This is the biggest change in human history, maybe ever. What's about to happen with AI? This is the biggest revolution, bigger than the industrial revolution.

Jensen is very paranoid about losing. If he just kept making his mainline chip, people would crush him on cost and performance. Acquiring Grock is how you get those resources to make more solutions for different parts of the market to stay king. At the end of the day, this is an economic war. If the US and the West win in AI, China will not rise to be the global hegemony. But without AI, China definitely will rise. They're just going to outrun America.

Hi, I'm Matt Turk. Welcome back to the Matt podcast. Today I'm joined by the one person Wall Street and Silicon Valley turn to when they need to cut through the hardware hype, Dylan Patel of Semi Analysis. We dove into many of the most important topics [music] of today: Nvidia's massive move to acquire Grock, the truth about the capex bubble, whether the US power grid can actually handle the AI boom, and the geopolitical chess match [music] playing out between the US and China. But I have to warn you, this conversation went off the rails in the best possible way. And we ended up going into all sorts of fun tangents like the strange phenomenon of Chinese romance dramas set inside semiconductor factories and what it's really like when three AI famous roommates live together in SF. Please enjoy this fantastic conversation with Dylan.

>> Hey Dylan, welcome.

>> Hello. How are you?

>> I'm great. I'd love to start with Grock and Nvidia since it's still fresh. So, not so long ago, Nvidia was saying that uh one GPU could do it all, and now they're doing this acquisition, non-exclusive deal with Grock. What does that mean from your perspective?

>> It's very clear. We're not sure where AI models are headed in terms of, you know, over the next few years, what happens to the architecture, but you know, the thing that I think everyone is sort of like agreed on is models are pretty auto-regressive, right? Next token generation is like the thing. But beyond that, right, attention mechanisms changed how it works. Everything changes, right? Could, could change. And so what's interesting is the reason Nvidia won is because they just took like the widest surface area bet, and then people kept developing models on that, and that kind of shape worked. But now the workload is so large that there is room for specialization that will give you 10x increases in certain domains, right? In a general purpose workload, Grock doesn't work, right? You know, it can't train, it can't, you know, it can't inference really, really large models, um, cost-efficiently, right? You can't serve many, many, many users. But what it can do is it can go blazingly fast, right? Same with the Cerebrus Open AI deal, but that's like one workload, right? Uh, very decode-focused, right? Generative doing auto-regressive tokens in a in a single stream super fast.

Another direction AI models could head, right? We don't know. Are models going to think in one token stream, or is it actually they're constantly context switching, right? And they're going from they have this humongous, humongous context and they're generating in multiple parallel streams, right? And so Google and OpenAI have both released mechanisms of this with their Pro models where the model actually doesn't just have one single chain of thought for reasoning, it has multiple, right? And then I don't exactly like, you know, and and how they choose which one and what the final answer to you delivers is is an area of research, um, but there is room for that kind of chip, right? Something that works on very parallel, a lot, lot of streams of chain of thought, and maybe the latency requirements are not as crazy, right? Maybe you don't want to go blindingly fast, right? Maybe you're okay with it being, you know, because I can spin up 100 parallel, you know, streams of thought or agents or whatever you want to call them. Maybe I I care a lot about cost there. And because it's 100 in parallel instead of one going super, super fast, it's not as deep, right? The tree search or the depth of the inference is not as deep, but it is much wider. You know, there's other parts of inference. Hey, process do creating the KV cache. So, Nvidia has a chip for that, right? That's the CPX. So they they've made the CPX, they bought Grock for decode, and then they still have their general purpose GPU. So they've they're kind of trying to cover their bases because unlike the first wave of AI chip companies where they sort of just made chips and then tried to figure out where it would work, right? They had a thesis. Grock and Cerebrus, both as well as Samanova, right, which was put a lot of memory on the chip and not necessarily in the case of Cerebrus and Grock, no memory off chip. And in the case of Samanova, less memory off chip or slower memory off chip with higher capacity. You know, they they sort of all made similar bets in that direction. And it didn't work for a while until it kind of did, right? Um, because there's a workload that now necessitates it.

