Transcription
This story you and your viewers must hear. Operation spider web trending completely.
When I first heard of it at 10:00, I didn't sleep the whole night. And do you think Putin is going to be using nukes now? Putin has been waving the nuclear rattle. They have hit the heart of his nuclear enterprise. Trump have told him you have no card.
Is this the beginning of European resurgence? You know from the prism of of what happened in Sind, do you think there's a case in point for a proper drone missile force in this country? Pakistan, I'm telling you, will be seriously worried. Will you be able to penetrate the Chinese air defense? You will never win the war on terror by chasing terrorists. And here we need to compliment the prime minister, and we've exploited that space between the the threshold which is nuclear and the conventional. The Paky dilemma: terror is no longer a low-cost option. Khan will be hit, sir. God will be hit. Brother-in-law. So killing a fly with a sledgehammer. That unless the lions have their own historians, the story of the hunt will always favor the hunter. The most outstanding military victory since '71. Absolutely. Sindu tells us that our rise will be contested. Pakistan, China, Turkey is one part terror. Look at Bangladesh. Drone missile force. Defense. It will add one rupee to your GDP. So we need action, we need ideation, we need a complimentary narrative for Amritkal 2047, because India's rise is going to be, you know, really, really been looked at. Why are we calling it Amritkal? It is important because you have to grow rich before you grow old. Wish for Bandhu Vikasid Bharat 2047.
[Music]
Hello and welcome to the podcast today. And today we have amongst us Lieutenant General Raj Shukla, PVSM, YSM, retired, also the retired army commander of the Army Training Command, as well as member UPSC. Welcome to the show, sir.
Thank you. And great to see you here in your new avatar.
Thank you very much, sir. This company of yours, Escape Velocity Media Works. So that's a new venture, I'm told.
Yes, sir. Thank you very much, sir. The best to all your good wishes, sir. And, uh, before we start, uh, General Shukla is one of my very, very important mentors and guides and philosophers, and whatever he's taught me, that's what exactly is manifesting here as we speak today.
And you're one of the brightest chaps the army had. Our loss is the media world's gain.
That's very kind of you, sir. Thank you very much.
Right, uh, we will speak today, sir, on Operation Spider Web, trending completely all over the world today. And, you know, how the drones, drones have created havoc. 117 drones, 41 aircraft, Tu-22, Tu-95, A50s, what have you? Strategic bombers all the way, 4,000 kilometers inside the Russian territory, in three different time zones. I mean, what do you make out of this? Is there a case and point that we now need to look at this entire segment in a very, very different manner?
Sir, you know, I have been reciting this this verse called dronery for the last four, five years, to deaf ears, but I have been observing it and I have been saying it for a while. Dronery has emerged as a new art and science. It is a new arm, and you know, it is neither artillery, nor armor, nor air. It's got a salience of its own. And just let me tell you how it has worked in Ukraine. 80% of Russian losses in men and equipment have come not from infantry, not from adversary armor, not from adversary artillery. I have to eat humble pie. Yes. Not from air power, but from drones. Oh yes. Drones had been going through trenches. They had been going through turrets of tanks. And they were used as strategic air power. Absolutely. The Russians were doing it to take the Shahazarad drones. Giranian drones were doing it to hit cave power infrastructure. And in a, you know, the Ukrainians have to be admired. There's a story behind this. Look at a country without a navy. You first took drones and then took Starlink's Elon Musk's to knock the Black Sea fleet out of his Sylvester. Absolutely. You