Transcription
He actually needs to address the root causes of his problems. He has to address the determination in Western Europe. And that's where I get concerned about this because as I see it, Putin only has bad options. But the only one that really will allow him the the the the possibility of actually winning anything is to somehow convince us that we need to stop supporting Ukraine. And I think he's going to become very desperate in that process. I I I don't think most people in Western Europe understand how determined he is and how how far he's willing to go to um to to win this war and at least to avoid a catastrophic defeat.
Today I'm delighted to be speaking with Anders Puck Nielsen, military analyst and influential YouTuber based in Denmark. He specializes in naval warfare and strategy. His public project now spans a YouTube channel that as well as the logic of war newsletter and his fantastic book, The Logic of War, which he describes as an accessible introduction to modern warfare. And indeed, I've got it and I've read most of it. It is fantastic and it comes very highly recommended. Links to that in the description of the video.
Before we jump into the topics under discussion today, I want to say a huge thank you to everyone who has supported the channel through Patreon by McFy and GoFundMe. It's your fantastic assistance that allowed us to do things such as meet with uh Gorgi and Anders uh in December and record an episode and we hope to do more of those again. Your support is absolutely critical to making those a reality. And welcome back.
>> Always a pleasure. Well, let's start with we were discussing themes before we hit record and I wanted the theme of this to be an inflection point. Uh we've had several inflection points. In fact, we are about to hit the anniversary uh the anniversary of one of the first inflection points. Uh which was in 2022, April the 8th. That was the point at which all Russian forces withdrew from the Kiev Obelist. Um which is in military terms is absolutely significant. It changed the uh focus and direction of the war and it's an unambiguous defeat for Russia. It was also at the point that the horrific war crimes uh started to be uncovered committed by Russian troops which of course hardened the sense in Ukraine their need to resist. And here we are uh I say three years later actually it's four years later um we now see that the front lines which had been in a kind of stasis or described as being in a stasis we're actually seeing perhaps the mechanics of that turning very much towards Ukraine's favor. But what's what's your view? Are we at a genuine inflection point? One that perhaps is comparable importance to the one that happened four years ago.
Yeah, I mean to some extent yes, we are definitely seeing the trends changing now and that is uh significant because we've actually had a picture that's been very sort of stable since Ukraine's counter offensive of 2023. So it's 2 and 1/2 years basically of the same picture of the Russians every month just sort of taking a little bit and pushing ahead and seeing what they could do and um really struggling with it but still the same kind of picture repeating itself for 30 months and now suddenly we are seeing different trends where we are seeing the Ukrainians making pretty successful counterattacks. We are seeing that the Russians are struggling more and more to take territory and I think we are at the verge of something that that that is going to be a new trend where um it will be more equal and maybe even we will see that over time Ukraine will take back more territory than they will lose. I don't think we're necessarily there yet or I think it's too early to say that we're there yet. But of course it's not really that as comparable to what we saw the early months everything was dramatic in in those um in in those months there and um very different sort of big changes. Are they going to focus on the KF region or moving to the east and then going from the Russians being on the at sort of offensive to the Ukrainians being on the offensive and so very very dramatic changes here. It's much more subtle and I think you it's really mostly people like you and me who follow this very carefully and uh who really notice that that things are changing here. I'm not sure that the broader public in the west really has noticed yet that uh something quite significant is actually happening in Ukraine especially now with everyone's eyes on Iran.
>> Absolutely. And that that's another huge distraction as we saw uh the attacks on Israel uh were uh two years ago which sort of deflected a lot of attention. Now, someone or people who have noticed what's going on are some of the Zed patriot community and those who were quite happy to, you know, mix uh regime propaganda up with, you know, the other communications about the front lines um to try and get a little bit of, you know, information through their their system. They're now finding several things. One, they're being suppressed with the suppression of Telegram. It's getting more and more difficult to get that information out from the front and then communicate it. But what we're also seeing is a change in tone. Some of the Zed Patriots are starting to actually comment in a way that that really wasn't the case before that they sense this shift towards uh Ukraine's favor. And in particular, they're talking about the lack of equipment and resource on the Russian side. But they're also talking about drone saturation. I've seen several posts, several figures that are bemoning the increase in um let's say uh Ukraine's ability to project both deep and narrow strike capabilities, both deep strike within Russia on resources, but also the huge saturation on the front.
