Transcription
A discussion of both theory and policy on the question of what does China want or what doesn't it want, next on The Impossible State. North Korea is the impossible state. It's a place that stumped leaders and policymakers for more than three decades. It has a complex history, and it has become one of the United States' top national security priorities. Each week on this show, we'll talk to the people who know the most about North Korea. Welcome to another episode of The Impossible State podcast here at CSIS. I'm your host, Victor Cha, president of geopolitics and foreign policy at CSIS and professor of government at Georgetown University.
Today, we're discussing the topic of China. I know this is a podcast about North Korea, but today we're talking about China. Um, and in particular, this question of what are China's ambitions? What are their strategic ambitions in the past and over time? And we have a wonderful uh set of folks to discuss this with us from both academia and from policy. So, we are really doing the theory, policy, academia nexus today. Um, Dr. Zenobia Chan is an assistant professor of government at Georgetown University. She joined the faculty in 2024. We are very happy to have her at Georgetown. Um, she holds her PhD in politics from Princeton. And before entering academia, you led an analytics team at Google and worked at the United Nations, World Bank, and OECD on development assistance, infrastructure financing, and industrial policy. So, you clearly must love academia because you've definitely given up a higher salary to work at Georgetown. So, well, we and the students benefit from that. I would I would say.
Um, also joining us is Henrietta Leven. Henrietta is senior fellow in the Freeman Chair in China Studies here at CSIS. Uh, prior to coming to CSIS, she was uh director for China at the White House National Security Council and director of Southeast Asia also at the National Security Council. Uh, but she was also uh deputy for China external at China House at the State Department. Uh, she began her career in government at the Pentagon, where she served as a spokesperson in the office of the secretary of defense. She has her BA and MA um from USC uh where she was also a member of the band. Right. >> Most importantly, >> most importantly, member of the band. Um, anyway, thank you both for joining us um to talk about this topic today. And before um I, so what I want to do is I want to spend some time talking about this very interesting article that um Dr. Chan, that you wrote with two colleagues uh both in International Security and then in Foreign Affairs. Um, I I want to spend some time talking about that. But before doing that, I, Henrietta and I have not had a chance to talk about Trump's recent visit to Asia. Um, and of course, the the biggest piece at the end was the Trump-Xi meeting. Just wanted to get your thoughts on how you thought that went.
Overall, it >> was a very interesting meeting. It seems like both sides, the US and China, were seeking a period of more extended stability after a bit of a roller coaster uh over the course of 2025. But it does seem like that stability was achieved largely on China's terms. Um, in that we see both sides agreeing to unwind some of the most damaging retaliatory measures they've taken over the course of the trade war in 2025. Um, but no discussion really at all about the underlying structural economic imbalances that Trump ostensibly launched the trade war to address. Um, I think it's also worth noting that really for the first time um this meeting has introduced US national security measures, US national security protections as a topic for negotiation with the People's Republic of China.
>> Um, now, not so dramatically as some people feared. Um, there was discussion in Washington ahead of time. Would Trump make concessions on uh Taiwan or in providing China uh access to high-end blackwell chips? We didn't see that. Um, so the outcome was in some ways more modest than um was anticipated in some corners, but we do see the US agreeing to pause implementation of certain measures from the Commerce Department, basically intended to close loopholes in existing national security export controls. Um, and the fact that the US has now provided China a veto over how it will implement US national security measures is actually a pretty significant shift in the overall character of the relationship and a shift that I think is uh causing folks in Beijing to feel very confident about their position going forward in the relationship.
>> So um, and so we, in a sense, that's a that's a very interesting point. Your last point in particular, um, if we step back, in a sense, we have sort of a timeout right now, a little bit of, um, uh, a deescalation. But is it something, as we get into the next, uh, first quarter of 2026, where they're supposedly going to meet again? Um, is it something where we're just basically seeing deescalation to escalate again in the future?
