Transcription
Who was Churchill and how did Churchill come to power at this moment? Well, Churchill is this absolutely towering figure in British politics. You know, he's been, you know, first a minister in the kind of naughties of the 20th century and the first years of of the 20th century. Um, first of the liberals, then of the conservatives. He's a former chancellor um um of the exchequer. Um he's a towering figure, but he's been in the wilderness because he's out of favor with the Stanley Baldwin government. Um he's out of favor with with with Chamberlain.
But he is this towering figure and he has been very outspoken as a backbencher, which basically means, you know, you're not a minister, you're not in the cabinet, you're just an ordinary member of parliament, but obviously you're an ordinary member of parliament, but you're also an ordinary member of parliament who has had ministries of state and who is this tying figure. So he's listened to in a way that other backbenches aren't. Um and he has been saying, you know, we need to stand up to the dictators. We need to do this. Um we need to rearm more more heavily. Uh and blah blah blah.
So when war is declared, he's brought back into the admiralty um in charge of the navy, which is Britain's senior service. And um suddenly he's there. And what happens is Britain doesn't really do anything. It's very difficult working with France because France is so politically fractured that they can't make any decisions. When you can't make any decisions, you're just impotent. Um and so Churchill first mentions going into Norway mining the leads. So, um the idea is that you're making life very difficult for the Germans to get iron ore out of Sweden. Their main their main source of iron ore is up in the northern part of Sweden in the Arctic Circle. It then goes on a railway through northern tip of Norway and then gets shipped down the um west coast of Norway into Germany into the Baltic.
So uh Churchill suggests in September 1939, why don't we mine the leads which are the leads are these passageways um out of the fjords in the in the north into the uh into the North Sea? Why don't we mine those and stop the Germans from from from um taking this? Everyone goes, "Well, yeah, that's quite a good idea, but they can't decide." and French are nervous that if they do that, the Germans retaliate and bomb France and all this kind of stuff. So, no decision is made until kind of April 19 1940. They go up to start mining the leads on exactly the same day that the Germans invade Denmark and and Norway. And and so they're they're caught off guards.
And at that moment really, it's seen as a failure of Chamberlain's government. And there is a kind of a mounting realization that no matter how good he was or competent he was as a peacetime prime minister, he's not a wartime prime minister. you know, he's not served in the armed forces himself. He doesn't really understand it. It needs a different set of hands. And um his government falls on the 9th of May. It becomes inevitable that he's going to have to resign. And the obvious person to take his place is Lord Halifax, who is in the House of Lords, but you can still be a prime minister. And um he is without question the most respected politician in the country. He's um u former viceroy of India. He's seen as incredibly safe pair of hands, man of resolute, sound judgment, etc., etc. Um, but he doesn't want to take it. He feels physically ill at the prospect. Doesn't want this responsibility. He's also not really a military man. He's got a slightly sort of withered hand which has prevented him from doing military service. And he just blanches at this moment. And that really leaves only one other figure that could possibly take on this position and that's Churchill.
So when Chamberlain resigns on the 9th of May and Halifax says it's it's not for me, um the only person who's going to slip into that position is Churchill and he becomes prime minister and he accepts it gladly. He feels like it is his mission in life. This is his moment cometh the outcome of the man. But he comes with a huge amount of baggage. I mean you know he's known as a man who drinks too much who's whose judgment hasn't always been great. You know he was chancellor during the time of the general strike 1926. you know he backed Edward VII over the uh monarchy crisis when the king wanted to marry Wallis Simpson the divorcee Catholic divorcee etc etc so you know his judgment has been brought into question you know he is the man who was who came up with the idea of the Gallipoli campaign which was you know an ignominious failure blah blah blah so there are issues over him you know he is seen as a hothead and a man who doesn't have the kind of sound judgment of Halifax so the jury is is very much out and I think it's again it's one of those things where you have to put yourself in you have to look at this through the prism of what people were thinking in May 1940. Yes, he he was considered a taring politician, but he is seen also as a loose cannon and by no means the right person in this hour of darkness.
