Transcription
What's your strongest argument or evidence for God's existence?
>> I am a big fan of the modal ontological argument and I'll be interested to hear in your critiques. I also noticed you have op in your bias.
>> Yeah.
>> Um what you're going to say I saw. Okay, let's go.
>> Uh sure. So um just for like the audience's sake. So the middle ontological argument makes like a like a pretty basic claim. Um if God exists then he exists necessarily. um it's possible that God exists which means that it's possible that God exists necessarily or that there's like this possible necessity which is God um and a possible necessity via uh the S5 axiom in modal logic is an actual necessity um and maybe we could think about it like this you know we have all of the possible worlds and you know if God exists then he's in all of them and he's in one of them which means that he must be in all of them uh which means that he must be in our world um so uh God must exist Um, so I think that this falls victim to the parody argument. I think that uh what the argument is like dying for uh is like some sort of symmetry breaker from the reverse modal ontological argument uh which is just um you know it's possible God doesn't exist. If God exists then he exists necessarily. Uh therefore um like God does not exist. So I think that sort of falls like I understand where you're coming from, but that sort of is epistmically unsymmetrical to what the S5 system sort of promotes cuz like fundamentally it's like a possibly necessary proposition is a necessary proposition, right? And that can be sort of proven by uh the sort of reductio adabsum like contraosition of the original axum. But to like make that like non-symmetrical move to like a sort of possibly nonex like a possibly necessary non-existent being that requires a sort of different that like is a that alters what S5 is trying to illustrate by it sort of it's a false dichotomy. It doesn't make the same argument that S5 is proposing. I don't know if I've explained that particularly well but
>> um yeah I mean I I disagree. Right. So think about it this way. If God exists, then he's in all possible worlds. Um, so there's one possible world where he isn't. Therefore, he doesn't exist. It's you could do like a modus tolins. God exists implies exists in all possible worlds. Doesn't exist in all possible worlds. That is uh it's possible he doesn't exist. Uh therefore, he doesn't exist. Oh, but there's a distinction between it's possible that God is not necessary and it's possible that God is necessarily non-existent, right? Those that sort of equivocates two distinct modal claims.
>> Uh so maybe there's like a bit of confusion here. Um my claim is just that we can infer from the possibility that God doesn't exist to the conclusion that he doesn't exist.
>> Sorry, can you reiterate that I'm breaking up?
>> Yeah. Um, so, so maybe we'd say like premise one, if God exists, then he exists necessarily. That is to say, like he exists in all possible worlds. Um,
>> there's a possible world where God doesn't exist. Uh, therefore, God doesn't exist by modus tolins. A implies b, not b, therefore not a.
>> Premise two, I think, is invalidated by the fact that the definition of mgb entails necessary existence. So if you grant that, you can't then sort of propose a world sort of via possible world semantics because via S5 all symmetrical and reflexive. You can't propose that there is a possible world in which God does not exist if you got the existence of the MGB
>> because by it's a sort of internal critique, right? You you have to uh ascertain the existence of an MGB that critique
>> uh like maximally great being. It's the acronym that uses.
>> No, so okay, wait. So the claim of the modalological argument is that if it's possible for God to exist then he must exist. Um but then you can run a parody argument of this which just says if it's possible for him to not exist then he must not exist. So and anything that you use to justify like the first premise that it's possible for him to exist we could equally use to justify the first premise of the reverse argument which is that it's possible for him to not exist. Planting acknowledges that. Um so like it's he acknowledges that a rational person can either believe in the modal ontological argument or not and the the only difference is whether you sort of accept the first premise. So I'm not going to sort of persist on that. I was just interested to hear your take. Um
>> the the sort of second thing I just wanted to propose more more modal ontology is what do you think about the sort of uh I forget who proposed it but the perfect dialing critique?
>> Uh oh. Uh that's um that sure. Uh I don't know. I think it's like all right. I don't think the NSOM argument is very good. I think obviously the modalontological argument is like way better. Um yeah,
>> but I think I you know I don't know. I I feel like I'm inclined to I haven't heard like an AMS argument in quite some time. Um
>> I don't know. I don't have strong feelings about it. Uh in terms of like the the island critique, I I probably like I think I've used it before. Do you have like a critique of the island critique? I'm sorry. Wait, let me let me break this all down for the audience. So, okay. Um, there's like a like an onlogical argument that that uh came like way earlier from a guy named St. Anselm. Um, he just says like if you know imagine like a maximally great being um well, this being would need to exist because, you know, that's better than it not existing. So, if it's like maximally great, then it would need to exist. You know, a maximally great being that doesn't exist wouldn't be a maximally great being. So, it needs to exist. Um, and then there's like a parody argument that was written by like a contemporary of Ansom, like somebody who lived at the exact same time, who like mocked it and said, uh, well, if there's a maximally great island, then it must exist because, you know, it would be better if it existed than if it didn't exist. Um, so the maximally great island must exist. Um, so yeah, what's your I guess like I Yeah, what's your critique of it?
