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Prosecutor Loses It When Corrupt Cop Gets EXPOSED in Court!

Audit the Court28:57

Transcription

On January 27th, 2025, defendant Christy Cohen was charged in the Greenwood County District Court in Kansas with driving under the influence, possessing a firearm while under the influence, operating a vehicle without a required ignition interlock device, driving uninsured, driving with a suspended license, transporting an open container, and operating a vehicle with unlawful window tint.

These charges stemmed from a traffic stop initiated by Deputy Blake Fiser at approximately 9:20 p.m. on January 22nd, 2025 on suspicion of an illegal window tint.

On June 16th, 2025, Miss Cohen's attorney, Jorge De Hoyos, filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion and that all resulting evidence should be excluded. The state filed an amended complaint on June 24th, 2025, elevating the DUI charge to a felony based on prior convictions. That same day, Magistrate Judge Phyllis Webster conducted a suppression hearing, and on June 30th, she issued an order denying the motion.

However, because the amended complaint converted the case into a felony prosecution, Miss Cohen was entitled to have her suppression arguments heard again before a district judge with felony jurisdiction. The renewed suppression hearing was held via Zoom on October 16th, 2025 before Judge Charles Hart with Mr. De Hoyos representing Miss Cohen and County Attorney Jill Gillette appearing for the state. Our footage starts during Miss Gillette's direct examination of Deputy Fischer.

>> And were you able to see into Miss Cowan's vehicle?

>> No.

>> Now, I know we had gone over this before. So when she went in front of you, what what if anything can you describe to us did the interior look like?

>> I can't tell you what the interior looked like. It was too dark.

>> And if someone has correct window tint, are you able to see how many people are in the vehicle?

>> Yes.

>> Are you able to kind of tell what the interior of the vehicle looks like?

>> Somewhat? Yes.

>> Have you been using this technique for a while?

>> Yes.

>> And when you stopped this car, did you eventually test the window tint?

>> Yes.

>> What was the window tent reading of the vehicle when you were able to test it?

>> It was 11% window tent.

>> What is the legal percent in the state of Kansas?

>> 35%.

>> Do you explain every time you go through a case all of your experience or how you use specific testing?

>> No.

>> And so um is is there anywhere in your report you explain how you use your experience and uh this technique of checking windows?

>> No, I believe

>> I will pass this witness to the defense.

>> Crossexamination, Mr. De Ho.

>> Thank you, sir. Uh, Deputy Fiser, I want to make sure I understand the way at which you determined the windows were too dark. How long did you have to observe the vehicle that you pulled over?

>> I don't know an approximate time frame. I mean, it was at She was driving by at highway speeds.

>> Okay. And that highway, that's US 54 or 5400. Is that what that is?

>> 400.

>> Forgive me. 400. Um, 70 there.

>> 75.

>> 65.

>> 65. Okay. Middle of the night, right?

>> Correct.

>> And you say that the technique you employed was you had your you you flash your high beams to see if you could see through the windows. Is that right?

>> I don't flash them. I sit with them on.

>> Okay. So So you say with them on and and help me understand what happens after that.

>> As the vehicle drives by, I make my observations.

>> Okay. I mean, is this a a lawfully approved technique? I mean, is there a sheriff's or a county association or or any kind of police association that approves of this technique?

>> Not that I know of. I mean, it's reasonable suspicion. She drove by. I saw that the window tent appeared to be too dark. So, I had reasonable suspicion to believe that the window tent was too dark, so I initiated the traffic stop.

>> So, so hear me out, Deputy Fisher. I appreciate that. When it comes to the lawful definition of reasonable uh suspicion, all that not worried about that. I'm trying to understand the facts. And the fact is you use a technique that has not been supported by any lawful community that or law community that you're aware of.

>> No, we all use it.

>> As it stands right now, you don't have the experience to to be able to say that at a passing glance what percent the window tint is.

>> I can't tell an exact percentage. No. And I don't think anybody would be able to tell an exact percentage, but I know that if a vehicle is driving by and I can't see into the vehicle, it's reasonable to believe that it is too dark.

>> Okay. So, if somebody drove past you while they're holding a blanket against the window, is that mean their window tint is too dark?

>> No.