>> Yeah. And uh one of the interesting things is I mean if we look over the last couple of years is that Russia has had many of these capabilities all the time. I think the what what's been new is that Ukraine gradually has gained many of these capabilities themselves and I think 2025 was really the year when they got serious about long range strike um capabilities and um got these into serial production. we saw the the strikes on Russia really intensifying and not just being something that was kind of annoying but something that actually had a real impact and that trend is just continuing. I think also that's why I mean the the set patriots might be surprised by this, but I think um I I for for me it's been kind of clear that that this is the trajectory and that things were going to be more and more difficult for Russia and that this was not a sustainable way for them to to to to fight and that eventually we would we would get to this point where uh gradually the the upper hand would shift to the Ukrainian side. I don't think we should exaggerate the impact, though. I mean, it's not likely that this will suddenly mean that the Ukrainians will drive all the way through Crimea. I mean, there are multiple things at play. I mean, one of them is that Ukraine is gradually getting uh more and more capabilities. the the drone production is increasing and uh at the same time the Russians are struggling with manpower these kinds of things. So that is real, but it's also real that the weapons technology just favors the defender a lot and um so so that's a result of also the the same drone technology and how that makes the battlefield transparent in a way it didn't used to be and that makes it really difficult to be on the offensive. That also means that even if Ukraine gets the upper hand, it's still going to be difficult to go on the offensive because then they would have many of the disadvantages that the Russians have right now. So, um, we need to be realistic about it, but I also think it's clear that something is happening and that this very significantly challenges Putin's narrative about the war. Um, because if they can't show that there is actual progress, then what's the war actually about?
>> Absolutely. Now in your book you talk about the logic of war but I want to question here on the mechanics of war because it seems there are two systems that are competing here as well as two armies. We've got the central purchasing centralization very vertical Russian system which is not necessarily so good as at innovation but it can innovate and when it does find innovations that work it can scale them. uh and the Ukrainian system which typically has been less efficient at resource allocation, good innovation, difficult to actually scale those up. um we're now starting to see perhaps um refined resource allocation on the Ukrainian side and certain mechanisms that are driving it. And I'm I'm really fascinated from a military point of view how you see this introduction of gamification of market forces of you know certain aspects of freedom and innovation which seem to be moving Ukraine towards uh greater lethality that is for instance you know assigning resources uh based on effectiveness on the front um you know creating uh brave one and that's just one example of this what in essence is a resource allocation system based on results. um is this entirely novel in warfare or is this just a refinement based on the real time kind of technologies that we now have combined with Ukrainians uh let's say entre entrepreneurial and freedomloving spirit.
Mhm. I mean it's definitely uh fascinating to watch and also how they have been working to um remove obstacles to innovation try in in in all different ways to smooth out the processes and this is a lot of this is very boring. It's not all fascinating uh stuff. It's also just about making sure that businesses can actually thrive that uh the whole system about it supports um the the the possibility of individuals entrepreneurs to start producing stuff for the government which was not necessarily possible four years ago. I mean that you would run into all kinds of bureaucratic obstacles. Ukraine is very good at bureaucracy. um so uh it is fascinating how they're doing it. Uh I I think it's also fair to say that they have been struggling quite a bit with scaling and uh that this has been as you say the the Russian advantage that they might not produce quite as good drones but they produce drones that are almost as good but and then a lot more and that Ukraine at some point needs to focus on fewer types and scalability of these things and also if you just have this sort of free entrepor neuro spirit. You just say, "Well, everyone just chip in with your projects." You're not going to actually get a working flamingo missile from that because you some guys in a garage are not going to build a flamingo missile. So you you need also the government invested in these kinds of projects where you think far ahead and several years into the future and say well we actually want this particular company to work on this particular kind of capability. So I I do think uh Ukraine is succeeding uh with this uh a lot um I mean u probably the most successful country in Europe in terms of uh scaling up to the new realities of defense production right uh but it's uh it's it's also clear that that it it's something that has required changes and just some of it also means that you need to get into the bigger structures. um so but it's also fascinating as you say the gamification thing and how they try to work with um numbers and see what how can we actually optimize things and find ways where we can actually get the data. Uh a lot of the gamification is also about just motivating the frontline troops to actually report back on on their experiences and and truthfully without distortion because the Russian system is designed actually to elevate distortions throughout their hierarchy which then get amplified, you know, further up the command chain they go.