And it is coincidental that the 10th of May 1940 when he takes over as prime minister, becomes prime minister, not through an election but by default of a new nationalist government. So no longer a conservative comp government but a nationalist crossparty coalition government for the duration of the war um which includes you know members of of the Liberal party and also the Labour party as well as Conservatives that it is by no means certain that that he's going to be able to deliver the goods and it is also coincidentally the same day that the Germans launch case yellow operation yellow the invasion of the low countries in France So these are tumultuous events to put it mildly. And it is also the case that you know only a couple of weeks before um Paul Reynaud has taken over as prime minister of yet another coalition government in France from from Daladier. So political turmoil is very much the watchword at this time for the uh for the western democracies just at the moment that the Germans are making their kind of you know their hammer strike into the west.
This might be a good moment to bring up this idea that has been circulating recently brought up by Daryl Cooper who hyperbolically stated that Churchill was the quote chief villain of uh the Second World War. To give a good faith interpretation of that, I believe he meant that Churchill forced Hitler to escalate the expansion of Nazi Germany beyond Poland into a global war. So Churchill is the one that turned this narrow war, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland into a global one. Um, is that accurate? No, I don't think it is. I mean, not least because the decisions over Poland were made by Chamberlain's government, not when Churchill was out of government. So, you know, Churchill wasn't even involved in that decision-making process at the time.
No, I I don't think so. I mean again I I go back to kind of Britain's position in the world in 1939. If you say we are going to defend the sovereignty of Poland and then you don't that is that looks really bad globally. You know Britain's prestige would plummet would lead to all sorts of problems. Um you are saying that you're giving carte blanche to dictators to just run a mock and take whatever territory they want. you are risking the future upheaval of the global order um away from democracies into the hands of dictators. You know in the west people believe in democracy and believe in advancement of of and freedoms of people. This is you know to to echo the words of Roosevelt in August 1941. You know that they're aspiring to a world um free of want and fear. Now obviously there's still some issues with the form that democracy takes in the 1930s. It's not democratic for everyone. You know, try saying that if you're in Nigeria or uh or or India or whatever. Um, or if you're, you know, in the black southern states of the United States. But the aspirations are there. And I think that's that's that's an important distinction. And I think by saying that that Churchill is the chief war-monger of the Second World War, I think is is ludicrous. You know, it's the same thing about about the bombing, you know, the the the detractors of strategic air campaign always go, "Yeah, but you know, Germans had the Holocaust, but but weren't the weren't the allies just as bad just killing all those civilians." It's like, "No, because the moment Hitler stopped the war, the bombing would stop." You know, the moment the war stopped in Hitler's favor, the killing would continue and be accelerated.
So the the thing you mentioned initially is the sort of the idealist perspective of well Britain can't allow sort of uh this warmonger to break all these pacts and be undemocratic you know um murder a large number of people and do conquest of territory okay that's idealistic but if we look at the realist perspective, what decisions would minimize the amount of suffering on the continent in the next 50 years? So, one of the arguments that he's making, I happen to disagree with it to put it mildly, is that Churchill increased the amount of suffering. So, Churchill Churchill's presence and decisions. So, we're not talking about idealistic perspective. We're talking about realist like the the reality of the war of Stalin, of of Hitler, of Churchill, of uh of France and FDR? Did Churchill drag Hitler into a world war? Did he force Hitler to invade the Soviet Union? Did he force Hitler to then in invade uh attack Britain?
Well, no, because because Hitler was always going to invade the Soviet Union if unless unless the Soviet Union invaded Germany first. So, that was always going to happen. Um, no one asked Hitler to invade the low countries and Norway and Denmark and attack Britain. Um he does that of course because he's not given a free hand in Poland. But there's no question that Hitler would have also wanted to subdue France or certainly turn France from a democracy into a totalitarian state as well. I'm absolutely certain about that. So I think there's pretty definitive evidence. I mean it's obvious from everything he's said, from everything he's written, from everything everywhere that he was going to invade the Soviet Union. Uh, yeah. And France most likely. Yes.
Also he would have done a deal with Britain. Britain could have coexisted. So actually there is a is there there is a possible reality. I don't know maybe you can correct me on this where Hitler basically takes all of Europe except Britain. Yes. But then he would have got so strong that he would have then turned on Britain as well. you know, because he he would, you know, the fear is that if you let him do this and then then he he gets greedy, he wants the next one, then he wants the next one, then he wants the next one, and you know, then he wants to take over the whole world. And, you know, that is that is the fear of the British. That is the fear of the Americans. that the fear of President Roosevelt who's got a very we haven't even touched on this yet, but he has a very difficult uh um case on his hands because he's come into power also in January 1933 um as president of the United States on an isolationist ticket with a retrenching with a kind of sort of you know step away from the European old order. It's time for the Europeans on their own. Um, it all sounds very familiar right now. um and and suddenly he's got to do this gargantuan political vault um and prepare the nation for war because he also fears like Churchill fears like most like Chamberlain feared as well um that that Hitler's designs are not purely on Eastern Europe and the Lebanons from there but would get ever bigger and I don't I don't doubt that they're right. I think if he'd prevailed in the Soviet Union, you know, he he'd always wanted more, you know, because his whole concept is the master race, you know.