>> Um, I I fear that may be inevitable. Um, you know, the the period of deescalation is nominally a year um where China has said it won't implement some of its more extreme controls on rare earth exports, the US has paused and these uh this uh export control implementation. So, to some degree, you see at least an effort to project stability further into the future. But as you mentioned, Um, President Trump will probably go to China in the spring. Um, and ahead of that meeting, I mean, there's just a a bevy of opportunities for destabilization. Um, in part because I don't think that Washington and Beijing entirely agree with each other on what was agreed between the two leaders in Korea. Um, and we're already seeing some interesting tests of um that uh consensus where um it was at least in my view, very welcome to see the administration finally approve an arms sale for Taiwan um just recently after um delaying for for quite a a few months. Um, how does China react? Even though this arms sale is totally consistent with precedent, with how the US has engaged on Taiwan in in uh over decades, really. Um, but it is a significantly more assertive step than what we've seen from the Trump administration until now. So when China is thinking about the status quo and the baseline against which it reacts, is it thinking about 2024? Is it thinking about 2025? And I think we'll see a number of these tests of the consensus over the coming months leading up to that potential trip to China in April.
>> Great. Wonderful. Thanks so much um for that. Um, so just for us to get caught up since we didn't have a chance to do that. Um, what I'd like to do now, if we could, is shift um to uh talk about Zenobia, your Foreign Affairs article, which is titled "What China Doesn't Want," co-authored with uh a good friend, our good friend David Kang and Jackie Wong. Um, and so in this article, you and your co-authors basically make the point that China is China's leadership is that more of a status quo power with limited aims um rather than an aggressively revisionist global hegemon. And you do in the piece take a couple of uh make a couple of references to the China discussion in Washington D.C. um, which has tended to all sort of revolve around one particular thesis when it comes to China. So, we wanted to talk a little bit about this, and I thought it'd be great to have both you and Henrietta. Um, you because of all this wonderful research you've done on um uh what we've learned about what China has said recently, but also over the years, with regard to these questions of grand strategy. Um, and then from the world of practice, Henrietta, seeing it, seeing what the Chinese say, but also what they do, in a sense. So, it would be great to have this conversation. So maybe we could start out for those of our audience um, and because it's probably more North Korea audience, I don't know if they actually read the piece, but you could maybe sort of give us sort of a thumbnail of what the basic argument is that you guys are making.
>> Sure. So, based on our analysis of um official publications, newspapers, including from the People's Daily, and speeches by Xi Jinping and other top Chinese officials, what we found in China's both words and deeds is that its ambitions are limited, consistent, and overwhelmingly focused on domestic stability, not so much on becoming a global hegemon. And Chinese leaders return again and again to a small set of core interests that include uh maintaining internal political stability, protecting borders and sovereignty, and preserving the Chinese Communist Party's authority and sustaining domestic economic development.
>> And these goals first appeared in China's official foreign policy white paper in 2011, before Xi Jinping took office, and they have not meaningfully changed since.
>> Interesting. Um, and so um, so you, it says here, so you collected basically a dataset of uh 176 speeches that Xi Jinping delivered uh uh between 2012 and 2024, and then almost 300 additional speeches by Yang Jiechi and uh and uh and Wang Yi over approximately the the same time period. Um, so let me um ask you a couple of questions. So the first one, uh the first one is, as you said, the focus is on sort of domestic stability, domestic reform, stability, not so much on external ambitions. So, I guess one question is, is it either or? I mean, or is it, can you do both of these things at the same time? Right? So that would be the the first question. Um, anyway, so let me ask you that one first. Um, uh, and give you a chance to respond. So, right.
Um, aside from what China said it wanted, it also explicitly rejected several things. First, it's explicitly rejected calls for global dominance. And in particular, it references um the Thucydides Trap, which uh the Chinese publications, these official publications repeatedly mention that the Thucydides Trap is what it doesn't want. And it also explicitly said that it doesn't want to replace the US as the global leader. And there are other occasions where um Xi Jinping and other official Chinese publications mentioned that they don't want to export China's political or governance systems to other countries.
>> Okay. Um, so let me ask Henrietta. So the the um, you know, we have this this data that has been collected that sort of essentially states that China's external ambitions remain somewhat somewhat limited, constrained. I mean, if we were to use IR, it might be like, you might be more of a defensive realist sort of view. Um, um, but I mean, so let me ask you, Henrietta, from, I mean, you've read the article, but also from your own time working the issue on the policy side, what is, I guess, so one question is, what do, what is the difference between, if there is one, between what China says and what it does, at least from what you what you've seen in the work you've done on this topic? So,
>> Sure. Um, well, I I think that the, it is important to pay attention to what China actually says. Um, but I I find that in practice, it, Chinese rhetoric on its global or regional ambitions or priorities is often kind of broad enough, uh, that one can read one's prior assumptions into it. And you see a lot of that in Washington um, both for those advocating for a more hawkish or a more dovish approach to dealing with the US-China relationship. Um, but I I definitely have seen
>> So it's like a Rorschach test. We basically see what we want in it.