>> Well, I think there can be no such thing as a a necessary island, and an island is inherently contingent on things like matter, the universe's existence. I just don't think that sort of falls again sort of symmetrical to the original argument. I'm not a particularly strong proponent of Anselm. I was just interested to see if you would take a position on defending it.
>> Sure. Um, and when you say like contingent, do you mean like it it's like ontologically dependent or do you mean like the modal definition of contingent which is just like it exists in like some possible world but not um all possible worlds?
>> No, sort of more like in the sort of cosmological sense like we we can't have infinite causal regress. So thus there must be a necessary sort of being. That's the original grounding for the kaleum and the the Leven sort of contingency arguments. And so I'm sort of I'm sort of applying that in this situation in the sense that we can't like even in Anon's original argument, right, the god he's proposing must be necessary and an island just doesn't like an island just can't be necessary. It's contingent on so many different things.
>> That's very interesting. Um I I'm familiar with like a a critique of this. Um one sec, let me find my doc. I I wrote this out in Google Docs like several months ago. Um, but there's like a there's like a critique by a guy named Everett. Um, and uh, it argues from the premise that contingency is is not a greatmaking property, which it seems like you'd be committed to in this response. Uh, to therefore like God wouldn't create the universe. Um, and the argument is like basically this. So to the act of creating the universe would bring in like an imperfect object that if God exists alone, then all of reality is perfect, right? like it it can't be made better. It's literally perfect. You know, the only thing in it is perfect. But then if you bring in a universe um then it's imperfect because contingency is imperfect.
>> So take the reverse of that that would lead to modal collapse.
>> I like you know if all if God's will was necessary and God's will is like it's like you know the pansyist view that consciousness isn't everything. Um if you know that if we take that view then that leads to modal collapse. So I'm not sure if that can necessarily be applied here. I sort of think the distinction I'm trying to make here is that like there is in in Ansam's original argument which I'm not a particularly strong proponent for. So I'm actually going to shift this to the sort of modological modal ontological version. Right.
>> Sure.
>> I was sort of seeing if you would stand on the perfect island as a critique of the modal version.
>> I'm probably undecided.
>> A critique of the modal version. No, I think the I think the proper critique of the modal version is the symmetry argument.
>> Yeah. And as I've already said, I I have no reason to push that further.
>> You sound like you sound like you're very well read. Uh you're familiar with like Majesty of Reason, right?
>> Not in any great depth, but sort of.
>> He has a great video where he goes over like I think you would actually love this video. Um, it's uh let me let me find the exact title of it. But he goes through uh the modal ontological argument and then he gives like lots of like possible symmetry breakers that people have given like um like a reason to think that either um it or specifically he just goes through reasons to think that it's possible for God to exist. Um and there are some interesting ones right like one of them is like you know it would be good um u implies can like u implies possibility uh therefore like it must be possible for God to exist in so far as it would be good for him to exist. Um, you know, that's like an example of like a symmetry breaker for why it's possible for God to exist. Um, and then he just like gives like like thorough responses to like a bunch of different symmetry breakers. So um that might be like good in terms of like you you might be interested in that. Um to the extent that it could give you like some ideas for symmetry breakers
>> that I think sort of the next proposition I'd want to raise is are you familiar with naturalism as a concept?
>> Yeah.
>> Cool. So, what do you think about Planting's evolutionary argument against naturalism? Because I'm assuming you you're a proponent of naturalism as a worldview.
>> Uh yeah, I am. Um, I think uh I think proper functionalism like the proper functionalist framework that it operates under leaves god with all of his beliefs being unwarranted.
>> I come again. I I can hear that.
>> Yeah. So, okay. So, uh what underlies like the evolutionary argument uh against naturalism is the idea of proper functionalism that your beliefs have warrant only if they have they they're like working as they were designed to function. Um, now that means that none of God's beliefs has warrant. So, he just couldn't be an all- knowing being. More to the sort of my understanding of the the in is that it's implausible to hold both naturalism and like to accept evolution as a premise, which I think I would be more I'd be inclined to accept evolution. I think there's too much scientific evidence to doubt it.
>> Yeah, of course. But then if you then take naturalism as a you know you take naturalism to be true as well there is then not sufficient selection pressure on like our cognitive abilities to be truth seeeking
>> because
>> because truth seeeking sort of truth seeeking mechanisms are not correlated to survival in the same way that sort of evolution selects for fitness seeeking
>> so mechanisms.
>> Yeah.
