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They will continue to hold the major, you know, the heart of uh Myanbar. They will continue to hold the capitals. They will continue to hold um, you know, the major cities.
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Hello and welcome to the gist for Strat News Global. I have with me today Ambassador Gautam Mukadhai. He was India's ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar. We are going to understand from him today the dynamics that are being played out in Myanmar, which is facing the elections currently. And this is the first crucial election taking place in that country after the coup takeover that happened in February 2021. Now, of course, we know what has happened with the civilian leader there, Aung San Suu Kyi, and her party, National League for Democracy, but we are going to also understand that once the election results are out by the end of this month, which probably will be January 25th, what does it mean for the country and also, of course, the relationship with India?
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Welcome to the gist, sir, and thank you for your time. Nice to speak to you.
Thank you.
Um, sir, so my first question to you will be, of course, to understand for the benefit of our viewers, the the military-backed party, which is called the Union Solidarity and Development Party, the USDP, which has been there, and the fact that while elections are on, and the second, uh, phase, you know, just took place last week on Sunday, they are already claiming victory in a way. And, and, you know, globally, we've seen a lot of commentary is coming that these elections are, are kind of rigged because you're not allowing NLD to take part. And we know that NLD has been deregistered. We do not know what's happening to Aung San Suu Kyi. So, if you can give us an understanding on that.
So, thank you, Nima, and thank you to your, uh, viewers as well. Uh, so let me say that, you know, when we talk about general elections being held, it sort of conveys a sense as if it's business as usual. But what we should remember is that, uh, the last elections were held in 2020. The NLD, uh, which was in power at that time, uh, won a resounding victory, just as it had done in 2015. And the military had intervened just before the parliament was about to convene, uh, and annulled the entire election results. Under the constitution, there are set limits to the number of emergencies and the time period and the number of emergencies that you can, uh, announce or declare. Uh, in fact, Myanmar has been in a state of emergency, continuous emergency, that has been, uh, renewed from time to time since the coup of 2021. So the elections that are taking place are taking place, uh, in highly irregular circumstances. So it's not normal elections in that sense.
And of course, uh, you pointed to the Union Solidarity and Development Party.
The Union, the USDP, as we sort of call it briefly, uh, has been the civilian party of the military. And it was devised in a way after the 2008, uh, you know, military-drafted election, as the civilian face of the military, uh, the, of the military.
Okay. Uh, and it was largely composed and led by retired, uh, military officers.
Mhm.
So, for example, the 2010 elections that people talk about and make some comparisons with, uh, was also conducted without the NLD, and it was also, you know, uh, there was a virtual total victory for the UN, USDP, uh, because there was really no opposition party, or at least a major opposition party, um, in the free right. And what we are seeing this time is something similar, that the, NLD and other major national parties have all been deregistered.
Mhm.
All but six parties can contest nationally out of the 15 that they broadcast that are participating. The rest are all regional or contesting, you know, uh, in a very limited scale. Uh, so it sounds good that 57 parties are, uh, contesting, and, uh, but it hides a lot. And given the fact that there is no opposition, and given the fact that there is also no, uh, not vote, that means, you know, in the voting, there is no option that there is no, uh, "none of the above."
Right.
Uh, so in a way, you are forced to choose between, uh, registered and approved, so to say, parties.
Okay.
And the Union, uh, USDP is by far contesting the maximum number of, um, constituencies. For example, in the first round, which was for a thousand and two, 102 constituencies, uh, they had about more than a thousand candidates.
Okay.
So, it's a foregone conclusion. It's a predetermined conclusion. Uh, there are many other ways in which the, you know, the voting has also been skewed or rigged or gerrymandered or, you know, managed. But the fact that the USDP was, is going to win this, is known beforehand. And that's it. And I don't think it is going to fool anyone inside Myanmar. It is really meant to fool people outside Myanmar.