>> A little bit. Um, but um, I I do sometimes see like a more of a clear-cut disconnect between the kind of rhetoric that China wants to project into the world um, and the actions it is simultaneously pursuing um, on the ground or on the water, as this example will go. Mhm.
>> So, um, for example, in dialogue uh between the United States and China on maritime issues, an area where there are really significant disagreements between the two countries, especially when it comes to the South China Sea, where China has quite aggressively bullied um US treaty allies as well as other Southeast Asian partners, kind of in pursuit of uh its unlawful claims to most of the South China Sea. Um, when there's dialogue between the US and China on maritime issues on the South China Sea, you see China really wanting to emphasize cooperation. China wants the public message from those consultations to be all about a common vision of cooperation and ocean plastics and trying to really lift up the areas where there could be potential agreement and and ideally probably not acknowledge at all the really significant areas of disagreement. Um, and whereas from the US perspective, you often see an interest in communicating more clearly that this is a contentious conversation. It's a difficult conversation, and that's partly because the US has a different set of responsibilities when it comes to alliance management. Uh, for example, reassuring the Philippines that this isn't some G2 conversation. Uh, you know, that the US is representing quite solemn concerns to China. Um, but China will want to talk about cooperation, often, you know, at the same exactly the same time as China is very aggressively bullying Philippine ships or even kind of other countries in that same domain. Um, and I think these actually are related ideas. It's not that China isn't coordinated. That especially when it is pursuing a more aggressive, a relatively revisionist agenda for the region, you see it double down um, often even more uh more actively on a rhetoric of cooperation.
>> Um, and China does care very much about its international reputation. Um, you never see China saying it's fine that we bully the Philippines because we're a big country. They don't say that. They say the Philippines is bullying us. [laughter] The Philippines is impinging on our sovereignty. The US is provoking tensions in the region. Um, and so again, just that I think they often do try, especially in these areas where their ambitions can be most significant or most disruptive, to project a message of benevolence and cooperation. M.
>> So, to I mean, to sum that all up, they kind of say the soft part out loud, but they do the hard part quietly behind the scenes. What I mean, what do you think of that? Does that, Zenobia, based on sort of the work you've done? Like, how does that, how does that comport with the data?
>> Right. So, I mean, let's caveat what our findings is. We sure >> acknowledge that China has exerted a lot of pressure on its neighbors and it has engaged in different kinds of coercive diplomacy and um behaving aggressively in different uh specific disputes, such as those in the South China Sea. But I think what we also see is China has a long-standing preference for resolving its border disputes um peacefully, sometimes often according to the work of Taylor Fravel, by giving up its territories. So, we do believe that there is an intention to resolve these crises and keep them at a low level.
>> Um, so interesting. Um, let me ask you, just to let me follow up. So, in reading the piece, um, it, uh, the focus, sort of on domestic stability, legitimacy, not on external dominance. Um, maybe this is too big of a generalization, but it's, it's still, it's kind of resonates with this notion of peaceful rise, right? China's peaceful rise. Um, but at the same time, there's clearly a disconnect between, you know, China's external behavior in, you know, the 1980s compared to their external behavior now, whether it's in the South China Sea, the Philippines, these sorts of things. Um, in the in the context of this framework where you talk about China as a status quo power with limited aims, are so, do those things fall within the limited aims, and that's why we see that sort of uh forceful behavior within the first island chain or so? So, where do you, like, where is the end of status quo? Like, does that, does that sort of come out in your, in your, in the research that you all have done?
>> So, yeah. >> Yeah. A lot of China's claims and behavior internationally has to do with territories that are internationally recognized as China's: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet. These are long-standing issues that the Chinese government classifies as its core interests. So, these are, we believe, the areas where the Chinese government would do whatever it takes to protect its um territorial integrity and sovereignty. And whereas the South China Sea issues, those are we believe more related to what China views as its historical boundaries. We do believe that there are rooms for our negotiations and cooperation there.
