Transcription
[Music] You are listening to an art media podcast. I think that what Hamas is trying to do to Israel right now, and I'm going to say something very difficult, the ploy here is to say the Jewish genocide, the Holocaust that gave them enough credence and legitimacy worldwide and the support of the world for their independence. And if we convince the world as to our own genocide and famine and starvation in Gaza and all the rest, that will grant us the legitimacy needed. And out of our genocide, as they see it, our country will be born. And that was always, by the way, the big project. This was the project of Yahar Sinir. This is a dramatic watershed line in the war because the way Trump, Rubio, Witkov, Netanyao and Durmer this are describing what is going to happen is like a train coming and on the other hand on the other side there is a train coming with the international community on board. To be honest, I don't know where it goes but I think there are going to be dramatic days. [Music]
It's 6:00 a.m. on Sunday, July 27th here in New York City. Yes, 6:00 a.m. It's early. It's 10:00 p.m. on Sunday, July 27th in Israel as Israelis begin a new week. A new week in which they have learned that two IDF soldiers were killed in an armored vehicle blast in southern Gaza in Khan Yunis. Those two soldiers were Captain Amir Saad, who was 22 years old from the Druze village of Yanuh-Jat, and Sergeant Enon Nuriel Vana, who was 20 years old from Kiryat Tivon. Both were serving in the Golani Brigades reconnaissance battalion.
On Thursday, the Israeli and American negotiating teams left Doha, signaling that hostage ceasefire talks with Hamas were not progressing, at least for now. President Trump told reporters as he was leaving the White House that Hamas did not want to make a deal with US special envoy Steve Witkoff, saying, quote, "We will now consider alternative options to bring the hostages home." Close quote. Alternative options.
In light of this, Hamas, according to public reports, is preparing to fend off possible hostage rescue operations. Meanwhile, we have been hearing a lot over the past week about the risk of starvation among Gazans. Research by Yai Spitzer of Hebrew University on the price of flour in the Gaza Strip has convinced many Israelis that this time, unlike any time before, any time in the 22-plus months since October 7th, that the reports of starvation now are real and that people in Gaza, including children, are at high risk. In response to this crisis, Israel announced that it will allow the UAE and Jordan to resume airdrops of humanitarian aid. And now there is even talk of military pauses in Gaza, something we've only seen during ceasefires. Now, in a non-ceasefire period, there will be military pauses to allow for more free flow of aid in Gaza.
On Thursday, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would recognize a Palestinian state at an upcoming UN meeting in September. The move has drawn intense criticism from Israeli and American officials, including from President Trump, who had some very harsh language for the French president and Prime Minister Netanyahu, saying, quote, "That this rewards terror." Hamas responded to the move, saying that, quote, "We call on all nations to follow France's lead." Close quote. France will become the first major Western country to formally recognize a Palestinian state, prompting many to wonder if this will set off some kind of chain reaction. Canada has already announced that it will follow France's lead. If this happens and we see some kind of domino effect of more nations recognizing Palestinian statehood, what would that mean for the future of Israel and Gaza and the West Bank? Is it possible that Hamas's savage attack on October 7th could actually have had the effect of setting off this chain of events that could result ultimately at some point in the establishment of a Palestinian state?
Joining us now to discuss this are Call Me Back contributors Nadav and Amit Seel. And Nadav, Amit, welcome back.
>> Hello.
>> Thanks for having us then.
>> Nadav, I want to start with you. Let's start with the UN vote for a Palestinian state. Which countries are behind this effort and what are they actually envisioning for a Palestinian state?
Look, this is but another, uh, symbolic gesture of sorts, and it, of course, follows suit, uh, as a result of, uh, of the French initiative and Emmanuel Macron's announcement that France is by September going to recognize Palestinian statehood. Uh, what do they envision? I think it's less about envisioning, it's more about their public audiences. It's domestic consumption. It's also about pressuring Israel. Uh, basically saying if you don't stop the war or reach an end to the war, uh, things are going to fall down and they're not going to fall down your way. It's going to be against what you consider to be your vested interest, which is a negotiated agreement, uh, with the Palestinians sometime in the future.
>> When you say domestic audiences, say a little more about that. Who, who, who are they actually, who's he actually pandering to?
Israel is, is now witnessing probably the worst crisis since its inception in its public opinion abroad. I know that people would say, you know, you, you had the Arab boycott in the 1970s and '80s. That's very true. Uh, Israel had, um, you know, African nations and South American nations disconnected their diplomatic relations with Israel after 1967. But if you look at public opinion today, mostly in the West, but not only in the West, you see that Israel is in a very dire condition. I think that politicians in these countries want to supply the voters with some sort of practical ways in which they think that they are aligning themselves with Palestinians. We just published a YouGov, uh, Economist poll in the US that shows that still, you know, a bigger part, a bigger chunk of the American audience, uh, supports Israel and supports the Palestinians, but this gap is closing quickly. Even if you measure it like a year before, and specifically with 18 to 29-year-olds, Israel is, is losing by dozens of percentiles to people who support the Palestinians. So just imagine, Dan, what's happening in a country like France that has a, a big Muslim minority there. What's happening in the UK and other countries that are at any rate extremely critical of Israel's war in Gaza?