Uh, so interesting, sir, that you talk about the fact that the elections are mostly, you know, being conducted to kind of fool the world, but they are having this kind of phased elections to show the world that as if they are having proper, uh, kind of elections that are happening there. But do you think after the February 2021 coup, they have not been accepted largely by ASEAN, and with India, there had been a, you know, a kind of a mixed relationship, if I can say that. But after the elections are over, and once they claim victory, which they are kind of doing now, do you think they will be now expecting kind of legitimacy and recognition from ASEAN? Why do you think, uh, what is the motive behind all this?
So, that is very much the calculation. You know, the calculation is that, and I think it's also, they have, uh, discerned a kind of geopolitical opportunity.
Right.
So, what we have with the assumption of President Trump as president in the United States is that the US has by and large retrenched from areas where it has very little interest. And one of the, sort of, visible signs and acts of that was President Trump actually discontinuing US aid. And a lot of Myanmar refugees, displaced people outside, were really depending highly on non-lethal aid, that is humanitarian aid for these refugees. So the US, in a way, stepped back. Uh, but in the meantime, this has also given an opportunity to China and Russia, uh, who are the two principal backers of the Myanmar regime, uh, right now. So I think they sensed, rightly, I would say, a geopolitical opportunity.
Yes.
To try and sell this, uh, uh, election as a, as a way of legitimizing themselves.
Right.
Uh, and therefore, they can almost certainly count on, uh, you know, as, as they also sent observers, official observers, count on the support and legitimation of China and Russia, you know, the two most important veto-wielding powers, uh, who are also veto-wielding powers in the UN Security Council, to legitimize this, uh, election. They probably hope that a country like India will fall in line. If India falls in line, it will be very significant because unlike China and Russia, uh, India is a, you know, multi-party democracy, democracy, and a federal democracy, or at least a federal type democracy.
Uh, so that would be a big way for them to legitimize themselves.
They really tried very hard to hope that the ASEAN would send observers.
Yes.
Actually, ASEAN declined to send observers, you know, saying that the five-point consensus had not been, uh, followed in letter and spirit.
Right.
And, but they will still hope and try that some of the ASEAN countries may once again certify the election.
Okay.
But I feel that, you know, while they may be able to get this international kind of, uh, appearance of legitimacy by the support of a few countries, they will not be able to get it from the West. They will not be able to get it from Japan. They'll not be able to get it from many other consequential countries. But more than that, it's not going to change anything on the ground. It's not going to get them internal legitimacy. And it's a very open question whether that will actually help them, uh, to even reverse the state of the civil conflict. Because of course, what they will hope, is that, uh, once they have this international legitimacy, they will get more arms, more fuel, they'll be able to, uh, escalate, more investments, more investments, they will be able to, uh, um, they will be able to, uh, capitalize on that to, uh, to launch an offensive, a stronger offensive, uh, against the ethnic resistance organizations, and over a period of time, you know, through a war of attrition, basically force them back, along with negotiations, with the help of China. You know, China has played a very important role even in bringing the situation to this current stage. So I think their gamble is that they will use this as an opportunity to, uh, weaponize the elections to, in fact, really, uh, step up the offensive against the, uh, ethnic resistance organizations. And this is an open question as of.
I, I'll [laughter] come to the China factor, sir, because of course, that's very important. But since you talked about the resistance group, now, till 2024, we were hearing a lot of resistance being happening, and a lot of territory being claimed by them. Whether the junta was kind of pushed back. What is happening to that? Because suddenly, in, in entire 2025, we were not hearing all that is happening. Rather, this, uh, I mean, the junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing, he was kind of looking more empowered now.
Yeah. So, uh, I'll say this that really, a turning point. There were two turning points in this conflict. One was in October 2023, uh, when the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which was an alliance of three ethnic resistance organizations.
