Transcription
A land bridge from Tehran to Baghdad, to Damascus, to Beirut. This region needs to stabilize, but how will it ultimately stabilize? The region will not allow a single victor to emerge and declare victory. What they call in political terms, "restoring warmth to relations with the interim authority in Syria." And the visit that Ahmad al-Shar'a made to the Gulf countries was not just a failure; it did not seek to achieve true stability in Syria. It actually, the term "interim authority," it sought to consolidate its power. The magic formula for dictatorial rule, or even when they go to occupy another country, is "divide and conquer." My guest today is researcher Alaa Al-Khatib. Welcome, Professor Alaa. You honored me. Welcome. Good morning, Professor Alaa, and greetings to all followers. Thank you, Professor Alaa. Let's start with an article you wrote detailing the repercussions of the Syrian earthquake on the Gulf. In reality, I wrote this article after the outbreak of the war in the Arabian Gulf and its impact or overlap with what happened in Syria. I would like to remind viewers of a statement made by an Iranian official in 2013, Hujjat al-Islam Mehdi Tayeb, as he was called. He said about Syria that it is the 35th province of Iran. Of course, this caused a great uproar. People understood it as a kind of indication that Iran simply controls Syria or occupies it. In reality, he was speaking, and the meaning of his words, regardless of what he intended, was that from a geopolitical and national security perspective for the Iranian regime, Syria represents one of the most important national security issues outside of Iran. Therefore, we say that one of the worst things Hafez al-Assad did was to bring Syria into a strategic alliance with the Iranian regime in 1979, after the Iranian revolution. This alliance has constrained Syria. Until now, Iran, or the Iranian regime, has always prioritized, let's say, breaking the isolation imposed on it from the beginning. It wanted to maintain what I call a land bridge, a land route, a land bridge from Tehran to Baghdad, to Damascus, to Beirut. This axis, for the Iranian regime, is an axis of extreme importance on all fronts, economically, of course, but also on the front of national security, on the front of the region, and on the regional level. By the way, Bashar al-Assad said in an interview with a Russian newspaper in 2016 that Syria is the first line of defense for the Iranian regime. Of course, the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime was a severe geopolitical blow to the Iranian regime, as Syria was fundamental to the Iranian regime's attempt to have influence and enter the region as a major power. Of course, this created a vacuum, and Syria, we can say, slipped out of Iran's control and dependence. This shock, for the Iranians, cost them a huge strategic depth. There was a kind of reaction, let's say, for the Iranians. They began to look more towards what I called the policy of naval interdiction in the Arabian Gulf and to benefit from their position on the Arabian Gulf after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime. So, what is happening now in the Gulf is not just a military confrontation for direct reasons at all. It is expressing a phase of change in the equations in the region after the fall of Bashar's regime and a radical change that is not easy in all aspects. So, Iran needs other tools of pressure after losing this important axis that passed through Damascus. Therefore, the collision in the Gulf was inevitable, let's say, from a regional perspective, and even from America's perspective. For America, there are two important factors that it shares with Israel. The first factor is that both realized that Syria's exit from the Iranian sphere of influence weakened the Iranian regime, and this is a suitable opportunity for both parties to increase or perhaps deliver what they might imagine to be a fatal blow to the Iranian regime. Not to mention, of course, in America, there is the mentality and way Trump manages conflict and his need now to achieve something he promised to achieve from the day he withdrew from the Iranian nuclear deal that Obama concluded in 2015. Trump, as we know, withdrew from it in 2017 and promised that he would reach a nuclear deal with Iran better than what you achieved, Obama. In addition, of course, to Netanyahu's internal problem, he also needs an external distraction. So, several factors have converged. I say that the most important is what we called the Syrian earthquake because the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime was unexpected and surprised everyone. Yes. And among these repercussions was the Iranian regime falling into a moment of weakness that it realized, and America and Israel also realized. So, we can say that it is like dominoes. The fall of Assad's regime will affect, or has already affected, the Iranian regime. But what do the Gulf states expect to be the result? Some expect that the era of prosperity is beginning to end. No, I expect that to be a hasty conclusion