know what is dronery telling? Air power, maritime power, all the bachas of the fighting world. Air power of not acknowledging what the indicators were there. When Sylvester Pole was it, what did the Russians do? 80% of men and equipment. You did nothing. And finally, they have now come and challenged your nuclear theology, your doctrine, strategy. It's, it's, uh, it's a, you know, it's a psychological challenge. Uh, the whole thing of drone engineering, technological innovation, precision targeting. When I first heard of it at 10:00 yesterday, I didn't sleep the whole night. Yes, absolutely. It was so, there was, it, it, it aroused so much curiosity in the military mind. It, there is also a psychological architecture. See, Putin has been waving the nuclear rattle. Yes. They have hit the heart of his nuclear enterprise. They have hit strategic aviation, nuclear bombers. Yes. They've hit the maritime leg of the nuclear triad in, um, I think it's in, in a place called, um, the Veelia air base. The Vegelia air base that has the long-range bombers. It has the refuelers which is for deep strikes in NATO. Yes. Those the 22s and the 95s. Absolutely. So he has punctured Putin's ability to carry out deep strikes into NATO. So I think it's part of a larger architecture and design. Perhaps Europe is behind it. And they have told Putin, not only is your nuclear triad at risk, your ability to hit deep, the base they have hit in the east, I think it is, uh, the, uh, the, uh, Bara air base, it is challenging Putin's ability to project power into the Pacific. Totally, completely, sir. So, I mean, the technological wonderment is one thing. The strategic design is quite another. They have carefully chosen these targets to signal to Putin a day before Istanbul. Yes. I mean, you saw the face of the Russians when they arrived for the talks. Yes. But do you think the geopolitical timing in this is right? And do you think Putin is going to be using nukes now? So that's a question which is, you know, on everybody's mind now. Absolutely. You see, so two things before you come to this. Two things I want to tell you that, uh, you know, in Cold War, it took Reagan and Gorbachev and their predecessors and successors to negotiate for two decades before the Russian nuclear force was shrunk by 30%. 30%. In the space of one night, one night, you have shrunk his nuclear force by 34%. 34. Somewhere I read 15. If it is 34, it's even more dramatic. One night, three decades. This is what this strike has achieved. Now, you see the question that you raise. You have hit the heart of his nuclear triad. Any doctrine you take? If you don't respond now, when will you respond? Absolutely. But the challenge is that will Putin respond with tactical nukes? Maybe. I think he will do that ornik stuff. But he's going to hit Ukraine very badly. Very badly. I think it's may escalate. But see the signaling is all around. I think Zelensky is signaling also signaling to Trump. Trump have told him, you have no cards. He has shown you he has more than one card. Oh yes, of course. It's become very murky actually. It's become very complex. So there is multiple signaling now. Is Ukraine in emerging as an independent player now? Is this the beginning of European resurgence if UK and Germany are behind all this? Because there was a statement by Scholz a little while back where he said, we have removed the restrictions on ranges. Yes, sir. So the Europe, it seemed to be in military doldrums, may be back through Ukraine and Zelensky certainly is now a force to reckon with. Absolutely. Absolutely well said, sir. But then, you know, if you look at all this, you see this entire thing, and then you look at it, uh, you know, from the prism of Op Sindhur, where we use our loitering munitions, the Harop and the Harpies, and we used our, you know, swamp drones and all of that to carry out a lot of tasks like SC and whatever it may be, you know, sir, but do you think there's a case in point for a proper drone missile force in this country now?