The Kokang, who are an ethnically Chinese group who inhabit the northeast of Myanmar. Uh, they had their own, if I may call it, short or EAO, ethnic armed organization called the MNDA. Uh, and, uh, a tribal group or an ethnic, uh, race, they call it the Palong, who had the TNLA. The TNLA, the MNDA, and the Arakan Army, they formed something called the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
They did not unite, but it was a coordinated alliance. So they coordinated their operations vis-a-vis.
The ideology was the same, anti-junta.
Yeah, they're all anti. And they, these are three, um, sort of organizations that are anti-junta, but they're also looking for greater autonomy and self-determination within their own areas. They're not really seeking independence, or at least none of them have ever declared that they're seeking.
Correct.
Independence. Right?
So, they coordinated their actions, and as a result of their actions, they, uh, were able to really, I mean, they were able to make major advances, uh, on the regime.
Okay.
So, at, by the end of 2024, first in October 2023, uh, or sometime, I may be a little confused about the dates, they were able to take the Lashio regional military command, uh, one of the very important and big military commands, which looks after the entire, you know, gateway towards China. And then by December '24, the Arakan Army was able to take the, uh, northern regional command, that is the western regional command. So they had two regional commands under them. They had more than 90, about 94 or 95 townships out of the total 330 townships, uh, of Myanmar under their wing. They had most of the border trading, uh, uh, posts, uh, in that area, in all over Myanmar. I mean, even for example, the, on the Indian side, Ricard, Zoratar was under them.
Okay.
But, and at that point, the Arakan Army, in particular, I mean, more than just the Arakan Army, I'll spill it out, uh, was positioned to ingress, was positioned to advance into Moy, where most of the defense production units are located, as well as the Ayeyarwady, that's the Irrawaddy, uh, region. Uh, and that would have been entering the heartland, you know, close to the heartland of Myanmar. In the north, the TNLA was pressing down on Pinlon, which is their defense education, defense training, uh, center. The MNDA had already taken over Lashio. Uh, there was pressure on Mok, in fact, they took over Mok as well at one point of time.
Okay.
Uh, the KIA was putting pressure on Bhamo, another strategic town in the north. The, the Mandalay PDFs were pushing from the south up towards the Shan Plateau. Uh, so, uh, this, the situation of the, uh, the regime was looking precarious. What happened was that none of these parties were able to actually succeed in advancing further. Number one, and that was partly and primarily because at that point, China, which had been playing an ambivalent role, actually supporting and in a way managing, um, you know, its interests through both parties, at that point, they, uh, uncharacteristically, actually came out pretty openly in favor of the junta. Because I think they began to feel that this was getting out of hand.
Okay.
China has always, uh, you know, sought to avoid instability in Myanmar. And so they came out openly in favor of the junta and put unbearable pressure on the MNDA and the TNLA to negotiate ceasefires, uh, with Chinese help in the northeast. They were not able to quite do the same to the Arakan Army, but they may have, uh, they may have restrained them a little bit from the further offensive. As, just to complete this, as a result of this, they were actually able to take back Lashio regional military command, though not an, uh, they were able to relieve pressure on some crucial towns like Bhamo and Moy, and a couple of others in the northeast. And so, you know, that sort of, and in other words, they were able to push back to some extent. Even Mandalay, they were able to push back a little. So, as a result of which, they, and by this time, they also sort of put more of their, um, their experienced, uh, units and battalions into the attack. Uh, so they were able to change the military balance a bit. And this, of course, was planned with the election in mind, and gave them the also the opportunity to conduct the elections.
M sorry, no, sir, just, since you were talking about how China played the dynamics there, in 2024, we were also hearing, and that time, of course, US was under Joe Biden, that, that the Americans are also supporting the, the, the resistance group. How far was that true? And do you think that has kind of faded away with Trump coming in?
