Transcription
So Eric, I would like to first begin by asking you this. You spent your youth in China at the height of the Cultural Revolution. And in your viral TED talk, which most of the audience members probably have much watched already, you say you were disillusioned by the failed religion of your youth in China and went to America to learn about the West. Uh, you worked your way to get degrees from Berkeley and Stanford and became a successful salesman in Rose Paris's company. You even got involved in uh, Rose Pero's presidential campaign um, and seriously participate in American liberal democracy as we would all expect from your democracy-loving speech. Um, uh, you seem to have drive in the West, but you now are very skeptical of the idea of liberal democracy and even more skeptical of the idea that um, liberal democracy is desirable for China and is compatible with China. Um, how did this shift in your view um, take place?
You know, when I was your age, I knew everything. You know how it feels. I do, because I was there. And when I knew everything, and when you knew everything, you are predisposed to buying into neat formulas that explain all of the world. And you're predisposed into believing that there's a solution to every problem and there's a grand solution to the grand problem. And of course, I knew everything when I was growing up and and and and I grew up with the narrative that there was a certainty in this world and the whole world was moving in the same direction and it's for certain that we will go from primitive societies through sla-very to feudalism to capitalism and ultimately end up in the communist utopia. It didn't quite work out that way. And of course, when I was coming of age and and was a student in in in in America, I was still young and I was fed another story and that was neat too, a beautiful formula where the individual will emerge as a sovereign unit of all societies and and 1.3 billion or six billion individuals will vote ourselves to paradise. And it was a beautiful story too, but...
And of course, I left America. I returned to my native country and I traveled everywhere and I studied. I went to Africa. I went to Southeast Asia. I grew my business in China. And the world turned out to be more complex than that and more nuanced than that and more interesting. I think um, the the the the the formula that was devised after the Cold War where every country must follow to to to to achieve prosperity didn't really work out for most of those countries that prescribed them and followed them. Uh, you can go to all those countries in Africa, in Southeast Asia, they follow the playbook. They they did everything by the book. But it didn't work out for them and they can't go back. They're in trouble.
>> Also,
>> China didn't do that.
>> Yeah.
>> And it did work out to some extent. There are many problems, of course. Uh, but the fact is still that it led to, like I said, the greatest, most significant improvement in the way in the way of life for the largest number of people in the shortest time in history.
Um, also during your speech, you said one might be very counterintuitive to audience members here. You said, "What did they get wrong?" It turned out that the party has not been holding back or reacting to China's modernization, but leading it. Self-correction, the ability many attribute to democracies, has been a hallmark of the party's governance. And you've been actually arguing that the Chinese political system is at least self-correcting as Western liberal democracy, if not more. But how does the party self-correct their policies? I mean, in the absence of institutional liberal democracy, of free press, uh, judicial oversight, popular vote, what is the mechanism through which the Chinese model informs the party of being wrong about their policies?
Um, you know, let me first address the second half of your your your your question, which is, you know, the the overriding assumption in the last few decades by political scientists is that democracies self-correct. Democracies are uniquely capable of changing courses and reforming themselves to adapt to the times. It turns out the facts are, if you're political science, how many are political science students here? I don't know if you're political science students. It turns out, at least so far, the evidence indicates that electoral democracies are extraordinarily rigid. They can't change course. So many interests are involved. Um, you know, Frank Fukuyama, my friend, the political scientist, calls the American system "vetocracy." Everybody can veto everything. It can't, can't do anything. The the, in fact, Fareed Zakaria, another great American commentator, has recently written that, you know, the American political system should change itself into a parliamentary one because the circumstances in America are such that a parliamentary system could work better. But of course, it's simply not possible. It will not be done. So even within democratic models of governance, it is nearly impossible to change from a parliamentary one to a presidential one or vice versa, let alone any wider range of changes. And I think political reforms, reforms are badly needed in America and Europe. But why is it not happening? Because these systems are extraordinarily rigid. The Chinese system, so far, is not going to be forever. The one-party system happens to be very agile. I use this one particular example. For the 10 years before the 18th Party Congress last year, we had nine members at the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which is the highest ruling body in the country. And it turned out that the power was too diffused, decision-making process was dragging and and didn't work quite well. So what did they do? At the 18th Party Congress, they took it down to seven. Imagine taking the US Senate from 100 people to 88. It won't happen, regardless how urgently needed it may be. So the Chinese system is very, very agile. And now, the reason why I would advance the case that it is agile, because the Chinese Communist Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic and upwardly mobile political organizations in the world today. If you conduct a good analysis, the leadership of the party emerges from the grassroots. Yeah, I know there's a lot of talk about princelings and what have you, but if you really take a look at the numbers, yeah, I I studied the Central Committee before the 18th Party Congress. Haven't gotten around to study the current one, but I think it generally holds true. In the in the Politburo, in the last Politburo of 25 people, only five of them came from so-called princeling background, any background of of privilege, whether it's wealth or power. The other 20, including the president and prime minister, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In a Central Committee, in today's Central Committee, the percentage of people who come from a background of any privilege is even smaller. Compare that to the US Senate, for instance. How many are sons of senators and sons of come from wealth? Compare that. I I would I would say if we conduct a survey, if you conduct a study and compare the Chinese ruling elites at the Central Committee level or whatever level you want to choose and compare that across the board against developed countries from America to Europe, against developing countries from the Philippines to South Korea, the entire country of South Korea, where just there was run by princelings from politicians to travel CEOs to university presidents, who are all sons of university presidents.