>> Okay. Okay. Um, Henrietta, let me ask you, if anything you want to respond to there, but also let me ask you about sort of the the DC consensus, right? I mean, maybe you could explain a little bit, because you've been working on China through different administrations. Um, you've seen the policy debates sort of come and go on China. Maybe you could sort explain to us a little bit about how it has evolved in the time that you've seen it inside of government compared to where we are today, where we were 10 years ago, um, and why we saw the changes that we did.
>> Um, it's, it's an important question. Um, and I I think that if we go back to when I was at the Pentagon during the Obama administration, there was a hope that the United States could help China understand that actually our interests in a rules-based international order align. Um, and I think that's because China benefited so, so much from the rules-based international order, which facilitated um, China's meteoric economic rise. Um, so, it's, it's not that this was necessarily an unfounded assumption, but I think it may have been a little ambitious on our part to think that we could convince China to see the world uh our way through force of argument, through dialogue, through engagement. Um, and dialogue is very important. But I think where we've come to within that consensus, more or less now, is that dialogue is important to address misunderstandings, address miscommunication, identify perhaps very narrow areas of cooperation where our interests really do align. But mostly, like, dialogue is about avoiding World War II. [laughter]
>> Dialogue is about avoiding inadvertent escalation that neither side is seeking. At least that's perhaps the most important function of dialogue. It's not necessarily about persuasion.
>> Um, and if we want to change the way China views its interests in the world, uh, in the region, then it's incumbent on the US and like-minded countries to change the environment in which China is making decisions, for example, by strengthening alliances and partnerships. Um, so I think that's, I mean, just a little piece of how the conversation has evolved, and of course, there's much more we could discuss. Um, I do want to um, maybe just also address one of um, the I think really important insights from the piece that you've highlighted, that um, China's leaders are really deeply focused on internal challenges and domestic stability. I think where my perspective would differ to some degree is that I don't see that as a fact that is in tension with the idea that China has very broad global ambitions. Um, and to some degree, maybe in significant part, I think those global ambitions are driven by that same desire to guarantee domestic stability, to guarantee regime security. Um, China, if I think maybe demonstrates this most clearly in the the way the China-Russia relationship has evolved.
>> Where, you know, if you ask someone who's only thinking about China's international standing, kind of conventional foreign policy considerations, why is this incredibly powerful, innovative China tying itself to a failing pro-state [laughter]? Um, it doesn't make sense necessarily. Um, but it makes a lot of sense if you think about not just Russia, but Putin's Russia specifically, as living in President Xi's head as a bulwark against the Western color revolution he feels would otherwise come if he didn't have Putin kind of in place to serve as some kind of protection. And so, China's going to support Russia. China cannot allow Russia to fail in Ukraine, kind of more or at least in part out of those same domestic concerns rather than kind of a purer form of international ambition.
>> Yeah, I mean, that's an interesting point, and it was your penultimate point was uh stated much more eloquently than the question. I intended to ask that same question of Zenobia, but you, you put it in a much more eloquent way than I did. Um, but um, so I guess the question that that your last point raises, Zenobia, is this idea that like you talk in the paper about how China doesn't talk about hegemony and dominance, they talk about multipolarity, they talk about multilateralism. But um, if multilateralism as a concept in policy is operationalized as things like working with Russia, I mean, that could still be considered threatening to US interests, right? I mean, the, in other words, the dichotomy between, it's either hegemony or multilateralism, they don't say hegemony, which is threatening to the United States, but they say multilateralism. But my point is that that could also be threatening to the United States if that is operationalized as, let's work with Russia or something like that. So, I don't know, what are your thoughts on that? So,
>> No, I I actually agree with you. So, the way we look at China is a lot of its foreign policies is driven by its domestic interests, its concerns for its sovereignty, and particularly when it comes to color revolution. We can see a lot of previous events that are based on China following the rule-based international order. For example, in 2005, when the Responsibility to Protect became um an issue debated at the United Nations General Assembly, China eventually supported it. But then, as time goes by, a lot of concerns have been raised among Chinese leaders, including uh, for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 that authorized NATO intervention in Libya. And what concerns China a lot in these um events is Chinese leaders are actually worried that internal issues in Xinjiang and Hong Kong or in Tibet will eventually become pretexts for um intervention in China. And so, driven by these concerns, um China can act in a way that would look that would seemingly appear um counter to US interests in these areas. But I do believe that ultimately these concerns are driven by China's concerns for its um sovereignty. Now, this is not saying that it doesn't um counter other countries' interests, including the United States.