Yeah. I I think I think it should be said if we if we measure human suffering, if there was not Britain on the other side, if it was not a two-front war that the chances of Hitler succeeding in the Soviet Union is much higher or at least a more prolonged war and there would be more dead, more enslaved and more tortured and all of this. Yes. and and ditto if you you know if the if the allies hadn't got involved against Imperial Japan you know it would have been would have been catastrophic I mean 20 to 30 million Chinese dead anyway you know with American and British intervention you know was it going to be in China without that I mean and elsewhere you know because because the reason why Japan invades French Indo-China now Vietnam um and Hong Kong and um and Malaya and Singapore and and so on and Burma is because it's not winning in China and it needs more resources because it's resource poor and America has cut off the tap. So is going into these countries to to get what it needs its rubber and oil and natural resources and ores precious ores and all the rest of it. And if it had been unchecked, it would have done so. And then it would have absolutely built up its strength and overrun the whole of China with even more deaths. So, you know, I I think there is I think the one of the interesting things about the Second World War is is lots of wars and why people get involved in them are extremely questionable. But I think there is a moral crusade to to the Allies and what they're doing that I think is entirely justified.
What I think is interesting also is that as the war progresses, you know, if the allies are supposed to be on the force of the good, how come they're doing so much bad? And at what point is doing bad stopping you from doing good? And at what point are you doing good but also doing bad at the same time? Such as destruction of cities, um destruction of monasteries on outcrops in southern Italy, you know, destruction of killing of loss of civilians, etc., etc. you know that these are these are difficult questions to to answer sometimes they're also incredibly interesting and I think that moral component starts to blur a little bit by kind of middle of the war by 1943 you know it's it's kind of easy to have a fairly uh cut and dry um war in North Africa in the deserts of North Africa where you know the only people getting in the way are a few sort of bedouin tribesmen or something but but once you start getting into Europe or getting into the kind of the the meat of highly populated countries in the Far East. Um, for example, that's a different kind of fish because the scale of destruction is absolutely immense.
But it is also the job of of political leaders um to look after and defend their own peoples first and foremost. And so what you're doing is you're trying to protect your own sovereignty, your own people before you're protecting other people. And so that's what leads to, you know, what the whole way in which the allies are, the western allies are protracting war is to try and minimize the number of deaths of their own young men as much as they possibly can whilst at the same time winning the war. And that means bringing lots of destruction to your enemies, but also trying to minimize it. And the way you bring lots of destruction by to your enemies is by using immense firepower. and this concept of steel not our flesh which I mentioned earlier on and technology um so that you don't have to bring to bear too many of your young men's lives in have a repeat of the slaughter of the first world war.
So, you know, it is really interesting that that in in our mind's eye when we're thinking of, you know, the Western Allies in in the Second World War, probably the first thing that comes into mind is Americans jumping out of landing craft on Omaha Beach on D-Day, for example. Those are infantrymen. They're the front line. They are the cold face of they're the first people going into the into the fire of the enemy. And we tend to think about guys in tanks, um, infantrymen with their Garand rifles or, you know, machine guns or whatever. That's that's what springs to mind. Yet, actually, they're a comparatively small proportion of the army. So, no more than 14 to 15% of any army, allied army, is infantry. 45% are service corps service troops driving trucks and cooks and bottle washers and people lugging great big boxes of stuff you know and that's because by that stage you know the allies have worked out the way of war which is is to is to use is what I call big war this concept of of a very long tail logistics the operational art making sure that people have the absolute best you possibly can great medical care huge advances in in in first aid and medical care of troops getting them back onto the battlefield and You're using firepower and technology and mechanization to do a lot of your hard yards.
