Transcription
Of course, because there's no way that Trump can get a deal if he works with Netanyahu because Netanyahu is adamantly opposed to a deal. Israel and the lobby will go to enormous lengths to undermine the deal. This is the problem that Trump faces. He's caught, he's caught between the pressure, this, uh, uh, this truly profound pressure from the international economy on one side, and Netanyahu, Israel, and the lobby on the other side.
This is perhaps a rhetorical question, but if this agreement proceeds more or less along the lines that have been leaked, would you characterize it as primarily a big strategic defeat for Israel?
Oh, it'll be, this is a catastrophic defeat for Israel.
Yeah. Right. They, they, because the original, the original Israeli objective, let's just be clear for our audience, was not coexistence with a constrained Iran. It was about a permanent weakening of Iran's, um, nuclear and regional capabilities. Correct. And ballistic missile capabilities, John.
Absolutely. It was similar to what we wanted to do to Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war. As you've heard me say many times, we wanted to knock Russia out of the ranks of the great powers. I think in this particular case, what the, what the Israelis really wanted to do, they talked about regime change. Uh, and I think they would have settled for regime change, but what they really wanted was to do to do to is do to Iran what's been done to Syria, which is break it into pieces, uh, cause a serious revolution that greatly weakens the state.
So, what does all this mean for Netanyahu? He's presumably trapped politically because if he openly confronts Trump, I mean, couldn't he risk alienating a lot of Israeli voters who still strongly support Trump? But if he remains quiet at the same time, he risks appearing to acquiesce in this deal that doesn't help Israel.
John, well, he's in deep trouble because no matter what happens with Trump, he lost the war against Iran. Iran's not giving up, these are the points you made before. Iran's not giving up its missiles, right? Its nuclear enrichment capability is going to remain intact. It's not giving up its support for Hamas, the Houthis, uh, and Hezbollah. And, uh, Iran is, uh, getting all sorts of relief. Uh, so, uh, he loses in the war in Iran. The war against Hezbollah in Lebanon is going terribly, independent of the Iran issue.
Tell us more about that because that's not getting much play in the mainstream media. Is Israel's, uh, war with Hezbollah in, in Lebanon? Uh, tell us more, John.
Well, first of all, the terrain in, the terrain in southern Lebanon, uh, is ideally suited for the defender, and the defender in this case is Hezbollah. And when the Israelis went in there in 2006, they got clobbered by Hezbollah because Hezbollah used the terrain, uh, in southern Lebanon to ambush, uh, Israeli armored, uh, and infantry forces. But what's changed since then that makes Hezbollah even more effective is the coming of drones because Hezbollah is using fiber-optic drones. Those are drones that are very hard for the Israelis to jam, uh, to deadly effect. So the Israelis have been suffering significant casualties in southern Lebanon. And the other dimension to this, Tom, is that Hezbollah is firing every day large numbers of rockets and missiles into northern Israel. You remember a number of months ago it looked like Hezbollah had been defeated. Israel had won a great victory.
Uh, the table has now turned, and Hezbollah is back on its feet and it's causing the Israelis huge problems, not only inside southern Lebanon itself, but also in terms of bombing, uh, north, uh, Israel. So if you look at the Lebanon war, and just go to Hamas, I mean, there's no question that Hamas has been clobbered, and the Palestinians, of course, have undergone a genocide in Gaza, but the fact is that Hamas is still alive and still fighting. It would be too much to say Hamas is alive and well, but it's close to that point. So they haven't defeated Hamas. They haven't defeated Hezbollah. They haven't defeated Iran. And they've done enormous damage. This is, the Israelis to their reputation, not only around the world, but in the United States. It's quite stunning the extent to which people in the United States are now critical of Israel in ways that were unthinkable.
But surely the security intelligence in Israel and Washington before February 28 knew about Iran and its proxies' ability to, uh, fight back.