for the Gulf states. Ultimately, the region is reformulating, let's call it, its regional alliances. All the interactions happening, of course, for the Gulf states in this war, they have paid a heavy price and suffered great losses. But there is a direction, ultimately, this region must stabilize due to its great importance, at least economically, of course, geopolitically, on a global level. We all know the importance of the Arabian Gulf region economically is not just energy, primarily. In addition to being a main passage for goods, in addition to its geopolitical location, this region needs to stabilize. But how will it stabilize in the end? This region will not allow a single victor to emerge and declare his victory. And as we see now, the political statements, Trump will announce that he has won, and the Iranian regime will announce that it has won. Now, political statements are for populism. Yes. But practically, has anyone achieved final victory? No one has achieved it, and the region will not allow that. Stability now within this region has become a global demand. So, the Gulf states, we hope for the Gulf states to have the plan and strategy and have learned the lesson so that they maintain their stability more and return to any path they were following. And this, ultimately, will reflect on the entire region. Uh-huh. Uh-huh. We can link the issue of stability with granting authority, as if it were a new opportunity. We are seeing a new external tour for the authority after several months of stagnation. We felt as if no one was communicating with Syria, or there were no external visits, except for visits to Europe, the goal of which was announced as the return of Syrian refugees, and nothing new resulted from it. Currently, al-Shar'a's requests are unprecedented calls for Syria, and some interpreted the picture that Trump published of two perfume bottles, "I renew my perfume for you," as if he is granting a new opportunity. So, can we link these two matters together? Certainly, certainly. Let's clarify a very important point. Syria, with the fall of the regime, or the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, and consequently Iran's exit from Syria as an ally and controller of the Syrian situation, with a dominant hand in Syria, created a vacuum. Whoever comes to rule Syria, Ahmad al-Shar'a or someone else, the Gulf states, Western countries, and America will jump to fill that vacuum. Why? Because, as we said earlier, of the geopolitical importance of Syria's location. So, this vacuum must be filled by the Gulf states in particular, Turkey, and Western countries led by America. This is indeed what happened, whether it was Ahmad al-Shar'a or someone else. Now, Syria's importance in the region and even globally is increasing due to the interventions and the Gulf war conflict. So, Syria's political importance has also increased. Therefore, we witnessed what is called in political terms "restoring warmth to relations with the interim authority in Syria." And the visit that Ahmad al-Shar'a made to the Gulf countries, and he also concluded it in the UAE. The UAE is known for its pragmatic policy in these cases, and it is quick to invest. The Emiratis are more pragmatic, let's say, than Saudi Arabia, so they are more urgent. This is what they did, for example, in Egypt after the era of Sisi began, and this is what they were trying to do in Yemen as well. They focus a lot on seaports, they focus a lot on trade routes. So, in Syria, we find that they also focus on the issue of Tartus and Syrian ports. Uh-huh. Approximately, we can say the reasons are still the same for Western countries. Now, in the midst of the conflict with Iran, any system, this interim authority in Syria, must be strengthened so that it remains with us. Syria is now outside Iranian control, and therefore, it weakens Iran. Yes. So, its invitation to the G7 summit or the summit of the seven major powers in France, and the invitation of al-Shar'a to attend it, also falls within the same scope. And there are many reasons being discussed, of course, regarding the geopolitical balance of power in the region. This, we can say, is the final seal of Syria's exit from the Iranian umbrella. Not to mention the issue of trade corridors for Syria, which will also be an important knot, along with Jordan, by the way. All these factors, in addition to the personal aspect, let's not forget, Trump admires these models of rule. And he admires the way the interim authority is managed. Why? Because it is closer to totalitarian rule, let's call it dictatorial, rather than a democratic country. Okay, if we agree that the broad title is stability, then is this authority capable of granting Syria stability? I mean, an observer might see that the first set of opportunities was not invested in as required. From afar, it seems as if the authority, too, is like a person standing on a landmine. Any movement he makes, this landmine will explode. The landmine has not been removed; there is ash, and under this ash, there are embers that can ignite at any moment. And