In terms of the practical implications of this, I, I'm, I'm skeptical that it means much or that it's going to go anywhere. I think both the president of the United States, the prime minister of Israel are going to be dismissive of what Macron is up to. Um, but just so we understand what Macron is actually saying. He's saying, what he, he's recognizing the principle of a Palestinian state, or is he actually defining what a Palestinian state is, what the contours would be, and, and what, where the borders would be?
>> We, we don't know yet. And, uh, it's not the first time it happens. It happened in 1988 when Yasser Arafat declared the independence of the Palestinian state. We all know how it ended, and it happened again in a wave in 2011 and then in 2016. Um, so I wouldn't, uh, attribute a lot of importance to this, save what I've described as, uh, the Israeli collapse in the international public opinion. This is it, in my opinion. I mean, it won't help the Palestinians.
>> Okay. Well, Nadav, Amina mentioned, mentioned the hunger crisis. He, he's written a very important, I think, a very important piece on the hunger crisis, uh, for the, for the Free Press. You've been commenting on what's going on. What, what is going on? What actually, what actually changed? Because, you know, without getting into the merits, it's now widely accepted that there is a real hunger crisis in Gaza, or we're on the cusp of a real hunger crisis in Gaza, and that every day people are starving. What, what changed?
>> Okay, so first of all, I, I want to set two, uh, principal rules, two basic rules. One is that Hamas is to be blamed for the hunger because Hamas steals 80 or 90% of the humanitarian aid by the United Nations. Second is that the United Nations and Hamas are not interested in solving the hunger crisis in Gaza, but in keeping the monopoly of Hamas and the UN on the humanitarian aid. Uh, if the UN was interested in solving the hunger crisis in Gaza, they would say, no matter how the humanitarian aid is provided, from the air, the sea, the GHF, we are for it. But the UN is focused on taking the humanitarian provision from GHF, the American so-called company that, that supplied 85 million meals so far, because they don't want Israel to control the process. All of this is not helpful when it comes to Israel because Israel is blamed. Even if, uh, uh, dozens are massacred when they get the UN, Hamas humanitarian aid, Israel is, is blamed. Uh, if even if Hamas steals the, uh, the trucks and the flour, it doesn't help because Israel is blamed because Israel is handling this war. And therefore, this is the reason why the IDF last night, at the order of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his cabinet, started providing food, uh, 10 times as much as it had provided before, because this is a huge crisis. And I guess Nadav would expand on, on the, on the know-how of the process. What happened in July 2025, but I would say as follows: The, the fact that Hamas claimed for a hunger crisis in Gaza since October 28th, 2023, doesn't mean that there isn't a growing problem as we speak.
>> All right, Nadav, what, tell us how this happened and, and, and what's happening now.
This issue is right now, uh, probably the worst crisis that Israel faced internationally and within the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the war. Uh, the IDF has just announced on humanitarian pauses throughout the Gaza Strip, something the IDF and the government wouldn't do since October 7th. From 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., Dan, from 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., humanitarian pauses in the Gaza Strip. So, just, just so our listeners understand what that means, that the IDF is for the first time in a wartime situation. So not during a ceasefire, not in a lead-up to a ceasefire, while the war is still being fought. They are, they've announced there will be pauses in the war fighting to enable a more efficient distribution of food. This has never happened in this war. I can't think of another war in modern times anywhere where one, one, one country was attacked, it's fighting back, but it's imposing on itself pauses in order to distribute aid.
>> I think that this is, uh, a moment of reckoning for the Israelis. And I think we, we ought to be here as, as people who, who love Israel, speaking from Israel. Uh, it's, it's time for some tough love, Dan. And I'm going to say some, some hard truths. And, and I think that Amit would agree with at least most of them. Israel decided to stop all aid to Gaza in March of 2025. By all aid, I mean all food with no exceptions. This was under the pressure of Betzalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir. It was a cabinet decision, and it wasn't very much discussed by, by media in Israel. Now, what is that crisis? Uh, Israeli journalists are speaking with Palestinians in Gaza all the time. Now, Hamas is trying to pitch, and Amit is absolutely right, since October of 2023, it's trying to pitch the idea that there is mass starvation and famine in Gaza. Why didn't that campaign really pick up? And the answer is because of the facts. The facts weren't there.
>> But wait a minute, Nadav, I just want to stop you there because there were periods between March and today where the campaign did pick up, that there were these crises in the international press. Some UN food aid official came out saying starvation is going to happen in 48 hours. And every, every three or four weeks, we were hearing that starvation, mass starvation, mass famine was about to kick in. And then, and then really, I would, I would, I would footnote, I, I would bookmark the story and then I'd come back to it a day or two, and it was gone.
>> And the reason it was gone, and that's, that's exactly my point, is because it wasn't supported by the facts. It was supported sometimes by photos, for instance, of children who suffer from a genetic disease and cannot consume types of food. H, and they would use these photos of children in medical, uh, in medical installations to argue famine or mass hunger or starvation. Now, the reason that this time it's different is because there is a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. And because sources who speak with Israeli journalists and, of course, with the international community who are anti-Hamas, who criticize Hamas, who say that Hamas is taking the aid to its own, are now also saying, "We are hungry. Okay? We don't know what we're going to eat today." And the reason for that, the original reason for that? Why did this change almost two years of war? What happened? What happened is that Israel made two crucial mistakes. The first mistake was that it surrendered to the far-right in the government battalion and Ben-Gvir, that were very angry at the previous hostage deal, and they demanded to stop aid to Gaza.