>> Okay. But that would still create the same effect that you not being able to see through the windows and then pulling them over because the window tint is too dark, even though that wouldn't be true, right?

>> I would disagree with that.

>> Okay. Which part?

>> Well, if somebody if the window tent was not too dark and they drove by and they were holding a blanket up, I would be able to see that they were holding something up. As she drove by, I wasn't even I wasn't able to see her or any other person in the vehicle, indicating that the window tent itself was too dark.

>> And are there any outside circumstances can that can affect your judgment as to the lightness or darkness of the window tents as they fly by at 65 miles an hour? as in

>> Oh, I don't in a in a storm, would you make the same call? Would you make the same pullover and same arrest?

>> I mean, it could alter some, I guess, but no, not really.

>> So, at the time in which you observed the defendant's vehicle, was it by itself or was there any other vehicle within its proximity?

>> It was by itself. So, if the video of you observing that uh I think it was a Chevy Sonic demonstrates that it was right next to and alongside an 18-wheeler that was all black and that you observed it with the all black background. That would not be consistent with your memory in the way you would do this technique. Is that correct?

>> I mean, I from what I can recall, like I said, I haven't been through the video. I haven't been through the report. From what I can recall, what I saw was her. I wasn't paying attention to any other vehicle and it was the front passenger side window that I was paying attention to. She was closest to me and she we were in a four-lane highway. She was heading eastbound. She was the closest vehicle to me. So, I was looking at that window specifically.

>> Okay. Well, I appreciate that. Um I have a Jill. I have a body or a dash cam video.

>> So, your honor, I'm going to move to midfend exhibit A. This is the dash cam video from uh officer Fischer's uh vehicle that demonstrates what he would have seen as the uh vehicle the defendant was driving passed by at 65 miles an hour on US 400.

>> Any objection by the state? Miss Gillette?

>> No, your honor.

>> The exhibit is admitted into evidence and the court will view the same.

>> Can you see it? Okay, judge.

>> Yes. Judge, if I may resume cross-examination.

>> Yes, please resume crossexamination of the deputy fisher.

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>> Just real quick here, deputy, that's a true and accurate copy of the video that would have been observed from your dash cam that night. Is that right?

>> Correct.

>> Okay. And there was other vehicle. There was at least another vehicle on the roadway, that being the semi that was behind the defendant's vehicle. Is that right?

>> Yes.

>> Okay. Um and do you agree that's little different than the testimony that there was another vehicle with it? There there was another vehicle with it, right?

>> Yes. Yes.

>> Okay. That's all I got for you, Deputy. I appreciate that.

>> Any redirect, Miss Gillette?

>> Yes, your honor. Deputy, he's asked you lots of questions about what was behind the vehicle, but you said you were concentrated on the front window and inside. Does it matter what's behind the vehicle?

>> No.

>> And your testimony was that you're focused on the window. Are you focused on being able to see what's in the vehicle versus behind the vehicle?

>> Yes. Now, I kind of alluded to this before. I I get to spend a lot more time with deputies and talk to them. I've even done ride alongs. Based on your experience, can you tell when a vehicle is approaching if it's faster or slower than what should be normally the speed of the vehicle?

>> Yes.

>> How can you tell?

>> Based on my training and experience, I've been doing this for long enough to know that the the way the the vehicle is on coming towards me, I can adj I can kind of adjust the speed in my head and kind of see um how fast it's going and then I um affirm that with my radar.

>> You said all of us do this test. What do you mean by all of us?

>> like deputies and officers in general, we use the same practices.

>> How often would you say you do this?

>> Every night that I work.

>> Judge, I'm going to object to the rest of these questions. If the strategy is inappropriate from the beginning, it doesn't matter if he does it a thousand times a day.

>> Now,

>> objection sustained.

>> I'm getting to my point, judge, because experience based on the experience in totality of the circumstances is what he needs for only reasonable suspicion. He doesn't have to have probable cause and he's already said he could reasonably infer that her window tent was too dark and we're getting to his experience here. Deputy, um, are you provided with a tool to measure window tint?

>> I am.

>> Are you able to use that while a vehicle is in motion?

>> I am not.

>> So, if you have a reasonable inference that the window tent is too dark, do you effectuate a traffic stop?