I think that was always rather exaggerated. I think the, American assistance under the Burma Act was largely non-lethal, was largely humanitarian. There definitely, I do believe that there was some amount of logistical assistance, whether it was official or it was done by unofficial experts, difficult to say. And mainly the route would have been through areas of, uh, uh, Thailand, definitely not China, definitely not India, uh, and definitely not any of the other countries around the place, not even Bangladesh. So, but I think, overall, that that, uh, the, the both the quantum and the impact of that was very, very limited. Largely, I insist, and I strongly believe, that the ethnic armed organizations and the Myanmar resistance, including the Bama resistance, uh, is almost entirely indigenous. There is no resistance that is 100% indigenous.
But where are they getting the arms from, sir? That's the main question.
The arms are, a lot of arms are available. Firstly, there's the international arms market, and Thailand is not too far away. But mainly the Wa, who are an autonomous group, uh, in northern China, they have been a manufacturing center and supply center for a very long time, and the ethnic armed organizations. Some of them, they got through smuggled, uh,
Golden Triangle and all those?
Golden Triangle, but also Chittagong and, you know, places like that. But a lot of it also came, probably most probably came supplied from the Wa. And everyone knows the Wa is a very, uh, you know, uh, very well-provided army, and they have a defense production, uh, um, capacity, and, and they have been players in this for a long time. Mhm. So, I don't think, you know, a lot of people sort of insinuate that there are external powers behind that, but I don't think that is really validated.
Okay. Um, now, so coming to the fact that there is also this larger concern that again, we used to hear from the US, and now, global experts and commentators, and of course, people like you who are closely watching this, is the concern that the generals there have, have their control over the, uh, vast rare earth minerals and the, and the reserves that are there. And of course, there is this strategic maritime linkages that Myanmar has with India and the, and the larger, Southeast Asia. Now, if they get the legitimacy, I don't know whether they'll get or not, but you can tell me, how crucial this is going to be? I mean, from India's perspective, what do you think countries like India can do, uh, who really cannot, you know, completely not have ties with the junta, although of course, we have ties, and there were other reports that, you know, how India is helping them, but keeping that aside, after the elections are out, how do you see that's happening? And of course, there is this burning question, what happens to the Kaladan multimodal project, which has been going on for decades now?
One of the things is, you know, actually, a lot of the rare earths that we know about are really not in the Myanmar junta's hand.
Okay.
Uh, uh, the, the most important component of it is with the Kachins, uh, in KIA controlled territory. And, um, there has been some, uh, you know, jostling, uh, there as well. And, you know, the fact of the matter is that China has had a grip on these rare earths even before this conflict began, and China is not going to relinquish it at all. There were reports at one stage that the Americans, uh, were interested in the rare earths.
Yes.
Um, and that, in fact, they actually relaxed their sanctions on a couple of individuals who could have possibly been helpful. But I don't think that will actually give them access to, uh, the rare earths in the Kachin state, and I don't think the Chinese will also easily relax their grip on this. So I think there's a little bit of misunderstanding on the question of the junta and rare earths. But what they do have is, that actually, other than China, it's very difficult to to transport that rare earths anywhere else, whether it's India or a third country, because the junta is in control of areas in between. So that's one fact. In terms of strategic maritime links, I don't think really Myanmar has been that well-positioned in terms of strategic links. Uh, but coming to the sort of nub of your question, which is, uh,
I mean, the Sittwe port and the larger.
Right, right.
So, you know, again, there's a lot of misunderstanding about Sittwe port.
Okay.