>> It's like planting's tiger experiment. No, sir. Go for it.
>> Um, are you familiar with the sort of tiger thought experiment?
>> I I think maybe. Is it um is it the idea that like you can't tell if it's like a tiger coming at you or it's like a piece of driftwood?
>> Yeah, that's that's sort of that's one of them. I probably should be more specific. It's uh so imagine like when in the context of developing a species, the action of okay, god tigers are gods and the best way to appease our gods is by running away really really fast. And also the sort of truth seeeking mechanism that tigers are dangerous, the best way to survive is running away really really fast. That like the underlying belief doesn't necessarily correlate with sort of fitness seeking action that evolution selects for.
>> Um, yeah, no I I hear that. Um, so I think that there's like kind of something to say which is just that um like clearly like evolutionary like cognitive biases are are definitely present in our cognition. And like that's obviously true, right? We have like things like confirmation bias, recency bias. Like we have all of these cognitive biases. Um, like a like a great book on this is uh [ __ ] what is it? Thinking fast and thinking slow. Um, but just get like surveys are our biases and it lays out this like model of human cognition where we have like a like a really quick like system one where we will make inferences like really quickly. Um, but it'll be riddled with biases. We'll use shortcuts. We'll use heruristics and we'll arrive at conclusions really quickly um like without thinking even uh yeah, you know, and the biases by which we arrive at these are ones that are good evolutionarily speaking there's an evolutionary reason for all of the biases that we have um but then there's a system too that is able to overcome those biases that is truth seeeking um and that makes sense right like it makes sense that evolutionarily you should be able to make instant snap judge ments and then when you're safe like go back and revise them. So I think that there is like good reason to think that we would be truth seeeking in so far as like the truth of reality uh is is quite important in terms of like your survival and reproduction. The the point is that it's not that truth seeeking mechanisms aren't like ne like like couldn't possibly be useful to what evolution selects but I think the point that plunge makes is that there is no necessary correlation between that and if you even have so much sort of any doubt on the selection pressure to trust your cognitive reasoning then holding evolution and naturalism together means that there is even some sort of slight doubt over the cognitive reasoning that led you to determining that evolution and naturalism were True. So thus it's sort of it's not that it's that it could possibly be plausible. It's more that there is no necessary like correlation between them if that makes sense.
>> Uh yeah, I guess I guess this argument is getting like um I'm I'm I don't think I'm convinced that this is is like a valid argument or that it follows a valid inference rule. Um because it it totally seems like it's it could be the case that um like I agree like it's possible that I'm like a brain in a vat or that there's like something going on. Um but of course like I just have no justification for thinking that sort of thing and I'm not sure why evolution would give me some sort of justification. Like it seems like another well it's possible that you evolved to not grasp that truth. So therefore, it's the case that or like all of your beliefs are like unjustified. I don't think like a possible defeater is an actual defeater. Um, so you know, I'm not I'm not I'm not really sure what the thrust of the argument is in so far as I think it's like totally plausible that evolution would select uh for like it seems plausible that evolution would select for this.
>> Again, it's one of those arguments I'm more just interested to hear what you think. um sort of next. Uh I'm done with that as long as you want.
>> Sure, that's fine. Yeah,
>> cool. Uh cosmological argument for God's existence.
>> Which one?
>> Um uh let's we can go Kale then just for simplicity.
>> Yeah.
>> Um
>> so I I understand that you're an OPY fan. So I'm going to deduce from that you don't think infinite causal regress is impossible.
>> I'm actually more than an Oppy fan. I'm a Dr. Blitz fan, which is why I think infinite causal regress is possible. I actually don't know. Uh I I'm unconvinced by all of the infinity paradoxes or all the arguments against causal regress. Um, like I you know I I like the idea of like the necessary initial state, but I think there's like really good evidence for big bounce big crunch which could very well be an infinite regress. I also hold to the B theory of time if you're familiar with that which gets out of like all of the infinity paradoxes really easily.
>> All right. Could you just sort of expand on that quickly? I'm not super theories of time.
>> Yeah.
>> Yeah. Yeah. So, B theory of time just states that all moments are equally real. Uh, spatial analogy is really helpful. So, 10 miles away from me exists. It's just 10 miles away from me. 10 minutes from now exists. It's just 10 minutes from now. It actually exists. It's just 10 minutes from now. Um, and like 10 miles away from me actually exists. It's just 10 10 miles away from now. Um, so the B theory of time just states that all moments are equally real. Uh,
>> sure.
>> So, if all moments are equally real, questions like, well, how did we get to here? Well, the here always existed. it just existed at this specific like like temporal location.
>> Okay. Interesting. So, I'm going to assume that you also don't hold to a sort of determinist point of view.
>> Um I'm inclined towards necessitarianism.