>> They were, they were angry. They were angry about the, the, which hostage deal are you talking about? The November hostage deal or the January hostage deal?
>> The, the January hostage deal. Okay.
>> The one that we just had, the last one.
>> And they demanded to stop all aid. And they saw this as a, you know, as a moment of the beginning of the end of the war. Now, we are not supplying aid to Gaza at all. Israel stopped all aid to Gaza by the UN, by international institutions between March to May 19. Now, Israel, when it did that, said Gaza still has about four to six months, Amit remembers that, of food already in Gaza. But when you do this in a war zone in which there is food insecurity, in which people don't earn a living, the meaning of that is that you immediately create what, Dan? You create a demand. And this demand is not only about eating. It's about hoarding food because you don't know when you're going to see food again. So people started buying food immediately on mass in order to make sure that their families will have food. Now came the second mistake of Israel, and I think we need to start reckoning with that. Was the GHF, which was celebrated. The GHF was an idea of taking away the leverage that Hamas has on the Palestinian society, uh, by controlling the merchants, the aid, and everything else.
>> Okay. Just, just another, I think it's important for our listeners to understand. The GHF, GHF, which we'll refer to a lot in this conversation, is the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. It was a project started by American interests, clearly supported or blessed by Israel, but it was started by American private interests. I, I just want to establish what it was. It wasn't, it wasn't a function of the Israeli government.
>> GHF was, look, we can't go into Gaza to distribute food, right?
>> We who?
>> We, the GHF, which is actually Israel and the US, okay? Mainly Israel. Why can't Israel go into Deir al-Balah and Musayrat and Gaza City? Because it's controlled by Hamas, right? In order to go there, you need to have full military occupation of these areas. Israel didn't want to do that, right? So, what they said is let's have these, um, quick, uh, spots, hubs of handing over aid outside of the population centers. This idea that you will have a big hub, you will invite the Palestinians to come. Each one will get a package of about 18 kilograms, and this would be on in areas that are on the outskirts of the major cities. Right. So the idea is you, you don't go into these Hamas strongholds. You stay outside of them, and people come to the GHS, GHF rather than the GHF going to them.
>> Exactly. Now, there, there, there are humanitarian groups almost immediately said it's a very bad idea. Now, immediately the Israelis went, you know, you're saying that because you want to control the aid, because you're, you know, affiliated with Hamas, because you want to have this.
>> Humanitarian groups being international aid organizations, the UN, the World Food Organization.
>> And this is something that I think people don't understand back home, Dan. Each morning, each morning, including these days, there's a meeting. Sits there a representative of the UN, a representative of the IDF, a representative of aid groups, and they sit each morning and they coordinate. Used to coordinate aid. At a certain point, Israel did something which is, uh, is very risky. It took control of the idea of food and aid to the civilian population in Gaza. Israel took what, you know, many thought would be a bold move and, and, and supported the GHF. Humanitarian groups said in a war zone, people never go miles and miles to get to the aid. The aid needs to come to the people in their community. It's, it's a, it's a principle of how you distribute aid in a war zone. Why is that? It's an active war zone. And then these massive shootings began. Now, let me describe to you why these massive shootings near the GHF were happening. They were happening, and I'm saying this as someone who saw documented material, which was dreadful to see. You see at 4:00 a.m., because the distribution center of the GHF opens at 5:00. You see an amount of people, you, it's indescribable, and they're running, and they're running because they know that at 5:00 a.m., and they want to be early. They want to grab their food. And sometimes some of them will come again and again during the day to take that food. That, that's a food for a week for a family. But the only people who can reach these places, Dan, are people who are, uh, fit, usually men, and can travel miles and miles. It's hot, you know, not, not elder women, not, not really children. Um, and they're running, and then suddenly there's a mistake in the road because they don't know where to run, and they might pivot and take the, the wrong, the wrong turn, and then you see an outpost of the IDF with four soldiers, six soldiers, 20 soldiers, and they're seeing, uh, thousands of people running towards them in a war zone. What happens next is what the IDF calls, not me, um, shooting in order to disperse. It's live ammo. And, uh, the IDF says never in order to kill people, but in order to make sure they don't come closer to the forces. The Palestinians reported hundreds and hundreds of people who have died in these events. This is reported worldwide, but it, it also reported in Gaza. What it means is that getting the food is risky, then, and that means that the food costs, costs money, because if it's risky, if you need to take a risk, it will cost money, and then it's sold. So, Israel, and according to publications in Israel, in Channel 11, the public channel in Israel, it's the Israeli taxpayers who are paying for, for a lot of that GHF food. So, the Israeli taxpayers are now paying, paying about 50%, according to that publication, of the food in Gaza. But this food is being sold in markets in Gaza, and it's sold for obscene amounts of money, and Hamas takes control of some of that money.
>> Okay. So, so do you have anything to add to that?