>> Yeah. Um, let me ask you um, both, I mean, since this is a podcast about Korea, [laughter] um, I won't ask you specifically about Korea, but in your mind, I mean, Zenobia, if we sort of take this argument, and if uh others in the region sort of see that like, what are the implications for them? Like, how are they dealing with China correctly or incorrectly? Um, and and the same question, obviously, of the United States. But let me first ask you about, let's say, the so-called middle powers. How should they be thinking about this particular argument or in terms of their own policies towards China?
>> Sure. I think um a lot of times, countries in the region, from ASEAN nations to countries like South Korea and North Korea, Japan, I think a lot of the emphasis has been put on economic cooperation because um, in my in my own research, a lot of officials in Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam, they've always come back to this point, like, geographically, China is here to stay. It is going to be a neighbor, and economic cooperation is something that's very important to them. But a lot of times, these countries also see the US as a very important ally. So, that comes into a very um, I guess, um, very delicate situation for a lot of middle powers in the region. That on the one hand, they want to cooperate in security realms with the United States. On the other hand, they want to benefit from uh economic cooperation with China. So, I think this kind of delicate balancing act will continue into the future. Mhm.
>> And then, I mean, if this is the way um China thinks, as you say, um, how would, what would their thoughts be? What would Xi Jinping's thoughts be about a G2? The notion of a G2, you know, basically a US-China condominium. Would that be something that would fall within, would that be something that works within this framework that you've described for China's domestic and foreign policy?
>> I think ultimately, for the Chinese government, the most important thing is to find grounds for cooperation that could ultimately benefit its um regime stability, internal economic development, issues that are at the core interest of the Chinese government. So, if a G2 can serve that purpose, I don't see why not.
>> Okay. All right. Let me, Henrietta, let me ask you the same, same two questions. One is, how should um countries in the region, putting aside the United States, be thinking about uh thinking about China today in the aftermath of the Trump-Xi summit? Um, and then also, um, is Trump susceptible to a G2 mentality or framework when it comes to uh Xi Jinping?
>> He certainly seems to be. He's been very >> excitedly proclaiming the arrival of the G2, um, which is a concept that US presidents have quite studiously avoided since uh Xi started pushing, you know, a new model or new type of great power relations back in the Obama administration.
>> Um, and this was always seen as a bad idea from the US perspective. Um, in part because it breaks faith with our allies to suggest that the US and China would kind of make decisions over the heads of countries with whom the US shares values and history and commitments. Um, but also, it, it kind of elevates China's position in a way that probably is not advantageous for US interests. Um, and it's interesting that now that uh Trump is talking about a G2, um, China has said, well, we, we don't accept that. Like, that's not our [laughter] idea. Um, which is really interesting to me because basically up until that moment, they have sought, you know, through different formulations, exactly that idea that the US and China can cut out the world, make big decisions together. Um, effectively, I think we saw China looking for the blessing of the United States that China has arrived as a as a real great power. And now China says, no, no, we don't want that. And and I think it speaks in part to the very high level of confidence that China now has in its position in the US-China relationship, where I think it feels, probably for the first time, that China can and should be negotiating with the United States fully as a peer. Um, A, and also, it shows China's confidence in its broader international standing. I think China doesn't feel like it needs that blessing from the US anymore.
>> Um, it feels its power is evident. And so, as long as that's the case, then, you know, some of those um questions of managing partnerships, managing China's international reputation that had previously affected the US position might be affecting China's calculus. So why not just say the right thing? Say say what the world wants to hear. We support multipolarity. All states are sovereign equals. Of course, we wouldn't, you know, we would never cut you out to cooperate with the US. Um, because China doesn't need that blessing from the US anymore.