Tom, I think on February 27th, when Netanyahu and company and Trump and company were thinking about going to war the next day, they thought that Hezbollah had effectively been defeated. They did not know that it would come back from the dead. Point number one. And point number two, they thought that they were going to win a quick and decisive victory. They thought a shock and awe air campaign which had decapitation at the center of it, uh, would produce a victory. And of course, as you remember, on February 28th, they did decapitate the regime in Iran. They succeeded. And furthermore, they did launch a shock and awe campaign. That was quite shocking. But the problem is, it didn't work. And once that doesn't work, they're then in a long war. And then the whole question of the Strait of Hormuz, uh, being [clears throat] closed comes into play. You want to remember that beforehand, President Trump has said that he was warned, uh, about the Strait of Hormuz, being closed. And he said, "No need to worry because we're going to win the war quickly and it won't become an issue." Well, they didn't win the war quickly. It became an issue. And then to go back to Hezbollah, it came into the fight. Uh, and furthermore, Tom, there's one other very important point that I want to make. Uh, reports have come out from the intelligence community via the Washington Post, the New York Times, that we, the United States, have suffered much greater damage to our military bases, uh, in the Persian Gulf than we realized. We, the public, realized at first, but they're now telling us that our base structure really got clobbered. Now, you say to yourself when you hear this, if they were deadly effective against our bases, doesn't that mean that it's highly likely that their attacks against Israel were deadly effective?
Well, you remember, we knew nothing, virtually nothing, about how much damage was done inside Israel during the bombing campaign because the Israelis did a brilliant job of keeping information about the consequences of the bombing from the rest of us. But we're now getting lots of information that Israel really got clobbered, uh, by those Iranian missiles, just like the American military bases in the region really got clobbered. It makes perfect sense. So you want to understand that Israel has paid a real price in terms of, uh, the damage that has been done by those Iranian missiles and drones that hit them. And that's not to mention America's allies, the Sunni Gulf allies. You think of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, uh, how are they feeling right now? Because this deal may well embolden Iran, their nemesis.
What's very interesting on this point, Tom, is that virtually every one of the GCC states, the six Gulf states, uh, including the UAE, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, who are mortal enemies these days, all six of them begged the United States not to restart the bombing campaign for exactly the reason that you're alluding to. They understand full well that Iran has a second-strike capability, and they are in the crosshairs. And the Iranians, if enormous, if enormous damage is done to Iran, the Iranians will do enormous damage to those, uh, six Gulf states, and they don't want that for all the obvious reasons.
John, let's conclude with where we're at. Um, it's still uncertain, of course, how diplomatic negotiations proceed, but we should remember that the administration and the Israelis started this mission on February 28, um, with what's called maximalist objectives. So, they wanted to, and destroy Iran's enrichment capability, um, especially following the June, um, attacks last year. They wanted to weaken the missile infrastructure, the ballistic missile infrastructure. They wanted to roll back the regional proxies. We mentioned them before, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels. And given that the regime is now likely to remain intact, and that enrichment capability, I know it's still a work in progress, but that may well be preserved. Sanctions relief on the table. I mean, how do you think future historians are likely to view this episode in history, John?
Well, uh, I make a couple points. One is, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, uh, a year or two ago, commissioned some diplomatic historians, American diplomatic historians, to assess what was the greatest foreign policy blunder that the United States has ever made. Uh, this is obviously before the Iran war. And they concluded that the Iraq war in 2003, which you and I know all about, was the greatest blunder that the United States ever made.