>> I do.

>> What happens when you effectuate a traffic stop with a reasonable inference that the window's too dark?

>> After explaining the reason for my stop, I test the window tint.

>> Can you test it at night?

>> Yes.

>> Can you test it during the day?

>> Yes.

>> If someone's window tent is legal, what do you do?

>> I let them on their way.

>> If the window tin is too dark, then what do you do?

>> I take further action, whether that's issuing them a warning or a citation.

>> Now, in this case, based on your experience, did you have a reasonable inference that this window tent was too dark?

>> Yes.

>> Once you stopped the vehicle, did you conduct the window tint test?

>> Objection. Relevance. It's relevant if he confirmed that it was too dark.

>> By that time, we're saying it's already illegal, so it doesn't matter.

>> Objection sustained.

>> Mr. De Hoyo subjects to Miss Gillette's question, arguing that the result of any posts stop tint measurement is irrelevant to the central question in a suppression hearing whether Deputy Fischer had reasonable suspicion at the time that he initiated the stop. And Judge Hart sustains the objection. As the Supreme Court held in the 1968 case of Terry versus Ohio, in deciding whether reasonable suspicion existed for a stop, a court must evaluate whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. In the 2000 case of Florida versus JL, the Supreme Court held that even though an anonymous tip about an individual possessing a gun turned out to be accurate, the officers still lacked reasonable suspicion because they had no reliable, articulable facts before the search that uncovered the gun. The court emphasized that the reasonleness of suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted the search or stop and not by what the search later uncovered. Likewise, whether Miss Cohen's window tint ultimately tested illegal cannot retroactively justify Deputy Fischer's stop because the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion to exist at the moment that the stop is initiated. Under section 60-41 of the Kansas statutes, relevant evidence must have a tendency to prove any material fact in the matter at hand because the issue to be resolved in the hearing was whether Deputy Fischer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Judge Hart found here that Ms. Gillette could not question Deputy Fischer about the tint on the window as measured after the stop as this evidence was irrelevant to the suppression inquiry.

>> Now, when you does any officer or anyone have a test they can do on windows prior to stopping the vehicle if they have a suspicion?

>> Not objection. Relevance.

>> Objection sustained. Judge, it's relevant because if there is

>> is there any device that you've been provided that can test a window before you have the reasonable suspicion to stop it based on your experience?

>> I'm going to object to that as a as for a legal conclusion.

>> No, it's asking if he has a device.

>> Well, the the request of before you that's the problem

>> rule.

>> Do you have a device that can test window tent before the stop?

>> No.

>> Do you have to stop the vehicle to test the window?

>> Yes.

>> In this case, based on the totality of the circumstances, the technique in which you were trained in your experience, did you have a reasonable suspicion her window was too dark?

>> I did.

>> Now, once you stopped this vehicle, was there something else that drew your attention on to it more?

>> Um, the window was rolled partially down.

>> And did you run the tag on the vehicle?

>> I did.

>> Were there any issues with the registered owner?

>> Uh, she had a no bond warrant out of Butler County.

>> No, but your initial stop was based on the window tent.

>> Correct.

>> And which window was rolled partially down?

>> Object to relevance. It's irrelevant because if the driver's side window was rolled partially down or the passenger side window was rolled partially down, if he can't tell that the other window was rolled down until he stops, that's further evidence that he couldn't see into the vehicle cuz he couldn't see her and he couldn't see into the vehicle.

>> I'm I'm confused. Are are you saying that?

>> I'm confused. Also, what about the rolling down of a window makes it relevant as to the tint percentage darkness to the windows?

>> I'll withdraw the question. Um, so deputy, when she drove by, could you clearly see the driver?

>> No.

>> Could you see if there was a passenger?

>> No.

>> Could you see anything into the vehicle?

>> No.

>> Is that normal?

>> No.

>> I'll pass the witness.

>> And Mr. De Hoyos,

>> the only reason you Sorry, Judge. The only reason you stopped that vehicle is because the window tent appeared too dark as it passed you at night going 65 miles an hour. Is that right?

>> Correct.

>> Okay. Um, you said that based upon your training, you determined it to be too dark. What is the training you've had in identifying window tent being too dark?