>> First of all, Israel can do more. I think that the, the problem with the GHF was that it, it was a half-baked solution. The idea was to build an area free of Hamas. We have such an area in Rafah. If anyone read the Abu Shammah op-ed on the Wall Street Journal this morning, it's a must-read about life there. But Israel should have done way more to take the, to allow the population go there. The fact that it, it didn't succeed in doing this led to the situation that, that I've described of unsafe roads leading to the GHF. So, Israel has to choose whether to go the full way, all the way towards the first solution, or to give up the, the situation in this specific segment, giving humanitarian aid knowing it would go to the hands of Hamas, and try to, to actually defeat Hamas in a different way.
>> And why couldn't these international aid organizations fill the gap during this time?
>> First of all, in principle, the biggest mistake Israel made was it took control and responsibility for humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Uh, you know, from that moment, if people are, are hungry in Gaza, it's Israel's responsibility. Now, it, it's legally speaking, you know, you can maintain that it's always Israel's responsibility because it controlled 75% of the, of the strip, because, you know, it's at war there. Even so, it's, it's the UN and these elite organizations that were supplying the food into Gaza. Then suddenly the Israelis said, "No, we, we know better and we have our own interest. We're taking control." Now, the, the second thing that happened, of course, that I mean, it is right that the UN, you know, played, played Israel in that sense. But the other thing that Israel did, which is not very published in Israel, is even the aid organizations that used to get food into Gaza, uh, the Kogat, the, the body responsible within the IDF to coordinate that, implemented what it called the six-phase plan to make sure that the food doesn't reach Hamas. This made it very complicated. Now, another thing that happened is again, that the UN or other aid groups said, "We're not willing to work with the GHF," and they were not picking up some of the, the, the aid, and this is what Israel has been publishing. Now, first of all, I think it's not only about appearances. If I'm saying this as an Israeli citizen, if we call on the Gazan population, and by the way, all the officers I'm speaking with, I'm sure that Amit heard the same. The population coming to the GHF center are not hostile. They're not attacking Israeli soldiers. They just want food. Okay? If we called on them to come at 5:00 a.m. and, and the result of this event is that they get shot on the way, doesn't matter, you know, why. And you have massive casualties. And, and these are not people that you can argue came to hurt or jeopardize the idea of soldiers. I think this is a problem. Okay? Okay. And by problem, I don't mean image problem. I mean a real substantive problem. Now, is it the entire war is to blame with Hamas? Of course. Is Hamas enjoying what's happening right now? Absolutely. But the question that we should really ask ourselves is, how did Israel build the trap and fall into that trap? And this, this is internationally speaking, such a trap that the prime minister of Israel would order the IDF to use the Israeli Air Force to drop cargo of aid and food into the Gaza Strip last night, to announce humanitarian phases around the Gaza Strip for the first time since the beginning of the war, to open humanitarian corridors, and for Israel to move from talking about the amount of aid coming into Gaza during the negotiations with Hamas for a hostage deal to basically saying, "Get as much aid into Gaza as possible." Now, this reminds me of someone, maybe it reminds you of someone, and that's someone I'm thinking about is President Biden. Uh, because it was the American administration back then that told the Israelis, don't play with the humanitarian aid, and you need to, you need humanitarian aid to overflow in the Gaza Strip.
>> Yes. But Nadav, Nadav, it was the same Biden who said on October 11th, on his way to Israel, that he wants Israel to actually provide humanitarian aid. But if he, Biden knows that it goes to the hands of Hamas, he would stop it. And he never stood up to his word. In my opinion, Biden's insistence on providing this humanitarian aid, which is, in other words, a, a, um, an assistance to Hamas, prolonged the war, prolonged the suffering of the Gazans.
>> But, but what, look at the other side of what you just said, Amit, and I'm, I'm, I'm going with you here. So, I should stop humanitarian aid, and that means that I'm using the population. I'm, I'm, I'm starving the population. I think this is something that is rejected by the Israelis.
>> No. So, so first of all, I mean, we can speak about hypocrisy and for, for hours and how conflicts in Congo are, are not covered enough, but let's put it aside. Okay? Here's the thing. The, the main, uh, reason or the main idea of the war was to differentiate Hamas from the population, because Hamas is a gang that uses this humanitarian aid as, as a measure to fight, because it gets money, thus control, weapons, etcetera. This attempt failed. It failed dramatically, in a devastating way, for two reasons. One is the American effort for more than a year, till the Democrats lost the election in November 2024, to actually provide Hamas humanitarian aid, knowing that it would go to the pockets of Hamas. And then came the Israeli failure that, without the excuse of Biden, failed to build a reliable plan that would actually do the same. Now, there are no excuses. I, I mean, there are many, many excuses, but none of them is accepted. The only way in which Hamas, Hamas is now taking control of the GHF aid. And the way it's doing that is because those young men who can pick up the aid, they go back a few times a week, sometimes back with the aid, then it gets sold through merchants and in the market, then Hamas taxes it. Why? Because Hamas controls the Palestinian society. And to hear the idea that there is Hamas and the Palestinian society, Hamas is part of the Palestinian society. It's taxing. It's, you know, it's the governance even in those small enclaves right now. Let's say the, the exact opposite. Let's say that Israel would have flooded the Gaza Strip with aid. Flooded it with aid. The prices of food would have dropped, and the ability of Hamas to profiteer, uh, as a result of, of, uh, the scarcity of food would have also plummeted. Uh, that's not the real reason between you and me. The real reason is that Smotrich and Ben-Gvir and Netanyahu had to surrender to that. Um, were extremely pissed off because of the last hostage deal, and they wanted aid to Gaza to stop, believing that this would maybe Hamas. But actually, you know, this is, this is what their base was. But because they no, because they believed, like, like 90% of Israelis, that humanitarian aid goes to Hamas, they had an alternative idea of the GHF. Um, and therefore, I think that the GHF collapsed, and there should be an alternative idea. But I would refrain from arguing that there are parts in the Israeli society that wants all the Gazans to die. And second thing is that it's interesting what you say that Gaza is Hamas and Hamas is Gaza. This is basically the argument of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir. I mean, the whole idea that there is a non-Hamas Gaza is a, um, progressive liberal idea from, from the Biden administration. I personally think that the vast majority of Gaza support Hamas. What I'm trying to say is that you must differentiate it, exactly like the US did with Japan following World War II. That's what I meant.