Mhm. [clears throat] Uh, I think this decision to attack Iran on February 28th will far outdistance the Iraq 2003 war as the greatest foreign policy blunder the United States ever made. Second point I'd make in support of this is you want to remember that Robert Kagan, who is a hard-nosed and very smart neoconservative, [clears throat] uh, an arch proponent of the 2003 Iraq war, has said that the decision to attack Iran on February 28th and involve the United States and Israel in this war was a catastrophic mistake. Uh, I think his view on how foolish this decision was, uh, is completely in line with my view and with your view. Uh, and all of this just tells you this, I think will go down in the history books as a massive blunder. The nuclear threat. We're not just talking about starting World War I or World War II, which would be absolutely horrible in its own sense, but we're talking about the fact that the Russians have nuclear weapons and the Caragonov and others are talking about using those nuclear weapons. It's very important to understand that. So once you begin to go up the escalation ladder, everybody understands that at some point up there, it's hard to figure out, you know, exactly where that point is. Your eyes are closed and you're feeling your way up the escalation ladder, right? But somewhere up that ladder, uh, is nuclear use. On one of the rungs is the use of nuclear weapons. And, uh, everybody, or almost everybody, is going to want to avoid that. This is what Caragonov understands. The mere threat of nuclear weapons will have huge deterrent value. And I think he's correct in that regard. Uh, because we don't want to get incinerated. And what Caragonov is talking about and others are talking about is, you know, getting out on the slippery slope. And, uh, once you're out on the slippery slope, who knows how far you're going to slip, right? Again, we're on the escalation ladder. You can't see for sure where you're going. Your eyes are closed, right? You're feeling your way around in the dark. And, uh, nuclear weapons may be used. So the argument here is that once you start up the escalation ladder, the incentives for everybody to put an end to it very quickly, uh, are very great.
Yeah. See, that's why I see the logic in, in the at strike against the NATO country. Not because this is, uh, low risk, but, uh, doing nothing now, it seems like this is even greater risk because Europeans already told us where, where they're going to take this. We want to bring the war to Russia. We're going to mass-produce long-range missiles and drones to strike deep inside Russia. Uh, this is actually what we're going to do. And they've shown now with this attack on Moscow that this is what they're planning to do. So not doing anything now, it seems, uh, almost more reckless than striking NATO, which shows how well horrific situation we've got ourselves into. Um, that being said, I, I did want to pivot a bit though towards, uh, another horrible war which seems to get out of control, which is Iran. It, from what I understand, after China, there was no meaningful changes. Uh, the, the Iranians don't accept American proposals. The Americans don't accept Iranian proposals, and there are many now warning that a war could be mere hours away, or, you know, 24, 48 hours. Uh, how do you see this situation developing? My, my, the only source of, uh, relief or calm now seems to be that it doesn't make any sense, that it's unclear to me what can be achieved which they didn't achieve in those 40 days. So what, what are we looking at here?
Well, if you look at the, uh, proposals that the Iranians and the Americans are making on how to settle this conflict, you see that they're light years apart. There's no bargaining space here, uh, in this conflict, just as there's no bargaining space in the Ukraine/Europe-Russia conflict. Uh, and therefore, you're not going to get a deal unless they're making concessions behind closed doors that we just don't know about. But there does not appear to be any evidence of that. Everything you see in the public record tells you there's just no agreement on any of the key issues between the two sides. Uh, and Trump is getting desperate. There's just no question about that. Uh, we started with a bombing campaign that lasted 40 days. That didn't work. So on April 8th, we moved to a ceasefire. Uh, and then our coercive leverage was supposed to come from the blockade. Uh, the blockade was the new, uh, formula for getting Iran to surrender. The original formula was the 40-day bombing campaign. That didn't work. Well, it's quite clear that the blockade is not working either. Uh, and that if it ever is going to work, it's going to take a long time. And time is something that Trump doesn't have. He's got to deal with this, uh, quickly. He's got to get a settlement because of the economic consequences of this war. Uh, and that means he has really two choices. He can go back to bombing, or he can basically cut a deal on Iran's terms. Uh, and he finds it almost impossible to cut a deal on Iran's terms. Uh, I think that he hoped that when he went to Beijing, he could talk to the Chinese and the Chinese would be willing to put pressure on Iran. Uh, and the Iranians would end up making some significant concessions that would allow Trump to declare victory. Uh, even though he would have to make concessions himself, but at least the, at least the Iranians would make major concessions, too. But