used to be it was villages, then it was small areas, then it was unification of countries; now it's regional. That's not just because regions are wonderful; it's because the underlying technological reality says Europe should be an integrated area—by transport, by fast rail, by digital—and so there's Europe. The politics follows the technological realities to a very important extent. We're in a world of regions now, so Europe should be Europe, with subsidiarity. Don't lose all of the wonderful, wonderful national and local elements, but Europe should be Europe. So the good side is—let's… I want Europe to have diplomacy, for example, with ASEAN. I spend a lot of time with the ASEAN countries. If the EU Green Deal—wonderful idea—I said many years ago, okay, to the ASEAN leaders, "Make an ASEAN Green Deal, and then talk with the Europeans so that you have this wonderful relationship—trade, investment, technology." So last year they announced an ASEAN Green Deal. What did Europe do about it? Nothing. It said, "Sorry, we're in the Ukraine war." Thank you, no interest. So this is my point. The prospects are very positive if we construct the… [Applause] peace can… because we have to go. I get all the time messages that I should leave the room.
Can something very short? Yeah, it's quite short. Sorry. Yeah. Uh, thank you a lot for the lecture. Uh, I wanted to ask, like, do you think a way out of the conflict is some sort of style of Finlandization? Um, and then also do you think that's what—is that the way you would have liked to see, like, for example, Finland and Sweden's NATO process—like, sorry…
Do you think that a way out of the conflict is some kind of style of Finlandization? Um, and then, like, is that what you would have—sorry… yeah, is that what you would have liked to see, like Sweden and Finland's foreign policy as an example? Like, is that instead of them becoming members of NATO, is that the way that you would have liked to see these countries handle their foreign policy? Um, and do you think that these countries that border Russia should just kind of succumb to their fate, that, okay, we can't provoke Russia like this is the way we have to live?
Excellent question, and let me just report one part about Finlandization. Finlandization landed Finland number one in the world happiness report year after year—rich, successful, happy, and secure. That's pre-NATO. So Finlandization was a wonderful thing. Number one in the world. When Sweden and Finland and Austria were neutral—bravo, smart. When Ukraine was neutral—smart. If you have two superpowers, keep them apart a little bit. You don't have to be right with your nose up against each other, especially if one of them, the US, is pushing its nose into the other one. And so Finlandization, to my mind, has a very positive connotation. So does Austrianization. Austria, in 1955, signed its neutrality; the Soviet Army left; and Austria is a wonderful place, by the way—absolutely wonderful. And so this is basic how to avoid conflict. If the United States had any sense at all, it would have left these countries as a neutral space in between the US military and Russia. But that's where the US lost it. Okay, thank you very much. Let me… I… I just want to end with an appeal. I think we both agree that we will have—the war will end within a month or two—and that means the fighting will end. It doesn't mean that we will have peace in Europe. The peace in Europe that has to be done by us, by Europeans, not by a president from the United States. We have to create this peace, and that is Europe, which includes, of course, Belarus, Russia, and all these other countries. So we have to do something, and we are here at Parliament. We, as parliamentarians, we represent people. We are the only legitimate, democratically legitimate institution in the European Union. Maybe we should have become all a little bit more proactive in trying to move this peace process forward across party lines. I think—I don't know how many parties here really are—but that we can talk to each other without saying, "Ah, you're from this party; you're from this party." I think we really have to concentrate. If here we could not take more initiative from the Parliament vis-à-vis the Commission and saying, "We are representing the people, not you. We are representing the people, and these people in Europe want peace, and that's what we should go for." So maybe this is the beginning of… and we will make every month—I will organize with my colleagues—an… or the same thing here about different topics which were all around it, and we hope that this one we get a discussion that is different from what we have in the plan where we basically don't have a discussion, but that we have a discussion and also across the party and invite also people from other political parties. We don't bite anybody; let's discuss it. In the end, we all want this same peace for the next generation. And I have plenty of children and grandchildren, you too, and that's what we need. Okay, thank you very much, Professor. [Music] for [Music]