Nvidia recognizes they're they're the leader. They're at the tent pole. Hey, in one respect, they can just run faster than everyone, but it's kind of hard to be 2x better than Google or or OpenAI or whoever else's internal chip, right? To justify their, you know, 75% plus margins, right? And then they have to be 2x to 4x better to justify 4x better to justify their margins because that's what they're charging above COGS. You know, the question is, what what architecture will deliver that? Well, yes, keep the programmability of their GPUs is great for training and for a lot of workloads, but you know, guess what? I think I think a lot of people will just be downloading an open source model, downloading an inference framework and pressing go, right? A little bit more complicated than that, but that's that's going to be the consumption method for a lot of enterprises, a lot of uh startups, a lot of tech companies is they're just going to do that or they're going to rent the GPUs or or rent the chips and then download an open source framework and model and go, right? And Nvidia recognizes this and hey, there is room for products that aren't general purpose, right? The general purpose GPU will still probably be the main line for training and for a lot of inference and for cost-efficient inference, but maybe blindingly fast or workloads that have a ton of prefill, i.e. creating the the KV cache. Maybe that those workloads could be different chips, right? And the CPX chip they announced, right? They say it's for the context processing, creating the KV cache. It's also really useful for video models because video models don't care about memory bandwidth and so you know why pay for the expensive memory that the general purpose chip has or why do what Grock is doing, which is tying hundreds or thousands of chips together and not having memory but keeping the entire model on chip. The trade-off for that, of course, is you need thousands of chips and you have less compute per chip. And so like Nvidia's trying to capture the whole surface area because again, you don't know where models are headed and it's hard to say where the research is headed.

>> And do you think it's a good thing for the market? Yet another one of those deals that's structured as a as a license but really an acquisition.

>> I certainly think it's not good from an anti-competitive sense, right? I don't think people should just be able to buy companies without like any antitrust like process at all. Now, in the case of like a large company buying a startup, I'm completely fine with it. The flip side is like, hey, we know the deal is happening, right? Uh, this happened for a company I was an advisor for. Nvidia acquired Infabrica just maybe a few months before they did Grock and similar style of deal, right? If someone wanted to strike it down, that's the biggest limbo. We've seen this happen in venture, and you probably know more stories of this, but like a company trying to get acquired, they get stuck in limbo for like a year.

>> And then it falls apart.

>> Stories.

>> Yeah, it falls apart. The deal did because some regulatory BS, and now the company was, and the founders were focused on getting the deal done instead of like making the product better for a year. And now they're like behind, or, you know, they they weren't focused on growth as much, right? You know, you only have so much time as a founder. So in that sense, I like the license deals.

>> So now is uh Nvidia also dominating the the inference market? Is there any world where Nvidia is no longer the king, or they seem to be getting stronger?

>> I think the thing about Nvidia is they take the Andy Grove mentality like more seriously than anyone else, right? Like, okay, fine, Google like implemented OKRs because Intel did it, but that's like, you know, management stuff, right? "Only the paranoid survive," right? This is like core to the Bay Area, um, core to Nvidia. Um, Jensen is very paranoid about losing, right? These specializations, if he just kept making his mainline chip, would mean people could, you know, point solutions for specific parts of the market would crush him on cost and performance. Then he can't justify his margin. That's a threat to Nvidia's business model as a whole, especially if the best model only changes every three months or the model you want to roll out. Okay, well, then you're going to have three months to figure out how to make a model work on one chip architecture for that point solution. And, you know, it's fine. Software advantage of Nvidia is not that important. Then Jensen's super paranoid about losing, and frankly, it's really hard to hire enough talented chip people. When you look across the market, there is only a few companies who have successfully created a chip architecture software to run the models accurately, run the models accurately, right? Like, 'cause you can look at random APIs of say an Alibaba Quen model, and different people are doing all sorts of tricks like quantizing it, but also many other tricks which then end up like making the model quality lower. You know, building a rack scale solution, networking thousands of chips together, and then deploying an API. And Grock did the whole thing with frankly not that many people. So now it's like, okay, well, I'm Nvidia, I want to make four different chip architectures and actually four different point solutions, maybe the general purpose, and then one here, one here, one here. And in addition, my general purpose thing is actually not just like a GPU chip, it's like GPU chips, CPU chips, networking chips, NV Switch, NICs, like, you know, there's many, many chips, and each of those chips has many chiplets. You don't have enough engineering resources, right? And so like acquiring Grock is like how you get those resources to make more solutions for different parts of the market. As far as like, are they threatened? Like, I think I think like obviously there's some cool startups out there, right, that are raising a lot, right, currently or have raised, such as Etched, MadX, uh, Positron, these new age of AI companies. There's also the prior age of like Cerebrus is is out there still, right? You know, Tenstor, etc. And there's so many AI chip companies on the startup side, but then there's also, you know, Google's TPU, AMD GPUs, Amazon Tranium, uh, who are all really credible competitors. And then, you know, Meta's MTIA is somewhat credible. And then, you know, Microsoft's Maia is not credible, but like, you know, maybe it will be one day, right? So you sort of have like a lot of competition. They've got to hold the gates back. And so I think...