>> Exactly. and and this thing about actual actually actually getting true data on what works, what does not work, which drones produce what results and also getting the the footage. um so uh motivating the soldiers to provide all this data and then see what can we actually do with modern technology on this what can machine learning tell us about where we should allocate resources and there are many pitfalls in that. I the the many ways that these things can also go wrong and um so so it's not the silver bullet but it's still um it's fascinating that they try to embrace that and I think it's an important part of the uh the solution they have to how they're going to get to the goal of um 50,000 Russian casualties per month which is the stated goal u that they have right now which will require them to almost double the number of cash losses from what it what it used to be.
>> And we'll dig in that in a minute because there's evidence suggesting that they are actually moving towards that KPI and actually using you know KPIs around lethality may also be a somewhat of revolution in thinking to uh to certain people but u you know it it seems to be a key part of their strategic planning. Let's remain on. If I can just you know it's it's actually I mean uh it it's actually fascinating because it goes against everything that we in the west have been talking about since we started doing counterinsurgency operations where there was this whole discussion about how in the beginning in Afghanistan and Iraq we we actually made the era of focusing too much on casualty numbers and maximizing these things with the enemy and that this was no way to win the hearts and minds of the local population and we needed to get away from that because that's not how you would win a war there. But now this is just a different war and against Russia that might actually be exactly what you need to focus on and much less on winning the hearts and minds of the local population because you kind of are mostly are probably already there.
Yeah, this is it. I mean, this is this is a big debate amongst people I think who try to see Russia as it is rather than through rose tinted spectacles that winning hearts and minds is not a war-winning strategy. Hope in this instance is not a strategy nor is is naivity. um just staying on that before we go to recruitment because a lot of this ladders up these KPIs ladder back to the idea that what you're trying to do actually is to um exceed uh casualty rates and take that way above the ability of the Russian system to recruit. Well, we'll come on to that in a minute because that's got all sorts of um uh implications. Let's just close the topic out about uh success because it seems that uh the use of KPIs, the use of uh let's say relative freedom for units to experiment while still having uh certain you know lines of command and responsibility up to the Ministry of Defense. This is actually working quite well because we now see the interception rates in air defense approaching 80 to even 90% in some instances. extraordinary success rates. I suspect there are many in the West, especially in political and maybe even some military structures, who don't actually appreciate what it's taken to build such an interception rate against an enemy that's constantly uh evolving techniques uh and experimenting to try and get through and and increase its strike rate. um but Ukraine is at the forefront of this revolution and it's been something of a uh let's say a closed revolution in that outside of Ukraine it's it's not really got much attention. Now with what's happening in the m middle east suddenly it's got more global interest. In fact there's been a revolution in the perception of Ukraine as a military leader and a power that is entirely pertinent to the application of these techniques outside of Ukraine. So, as you are watching this, I mean, what's what's your take on on the improving interception rates and now this sort of let's say global relevance despite what President Trump says about not needing Zalinski in Ukraine?
um I think almost everybody else now realizes that that is not the case.