I have no doubt in my mind. And how do we go about it? So my military clarity tells me three things, and it's open for debate. You see, what has happened in air power? BVR has tailmated. Yes, sir. It has. Now, whether it is 150 or 175 kilometers is immaterial. Aircraft are unable to penetrate the adversary's air environment. Where is Russian air power? It used to be a formidable air force. Used to be. Used to be. Now, our air enthusiasts have to acknowledge this humbling moment. And see, I may disagree with Elon Musk, but he makes a very powerful statement when he says that in a hypothetical dogfight between unmanned platforms and manned platforms, the pilot is a liability. I, it may not sound good, but have we come to that moment? This changes the entire complexion, understanding, and it's no reflection on the air force. This is the, I mean, arrival of technology. It is as it is. So perhaps the three priority things that we need is stealth-enabled defensive air power. Just air power is not good enough. It has to be stealth-enabled. Stealth-enabled, otherwise you are not breaking the BVR stalemate. Absolutely. You will not penetrate. You may still penetrate the Pakky defenses, which we have done. I mean, much to my surprise. And, uh, uh, I mean, Pakistan, I'm telling you, will be seriously worried. What happened to their HQ9 and all that? But the issue is, will you be able to penetrate the Chinese air defense in the WTC? That is the question. So I think stealth-enabled defensive air power, and it has to be complemented by a drone missile force. It is not an either-or option. Yes. And, and, and so the air force should be 50% unmanned, 50% manned. Or, let me tell you, our army friends, you have three strike corps, sir. Mech armor-based in a terror situation, they are not the first instrument of response. Why not take one strike corps and convert it into an instrument of long-range precision strike with mech armor built into it as a second stage of response? What happened in Sindhur? I said, let me now, let me take you back to Parakram. That is very important to understand. I wonder where you are. Nurog. I was a Lieutenant Colonel in Parakram. I was a Major, sir. I was in the J&K, sir. So you would have seen it. Look what happens. The heart of your parliament is hit. The citadel of democracy was hit. Yes. So we mobilized. Yes. And what were our instruments? Pivot corps. Strike corps. Pivot corps. Strike corps. But at the end of 24 months, we realized that it was a blunt instrument. Look how the air force argued. Air Force argued that if you use air, commit Singh, somebody I respect very much, but he said this, he said, if you use air power, it'll be escalatory. It will might escalate into the nuclear domain. Respectfully, that was a pack of nonsense. Air power has proved to be battle-winning. See, doctrine is so important. What happens then? Now, see this story, you and your viewers must hear. When you are mobilized, he provokes you a second time. When he hits Kaluchak, yes, military station massacre, 34 sleeping soldiers, women and children. Women and children. Yes. And we thought we'll go to war. Of the next week, the Prime Minister Vajpayee said, our Park, if you recall, I think July 2021, May 2020, 2002, May 2002. That's correct. I was in Ratnu, so we know this. It was close quarters, and we thought we'll go to war. And what happens now? Look at this. This, this is how has to be understood. The Pakis, Hamid Gul, and that nuclear rattle. Yes. Those famous nuclear no red lines or and all that. Are they meant to be kept in museums? Yes. And now see what happens. Americans get scandalized. Washington tells the US embassy, thin out. American businesses move out. Sir, and then we are told, you are being irresponsible. You are threatening war. So stability is being affected. If I'm a Pakistani, I'll go laughing all the way to the bank. Nuclear rattle, and this worked as a design. Tell me, I want any nuclear theorist to answer this. What nuclear theology tells you that under nuclear cover, you'll go on a terror rampage? Nuclear weapons are existential. They are to be used responsibly, and not like this. And the gullible West bought this narrative. It still buys it. It still buys it. Still buys it. And so they kept doing it. They kept doing it. Now, I just want to make three points to you. See, I want to capture to you the mood of those times. There was so much frustration with all this, coupled with, uh, 26/11, when once again, we do precious little. Arun Shourie said, not an eye for an eye, not a tooth for a tooth. For one eye, both the eyes. For a tooth, the whole jaw. He was capturing the mood of those times. That do something, do something. Another politician, I won't name, he mocked the air force. He said, air force, this is all part of narrative. Air force. He was making a telling point. I remember that, sir. And a very wise KPS Gill said, "You will never win the war on terror by chasing terrorists, or merely by chasing terrorists, which we've been doing for three decades. You need to escalate the cost. You will win it by overwhelming the adversaries." Now, Op Sindhur has converted the frustration, despair, even the wisdom of those times into a strategic reality. And here we need to compliment the prime minister and