there was no evidence the Chinese were willing. There is no evidence the Chinese were willing to do that. So China's not helping. So he's back to square one here. And the question is, what does he do? And, uh, I think one gets a sense that he might very well, uh, roll the dice and, uh, go back to bombing Iran. There's no question that the Israelis and the neoconservatives in the United States are pushing him in that direction. But the problem he faces is that using, or or or launching another bombing campaign is not going to fix the problem. It's not going to cause the Iranians to surrender. Uh, almost everybody understands that. Uh, you can inflict massive punishment on Iran, as we did in the first 40 days of the war, and they won't surrender. If anything, uh, uh, they'll become more committed than ever to, you know, hanging in there. And then the other problem that Trump faces is that the Iranians have a second-strike capability. And, uh, you know, if you think about restarting the bombing campaign, Glenn, uh, it seems clear to me, if it didn't work the first time, uh, you're going to have to even go harder at them the second time. In other words, you're going to have to make the bombing campaign this time around even more intense. It makes common sense. Of it, of a, if the bombing campaign didn't work the first time and you expect it to work the second time, it has to be because it's going to be a much more, uh, it's going to be a much more ma, it's going to be a massive bomb, much more massive bombing campaign, uh, than the 40-day campaign we started the war with. But if you do that, that gives the Iranians a greater incentive to just wreck the entire Gulf. Uh, to go after almost every country in the Gulf and do everything possible to destroy those countries, shut down the Red Sea, uh, and so forth and so on. And the end result is that even greater damage will be done to the international economy, and the Iranians will still be in the fight. Uh, so I don't see why from a strategic point of view Trump wouldn't just accept the fact that we've lost and cut a deal. It is, it a good alternative? No. But it's the least bad alternative. Uh, you know, going back to bombing and launching a more massive bombing campaign than we did last time, it's not going to solve the problem. Uh, it's just going to make it worse, as I said. But anyway, you don't have the sense, at least from what we can see on the outside, that Trump is willing to make any meaningful concessions to the Iranians and let them walk away with a victory. So, it appears that he may very well roll the dice.
Yeah. Know, that's what I'm thinking. If [clears throat] it does go back into this war, it's going to have to be much higher intensity despite being fewer military targets, uh, they have left. Uh, but that means, yeah, the, the Iranians have very little reason to have any restraint. As you said, they can shut down this, uh, Red Sea. They can essentially destroy a lot of the Gulf states. They can cut the internet cables. They can, uh, make a significant territorial conquest against, uh, Kuwait through the, well, you have the Iraqis do it. I mean, there's so much that can be done. Uh, I'm, it's, this is why it's hard to imagine them going down this path. But let's say instead of escalating, going back into the war, uh, Trump decides to instead strengthen the, the, the blockade. So one of the problems now is they have to have too far distance from the, uh, Iranian coast. But what if they moved it, for example, to the Strait of Malacca or something to cut off the Iranian ships there? Do, do you also, of course, bringing the war to some extent to China? Do you think this is, uh, you know, something like this is possible where they essentially begin to draw in more actors?
Well, the problem here is not where the blockade is located. Uh, the problem here is that the blockade does not inflict sufficient punishment on Iran to get it to surrender. And as long as Iran doesn't surrender and, um, the Strait of Hormuz is closed, this has huge consequences for the international economy. And as time goes by, the situation just worsens. If you look at what's happening to inflation inside the United States and around the world, and you start thinking about the problems that various countries are having servicing their debt, or their debts, and how this is likely to become a more acute problem over time, what you see is that the incentives for President Trump to shut this war down sooner rather than later are very great. But again, how does he do that? Uh, and I think where the blockade is located just doesn't matter very much. Um, and, uh, that's why I, I think that continuing the blockade is not a viable alternative. And I think the Trump administration recognizes that. That's why we're talking about going back to bombing. We're talking about going back to bombing because the blockade doesn't work. Uh, and you want to remember that just as the countries in the Gulf, uh, outside of Iran, are looking for ways to beat the blockade, the Iranians themselves are looking for ways to beat the blockade. Uh, and all of the players have some options here. So, the Iranians are hard at work trying to figure out different ways to get around the blockade. And they have some cards to play here. And that's what makes it very difficult, uh, to inflict the kind of punishment on Iran that might, and I underline the word might, might might get the Iranians to surrender.