>> Mhm. It's absolutely fascinating to watch how Ukraine is going from uh being clearly the underdog in this and nobody really saw Ukraine as being this sort of big military power in itself and uh someone who really needed our help right to now Ukraine being the the the country everyone wants to talk about about these things. um there is something fascinating as you say about the way that Ukraine is now gaining access influence in the Middle East because they have this capability they have they can even export these things during war. I mean that's quite a power move that that that they can actually do that and there is something fascinating about how at the same time we are seeing Russia really losing influence in the regions where traditionally they've been very strong. So uh central Asia, south caucuses like these areas suddenly countries starting to move away from being in Russia's sort of clear sphere of influence and we are seeing Ukraine actually increasing their reach. There is something fascinating about that and as you say it's it's it's true that um you I mean there's probably a bit of luck in the timing I guess that we're also seeing that this technology seems to be mature just about now and then there is this war in the Middle East where it's super relevant. um but it is something that Ukraine obviously has been working a lot on for a long time and trying to make this work and in the beginning it was not super reliable. It's not that long ago when it was celebrated that there was the first instance of a drone taking down another drone and now it's it it's it happens all the time. um so it is something that they've been working on. It's something they've been refining. And it also shows how Ukraine is good at that, at getting something out there, seeing it doesn't really work, and then refining it um and fixing the errors and then suddenly over time you get something that works better and better and better, right? and uh you actually have a real capability. And this is absolutely something that is changing um not just the war in Ukraine but also how we need to look at war with Russia generally because obviously this is something we also need. I mean we're up against Russia that has the capability of producing maybe a thousand Shahed drones every day, right? We are nowhere near a point in Western Europe where we could defend against something like that. We would be even worse off than the Middle Eastern countries have been in in in this situation. um so if if we want to be able to defend against these things, we are absolutely going to need this kind of technology that Ukraine has. So it it's also something that just means they are more relevant for us as a partner than I think most people realize.
That is that absolutely right. And of course uh what Ukraine has also been innovating uh is the uh deep strike capabilities. um and that has gone from being something which uh you know you you'd have a couple of strikes, Russia would repair facilities and it was clearly an issue because a lot were being shot down, one suspects, uh on their route to target. um the accuracy perhaps wasn't as great. The payloads they could carry long distances wasn't as great and they just didn't have the volume of these things in order to create sort of consistent outages. This also seems to have shifted and we now have reportedly 40 to 45% of Russian ex oil export capacity taken offline in a recent uh spate of attacks. um and actually it seems that Ukraine now can deliver both the accuracy but also the volume and consistency um to be able to make a serious dent on uh well Russia's oil infrastructure. It's micro electronics plants um you know various avionics factories. I mean this seems also to be you know an extraordinary development which is only going one way which is increasing capability and increasing risk to Russia.
>> Mhm. Absolutely. um and the thing is I mean Russia has the same capabilities. Russia can also hit pretty much everything in Ukraine with long-range missiles. the new development in the war is that now Ukraine also has these capabilities and and and can strike back and that it is growing more rapidly than on the Russian side. So um this is something that will only go one way uh unless something significant happens and Ukraine suddenly doesn't have access to funding anymore. uh then this is just going to continue and we're going to see them keep on refining things, improving it, uh boosting production. We're going to see more and more and we're going to see better and better systems. um an example is perhaps the Flamingo missile that that's there's been so much talk about. I think generally there is an idea and an understanding that Flamingo has not really realized the potential yet. um it has not been produced in the kinds of numbers that people were expecting, but also the accuracy has not been great, but we're still seeing them working on it and we are actually seeing this the flamingos more and more and this will just improve and pretty soon the flamingo is the FP5. Pretty soon we're going to have the FP7 and the FP9, right? So like more more systems are being developed and they they will get a more and more complete package and it's it's very hard for me to see how the the the Russian economy will will not suffer significantly from this in the medium to long run.