>> Just at work.

>> What kind of training? Like a national training like you did for your CLE and for your law enforcement training or was this something different?

>> Just my regular field training.

>> Okay. So, in field training, they teach you how to uh use your eyes to determine tint values in a vehicle.

>> Correct.

>> So, Kansas Law Enforcement Training Center has classes on how to identify.

>> Mr. Doyle, I just said my field training. That was not my academy training. my field training.

>> Okay. And the field training, uh, who provided you the field training on how to identify how dark windows are?

>> I was with numerous deputies.

>> Okay. And are they using a national program, something that's been federally approved, or you any law enforcement?

>> I don't.

>> Have you ever you ever seen any literature on any of those things?

>> I've already asked and answered no. And and there's no studies you've seen about how observations could be changed by the direction of travel, the way the light hits, anything behind it, nothing like that?

>> No.

>> Okay.

>> Mr. De Hoyos questions Deputy Fischer about his quote unquote training and experience in the methodology that he employed to initiate the traffic stop on Ms. Cohen at night, shining his high beams at passing traffic to see if he could see inside the vehicle. Courts have repeatedly held that while officers may rely on their training, reasonable suspicion still requires specific facts instead of investigative tactics built on guesswork. In the Terry case, the Supreme Court stressed that an officer's decision to detain someone cannot be based on an unparticularized suspicion or a mere quote unquote hunch. Rather, to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion, such as a traffic stop, a police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the stop. By probing whether Deputy Fischer's technique was officially sanctioned, backed by any studies, or actually produced reliable observations, Mr. De Hoyos was aiming to show that the stop lack the legally required reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.

Yeah, I I don't have any further questions for this witness.

>> Any objection to the witness, Deputy Fiser being excused from the proceedings? Miss Gillette?

>> No, your honor.

>> And Mr. De Hoyos.

>> No, that's fine, your honor.

>> Further evidence to present, Miss Gillette.

>> The state will arrest, your honor.

>> And evidence to present, Mr. De Hoos.

>> Your honor, between the deputy testify and the exhibit, that's what we have. Thank you. Council, request any argument in regards to the motion. Mr. Le, please proceed.

>> Your honor, in a traffic case in a traffic stop, officers do not have to have probable cause beyond a reasonable doubt, they have to have a reasonable inference. An inference is much, much, much lower. An officer is allowed to use their training and experience in the totality of the circumstances. A traffic stop is a Terry stop. Reasonable suspicion does not have to be probable cause. Doesn't have to be I know that exact number beyond a reasonable doubt because there's not a device that can test window tint until you stop the car. The window tent was tested and um Deputy Fiser was absolutely correct. The window tent was dark. Clearly, Deputy Fiser was absolutely right in being able to tell that the window tent was too dark under his totality of the the circumstances, his experience, and his training under the law.

>> Argument for the defense, Mr. De Hoyos.

>> So, your honor, the reason I uh was not prepared to play that video was because I didn't expect the officer's testimony to be different from the facts shown in the video. Specifically, there were other vehicles on the road. There were vehicle in close proximity. Um, and we don't have any kind of science studies or anything else supporting the idea that that this isn't a reasonable association. I think what this is akin to is is bitemark evidence which was outruled in the 70s and 80s. At the end of the day, judge, I mean, this is a hunch, a guess, not a truth. This is let's go see if that's too dark and pray we're right. And and the idea that we do this all the time is not a defense. No, there is no science supporting this. We don't have any kind of evidence or or science describing how that vehicle being behind it changes that reflect. And what if that vehicle is reflected? What if it's matte surface? We don't know because there's no science that supports the idea that this is reasonable to to to go about this way. If the officer had waited to initiate the stop until after he read the license plate and came back with a warrant, I I might not have an argument here. How can we tell the difference between window tint? Uh just the circumstances of night or if I'm holding something up that's not illegal either. I mean, I guess my point here is I want more than a hunch to pull people over and this doesn't beat that.