the authority is trying not just to remove the embers, but to put a new layer of ash. In your opinion, what will actually happen? Will we be able to reach stability? I would say that your analogy is indeed expressive. It is an increase in the amount of ash over the fire, unfortunately. This authority has not sought, not only failed, but has not sought to achieve true stability in Syria. It is actually, the term "interim authority," it has sought to consolidate its power. The authority led by Ahmad al-Shar'a has sought to consolidate its power, the power of Ahmad al-Shar'a and those with him, as a totalitarian authority ruling Syria. This has helped him, but there is a difference between that and achieving stability and rebuilding a stable Syrian state capable of benefiting from this historical opportunity that is happening in the region. We can call it a historical opportunity, a great change that increases the importance of Syria's position within these global and regional conflicts that are happening, which we have discussed. But to be able to benefit from this historical moment, there must be a real project for rebuilding the Syrian state, the most important condition of which is stability. One of the fundamental questions, for example, is that he asks, "Well, these corridors we are talking about, and we hope they work correctly." By the way, there is exaggeration in their size, quantity, and speed. There is exaggeration, especially from the media supporting the interim authority. These corridors and this position, can they work in a country or a region that has not been without war for ten years? If we go back 80 years, it hasn't been 10 years without war. And can it work in an unstable country with embers burning under the ash, as is the case in Syria? And these embers are burning from all sides. Yes. Economic failure on the economic level, so far, floundering left and right. On the economic level, there is no roadmap and no real economic strategy for rebuilding, and most importantly, the infrastructure in Syria. For example, here I put it in parentheses because one of the questions asks, "Well, why do these trade corridors pass through Syria? They pass through Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan, and could go to Israel." What is the advantage that Israel offers in this case? The advantage they have is that they have strong infrastructure, whether it's ports, railways, or transportation. In Syria, for example, this is one of the most important infrastructures required in Syria, which is transportation, for example, and electricity, as well as ports. So, here I need at least a plan. If you ask, "Have you made a plan?" There is no plan. Stability on the social and political level in the country. We know the Syrian society after 14 years of suffering and after 50 years of oppression. Also, I have a real problem. There are vertical rifts in Syrian society, sectarian rifts, ethnic rifts, and political rifts. And now, regional rifts are appearing and have multiplied tenfold in the last year and a half. Why? Because of the failure to achieve transitional justice. Transitional justice is not just a moral demand or an emotional demand. No, absolutely. It is a fundamental condition for stability in Syria. On the level of transitional justice, of course, there is complete failure. On the security level, the security situation is unfortunately from bad to worse. If we exclude, if we exclude, there were two major massacres, the massacre of the coast and the massacre of Sweida, so to speak, crimes of murder and kidnapping. Uh-huh. Yes. So, please, there is no will, let's say, at all, to achieve stability, as you mentioned, economically or even socially. There is no will to stop the rhetoric of hatred, to stop the rhetoric of sectarianism, even in the simplest details that we see. Kidnapping of women is still ongoing. The glorification of the sisters in Christian neighborhoods. All these details are details that increase this rift and threaten civil peace, and they are left as they are. But the question, Professor Alaa, don't the countries see this? They see it. Is there no alternative? This is the point. Countries with influence in Syria and with interests, whether regional countries, Gulf states, and Turkey, or even America and Western countries, they do not have enough experience to see these problems. But they are betting, as usual. Ultimately, these countries, let's not imagine that they always act logically and objectively. Let's say, objectively. They are more pragmatic. Dealing with a strong dictatorial authority is enough for them. This is enough for them. For al-Shar'a to seek to establish a strong totalitarian authority, meaning al-Shar'a's project is to consolidate my authority as the eternal ruler of this country. For these countries, within their history of dealing with dictatorial countries, whether in the region or in the world, they still believe that this is better, or that this might work. And the other options, they do not have, as they see the situation. They fear the situation exploding. They