ourselves because we've told them, listen, we know what the nuclear battle is. We know what the red line is. Our generalship will keep it short of the red lines. Yes, sir. And this will not, we have called their nuclear bluff. And we've exploited that space between the threshold which is nuclear and the conventional. So, schoolboy nuclear bluff. And now look at the Pakki dilemma. Terror is no longer a low-cost option. It is absolutely. Now, you do this, Khan will be hit. Sir, Gora will be hit. Kay, at least this bit has been, you know, equalized, drummed in. And therefore, and also see the Indian military from a blunt instrument, which could not be used, is now an instrument of long-range precision. Absolutely. If we convert one of our strike corps into this loiter, various kinds of drones, you know, including the MQ9 Reaper, look what will happen to us. He will stop doing it. We should so invest in space. Int. We are absent in the LEO space. And once we do that, I'm making this point of action, narrative complimenting each other. Okay. Once you have these capacities, and we should tell him quietly, brother-in-law Masood, and then you do it more. GOC 30 Corps, or one of these corps commanders will go now. Like, yes, terror will stop. You just take it. Terror will stop. As long as they can get away with any kind of nonsense, they will keep doing this. So killing a fly with a sledgehammer. Sledgehammer. And I'm talking of action, narrative complementarity now. Yes, they have to complement each other. You know, there's a, since you were talking of this, I was just going through my old notes, and there, there's an African proverb that unless the lions have their own historians, the story of the hunt will always favor the hunter. Yes, sir. Absolutely. So this is the lesson that you have to have action, but also a narrative. In fact, they have become so complimentary now that if they are not in synchrony, if you do well militarily, and your narrative is not as effective, it tends to subtract from the quality of your military performance. Absolutely. So that comes to, you know, the, the next part of the whole thing, sir, which, you know, has been baffling a lot of people, you know, you, a lot of people are now saying, sir, that the narrative warfare, in whatever meaning and form or structure or dimension it may be, it is as important as kinetic warfare. So if we take the example of Op Sindhur, in your view, sir, did we lose the narrative at some stage in time, or or we need to work more on this as to how, how do, how do we capitalize this, you know, narrative management system, as I've written along with the battlefield management system? So, see, so it's so important, uh, you know, those were the days of so-called strategic restraint. I'm quoting Jaswant Singh now, whom we all respect. Absolutely. Jaswant Singh said, the objective of Parakram was to contain terrorism without conflict, which means we never were to go to conflict. The most telling thing he says, he says, my most taxing challenge was to try and teach the service chiefs the advantage of restraint. I find it baffling. Service chiefs are supposed to fight, but strategic restraint became such a matter of highbrow intellect. Yes. Restraint, restraint, restraint. So we forgot the utility of force. We have now rediscovered the utility of force, that force can be used in a utility manner. So I am saying the narrative has changed from strategic restraint to offensive poise. Offensive poise. But if we are to be honest, our narrative, the other kind of narrative, Maxar imagery showing what was hit in Bulari in Scardu, Na, that was telling the world. The world has bought that bit. The Pakistanis have nothing but waffle there. Yes, we have shown that bit. But this other bit, I think of addressing the western audience, we were late. This our all-party delegation, perhaps could have gone earlier. Earlier. Should it have had military veterans in it? Because your forces worked so well. Should you have people who represent that instrument? It becomes more credible. We must see for the future. So in that sense, I think our information narrative tended to lag. When, and I'm making this point on your show, I think we've had the most outstanding military victory since '71. Absolutely. '71. I think it's, it's unprecedented, sir, the way we have functioned and the way we have executed and prosecuted operations. I think one could not even think, you know, in, in my own service, we always thought, you know, that there is, sir, Godha, and you saw those, you know, uh, and also Anurag '71. Do we now miss the charisma and eloquence of Sam Manekshaw? Yes. Oh, yes. I think he did a lovely job on ground, but also complimented, complimented with the narrative building. So he, he had that, he had that charisma, sir. So we need to work on both, and a professional military, a professional strategic military system, which is a little beyond the military. We should perfect the latter. But do, do you think, sir, there, there needs to be, you know, more steam in the space by incorporating the civil society as a, as a, as an instrument, by getting in think tanks, by getting in, you know, military veterans, by getting in, you know, people who are specialists into domain, as part of the narrative building?