>> Uh, Amit, Nadav said earlier that Israel built the trap that was then used on Israel. And in that sense, one could argue that Hamas has Israel right now exactly where it wants it, with the pressure mounting on Israel from any corner of the world on a range of fronts, including the humanitarian crisis. How has this hunger crisis affected the now failed negotiations between Israel and Hamas? Because as we know, the admin, the US administration has just announced that Hamas is not serious about negotiating, that the US is done for now. It's pulled its negotiators. Hamas has pulled, Israel has pulled its negotiators. What, what's going on?
So it's like the opening sentence of A Tale of Two Cities by Dickens. It was the worst of times. It was the best of times for Hamas. It's the worst of times because Sinwar is dead. Yahya Sinwar is dead. The whole Sinwar family is dead. There are Qamash tribes in Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza and in Rafah in southern Gaza that actually took the control, and Israel has the ability to eliminate Hamas once and for all. This is, and, and of course, the Trump administration would, would actually, um, um, back every Israeli measure. And it's the best of times for Hamas because Macron is following October 7th, and there is no other way to describe it, recognizes Palestinian statehood, not because of Abbas, but because of Hamas, because Israel is isolated because of this international crisis, because Israelis are deported from restaurants in Vienna and from Spanish planes in Barcelona. And there are many, many instances. Um, and I think I know it sounds, um, how would they say, you've already heard it during our conversations, but now it's for real. This is a dramatic watershed line in the war because the way Trump, Rubio, Witkoff, Netanyahu, and Durmerthis are describing what is going to happen, uh, is like a train coming, and on the other hand, on the other side, there is a train coming with the international community on board. And I, to be honest, I don't know where it goes, but I think there are going to be dramatic days.
>> Meaning, meaning the US and Israel are basically saying, that's it. We're done with these negotiations. The Hamas is not.
>> All hell break loose.
>> So what does that actually mean?
>> So first of all, either assassinating or extraditing Hamas figures in Qatar, or threatening to annex territories in Gaza if hostages are not released in 48 hours, and then annexing more territories, etcetera. Many, many options there. There is a, a coordination between Trump and Netanyahu personally on this issue. There are measures that have been discussed over the weekend. I guess that some of them are what I've just described. But on the other hand, it's everything that Nadav just described, the, the, the collapse of Israel in the international community. And to be honest, for the first time, I don't really know where it goes.
>> Okay. So, I know Amit, you have to go in a minute, and, and Nadav, you'll stay on for a few more minutes. But Amit, before we let you go, if, if you say there's these two trains coming at each other, right? There's, there's the US and Israel basically saying, "That's it, we're completely ramping up." Believe it or not, we're ramping up. We're going to ramp up military pressure on Hamas in ways the world hasn't seen." That, that's one train. The other train coming the opposite direction is intensified pressure from the international community. If, if the international community's pressure comes in the form of recognition of a Palestinian state in this whole maelstrom, is it possible that October 7th then would go down in history as the Palestinians' independence day?
>> It's a, it would be a terrible message for the Middle East and the peace of the world, and that's why I'm sure it's not going to happen. France is still alone in this initiative, and yet we have the US with the veto right in the UN, in the Security Council of the UN. So I don't think it's going to happen, but, uh, still, it's still a very bad message.
>> Okay, Amit, we'll let you go. And Nadav, if, if you could stay on, what is, what is your reaction?