are not ready to take the risk again after 14 years. You know, 14 years of international interventions in Syria were intense from all countries. Interventions and conflicts occurred, and even conflicts between allies in Syria, at the expense of Syrian blood. So, they are not ready to return to that stage. And the other option, it is not their mission to rebuild the country. For them, their mission, or what they see as opportunities, is to benefit from this country as much as possible. Perhaps the totalitarian authority, as we see it now, is being built, a channel for corruption. So, now this authority is being built. On the basis of corruption. Yes. It is easier for me to deal with, or I have experience dealing with it. As I told you earlier, the Emirates went to invest in Egypt, they will invest in Yemen. These countries suffer greatly on this level. And they deal with the existing situation. What are they betting on, in your opinion? They are betting on empowering the authority and the submission of the Syrian people. This is the primary bet. The primary bet for them is that a strong authority will emerge, which will rely, like any dictatorial authority, on the security and military aspect of governance. A strong authority that possesses the keys to the economy, which will be based on corruption. And as we see now, the economy and the economic capabilities of the country are being distributed between the narrow circle around al-Shar'a and any call for private investments, which, by the way, investments are always said to achieve the economic miracle in Syria. This is an illusion. But selling the country to private investments, especially foreign ones, and this fulfills the objectives of these countries. So, a rule by force, a rule by the economic structure that suits foreign investments that do not work for the benefit of the country and are confined to a few hands around al-Shar'a. So, the methods of corruption are abundant. The accumulation between the two leads them to results, as they see them, and according to their historical experience, these are the desired results. Uh-huh. One of the tools, I see, that the authority might be using to achieve this goal, to consolidate power, is grievances. Using the grievance of the Sunni population to strengthen the ability to impose all kinds of corruption, oppression, and totalitarianism that we are seeing. Meaning, there is always a bogeyman that the majority is being frightened of, which is the return of the regime, the return of minority rule. So, the use of this grievance has become currently, but it is being met by other grievances. So, we now have the Alawite grievance, the Druze grievance. How are grievances being managed today in Syria? Unfortunately, the use of this term is indeed accurate. Exactly. You are right. First, let's say, as happened in Syria in the eighties, and as happened in all dictatorial countries throughout history, the magic formula for dictatorial rule, or even when they go to occupy another country, is "divide and conquer." Syria has, as we know, a huge sectarian diversity, said to be around 20 religious sects and about eight or nine ethnic groups. So, there is a huge diversity in the composition of the Syrian people. So, what do I need to divide the Syrian people? How do I divide them? The raw material is available. There are sects, there are ethnic groups, and even regions. The Assad regime relied on this, and al-Shar'a continues this formula, which historically has proven successful, whether we like it or not. And among its forms is what we can call the grievance. Let's say that grievance, fundamentally, to understand correctly, why do I say the word grievance? It is indeed a legitimate human feeling, there is no oppression. It is a response by an individual or a group to injustice that has befallen them. It cannot be denied that injustice has befallen the Syrian people. This injustice that has befallen the Syrian people, each group has also, let's say, felt that it has been specifically targeted. So, it is a social phenomenon that groups desire, and in Syria, these are primarily sectarian and ethnic groups, and even political groups. What is the problem with this collective feeling of grievance? It turns into an identity. It solidifies my sectarian identity, my ethnic identity, my political identity. This threatens the structure of the entire society, the Syrian society completely. When each group clings to its identity, as Ma'rouf called it, "killer identities," here the statement is correct. Grievance increases the cohesion of the group because it feeds, and at the same time feeds, feelings of hostility, aversion, or fear of other groups. So, it becomes how people deal with "us and them." And if you pay attention to the media and social media, the pronoun "us and them," or "us and you," is very frequently used. Everyone now speaks in the pronoun "we," not even in the pronoun "I" as an individual. I speak in the pronoun "we." I remain silent. For example, I am Sunni, so I mean "we" here. Uh-huh. And the 14 years and what preceded