Absolutely. See, now I think what we need to do is that we have to give a thought not only to narrative, but what is our strategic communication strategy being for Amritkal? Amritkal, that's, that's, you know, we can talk about it. And here, uh, there are two, three things. You, in my view, you need multiple narratives. You need a narrative to signal to your military. You have to now transit to a force of long-range precision. That is one narrative to your own military. Absolutely. You have to have a narrative for your adversaries, competitors like China. Peaceful rise. You deceive the adversary. They knew what standing things, sir. Peaceful rise. It means nothing, actually. And the West bought it. Bought it completely. So we have to have a very careful narrative for our adversaries, competitors. You have to have a different narrative for the domestic audience. Yes. Okay. Can we engage them to say, the way Pakistan is going? Do we need to invest in power projection across Malacca? Yes. The Chinese threat. Now, see, as you go into the narrative, there are more questions. To answer these questions, you need domain specialists. So the MOD should have people like Raja Mohan. You should have had some technology whiz kids, somebody from startups, who will help you in building and shaping this narrative. Narrative is not a one-liner. Yes, of course. It's not a one. And let's look at it. What is the narrative for allies and partners? Will strategic autonomy work when push comes to shove? Will we get technologies from the US? It's awful. So these are the questions. And what is the narrative for the international community? So since you asked me this question, so many look at one more thing of China's cognitive warfare. Mothership. Now, mothership is what the Ukrainians are doing because they have really invested in dronery. This is a kind of a mothership. What has the Chinese done? They've taken one AI image of a mothership, and the whole world is buying it as if the mothership has already arrived, and it's throwing out small, small drones. Social media with a collaborative air system. It is already going to beat the Americans. Social media fluff, cognitive warfare, all these things, you know, have to be seen. You must, your viewers must read a book called "Spies and Lies" by Alex Joske. Okay, sir. Which the Chinese with their MSS, the Ministry of State Security, and Communist Party spent decades manipulating Western audience. The all-important MSS. So it is beyond narrative. It is influence operations. Oh, yes. Yes. Now, should we do that? Who fell prey to this? Let's not name them. An Australian prime minister, people from the US Congress, think tanks, FBI, yes, travel agencies, writer associations. Now, this is where it becomes even more sophisticated. So I'm making this case immediately for the CDS to kindly consider the appointment of a DG StratCom, DG StratCom, a sharp three-star who understands all this, who has a team which understands the press gaggle. I'll give an example on this. We are always trained to be transparent, ramrod straight. We should be careful not to fall into media traps. So you always must not be transparent. You must learn when to dodge. It is important not to fall into a trap. It doesn't come naturally to us. It doesn't. StratCom and all have to be very smart. So, say, Sep should be part of this team. A journalist who knows the press gaggle, who knows this badmashi. Yes. So the narrative also has to be structured to a winnability, and not necessarily transparency. And this is just pencil jottings from what you asked me. So any common-sensical approach to this narrative building is what we must do. But it tells you now how nuanced it is, how many metrics it has, how diverse it is, what kind of specialization it needs. Absolutely. It's, it's very complex. We need to invest into this narrative.
But then, what do you think so should be the blueprint for the, the narrative warfare in so far as we are concerned for Amritkal 2047, because India's rise is going to be, you know, really, really been looked at quite interestingly by by the friends and the foes and all, all of the people who are on the sidelines. So what exactly do you think should be the part of the narrative warfare for India?