So, yeah, first of all, as to the whole issue of, um, what's going to happen now, I don't know. I know that Israel's best friends in Washington, best friends in Washington are telling it, and I'm quoting, "It's time to end the war. The war is not going Israel's way. The damages from the war to Israel today are higher than anything that you can right now get." And I'm talking about really Israel's best friends. I, I'm not going to mention the names. I'm sure Dan, you can think about a couple of people that were always loyal to the interests of the United States and its alliance with, with Israel. And they're looking at what's happening right now internationally speaking. I'm looking at data. I'm looking at a publication this morning of 3,769 IDF soldiers that are recognized post-traumatic, not only treated for, uh, mental challenges, but recognized post-traumatic. So, I'm, I'm looking also at the IDF. The IDF Chiefs of Staff have told the prime minister and the government that the IDF really needs a pause here, at least a ceasefire, in order to regroup. And I'm looking internationally at what we're, uh, what's happening and hearing what Amit has just said about, you know, um, going in full-fledged. I, I don't know exactly what this, this means, but seeing the data that I'm seeing, seeing the Israeli public right now that is definitely not united around an idea of, um, taking the war into a new phase that would be more extreme. I think that, uh, we should listen to what Marco Rubio, uh, has has told the some families of hostages. He, he was talking about the possibility of looking at an end to the war as, as a regional agreement of some sorts. Of course, not by allowing Hamas to win in Gaza, but but having a different government there. But, but everything is right now on the table as far as, as I'm hearing. Um, I think that, uh, you made a really clever remark, Dan, about, will October 7th go down in history as the beginning of Palestinian independence? And we need to recognize how governments and states are born in the international community. They are born through recognition, through what's happening on the ground. You need to have a piece of territory you control, and then you have recognition, a factor, the UN recognition. Uh, Israel wasn't born only because of a UN decision. It was born, that UN decision didn't carry, you know, any legal weight. And I think that what Hamas is trying to do to Israel right now, and I'm going to say something very difficult, is I think that the, the ploy here is to say, you know, it's the Jewish genocide, the Holocaust that gave them enough credence and legitimacy worldwide and the support of the world for their independence. And if we convince the world as to our own genocide and famine and starvation in Gaza and all the rest, uh, that will grant us the legitimacy needed, and out of our genocide, as they see it, our country will be born. And that was always, by the way, the big project. This was the project of Yahya Sinwar. This is what they thought about in October 7th. This is not reverse engineering. This is not me sort of playing with words. This is the entire Hamas argument that, you know, uh, only through violence will our state be born, and through the sacrifice, through the Shahid, through the way of the Jihad, and, and all the rest. And in that sense, and this is the reason why I sound in this episode a bit, uh, troubled, is that I think that if you look at what the IDF has been doing, if you look at the sacrifice of Israelis, of my friends and my friends' sons, the people I speak here in Israel, you know, if you look at their heroic actions and their intentions, never to starve, never to murder, absolutely not to have, you know, a genocide or anything like that. And if you look at how this was handled by Israel's political class, uh, whose responsibility is it that this is where we are at today? I don't think it's the responsibility of, for instance, the leaders of the defense apparatus who said at about February, March of 2024, "Hey, we need to move on from Gaza. There's very little for Israel to profit from Gaza." Isn't it time for us, uh, to start asking ourselves, maybe these professionals, uh, you know, all gave many years of their lives to the Israeli service, maybe they were right, maybe, maybe they were right that, you know, Israel should have moved on to the north to Hezbollah and the rest before. I know this would have come with a price, and everything else.
>> First, well, not the least of which is they wouldn't have killed most of the Hamas leadership. Sinwar would still be alive.
>> I don't agree with that. And let me tell you why. I think that if Israel killed, um, Hassan Nasrallah and it killed Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, I think Israel would have killed Yahya Sinwar anyway, and it will kill, for instance, Hadad, Hadad, who isn't dead, it will kill him, uh, at a certain point, because Israel would get to these people.
>> But you're saying Israel, had Israel moved on from Gaza in the spring of '24, Sinwar was killed in October of '24. And if Israel had said, "We're done with Gaza." Oh, nobody would have said, "Oh, oh, nobody would have said you get immunity." The idea was always to get a deal to get the hostages back. Look, uh, I, I can't say what, what Israel knows about where the hostages are, but let's say that the, the existence of hostages right now in Gaza is a main stumbling block to Israel operationally in the strip. And the idea was always, Eisenkot and others, you know, finish this, then you're free to act. Then came Prime Minister Netanyahu, who said, "No, they would want international assurances." Then they would answer him, "Who cares? You know, give them the international assurances. It's, it's your right of self-defense." But look where we are at today. We're a year later. Okay? Uh, we are a year later. What was actually achieved in the Gaza Strip? What was achieved internationally and regionally? When Israel has fought outside of the Gaza Strip, it was a huge success against Iran, against Nasrallah, and all the rest. The, the war on Gaza, and I'm quoting now, um, a senior military commander, it is like they have put the weight on our legs, and it's pushing us down. It's pulling us down, that war in Gaza. And that senior military commander told me, "Gaza is the most complex problem at the IDF's history, more than Iran, more than anything else." And why? Because of the population, because of the mixture of civilians and a terror group, and hostages, and the international community, and the need to aid. And it's again, Israel's best friends around the world who are now telling it, "Get your act together. Have a plan. Have a plan. We don't think that it is to your advantage." Now, if the prime minister has a different idea there, um, you know, maybe there's a master plan there that is being planned with President Trump. I don't know. I know the president is extremely vigilant against Hamas. He doesn't want Hamas to control the Gaza Strip. He is, um, offended by the existence of Hamas at this point. He hears out their cruelty, their cruelty and their evil. And I think that he is going to be committed for this until, you know, until the last day in his office. And I think that gives Israel a lot of confidence to do what it needs to do for its own security. The fact that President Trump is there. Okay.
>> Nadav, I mean, I think I hear this from time to time about, well, Israel should have pulled back at this period or that period. I, I do think it's important if, if Israel had pulled back at the time period you're talking about, it would have been before Sinwar was killed, before much of the Hamas leadership was killed. It would have been before Israel went into Rafah. I mean, it's some pretty important developments that occurred in Gaza for Israel. I'm not saying there weren't also massive setbacks. There were, but there were some important strategic accomplishments that I just think we need to, if, if we're arguing that Israel should have pulled back, it would have likely been at the expense of those accomplishments. Now, by the way, we have a debate whether or not it was worth it or not, but I do think I think there's a tendency to retroactively or retrospectively look back and say, "Oh, they should have done this at this point or this at that point," and, and, and just assume that the gains that we now all just take for granted would have been able to be pocketed even though Israel pulled back. But it's partly because Israel didn't pull back, it was able to to achieve those gains.