Um, so so if you make that comparison, I would suggest that the party, the the the percentage of people who come from the grassroots in the upper echelon of the party is probably the largest, period. And it is this ability, if you go to any Chinese university, I was studying for my PhD at Fudan, and the the the party recruits at the very grassroots level, the best and the brightest students who come from the countryside. They join the party and they move their way up slowly, step by step. Um, and it's the the the selection process is very meritocratic. Uh, and it's very tough. Even for Xi Jinping, the new General Secretary, he is a princeling, happens to be a princeling. But let you know, it's it's it's amazing. The party has been in power for 64 years. He is the first, he is the first head of state, head of the party who comes from a background of political leadership. No one else has. So, but even for him, the career path took 30 years. He worked his way up from village chief, county chief, mayor, vice mayor, mayor, provincial. By the time he made it to the top, he had managed 150 million people and a couple trillion dollars in combined GDP. Uh, the track record is amazing, and you don't make it to the top unless you go through that grinding machine of the of the party system. So I think the ability to recruit people from the grassroots, regardless of their background, and allow them the upward mobility to move up is the key to the party's ability to adapt because the upper echelon, the ruling elites, are the same generation of the people they're ruling and come from the grassroots. So they know the conditions of the country.
So you think the rise of princelings is a fiction?
Well, I I think the numbers indicate that um, if it's simply there, and I think the numbers will continue to indicate that even to a greater extent if you analyze the next lineup, the ministerial level cadres and the mayoral level cadres, the percentage of princelings is dropping. Even now it's small, >> but it will continue to drop. If you if you look at the the the the future lineup for the next 20 years, uh, there are hardly any princelings. I I I see two actually, th out of thousands. >> They have any hope of making it to the top.
>> I mean, you mentioned in the speech today that the party's performance track record uh gives the party its legitimacy. And I mean, I saw your TED talk, you actually refer to the Pew Research and Financial Times survey >> to show like the incredibly high approval rate >> of the Communist Party by the citizens. Then if the party is incredibly popular, as you say, why does the party feel the need to regulate the media and the internet, restrict freedom of speech and right to protest and arrest dissidents? I mean, if they're so confident, they can just hold elections.
Um, good question. You didn't ask that yesterday. This is how you get me. So I think it doesn't have a lot to do with popularity or confidence. I mean, I think it has to do with the idea of of free speech, really freedom of speech. Um, and I would like to suggest that the degree of space for debate, for public debate, for public speech should be calibrated by the conditions of a society at particular times. And I think history will tell whether China's current degree in space are conducive for its long-term success. But to simply say that freedom of speech is, I think, oversimplifying um, you know, the the the modern Western political ideology of so-called freedom of speech, I think is a fallacy. It doesn't exist. It's it's no society has absolute freedom of speech, and every society, based on conditions, regulates speech. It's based on the the the ideology of freedom of speech is based on the the idea that somehow free, somehow speech is not act, therefore it's harmless, therefore it should be allowed absolute freedom. But of course, it's contra- it's it's it's contrary to human experience over thousands of years. Speech is act, and speech has been capable of doing harm and have done harm to human societies since time immemorial. In Europe, one does not have to trace back further than 1933 to remember a case where a powerful speech by one man, amplified under the right conditions of the time and the place, ended up doing great harm and destruction to millions. In today's Europe, they're still grappling with with the same situation. In Greece, blood and death was involved with speech. In France, is a speech to cover your face? Does that hurt social cohesion? In Germany, because of its particular conditions, particular history, publishing certain books is b- is banned. So let's come back to China. Contemporary China is experiencing social transformations of which the speed and scale are unprecedented in human history. Under such conditions, the fragility of social stability can be easily disrupted by amplified speech. So I think responsible governance should take that into consideration. And and whether whether the the current range of freedom is proper, I think history will judge.