And of course that has another knock-on effect uh because we know that Russia's recruitment I mean yes some people have volunteered especially there's people in the provinces a few may volunteer because of principle although more often than not the videos I see suggest that is societal and familial pressure but the big motivator is payment in most circumstances and even driving families to send their their men away uh it is the financial inducement that pushes people over over that edge. If there was no financial inducement, I doubt whether uh the uh ideological basis exists in Russia to to do this mass recruitment. And we know that uh the effect of Ukraine strikes is to essentially trip the Russian economy. Now, I think Putin uh quite possibly thought that what's happening in Iran, we won't comment on whether Russia is an initiator of that or not, but we'll look at the outcome. Putin must have believed that actually this is going to work in his favor. It's going to massively spike oil revenues up. That will allow him to continue feeding the recruitment machine with the money that's required uh to do that. But Ukrainian strikes are actually choking off that income. um the ability of the gray fleet to export and generate revenue for the Kremlin. Is is that one of uh Ukraine's key um aims, do you think, is really choking off uh revenues and then in turns choking off the ability to recruit?
>> I think it's definitely Ukraine strategy to do that. um and I I don't think the Ukraine strategy in this sense is connected really to the war in Iran. um and but obviously it has made it more important to hit the the ability to export oil. So Russia will not benefit from the higher oil prices. um so it might have changed sort of the the order of when which targets are going to be chosen. um and uh that's probably why they went after the um the the the the ports the in in around St. Petersburg. um I it is absolutely Ukraine's idea that they are going to win by making it impossible for Russia to sustain the the war the recruitment and also just follow the pace in the development of weapons in the development of um both quality and quantity of new systems. uh that requires a lot of a lot of money, a lot of investments to do that and at some point it's just going to be too much a burden on the Russian system. So uh that that that is the the way it is and I mean um it's been my sort of thesis for a long time that that you have uh basically two competing economies here. So, and that it will be the economy that will ultimately decide who wins. And also that Russia's war economy is um is on a countdown, right? We don't exactly know when it will run out or like what what that will look like and it's not going to be a total crash. um but uh more something that gradually it will become harder and harder for them to sustain this. but also that on the Ukrainian side ultimately the the the the the economies that are financing Ukraine's war are much more sustainable and we can even with an oil crisis and all those things we can afford to keep on doing this uh forever if that's what we need to do. So um that ultimately Ukraine's war economy will win unless of course politicians in the west uh lose determination and stop funding it.
It's interesting what you say there because quite a bit of the commentary I've seen from people uh we have Ilaris law speaking out against the regime but we have others that haven't necessarily flipped but we have a lot more of these complaints of you know Russian propagandists and Z pet and so on talking about certain um you know drone manufacturers certain units they want you know they recognize have greater effectiveness are not getting the funds they need. So I think there's quite a high consciousness about this lack of resource to invest in equivalent effectiveness on the Russian side. But let's turn to recruitment because if the mechanic of paying for your recruits breaks down and if Ukraine is attritting more recruits um than Russia is able to sort of pump into that system, the evidence is that actually so far uh the first two months of the year that that that ratio did actually change that uh you know the recruit numbers are uh dipping below the casualty rate. We know the casual rates are only increasing um based on the mechanics you talked about earlier. Putin's going to have to do something surely. um if their recruitment rate is declining and their ability to support it economically is being reduced, which it clearly is, they're going to have to find a different mechanic to power their army. And we we know from Russian history what that is. Coercion, repression, extreme pressure throughout the uh country. um and starting to draw people from the larger cities that remain untouched. It's in that context that I find it especially interesting that the Kremlin has been experimenting with the absolute suppression of the internet, suppression of communications, even suppression of the banking system, which many at the moment think is, you know, accidental or incidental to the uh uh you know, the repression of the internet. I actually don't think it is. I think this is part of a coordinated process where they want to gain full control of all modes of monetary flow and communication in case they need to clamp down, in case they need to uh put extreme coercive pressure to um to recruit more. What what's your take on that? Firstly, the mechanic of needing more recruits, but secondly, what the regime might have to do in order to uh cover themselves when they go for more coercive recruitment techniques.