>> Going back to the sort of Calm argument then. So, would you assert that brute facts are sort of plausible in their existence?
>> I don't like brute facts, but I'm agnostic to whether they exist. Like I I think you should try to avoid them if possible. Sure. Do you do you would you validate the principle sufficient reason?
>> Uh which version?
>> Um let's go with
>> uh so is that like just every every contingency has an explanation
>> pretty much. Yeah.
>> I don't uh gosh I don't really believe in contingencies. I only think I think necessary things produce necessary things.
>> Interesting. Could you expand on that?
>> Yeah. Um uh the mo collapse argument is like a good illustration of this. But so let's say let's say that you have event A and event A necessitates event B and event A is necessary. Well then so is event B. There's no possible world where event B doesn't happen. If if event A is necessary and event A is bringing about event B like the the causal connection there like the laws of nature or whatever are necessary
>> um then event B is necessary too. There's no other outcome that could be
>> and thus that leads to modal collapse. Fine.
>> Yeah.
>> Um I think that's difficult. So your sort of I'm just going to summarize your sort of critique of the CAM argument is that it stands on the principle that we must avoid infinite causal regress. And because you invalidate that proposition, the the sort of conclusion drawn from CAM is irrelevant.
>> Uh um I'm not sure if I'm tracking or like I I uh I don't think the universe began to exist.
>> Really? I think that an infinite regress is totally coherent.
>> So what in the sense you don't believe the big bang was the beginning of our universe?
>> Yeah, like the big bang definitely happened, right? It was the rapid expansion. I have no reason to think that it was like 0. And actually the um if you're familiar with Phil Halper, uh he was in like the Alex Okconor debate against uh like Clifen Stewart. He's also like a like you know like a wellrespected like physics and philosophy guy. Um so uh he did a recent survey of physicists and the majority opinion is that the big bang says literally nothing about being the beginning of time or the beginning of the universe that all it is is just that the universe was in a hot dense state and then it rapidly expanded.
>> Any sort of empirical evidence demonstrating otherwise we there is no sort of compelling piece of evidence to illustrate that time in the sense that we understand it extended before the big bang.
>> Uh yeah, and like likewise like the opposite like there's no reason to think that it wasn't before. Um the majority the consensus opinion I should I should clarify this. It's it's not that the big bang um is not the beginning. It's just that the big bang makes no claims to being the beginning. That the big bang is a theory which is agnostic to whether or not there was a beginning of these things.
>> Okay. Do you not think um that sort of infinite cause or regress violates nilo x nil like nothing comes from nothing?
>> I'm not sure why it would
>> because in the sense that we can't have an infinite chain of like contingent events, right?
>> I'm a necessitarian. Again, I don't think contingencies exist,
>> right? Okay. I'm again that's sort of a premise that we just would fundamentally disagree on. So I think it'd be difficult to come to any sort of conclusions drawn from there. If you don't like brute facts, the alternative if if you reject like the argument that I put forward, the alternative is that you'd be committed to brute facts,
>> right? So if
>> if you have like event A and event A is necessary and then like it causing event B like the causal connection is necessary then event B is necessary. The only other alternative is that like event A is a contingency, but it would need to be like at the sorry at the start of the the chain of contingencies, there would need to be a brute contingency because there couldn't it couldn't come from like a necessary thing because necessary things only produce necessary things.
>> Proposition A was a necessary proposition and proposition B was contingent on proposition A. Regardless of the causal connection, proposition B is still contingent to proposition A and thus is not a necessary proposition.
>> Gosh, this is um I'm so sorry. Wait, uh this is this is a good point of clarification. But when I say contingent, when I say I don't believe in contingencies, I'm saying I think that everything is either necessary or impossible. I don't think that there's anything that exists in some possible world but not others.
>> I'm not using it in like the like the onlogical dependent sense.
>> Yeah. Okay. I I was sorry that was my misinterpretation of what you were saying.
>> That's all good.
>> Um
>> I'm afraid I I have to go but this was really Thank you very much.
>> I enjoyed the conversation. Thanks so much. You clearly very well read and I really appreciate the conversation. It's it's nice to be able to talk to people who have like clearly spent some time like reading and looking into this.
>> Yeah, I watched your last debate. That was quite something.
>> Yeah, it really was. I'm sorry that you had to sit through that. But anyway, um
>> have a good rest of your day or night.
>> Yeah, you as well.
>> Thank you.
>> That guy was super cool. Um, I'm I'm of course like a like a big fan of people. Uh, I actually can't believe that that call was only 20 minutes. Um, that call felt like it lasted like an hour or something. I guess time really flies. Um, anyway, uh, I guess or the opposite like it I don't know. We just covered so much ground. And his prequel.