I think you give a good account of the past track record of the party, and we cannot deny the pace and scale, the economic miracle that the party has brought to China. However, I think we are all of us here are not only interested in the past but also in the future. I mean, most of the East Asian countries that achieved first-world status in the last half century.
>> Let me guess, South Korea and Taiwan.
>> Yeah. Achieve, I mean, achieve them under authoritarian regimes, but once they reached, once their income got higher, they turned democratic. Do you think that's going to happen for China in the future?
The the the presumption of that question >> is is problematic. The the question presumes somehow that income has something to do with the desire for a particular political system. It's of course not the case. Um, see, after the Cold War, many, many more very, very starving poor countries adopted democracies. Didn't do anything for them. But so yes, South Korea and and places like Taiwan, and a few places, income has risen and they wanted democracy. I I would argue under unique circumstances. You know, South Korea was a semi-sovereign country, and Taiwan, they were under the umbrella of the Cold War, and and they made that choice. They had to, I think. But that's a longer and more complicated discussion. But but my point is, there's no link between income and a desire for a particular political political system. There are many, many more very, very poor countries, didn't make a dime >> and wanted democracy, right?
>> I mean, then then how long do you think the system is going to last? I mean,
>> Well, I think it it's it it depends on many, many uh variables. Uh, can they continue to perform? I think they will continue to perform for some time, probably within my generation. And second, will democracy continue to fail? I most most countries look at cases. I mean, most countries, most of the non-Western countries who adopted electoral democratic regimes did so not because of faith as the West has. I would argue democracies are outgrowths of religious and cultural traditions. But for non-Western countries, they adopted them because they thought it would work, and they looked at the presidents, look at those cases. And now the cases have reversed. Democracies are not working in most places. In fact, it's doing great harm. So, will it continue? If that trend continues, then the probability of China adopting democracy will be uh will be less. Who would be that stupid to copy something that doesn't work?
I mean, then do you think the Chinese political system is an alternative to Western liberal democracy?
>> Well, it's an alternative for China. I mean, I I don't think I do want to make the point that the Chinese political system at the moment is suitable for China under the current conditions, and it is not exportable. Because I mean, I I I think political systems work when they work, they work because they are suitable for the cultural conditions and the times, and they are unique across different cultures and different times. And and the Chinese system seems to be optimal at the moment. But but I would say that I think the only thing that's exportable is the idea that there are alternatives. And and each country, if you want to succeed and you want to prosper, should look for a path that's suitable for your own circumstances and not blindly copy others. And that is exportable, but but not the model itself.
What we have just witnessed was an extraordinary clash of ideas. But the most crucial fact is this: this conversation didn't happen today. It's from 2013, an era when many still held unwavering faith in the Western model. Back then, at Oxford University, a former insider, Eric Lee, launched a systematic challenge against the West's core political beliefs. Born during the Cultural Revolution and educated at top American universities, he was supposed to be the perfect convert to Western values. Instead, he became a heretic.
In that dialogue from over a decade ago, he made a series of arguments that at the time sounded radical, even absurd. First, he challenged the myth of democratic superiority, sharply arguing that electoral democracies are extraordinarily rigid. Next, he challenged the sanctity of free speech, calling it a fallacy that doesn't truly exist. And finally, he challenged the "end of history" narrative, posing the sharp question: "Who would be that stupid to copy something that doesn't work?"
Now, more than a decade later, let's return to 2025 and look back at this debate. Over the past decade, we've witnessed rising political polarization, social division, and the surge of populism across the Western world. Does Lee's diagnosis of its rigidity now seem astonishingly prescient? Meanwhile, China has continued its development on a completely different path. This decade-old conversation, like a time capsule, raises questions that have not faded with time. Instead, they have become even more urgent and acute today. This forces us to reconsider.
First, to what extent have Lee's warnings from over 10 years ago about the dysfunctions of Western systems become the reality we see today? Second, have we taken certain political myths for granted, ignoring their limitations and real-world costs? And most critically, does a path to prosperity and good governance exist that is completely different from the Western playbook?
So, was Eric Lee a clear-eyed realist or a clever apologist for China? Has more than a decade of history given us a new answer? What do you think? Feel free to leave a comment below. If you found this program valuable, please like, comment, share, and subscribe to our channel. Thank you for watching. We'll see you next time.