Mhm. I think um well clearly the the Manning model that they have is not going to work going forward. It's not sustainable. um it's if if you are in a time when you just you don't have the money anymore. uh your sort of finances don't work out, then you can't afford to have this very very expensive Manning model where you give huge bonuses to people that then are killed within a couple of weeks and you need to go give new bonuses to new people who like especially when there is an almost free alternative, right? Just you you can just tell people that they have to go. uh so mobilization doesn't cost a lot and I think that is an obvious choice that they will have to go down that route in order to prolong the the war economy make it a little more I wouldn't say sustainable but make it last longer maybe give it another year if they can uh do that they will have to find all kinds of ways to find more money in society um just to to throw into military production uh so Putin is rapidly heading toward the point when he has basically I say two choices actually three choices but let's start with two. I mean either he can uh he can stop the war and solve the problem that way. I mean that's um basically the big problem in the Russian economy is the war. So he can solve it by stopping the war or he can double down and go for the mobilization and uh try really to to get all of society on a war footing which it isn't today. I mean that's also a lot of the criticism from the uh the set blockers right that they don't they don't see that all of society is on a war footing um and that's what they want so that Russia can win. So they want a better war, more total war. um so that that's basically the choice that Putin is is heading toward and that the current model is not sustainable and I think regardless which one of them he chooses, he will need more repression. uh uh yeah I mean just to keep control of the country if he goes the mobilization route as you mentioned of course I mean that's something that would be hugely unpopular in Russia and um he will need to crack down on that both to avoid protests um but also to avoid people fleeing the country and um just also the the banking crisis as you allude to also that
>> well this is where clamping on the banks makes sense if you want prevent people leaving the country. One of the ways to do it is if they can't afford to leave the country.
>> Yeah. They don't have the money or um so that that's one way, right? But also if he goes the other way of ending the war, then basically that will also totally undermine his legitimacy. It will make it really difficult to see what the purpose was of this war. and he will what are you going to do about all these soldiers that you have under arms now and uh all these different questions and and and by the way the economy is still really bad. So in that case he will also need more repression. So, uh, I I think basically that's what we are seeing the Russian society just kind of building up to, um, just the idea that more repression is needed regardless what what happens that they will need that.
Do you think will happen if Putin goes for more coercive recruitment and seeks to scale the war up? Has he missed the window for achieving that given that Ukraine's lethality is rising? or do they have other problems as well? Lack of infantry, um, zero dollars assigned by the US for instance in 26 27 to support Ukraine.
I I'm going to return to my sort of general idea here that what will decide this war is the war economy and the fact that the Russian war economy is not super sustainable but that Ukraine's actually is as long as the European countries support uh Ukraine. um and that means that actually I I think what we're going to see is probably Putin trying to double down on the war in Ukraine. And we are going to see them take measures that, for example, includes uh mobilization and trying to intensify the war that way or sustain it longer, but it's not really going to solve his essential problem. It it's just going to prolong things. And that actually leads I sort of teased before that there were actually three choices that Putin could uh could could go for. And the last one is that he he actually needs to address the root causes of his problems. He has to address the determination in Western Europe. And that's where I get concerned about this because as as I see it, Putin only has bad options. But the only one that really will allow him the the the possibility of actually winning anything is to somehow convince us that we need to stop supporting Ukraine. And I think he's going to become very desperate in that process. I I I don't think most people in Western Europe understand how determined he is and how far he's willing to go to um to to win this war and at least to avoid a catastrophic defeat. um and and but that that so so I I think one way or another this is this is going to lead to things in Western Europe becoming more dangerous and the risk of an actual armed confrontation between US and Russia is growing as a result of this process whereby Ukraine is actually winning. So I I keep I I struggle with this thing. On the one hand, it's really good that Ukraine is getting the upper hand and things are move the trends are favorable for Ukraine, but on the other hand, um it it also means that it will be sort of the endgame of the war in Ukraine that will be most dangerous for Western Europe. And I think it's really important that we are aware of that.