Uh, in fact, um, I'm glad that you've given me this opportunity to say this. You see, Sittwe is a riverport, and it's in the mouth of a, of a river Kaladan, which carries a [clears throat] lot of silt. Yes. So, even at the best of times, even if you were to dredge this river port adequately, uh, it has a kind of limited draft. There is not, whereas actually further south, about 100 kilometers south, at Kyaukphyu, with the Chinese control, um, has been known since colonial times to be possibly the single best natural harbor in the Bay of Bengal. Mhm. And the Chinese have a gas pipeline. The Chinese have a, um, uh, an oil pipeline. And during the transition from USDP rule in 2015 to the, uh, NLD in 2016, in the last parliament of that session, the award for an exclusive economic zone in Kyaukphyu was handed over to the Chinese, uh, uh, you know, pretty much by subterfuge, uh, by parliamentary subterfuge. Now, that is being developed as part of the special economic zone. I don't quite know how it got in, but that China is now developing as a, as a port facility. So this has far greater. So, you know, we often make a lot of noise about the South China Sea, or we join the noise around the Chinese presence in the South China Sea, and we have projected a great interest in the Quad and the Indo-Pacific at different times in the past. But the reality is that through the CMEC, through these gas pipelines, through these oil pipelines, through the special economic zone, through the Kyaukphyu harbor, the Chinese are positioning themselves in the Bay of Bengal. And with so many assets in the Bay of Bengal, they have every legitimate reason to securitize it. And we hear very little about this in the Indian media, in the Indian strategic circles, or anywhere. Uh, and that's a mystery to me. And I had alluded to this in an article that I had written in the Deccan Herald on December 27th.
And so, since you're talking about this, do you think now, with the churning happening in Bangladesh also, this can double up as a bigger concern for India?
Absolutely. I mean, uh, I, I just don't see why, uh, our strategic eyes are not on this.
Interesting. So, so now coming to the fact that what is happening to, uh, Aung San Suu Kyi, right? We keep hearing all these reports that come out in the international press, and there is very little access. I'm sure, I mean, she has no access to the media, but, you know, her family members keep talking, but she's, uh, behind the prison. What is really happening? And how do you see, we can ever, I mean, not just from India's perspective, but even the junta can claim legitimacy when you do not, you know, give chances to leaders like herself? And what's the future then? Do you think military is the future now for Myanmar?
I, well, no, that's a bigger question. Let me come through it from the side. See, the Aung, the military has been trying to ease her, uh, for some time now. So there is no news about her. There's a lot of speculation. Nobody knows even for sure whether she is in house arrest or whether she's actually in prison. I think she's still in prison. At different points, conflicting signals were sent out. Actually, nobody seems to have seen her for a long time. And as you know, as you sort of, uh, referred to, some rumors that have also gained currency from, you know, from sources who should have some idea. So, I think, you know, one of the things that we must say is that whatever her position on the Rohingyas, uh, I think the international community, uh, including, I'm sorry to say, India, have really let down, uh, uh, Aung San Suu Kyi, uh, as a Myanmar leader. Because there's no question, in spite of whatever, you know, whatever, uh, to, to whatever extent her image may have been sullied by one or the other thing, she remains the tallest leader, at least for the Bama people, if not for all the ethnic organizations. And it's really a bit of a shame that she's isolated, no news of her, and there is very little international outcry about the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi. Clearly, if she were to come out, she would still have the power to galvanize a lot of the Myanmar people, although I'm not sure she was of the bent of mind to to go towards armed struggle, so, you know, that could also complicate matters a little. So, as far as, um, Aung San Suu Kyi is concerned, it suits them to keep her completely out and as erased and eaced as possible, so that they, the opposition does not have a chance to mobilize. They cannot claim a single leader, uh, you know, a kind of mobilizing point. And then they can carry out, uh, these exercises. But if she were, for one reason or the other, to come out, I'm sure there would be, it would make a difference.
M. Uh, you know, you had several other questions embedded.
No, I'm just trying to understand, sir, and and that probably where we can also close the conversation is the fact that what really comes in everybody's mind, what is the future for Myanmar finally now after the elections? Is it going to be the military rule? Because, you know, despite her landslide victory in 2015 and also 2020, we saw what happened. And as you are saying, there is very less international cry against whatever, uh, happened.
I think this is the crucial question. And right in the beginning, I said that in my view, it is not going to make much of a difference. So what we'll see is that whatever international legitimacy they may be able to buy through these elections, the internal conflict will continue.
Right.