>> Yeah. By the way, I, I listened to Ron Dermer's episodes, um, and, and I think you discussed that, and I could see the argument, and I don't want to, you know, I'm not going to downplay that argument of what was being done for instance to Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. I'm just asking, well, as to assassinations, as to striking down the people responsible for October 7th, it, it would have happened anyway. Okay? And nobody's talking about Israel pulling back and saying, "Oh, from now on, you Hamas can control the Gaza Strip." The conversation was, should we get an agreement to end the war with a government that is, formerly isn't Hamas, and get all the hostages back, or wait until we can disarm Hamas, as Prime Minister Netanyahu says, and really make sure that they don't control the Gaza Strip? This is the real question. Is it worth it? I, I, I'm looking at what was happening throughout the Israeli society. I'm, I'm looking at these funerals. Another funeral last week, Amit Cohen, his sister Gaia, asking, "Why are they still there?" In his funeral saying, "No, nobody cares. Another family is destroyed. My family is destroyed." These are the voices not of people who, you know, are radical lefties, objective. These are the voices of the families who have sacrificed everything, and together with the hostage families, together with the political turmoil in Israel, and the lack of, of, of unity as to, as to this. I think that that the conclusion is that we at least should be looking back and say, I, I had my hopes as to the GHF too. I, I think I, I manifested them on these episodes. I don't want to portray myself as though, but, but looking at this right now, and looking at what's important, the question, the main question is, could Israel get a deal right now in which the hostages can get back home, and it could have a government in the Gaza Strip that at least formally isn't Hamas? I'm saying this because I, I am well aware of the deficiency of this, but Hamas, you know, if you have two Palestinians in Gaza, one of them is going to be Hamas. This is just what the polls are telling us.
>> Not to get, not to get too granular, because obviously it's all just based right now in public reports. But according to public reports, one of the reasons the talks broke down was this disagreement about whether or not Israel should be able to maintain some kind of buffer zone, some sort of perimeter security. So you take, like, you know, Sderot.
>> So first of all, Hamas agrees to, to a buffer zone in.
>> But not the buffer zone that Israel wants.
>> Not the buffer zone that Israel wants. Hamas agrees to 800 meters. I don't know how much it, it is in feet. I'm, I'm.
>> But, but I just, I just, I want our listeners to understand. So what I'm talking about here. So Sderot, which is, uh, which is in southern Israel, which is right up there about the, about Gaza, was one of the areas that was, that was targeted on October 7th. It's a civilian population, a city. It's a little more than half a mile from the Gaza border. You take Tel Aviv, which is 44 miles from, which is, which is one of the three largest population centers in the country. It is the economic engine of the country. It is, it is 44 miles from Gaza. These are tiny, tiny distances. It's, you know, Sderot to, to Gaza is like from my home in the Upper West Side to Central Park. Okay? So it's, this is the, the. So, so in that sense, buffer zones matter, and the size of the buffer zones matter. It's not just like a detail. Oh, you give a little here, we'll give a little there. It's all fine.
>> I want to be clear because we didn't discuss in the negotiations. It's Hamas who is to blame as to the breaking of the current talks in Doha. It's not me saying that as an Israeli, it's the Egyptians saying that. It's the Qataris saying that. It's, of course, the US saying that. So I, if someone, and you know, if, if someone reads into this, not recognizing the true nature of, you know, this genocidal organization, but the tragedy that you just discussed, Dan, is that Hamas is going to be there, half a mile away or a mile and a half away, anyway you cut it, even if you have a military occupation of the entire Gaza Strip, because Hamas, unfortunately, tragically for Palestinians and Israelis, is a grassroots movement within the Palestinian society. Now, how do you live with that? And what I'm saying right now is critical because we need to be realistic about this and not, you know, try and find kind of, uh, quick solutions like, "Oh, we're going to have the GHF and then they're going to collapse."
No, they're extremely adaptive. And what they do is if they control the society, Hamas will collapse. Your point is Hamas is adaptive. They're not going to collapse so easily. It's not the IDF that would collapse.
Hamas is a fundamentalist organization, and it's a point I made on your show. I make it in English on my Twitter feed, and when I write in English. Um, how, you know, uh, Nazi Germany surrendered when they saw that Germany's defeated, Hitler committed suicide, uh, Berlin is destroyed. Hamas sees, you know, the destruction. They would not, you know, sign a a deal, a surrender deal. And that surrender deal is really not too much to ask for them to disarm. Israel is not even saying that there's not going to be a Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It's not even a war aim. The war aim is, is, you know, for them not to be a threat on Israel. And, and I think this is the basic dissonance that is so terrible, that, you know, that the war is just, you know, that Hamas is what it is. And the question is, what can you actually achieve at this point? And the answer of the professionals I speak with, and of course, they're not always right, and, and many times they are wrong. Okay. And, and, and, and sometimes, you know, Derman is right. Okay. Having said that, but their answer is, since February, March of 2024, is get a deal. Get a big deal. Get all the hostages you can right now. Get, and get out. Leave yourself that, those buffers that you can, and every time you see a security threat, attack. Get a different government there. Get to back then, you had a chance of normalization with Saudi Arabia. We don't have it right now, right? Uh, back then you could have maybe stuff that you also lost strategically. Uh, that, that's the answer I'm, I'm, I'm hearing. And sometimes, you know, I hear that the IDF opens, and I see videos of Palestinians thanking the IDF. I say, you know, maybe that's going to be a change. And then we learn how difficult is this swamp, uh, called the Gaza problem. Again, I'm, I'm quoting that military commander who saw a thing or two in his life saying to me, "It's the most complex problem that the IDF has ever seen."