>> I absolutely concur with that. I think too few people realize how um significant that is and the perception that Russia has that it is Western Europe that is essentially the barrier between them and Putin's regime survival and what he could call a victory in Ukraine. I think there's far too little uh awareness of that and the extent that he will go to, how far he will go uh essentially to undermine that. babble formed subject of I think our future conversations this year because this is not going to be 2027 28 29 when you know NATO and others are planning for it this is going to happen this year because this is the year that Putin's problems really kind of coales and one of the things we'll follow up on which is just rumored at the moment but which already could be an indicator of his internal desire to continue the war and erode Europe is apparently he's they've started telling various institutions including educational institutions, companies, private organizations in Russia that they need to uh let's say um impose a levy. Each institution, each organization will need to surrender up a certain number of bodies and people almost like a sort of human death lottery or you know, Hunger Games or something like that. This is all going to go to a dark place, but I'm glad Anders that you're here to shed some light on it.
Well, yeah. I mean, this this is one of those uh developments, but I still don't think we are quite there yet with these steps, right? It's it it just shows that they are working on it, but I still think the big push is really going to be when we see a a general mobilization uh in however big it might be, but something that looks like what we had in the fall of 2022. um and um the the the thing that we need to get beyond is this idea that the war in Ukraine is some a kind of stable stalemate where uh well, okay, nothing really happens there. It's the same kind of picture all the time. It's deadlock on the front line. and they keep fighting there. It's probably a stable situation where we can look in other directions and we just can't. uh and especially with these these distractions as you said the um the war in Iran from a European point of view I really do think it's important to understand that this is a distraction uh and that that that we should not sort of take the eyes off the ball because um Iran is a problem but but but Russia is a much bigger problem. I guess one of the outcomes Putin will want from the Iran war is some kind of reassurance that if he was to attack Western Europe that the US would not intervene. Now that might mean uh then withdrawing from NATO which is problematic um to achieve I think for but just the understanding that the rupture between Europe and other NATO partners is so great that even if the alliance formally exists the US will actually not lift a finger to um help Europe. I'm guessing that Putin is waiting for an unambiguous signal that that rupture between uh Trump and Europe is great enough that he can proceed.
I'll make this the last question because I know we've we've we've sort of covered this that that that's probably a logical thing to to suggest here.
Yeah, I I think they're I mean, if I were to to look at this from a Russian perspective, I think there are two things that hold them back from a more aggressive, more direct um confrontation with Western Europe. The first thing I'll say is I don't I think it's important that we don't fall into the this the trap of only talking about this as a well now the Russian it's a it's an allout war on Western Europe where the Russians are going to deploy all their forces against us right that that's because that is a distraction to talk about it like that where we we need to understand that from a Russian point of view this is something that would be seen as as supportive cooperation to what's going on in Ukraine. And the purpose of attacking us would be to win in Ukraine. It would be about making us stop supporting Ukraine, making us realize that uh this is uh extremely dangerous and it can lead to World War II and you know make make us lose determination that way and create a popular demand that our politicians stop sending all these things to Ukraine because we need it for our own protection. Right? And maybe it could give them a kind of bargaining chip, right? you can get back Latvia if we get Ukraine like that those kinds of dynamics. um I that that would be kind of the the purpose of this. um so I think it's important to understand that it would not be a separate war against Western Europe. It would be an expansion of the war in Ukraine um with the purpose of winning the war in Ukraine. um and the the big I I think there are essentially two reasons why they haven't done it yet. The first one is that they are uncertain about the Americans and how much can they really trust that the Americans will not still be there for NATO. um, and I think it's important that we we we sort of move a little bit beyond this idea of Trump is agent Krasnov and always does what Putin wants because that's not the case actually. I mean, there are many things that Trump does that are against what Putin wants and that the Russians are also struggling with Trump's unpredictability and they