So we can only explore it jointly. This is just a podcast. So let's explore it, and then wiser people can take it ahead. So I was just thinking, what should be the narrative of, let's say, Viksit Bharat, that's the dream. Absolutely. Wish for Bandhu Vikasid Bharat 2047. So I think we will need to ideate this journey, ideation, then see what the roadmap is, and see how the ideation and roadmap must converge. In the convergence, we must discover the narrative. Now, let me just explain this to you. What is, or this, how we converge the ideation and roadmap must be communicated through a narrative. Okay. So that, that's what I'm saying. And the narrative, there will be one overarching narrative, but we will have to make adjustments and readjustments every week, every month, because it's, it's not a fixity. Things will change. But we have to have a narrative in our mind. And let's take one good inspiration. This whole, uh, business about, you know, um, 100-year marathon. Yes. What is it to the Chinese? You will not believe it. It is so unbelievable. In 1947 or so, Mao writes to the American president. He says, "We want to become like you. Ultimately, we will be a democracy. We are poor. So, please give us money. Help us." This is called the 100-year marathon. Yes. A lovely book also. Lovely book. And how was it? They said it will take us 100 years to beat them. So, first deception, then hide and buy it. Yes. And when they got powerful, then they become loud and proud. 100 year. I'm told this, there is no written document. It was grilled into politburo members, military officers, bureaucrats for years on in the Tsinghua University, in their think tanks. So this 100-year marathon was the narrative. Now, in a democracy, it's very difficult. But we have to see what a narrative is. And one part of the narrative that I can see is we have to first, in an overarching manner, see what was the narrative so far. Our narrative so far was simplistic. We said, we will have a secure external environment and all that stuff. You know, that one-front diplomacy will take care, one front, no simplified, a benign internal environment, and we'll focus on the growth of our 143 crore citizenry. Makes sense. Eminent sense. But that is not the reality. Sindhu tells us that our rise will be contested. This rise will be contested violently. So we have to plot our rise through multiple crises, conflict, and confrontation. That's the first part of the narrative. Absolutely. And now, if this is the narrative, and if our foreign policy has to be muscular, because the environment is not benign. May I just point out to your viewers? See, I'm saying our environment is even more challenging than Israel. West may, Pakistan, Turkey, China. Not China alone, this time. The agreements were signed just two months back. So they could not fractify. Yes. And Shehbaz has gone rushing to Istanbul. They'll come with drone stuff. That stealth thing has been fast-tracked. J-20s, August delivery of Pakistan, China, Turkey's one part terror. Look at Bangladesh. And I've been following it. Now it's come out that Kaziranga, overthrow, Pich, Rakon corridor is going to be weaponized. Drugs and weapons. Will the next terror attack come from Bangladesh? Yes. Here you have Bangladesh, Pakistan, China, WTC, just one line. There is a military differential of the power component is $450 billion annually. Let it sink in. And this 400-ship navy is not going to patrol the ships. Moment they break out, patrol the coast of China, moment they break out the first island chain, Iowa. Tell me, is our environment not grimmer than Israel? Worse, sir. So muscular foreign policy. Now you need an instrument of force that is nourished, high states of lethality and readiness. Which means what? Next time a terror attack takes place at 2:00 in the afternoon, and in 2-3 hours, we know it is these guys. 6:00, the attack must go. It will go. When you have a theater commander, western theater commander, constantly looking at this, he should tell the prime minister, 8:00, we'll go. And if we can invest in LEO and all, we are absent in the LEO space. I have been raising this time and again. Military capacities will not come from 4A, 4B. That's a mirage. That's good for exploration. If we have all these capacities, as I said, next time, take out Masood quietly. Not Masood's brother-in-law. Wonderful. So now, muscular foreign policy, instrument of force in a contested environment. This gives these are metrics of that narrative. Now, each of these, you have to go into depth. Ask people to explore it. And now, force of various kinds, layered, short drone FPVs, one-way drone FPVs can function in a GPS-denied environment. Can't be even jammed. Absolutely. From just a simple, you know, analysis of this. Look at Amritkal. Why are we calling it Amritkal? It is important because you have to grow rich before you grow old. Grow rich before you grow old. You have to put your act together. Hasten it fast. All these things come out of the narrative. The prime minister has been saying Anusandhan, Anusandhan. What does he mean? R&D and technological innovation. Look at Ukraine, technological innovation. Can innovation take place with this IFA system? No commentary on the IFA, but it cannot happen. Yes, there is Friday, you find it is missing the target. Rocket motor problem. Unch lessons learned. It's a serious point. It is, uh, it is technological innovation will not happen this way. It is that western army commander in the field who has to say, and