Let me ask you a final question. In your, in your vision, if Israel just basically figures out a way to wind down the war with these details, which I don't think are such details, but we can, we can debate that another day about the size of the buffer zone and the, you know, security guarantees that Israel gets and how demilitarization works. Do you imagine, and this is totally speculative, so I'm not holding you to this, but just knowing how Hamas operates, and given how long you've studied how Hamas operates, and given that the people you talk to spend a lot of time thinking about how Hamas operates, can you imagine a world in which Hamas returns all the hostages?
I can imagine a world in which Hamas, uh, returns almost all of the hostages and tries to somehow expand, uh, the period of time as much as it can for the last four or five hostages, and using them, of course, as human shields. Absolutely. Um, and to, you know, your point is, is extremely valid, Dan. But if this is the point, so let's call their bluff. That's, that's my best answer. Uh, and it's, it's not only about that, it's about the difference. And I made this point months ago, you know, uh, Prime Minister Netanyahu is right morally to demand that Hamas disarm. He's right politically to demand that they don't really control the Gaza Strip, uh, you know, and, and for the exile, which I fully support also, you know, he's right. He's right. Uh, right now, what the region offers Israel right now on the table, you know, if it ends the war, is get the hostages back. They might be bluffing, but let's see. And to have a different government in Gaza that isn't Hamas, but probably Hamas is going to be behind the scenes. Uh, my main point is always the same point. Let's say Hamas agreed to Prime Minister Netanyahu's just demands, agrees to disarm. Will it disarm? No, it will never disarm. Who can monitor their disarming? The Emiratis? No. The Egyptians? They don't care. The Saudis? No. The only body in the world that can see if they disarmed by going house to house is the IDF. And then it means nothing, that agreement to begin with, right? It's like saying nothing. So, they're going to cheat. So why make that demand? Secondly, uh, you know, let's say Hamas says, "Okay, we're, we agree we will not control really the Gaza Strip." I don't know what it even means because Hamas is supported by half, at least half of the Palestinian public in Gaza. And after the war, maybe more, or maybe less. I don't know. Uh, will they cheat? Will, will they try to, you know, handle the Gaza Strip behind our backs? Even if they agree to all the demands made today by the Israeli cabinet, they will. So, what are we talking about here? And by the way, you would notice that I'm, I'm not saying anything about Israeli politics, about the far right, about the interest of the coalition. I'm just saying, you know, very practically speaking. And when I pose this question to the sources I'm speaking with from the government, uh, you know, not a lot of people have an answer to, to these questions. They still hope that there will be a scenario, to be honest, in which somehow there will be a collapse of Hamas. Hamas will collapse into itself, and people will basically come out of the bunkers with their hands up, or they will try to, uh, swap their lives for the lives of the hostages in those entrenched bunkers. This is like the fantasy, you know. And do I want this picture to happen? I do. When I speak with the IDF, and I ask the IDF, do you think that this is a feasible scenario in the near future? They are saying it isn't. It doesn't mean, of course, that they know what the future is. So I think that this is time, and in that regard, I agree with Amit. I think this is time for really hard decisions to be made, uh, by, by Prime Minister Netanyahu, and he will take with him the Israeli government, maybe by the American administration. Maybe part of these decisions would be to more be more aggressive towards Hamas and to get them to a deal, because from what I'm hearing, if there would be a deal, and I'm hearing that Hamas is still considering a deal, I'm hearing that Prime Minister Netanyahu wants a deal. I want to underline that he's not trying to block this deal. He's not being blamed by any of the mediators that he's trying to block the deal. He wants the deal because he understands that Israel is in a very complex position. Um, and I think that the best case scenario right now that is really feasible is to get the Steve Witkov deal still done, and then rethink, uh, this, this process, and I think it's, it's still possible.
All right, Nadav, we will leave it there. Thank you, as always. Uh, and, uh, we will certainly be back in touch, uh, very soon.
Thank you, Dan. [Music] That's our show for today. If you found this episode valuable, please share it with others who might appreciate it. Time and again, we found that our listeners are the ones driving the growth of the Call Me Back community. So, thank you. And to offer comments, suggestions, sign up for updates, or explore past episodes, please visit our website, arcdia.org. That's arkdia.org, where you can deepen your understanding of the topics we cover. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Lon Benitar. Sound and video editing by Martin Huergo and Maryanne Khalis Bergos. Our director of operations is Maya Rockoff. Research by Gabe Silverstein. Our music was composed by Yuval Semo. Until next time, I'm your host Dan Senor. [Music]