Uh, I don't see, I don't anticipate any abrupt change. It's not that, the military will go. It's not that the regime will go. They will continue to hold the major, you know, the heart of, uh, Myanmar. They will continue to hold the capitals. They will continue to hold, um, you know, the major cities. Uh, but the opposition is not dead and gone. And even if it is, uh, even if it is, um, uh, is, you know, kind of eroded over time, it will take a long time for this to happen. Plus, but the opposition is there. The opposition is there. In fact, even as we speak, I'm getting reports that the Arakan Army is actually making an offensive towards Sittwe.
Okay.
And we don't know what the strategy of the ethnic armed organizations and the ethnic resistance organizations and the Myanmar Bama PDFs will be. They are in a state, a bit of a state of disarray. The NUG also is in a state of disarray. But we don't know what their post-election strategy would be. And one would imagine that just as the junta would have a post-election strategy, the armed opposition would also have a post-opposition strategy. And one of their great weaknesses, which they, you know, slightly offset with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, is that you have, you know, literally hundreds of insurgencies, but they are small, against a common enemy. Many of them are small insurgencies, pocket insurgencies, but they have never really been able to come together under a single, or at least two or three major, you know, clusters of insurgencies. And, uh, so far, I don't think there are any signs that this is going to happen. So the future is uncertain. The Myanmar military will remain in control of the center. Countries like India, who are neighbors, who don't have the luxury that, you know, distant powers have, will have to continue to deal with the reality, which is that the junta is at the center. But you'll also have to re-deal with the reality that you have ethnic resistance organizations along our border. And you'll have to deal with the reality that Burma will remain, or Myanmar will remain fractured, maybe fragmented. And in that context, all the things that we have been wanting to do, which is transit through Myanmar, whether it's through the trilateral highway or the Kaladan, will remain complicated for a very, very long time. And, uh, there, I would sort of like to end with one final word. You know, somehow, we are not playing to our strengths. Our strengths in this conflict is that we are the democracy that they can look up to, or at least constitutionally, we are. And constitutionally, we also have, uh, remedies, or we have, um, provisions for decentralization, for devolution of power, for a degree of federalism, that more than any other country, they would, could benefit from India. But we are not playing those cards. Rather, we appear to be a bit confused, and we are trying to play both sides, mostly for the opposition or for democracy, by lip service. But in actual fact, you know, apart from some humanitarian aid, which we have, I think, very, uh, you know, welcome development towards people who have been affected by the conflict, particularly on our side, we haven't really made any major political moves. Uh, last November, 24th November, we did make some moves towards, uh, the, the opposition, but that doesn't seem to have proceeded, uh, much further. Whereas in fact, we have both the model, and I won't say by ourselves, but together with the ASEAN or with one or two other countries in Asia, we could have thought of a kind of ASEAN, Asian initiative, uh, uh, which, which could have taken Myanmar in a much more positive direction. I don't mean to say reconciliation between the army and the opposition, because I think that's pretty irreconcilable.
Right.
But at least towards an alternative future, which could have given hope to the large majority of Myanmar people, and particularly the youth of the Myanmar, who have really no hope, if this regime continues.
So you think we need to engage more with?
I feel that we should be much more proactive. But given now, international preoccupations, particularly after Venezuela, I'm not sure Myanmar will, you know, there is even the political will or the ballast, let alone in Myanmar, even in ASEAN, to really take solid initiative. So the way I see it is, Myanmar is going to continue in a state like this. Probably the opposition will face greater pressure, and we'll have to see how they are able to respond to it.
Sure. Sure. Thank you so much, sir, for all those insights. So that was Ambassador Gautam Mukapadha. He was India's ambassador to Myanmar, telling us that how it will be a complicated situation in Myanmar, even after the elections, it will be fractured and fragmented, but within which India has to maneuver its way and also have its relationship steady, also supporting the, the kind of democracy that is there. Thank you for watching this interaction on the gist for Strat News Global. This is Naima Basu.
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