>> Um, I do just want to engage briefly with kind of the way in which cooperation um falls into China's perspective when it comes to the US-China relationship. Um, because I think I would have a slightly different perspective in terms of China's priorities. I don't see China seeking kind of any opportunity for cooperation with the US. I think they, they do seek stability, um, and those decisions certainly are guided, to your, to your good point, um, by domestic priorities um, and questions of regime stability, social stability, etc. Um, but I, I don't think China looks at cooperation in the way that the US does, in the way that some of our partners do. That the US, for all its faults, has a very earnest approach to cooperation where we want to find areas where our interests align, put everything else aside, say we'll compete over here, but where our interests align, where it's good for the world, we should cooperate. Um, and so traditionally, um, areas of focus for the US in the China relationship have been things like counternarcotics, military-to-military cooperation, even dialogue on AI risk and safety, and questions um of limited but in the US view genuine shared interest. That is not, in my experience, how Beijing looks at cooperation, at least in the US-China relationship. For Beijing, cooperation is effectively leverage. It's something to be given as a gift when the US behaves as China hopes it will, and it's something to be taken away um when the US uh is less well-behaved.
>> Um, and so we often see China trying to tie cooperation to unrelated areas of the relationship. So, um, for example, um, I'm pretty sure, uh, China has sold the US a deal on cooperating on counternarcotics three separate times during the first Trump administration, during the Biden administration, and now again. Um, and I don't think there's anything about the way in which questions of counternarcotics and fentanyl and the export of chemical precursors from China to the US. I don't think that has changed so much over the course of those three US presidential administrations. But still, China has turned that cooperation on and off depending on what it's trying to achieve in the context of the broader relationship um and how it feels the the mood is uh between the US and China um in a much broader sense.
>> And so that doesn't mean cooperation can't be achieved, but it does make it complicated. And I think that's why thinking back to the Biden administration, when we were hoping to be able to cooperate um, for example, um on uh areas like climate, on public health, on macroeconomic issues um, and even on counternarcotics. It was always just a little harder than it would have been if uh we had a similar perspective on how to optimize shared interests.
>> Interesting. Um, [clears throat] so, um, if we, and this will be, since we're running out of time, the last question. I mean, if we take sort of this last point by Henrietta, if we see the word, I mean, so Henrietta's point, like, if we see the word cooperation, like in the data, we see the word cooperation um, that um, at face value means interesting cooperation as opposed to conflict or dominance. Uh, but there's this interesting point about how the word cooperation has different meanings, right? Or or in practice, like, I, I mean, in a sense, what you are saying is that if the United States and China, the United States looks at cooperation as something that is achieved, it can be achieved with China on issues where there's mutual interest, and then there is an effort to compartmentalize that, right? That that that cooperation goes forward regardless of what's happening with Taiwan, arm sales, or something like that. But um, but that for China, that cooperation is not compartmentalized, but it's kind of linked or leveraged. Um, and so, I mean, just your reaction to that. I mean, I, I don't know if you, whether you agree or disagree with that, or that um falls outside the realm of of the analysis or so.
>> Yeah. Yeah. So, the way I look at it um, just judging from events in the last 15 to 20 years, what we can see is that um, the way China looks at cooperation is um, I, I, by the way, I do agree that China is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the current um, rule-based international order, especially from trade, like you mentioned, from uh the economic growth we see in the last 40 years. But I think a lot of what China has been doing is kind of driven by its concerns that the United States would be able to isolate it. So, if we look at um what happened in this April, the Politburo um had a meeting called a Central Conference on Work Relating to Neighboring Countries, and it is very rare in Chinese history that in this kind of meeting, the terms "great power relations" are not the theme. And instead, this year, the focus was China's neighboring countries. And I think what we can see here is that um China would engage continuously with regional partners to strengthen their independence. And part of it is to avoid the United States from forcing regional partners, especially US allies and important partners in um Southeast Asia and East Asia to um pick sides between China and the United States, so that it can continue the continue benefiting from the current um arrangements, especially in the economic realm, to continue for China to benefit from that.
>> Okay. Um, very interesting conversation. I wish we could keep going, but we're, we're uh at the end of our time, the time that we rent in the studio, so we're going to have to stop. Um, what has been the reaction to the piece overall?
>> That's been a lot of different um opinions, and we're still kind of digesting it.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, thanks um Zenobia Chan. Thank you so much. Um, we're really happy to have you at Georgetown and really enjoyed the piece very much. Uh, Henrietta, it's great to welcome Henrietta back to the show again. Thank you so much for joining us. We hope you enjoyed the conversation. I promise you next time, we actually will have a podcast about Korea. Uh, but until then, thanks, and we'll see you on the next episode of The Impossible State. [music] [music]