them and what happened in them have increased this suffering. And it was exploited, for example, during the 14 years. We don't want to go too far back in history to the time of Hafez and Bashar. In the past 14 years, Sunnis were indeed targeted to increase their sense of grievance tenfold. At the same time, the media, whether from the Syrian regime or even from the Russian side, I say that Lavrov would not sit with his legs crossed without talking about protecting minorities in Syria. So, even minorities were ready and had a sense of grievance that they were victims. The regime fell, the regime fell. So, here al-Shar'a continued to exploit it. He came up with the story of the alliance of minorities so that the Sunni group would remain afraid, would continue to feel that its rights were not achieved. At the same time, during these year and a half, we have had two horrific massacres on the coast and in Sweida. So, they also grew rapidly, and these minorities already have a historical, old sense of grievance. So, the lesson, or the Alawites, or the Ismailis, or the Kurds, in the project of grievance, it is still older, ancient in history. Yes. The feeling of this grievance has returned. So, unfortunately, we have a competition and conflict: who is more wronged? Me or you? And through it, there is a kind of condemnation of the other, and "I am wronged, and I will not admit the injustice that remains upon me. I am the only one wronged. You are not wronged. You are wronging me." This leads to a reduction in the human value of the other party. Yes. Here comes the ruler, or the ruler, or the one with power in the country, to hold onto everyone, holding the threads of the loom. "Okay, Sunni, I will get you your rights. Okay, Druze, Alawite, Sunni, Kurd, I will protect you. I am the guarantor." And we know the saying that they launched on social media in particular, they keep repeating it: "If it weren't for Ahmad al-Shar'a, the coast would have been destroyed," for example, "and if it weren't for him, Sweida would have been burned." Uh-huh. Meaning, he gives you the feeling that "I am your guarantor," even though you see that I have wronged you, but I want to remain your guarantor. Playing on the conflict, these grievances then solidify, increase, and deepen the problem of sectarianism, the problem of ethnicity in Syria, and the problem of regionalism that is also appearing now and we are hearing more about it. And the absence of belonging to Syria. So, everyone now wants to belong to their narrow identity, which are the killer identities, as you mentioned, and we took the term from Amin Maalouf, unfortunately. Exactly, exactly. Of course, in rebuilding Syria, we spoke about it quickly. Rebuilding requires rebuilding the Syrian identity that has been destroyed over 50 years, over 14 years, over this year. How do I rebuild this identity? And the belonging to narrow groups is increasing, and with it, fear. I say there is no more hatred, there is no more fear for the majority. There is hatred for the minority. So, here it becomes clear, once again, we return to say: what was the importance of transitional justice? Transitional justice is not just about bringing a few criminals who committed crimes against the Syrian people and trying them, and even if they are executed, that is not transitional justice. Transitional justice is to compensate the victims, so that people begin to emerge, to begin to emerge from their feeling of grievance and that their rights are being restored, morally. And if possible, materially, and over a long period of time. The task of transitional justice is to reduce this, let's call it, encapsulation and withdrawal into oneself that has occurred between Syrian groups. Yes. And it prevents, consequently, any cases of revenge from occurring. Uh-huh. So, Syria is still standing on a street. If we remember, we saw, for example, when the murder crime occurred in Homs, which was an ordinary criminal crime. The couple was killed. Uh-huh. Based on slogans written by the killer on the walls of the house, it led to a فتنة (fitna - discord/strife) and another clash between Sunnis and Alawites. Correct. Meaning, a straw, like even what happened with the Druze when the fabricated video tape came out about the Druze sheikh. A single straw, a social media influencer, can create discord for me, can lead to bloodshed in Syria. And unfortunately, there was an insistence on protecting this person. Even when a case was filed against him, he was not tried. When he came to Turkey, someone filed a case against him in Turkey. The authority contacted the Turkish Interior Ministry to release him, even though he caused massacres and great bloodshed. However, there is an insistence on protecting this person. And as you pointed out, Professor Alaa, because the continuation of these grievances is a tool, unfortunately, to consolidate what is happening in Syria. Thank you very much, researcher Alaa Al-Khatib. Thank you very much for this interview and this valuable information. Thank you, Professor Alaa. Thank you, and to all followers.