>> Thank you, Mr. De Hoyos. court has had an opportunity to uh view the exhibit as presented today. The court has had an opportunity to listen to the testimony of the deputy fisher. Subsequently, the court finds the incident occurred well after sunset. There was no moonlight. There were no street lights and there were other vehicles on the subject highway. The court finds a factual basis has been established. So this court determines the deputy fiser could not establish a reasonable inference or suspicion that the window tent exceeded the 35% darkness allowable by law. Therefore, the court does grant the defendant's motion to suppress. After hearing arguments from both parties, Judge Hart concludes that Deputy Fischer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Miss Cohen and grants the motion to suppress. In granting the motion to suppress, Judge Hart applied what is known as the exclusionary rule, the principle that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure cannot be used by the prosecution. This means that because Judge Hart found that the stop itself was unconstitutional, everything that happened after Deputy Fischer activated his emergency lights was suppressed as the direct product of that illegal seizure. Under the 1961 Supreme Court case of MAP versus Ohio, the exclusionary rule prevents the state from using evidence obtained directly through a Fourth Amendment violation. And under the 1963 case of Wong Sun versus United States, all statements, observations, and physical evidence that flowed from the stop, which is known in legal jargon as quote unquote the fruit of the poisonous tree, must also be excluded. Therefore, in this situation, Judge Hart's decision to grant the motion to suppress meant that all the evidence gathered during and stemming from Deputy Fischer's encounter with Miss Cohen could not be used to prosecute the charges arising from the traffic stop.

Your honor, the state asks the court to reconsider ignoring because you're ignoring the officer's training and experience that allows him in the totality of the circumstances and utilizing methodologies that are used commonly in law enforcement. Common methodologies are recognized. So, we would ask the court to reconsider and deny this motion to suppress the same as Judge Webster did based on the totality of the circumstances and the training and experience of law enforcement officers because they have a lot more experience out there in recognizing these things in split seconds than the normal lay person which has been routinely recognized by the Supreme Court and the appellet courts and we'd ask the court to reconsider

>> as district judge of division 2 of the 13th judicial district. The court overrules the state's motion to reconsider.

>> The state requests a stay on dismissal for a notice of appeal.

>> Any objection, Minister De Hoyos?

>> No. I believe the state is entitled to an interlocutory appeal under the circumstances

>> and the court uh grants the stay pursuant to the motion of the state here in After Judge Hart granted the motion to suppress, Ms. Gillette immediately asked the court to quote unquote reconsider its ruling, which is essentially a request for the judge to reverse or modify his own decision. A motion for reconsideration is not a new hearing on the facts, but a request for the court to re-examine its ruling based on the arguments already presented, usually on the grounds that the court overlook something important or misapplied the law. Judge Hart denied that request and stood by his original ruling, meaning that the suppression order remained in effect. Ms. Gillette then requested that Judge Hart quote unquote stay or delay the dismissal of the charges against Miss Cohen so that she could file a quote unquote interlocutory appeal. An interlocutory appeal is a type of appeal filed before a case is finished. Used when a key ruling such as a suppression order is so essential to the outcome of the case that it must be reviewed immediately rather than waiting for a final judgment. By granting the stay, Judge Hart temporarily froze the case exactly where it was, allowing the state to ask a higher court to decide whether his suppression ruling was legally correct before anything else happened. On November 3rd, 2025, Miss Gillette filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, and as of the date of writing this episode, the case is still pending. This hearing underscores just how critical the Fourth Amendment's protections are in everyday encounters between citizens and law enforcement, as well as the criminal charges stemming from those interactions. Reasonable suspicion is not a legal technicality. It is the constitutional threshold that prevents officers from acting on instinct alone and ensures that traffic stops are grounded in objective articulable facts. When that standard is not met, courts have a duty to intervene and the exclusionary rule exists to ensure that evidence obtained through unconstitutional police conduct is not used against defendants in subsequent prosecutions. Judge Hart's ruling reflects this obligation, and the state's immediate pursuit of an interlocutory appeals shows just how consequential suppression decisions can be in a criminal prosecution. As this case moves forward, the appellate courts will determine whether the stop that set everything in motion satisfied the minimum requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Until then, this episode serves as a reminder of why constitutional violations matter and how closely police conduct can be scrutinized inside a courtroom. Let us know if there's a case or courtroom interaction that you'd like us to explore in the comments down below. Thank you for watching and don't forget to like and subscribe so that we can help foster a more informed society.