if you don't do it, the Chinese will do it, and they will be ahead of you. So all this, you know, is all part of this, uh, this, the, this whole narrative thing. Let's say economic state. You must someday get this guy, Adit Kular, or something. He and another economist, Indian economist, wrote in the Times of India. They said, following things. They said, it's a myth, you guns versus butter concept, false debate. Economist saying, he says, they see technologies will give jobs. It'll boost revenues. Economic argument. He says, defense has a fiscal multiplier of two, unlike others, which means defense, it will add one rupee to your GDP. What were I and you told? Defense is unproductive. Lie. You, you, you, you are feeding on the taxpayer's money. Defense will give you productivity. You must read it because I'm not saying it. And they have in turn quoted from an American Economic Review journal, peer-reviewed. It's a solid economic argument. Now, when we need to spend, should we spend in this manner? Revisit the, as I say, the metrics of your economic statecraft. Then the other thing, let's ask this question. Is it better to invest in deterrence, or let deterrence fail and then spend more on war fighting? So deterrence is costly, but wars are costlier. Now, this is the debate. It is not a narrative that I write one thing in one day. These issues have to be debated, come to conclusions. The debate is part of the narrative flowering, narrative building. But these are the questions. Can we achieve combat overmatch with Pakistan? Why not? 38 trillion, you are $4 trillion. The disparities in other fields do not reflect in the military field. He thumbs a nose at you because you have underinvested in defense for your size, for your heft. So combat overmatch with Pakistan, and with China. Fail-proved deterrence along the LAC. What I mean is, we have got enough troops. Give them technologies. They are startups. Just give them orders. Yes, you will have fail-proved deterrence. And I'm now positing this for the larger China challenge. Dant, what is the not just peace? Peace to buy time. Absolutely. Now, all these can be very sensibly put together. You know, cultural transformations. You will not get innovation unless you reform this, uh, this whole business of IFAs. They can work for acquisition of legacy systems. They will not work for technological innovation because the entire technology cycle itself, we must request him to rewrite it. How long will it take? 20 days. We can, we can, we can, you know, help him out. So innovation will not happen in a, in a, in a regulated environment. And then those three things I told you, stealth, enabled, defensive air power, and that kind of stuff. See, I'll tell you how the narrative is important. So important. Many years back, when I was a brigade, I went to ISIS, London. So that chap, my British host, told me that there's a Pakistani, he wants to meet you. So we said, we'll meet. When we met, the Britisher is briefing me that in J&K, we are the aggressors. Our military, you know, is what a narrative. What an outstanding narrative. They are the aggrieved, and he's buying it, sir. And he's buying it. So I said, by, you know, the reality there, terror attack, 26/11, and you know why he has got four people? That Pakistani team has four people. We have none in Western capitals that mattered. You have none. So who will carry the narrative? When we were doing a far better job in the counter-insurgency business. So what are our tools for that narrative? Think tanks, influencers, lobbyists. Absolutely, sir. I mean, and lobbyist is not a bad word. So today, you may not need institutions. Pulkit Sharma is a great influencer. Yes. So should we tap into her or people like her? Absolutely. Look at how smartly Raisa influencing foreign policy debates. Should we not have a parallel in the strategic military space? Why should Shangri-La be in Shangri-La in Singapore? It should be here. Now, all these thoughts should be, should be the dialogue. So I'm just throwing these issues. We know internally, General Rawat, with all his wisdom, had created a DGIW, Information Warfare. Where is he? The CDS needs a DG StratCom, Strategic Communications, perhaps. One of our most thinking three-stars, Admiral, Air Force, or that. And can we stop this now? Army boys, we are a joint force. So there are so many thoughts, you know, that one, one can throw in terms of these. So I'm saying, thank you for asking me this question because it got me thinking to put all these points down. So we need action, we need ideation, we need a complimentary narrative. Absolutely, sir. Action, ideation, and complimentary narrative. StratCom. An absolute wonderful exposition of whatever you have mentioned, sir. I'm sure we'll go from here from strength to strength. Thank you, sir. Uh, it's been a great talk and a great discussion as always with you. Um, StratCom, the, the bizel drone force, which is the, the most important thing in so far as today's warfare is concerned, precision-guided munitions, and most importantly, narrative warfare and building it towards Amritkal 2047. What a great learning for me, sir, and outstanding thoughts as usual, sir. I thank you so much for coming on the show, sir, and we wish to see you again very soon. Thank you very much, sir. Thanks a lot. I hope this conversation transforms into national security realities. That would be very gratifying. From your mouth to God's ears, sir. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you.