Well, I just have a hard time seeing the overall strategy or direction of the US here, though. Where, where exactly are they going? Because, uh, we were told in the national security strategy of '25 that, uh, the US was likely heading in a more multipolar, while adjusting to a multipol, multipolar, sorry, distribution of power. Now we see, uh, a lot of these wars, they seem to have a, you know, objective of restoring primacy. Where, for no good reason, a lot of the relationships have been spoiled. For example, with Europeans, the East Asians, well, the Gulf states have, probably accidentally so, but the international law is falling apart. No one's trusting diplomacy anymore. This is a key problem for the, uh, on the Iranian and the Russian side, they wouldn't actually trust anything, not just at the US side, but the Europeans as well. How do you, where, where, if you take a step back looking at all these, uh, conflicts at the same time, how do you think the US will adjust to this? Because, you know, at one point I thought that this, the US could flip this to an opportunity. It could just argue, well, when we wanted to get out of the Middle East anyways, we're going to pivot out. The Europeans, they didn't help us. We'll go away from Europe too. And they can, you know, they can essentially make an adjustment to multipolarity. But it doesn't seem this is the pathway. So where is the US going here though?
Well, with regard to Europe, what the United States is doing is shifting the burden of dealing with the Ukraine conflict onto the shoulders of the Europeans. Uh, and the United States is doing everything it can to wean itself off that conflict. Let the Europeans handle it. With regard to East Asia, it's quite clear from Trump's, uh, recent trip to Beijing that what he's doing is going to great lengths to make sure, uh, that there's no crisis in East Asia, uh, and certainly no war in East Asia involving the United States. That would be a total disaster for the United States, certainly at this point in time. Uh, and that brings us to the Middle East. This is where we are deeply involved in fighting a war. Again, we're not fighting the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are fighting the war, and we've been helping them for sure, but we're not doing the actual fighting. And certainly, we're not doing any fighting in East Asia, thankfully. Uh, but the place where we are doing the fighting is in the Middle East. This is the Iran war. And the question is, what can we do to get out of that? And you know, it's funny, but I, I often sort of think about the Vietnam War, uh, when I think about the Iran War. And, uh, you want to remember in 1968, uh, after President Johnson says that he's not going to run again because he's effectively, uh, been, uh, destroyed by the Vietnam War. Uh, Richard Nixon runs against Hubert Humphrey, and Richard Nixon wins the election in November of '68, and he takes over in January of '69. And Nixon made it clear when he was campaigning that he had a secret plan to end the war, and he was going to end the war quickly. Well, if you look at what happened after Nixon comes into office, he was not interested in ending the war. He wanted to stay in the fight. He did not want to concede defeat. Um, and, uh, we actually thought, uh, you know, by 1972, that by using American air power and Vietnamese ground forces, that combination would allow us, would allow us to hold off the North Vietnamese and forestall defeat. Uh, the Nixon administration did not want to lose in Vietnam. They were constantly searching for a clever strategy to make sure that we could win the war, or at least not lose the war. Uh, and, uh, of course, what happened in the end is that Congress forced Nixon's hand. Congress told them, uh, told the Nixon administration, you cannot use air power, uh, to rescue the situation. May '72, when we, uh, stopped the North Vietnamese offensive with tactical air power, was the last gasp, and after that, Congress made it impossible for the Nixon administration to prop up, uh, the, uh, government in Saigon with air power. And of course, what happened is that Saigon fell, the North Vietnamese won. But, uh, Nixon, and of course Henry Kissinger, who was his national security adviser and then his secretary of state, they did not want to lose. It's not the American way. And just to go to Afghanistan, as you well know, we were there for 20 years fighting the Taliban. We did not want to lose that war. Uh, so what this tells you is when the United States gets into a war, even when it's losing, it is very difficult to accept defeat. Very difficult. The United States is a very powerful country. Uh, and it's constantly looking for a way to win. And this is, I think, the basic logic that you see at play in the case of Iran. Uh, you know, you and I can point out to them that this war is lost, and in a certain sense, they recognize.