So, you know, that's the principle behind strategic bombing. You know, if you can if you go over and bomb and you can destroy infrastructure and civilians and households, that makes it much harder for for crop to make those Panther tanks and Tiger tanks or whatever it might be and guns. H and you know, you're disrupting the transportation system in Germany. you know, you're making life difficult for them to do what they need to do, then that means it's going to be easier for those 15, 14, 15% of infantrymen who've got to jump out of landing craft to do their job and you're trying to keep that to a minimum. And you'd have to say, broadly speaking, that's a very sensible policy that makes an awful lot of sense. Um, consequence of that is a huge amount of destruction. And maybe that's what Daryl Cooper's driving at, but no one asked Hitler to invade Poland. I mean, you know, that is the bottom line. No one asked Germany to go to war. No one asked Hitler to come up with these ludicrous ideology.
Yeah. There's complex ethical discussions here about uh uh just like as you described which are fascinating which are fascinating and u war is hell and there's many ways in which it is hell. uh just for a little bit. The steel man what uh Daryl is where he might be coming from is since World War II. The simplistic veneration of Churchill sort of saying Churchill good, Hitler bad has been used as a template to project onto other conflicts to justify military uh intervention. And so his general his and other people like libertarians for example resistance to that overly simplistic veneration of somebody like Churchill has to do with the fact that that seems to be by neocons and warmongers in the military-industrial complex in the United States and elsewhere using Hitler way too much to justify invading everywhere and anywhere.
I well I I do agree with that. I I think o oversimplification of anything is a mistake. You know, life is nuanced. The past is nuanced. It's okay to be proud about certain things and it's okay to be disgusted by other things. That's absolutely fine. You know, we have a complicated relationship with our past. It doesn't need to be black and white. And um you know, life is not a straight line. And of course, there's you know, the allies made plenty of mistakes in in in World War II. Overall, I think they made the right calls. And I think one of the things that's really interesting is I think that that the allies for the most part use their resources much more judiciously and sensibly than the Axis powers do and you know good um because that means they prevail.
I think you know there are so many lessons um from World War II that could have been brought into the last the history of the last 30 years which weren't you know such as you know if you have if you if you decapitate an incredibly strong leader you get a power vacuum and if you don't have a solution for that power vacuum lots of bad elements are going to sweep into that in very quick order which of course is exactly what happens in in in Iraq so you know Donald Rumsfeld going we don't do reconstruction where you freaking well should do. You know, this this if you're going to if you're going to take on this this particular challenge, you've got to see it through. You know, that's that's simply not good enough. You know, it's not good enough to go into Afghanistan and go, "Okay, we're going to change things around. It's going to be great. You know, all the women are going to have education. They won't have to wear kind of, you know, uh um won't have to cover up their bodies anymore. Um anything goes. We love liberalism. It's great. Um let's make Kabul into a thriving city once more." and then suddenly bug out, you know, because what what what's going to happen? You're going to undo everything.
And and I remember being in, you know, this is a bit of a segue, legs, but I I remember being in in Northern Helmand province back in, you know, when was it January 2008, and uh British troops had just taken over an absolute dump of a town called um Musa Qala. And I remember talking to this Afghan guy. He he just had all his willow trees chopped down to make room for a helipad that the allies wanted which they you know they put their kind of sur you know those cages with kind of rubble in the protective wall it called Hesco I think it was called anyway I said to him what what do you think about about the British being there and he just went shrugged at me lifted up his hands and said well you know if they stay great but they won't and and he said said you know if they stay then brilliant but he said I tell you what he Taliban weren't great. They weren't fantastic. He said, "But I could leave my personal wall and no one would touch it. I could leave it on a wall for a week. No one would touch it." Said said, "Will they bring that kind of order?" You know, "Will we have that kind of peace here?" You know, they've just chopped down my my willow trees. You know, thanks a lot. And you you know you you're seeing a total lack of understanding of the culture, ethnic differences, you're trying to impose a kind of western centric view onto something which is just some, you know, onto onto a onto a nation which isn't isn't ready for that. Now there are ways in which you know it looked like Afghanistan was starting to kind of emerge and there was a path and then just at the critical moment the west moves out with catastrophic consequences.
What you have to say though is that in the west post 1945 the rehabilitation of Italy of Japan of western Germany was really good. You know, the consequence of of all that destruction, all that turmoil was thriving, high producing democracies which burst forth into the kind of second half of the 20 20th century and into the 21st century in pretty good order. Um so the lessons of the previous generation from the first world war had had been had been learned even though the scale of destruction the displacement of people is unprecedented in 1945.