don't really know where they have him and how much can they can they really be certain that that that Trump is not going to interfere if if they do something against us. um and there of course you're right. I mean, if they could actually uh sort of cause the the war in Iran to to create this rupture between the United States and uh the rest of NATO, then that would be great because that would remove some of that uncertainty. But the other the other uncertainty that they have is that they they can't know that our reaction will be to do to just say, "Okay, we're going to step back. We're going to withdraw. We're not going to support Ukraine anymore. we're too afraid of this. Like they can't know that that is going to be the reaction. The reaction could also be the opposite. It could actually be that thing that finally gets the European leaders to transform our economies into war economies that will boost the determination. um, and that we will also understand that this war that is now going on in the Baltic states is also not separate from Ukraine. So we will also see that as a a combined front where our reaction might not necessarily be to say we need to prioritize ourselves at the expense of Ukraine. Our reaction could also be to say we need to multiply the the the support we give to Ukraine and then that is how we're going to win this war. So I think even if they can remove the Americans from the picture by creating this rupture or supporting it, Donald Trump is doing his best to create the rupture himself. But uh e even if if the Americans are out of the picture, I still think there is uncertainty here and a realization that it would be a high risk operation from a Russian perspective. um, and they would definitely need to do I mean it would not just be an attack on the Baltic states. It would also have to be very very serious nuclear saber rattling at a level we've never seen before because uh otherwise this this this might backfire really seriously. And so so it is a high-risisk operation but the problem is that what else are they going to do? Otherwise, it's just a kind of uh they're just kind of buying time until at some point they they are going to lose.
>> That's it. I mean, my bed is on a a full-scale hybrid assault. But again, they would have to be absolutely assured that that would coers um you know, various countries to to to not assist Ukraine, to stockpile their weapons, to not retaliate. They would have to be assured also that their puppet populists would be, you know, forced into power in the ensuing economic chaos. um none of these things are certain. Nonetheless, as you say, the malignancy is there. The intent to cause harm is there. The intent to divide the US from Europe, the attempt to divide Europe from Ukraine, that is absolutely there. The question is how that manifests itself.
>> I just there's so much happening. it's dizzying sometimes. It really helps to sort of talk this through with you and trying to get some clarity on it, strategic clarity. I hope people follow up uh with your uh newsletter and of course your book and it helps to bring them clarity and through this video as well. Thanks so much for for joining me today and on a Sunday as well. It's a
>> Yeah, thank you to you too. It's always a pleasure. Thank you for watching this video. Your support is massively appreciated. Here's just a quick notice at the end of it. Please do stick with this because here are two important messages. Firstly, there are links in the description of this uh and I really want to share with you the work of Steven Moore and his team, founder of Ukraine Freedom Project. He's a former congressional Republican chief of staff and he's been in Ukraine now for most of the full scale war. In fact, he was there on day five of the war. And he's produced an extraordinary film, A Faith Under Siege, the documents Russian atrocities against Ukrainian Christians. If you haven't seen that, if you haven't even seen the teaser, I strongly recommend you look at that. and of course look at the wider work that his team does to evangelize the importance of Ukraine as a topic especially and crucially now amongst congressional Republicans. Kartia is a Ukrainian core operating around Corpansk which is a critical area of the front. Now this campaign won't be for everybody. It is a kinetic campaign in that we are crowdsourcing here for funds to buy vampire drones. 15 in fact five of those have already been achieved in this campaign but we are looking to scale this up to get your full amount of $40,000 US that's going to Jiggers poor that are handling this. This is an incredibly important campaign. There are many creators who are taking part in this. My view is that it's not enough at this point just to help Ukraine to survive. It's not enough just to invest in humanitarian causes. Not everyone's going to be comfortable with this, but they have to remove the invaders from their lands. To do that, they need the skills, the munitions, the weaponry to achieve that. This is where these vampire drones come in. So, please, this isn't a full polished promo. I'm still working on that, but the campaign launches today. Please do check it out and of course help in any way that you can.