>> Is there a risk to them being? I mean, like, there's there's risk from all of those companies that I mentioned, and, you know, effectively California/Seattle, right? Only two, two places. There's there's also chips from other parts of the world, right? Obviously, China has a number of different AI chip companies that are doing cool things. Anyone would have told you Grock was, you know, their business revenue, their revenue was not like stellar, right? In fact, they missed revenue last year significantly, and yet they got bought, right? Because the value of the IP was there and the value of the team. Anyone else would have been like, "Well, why the heck would I buy this?" Right? Uh, makes no sense. There's definitely a credible threat.

>> Yeah, and do you think uh CUDA is going to remain that mode? I guess a combination of CUDA and whatever came out of the Melanox acquisition. Like, do do those persist as long-lasting advantages?

>> I think they do. I think networking is super important. I think uh the CUDA software mode is very important, but it's also like changing rapidly, right? It's an incredible amount of the software that Nvidia GPUs run on is not from Nvidia. It's it's the developer ecosystem that's open-sourcing it. When you look at, for example, VLM and SGLang, right? These support AMD GPUs almost as first-class citizens now. And VLM is getting significant support for TPUs for Tranium, and there will be other chips coming out from startups that also support VLM, SGLang. Now, like, how difficult is it? You know, the the reason why CUDA is so important is like, okay, I can do whatever I need to do, right? Programming a GPU.

>> I think most AI chips will not be consumed by people programming anything for it.

>> They will download an open source inference engine and they will download an open source model and then they will put it on the. And it's really simple to download VLM and like make it work. Like it's not that hard to set up uh, you know, a server. And Nvidia's putting out a lot of open source software like Triton inference server and and uh, Dynamo and all these things to to make it easy because that is the consumption model ultimately for the majority of AI, right? Is and it might be like, oh, it's my own inference engine, but most servers will not run code besides the inference engine and the model. It's like not like people are actually like researchers are like writing code for GPUs to see ideas if they'll work and train models and all these things or just mess around with them to figure out, you know, infra performance or whatever it is. But most of it won't be there. And so CUDA as a mode, CUDA language is like, you know, like it's like fine, right? Like, you know, no one actually writes CUDA, right? Most people write PyTorch and then like torch compile and then they just run it on the GPU. They don't write CUDA. But a lot of this CUDA mode is like, how does PyTorch translate into high performance GPUs? And that surface area from when people were just writing like hardcore, when people were hardcore writing CUDA kernels to like, hey, they're writing PyTorch and then it's compiling down to GPUs versus, oh, I'm just downloading VLM. Is it, is it a curve of like, not a ton of people that can do CUDA kernels, a whole lot more people can do PyTorch, right? Random, you know, PhDs and random people, it's very simple, right? A crapload of people can do VLM, download it, run it on a server. Well, if it now supports other chips, what is the CUDA mode's recognized this and they've been building software that is not necessarily the CUDA remote. And I I can give some examples.

All right. So the name of the game is fast tokens and lowest cost tokens, right? And lowest cost tokens happens by your chip being fast. But there's also tricks, right? One example, right? Like I mentioned with, you know, the CPX versus Grock, right? Is processing your prefill context, right? Super cheap CPX, right? If I'm if I'm care a lot about speed, then Grock. These are optimizations on the hardware side. There's optimizations on the software side as well, right? And so one example is when I'm doing, for example, if I look at a cloud code or a cursor type application, the workload is like it takes your repo, takes the relevant parts of your repo, puts it in the context of the LLM, it prompts, it generates. Right? And if it's an agent mode, it it it circulates the context a couple times, it'll collapse, put things off to the side, access different contexts. But what's, you know, especially when you think about an agent for software, and you can see this in Codex, you know, Codex, actually not as good as Cloud Code, but it can do work on time horizons of like nine, 10 hours. Um, and do like a big refactor better than Cloud Code can, even though most of the times Cloud Code is better. And and what's interesting about Codex does is it'll like take your repo, it'll identify parts, if you're asking it to refactor, identify parts, write stuff, you know, make like these notes for itself everywhere, collapse the context, switch from this part of the repo to that part of the repo to this part of the repo. But when you think about it, it's like, oh, if this thing is just generating tokens all the time, plus it's switching what my context is constantly, that's really expensive, right? If you think about like what's the cost of inference, um, I want to say it's like it's it's $10 per million tokens of output and or and $3 for decode, or 10 for decode and three for prefill. Um, and so if you think about, oh, it just worked for nine hours on one task, one refactor, huge value. But if it changed context a ton of times, and your context is like 30k, usually or 50k, or, you know, heading to hundreds of thousands, you know, how long your how big your repository is and how much context switch, now you're spending all this money on on prefill, right? Not the decode tokens, but actually why am I like regenerating the KV cache? I can actually just like store the KV cache elsewhere and then when I need it again, I can pull it and plop it into CPU memory or into GPU memory. And so Nvidia's got this like KV cache manager, and they've been working really hard on like making it so they can interface SSDs and stick the KV cache on there and pull it out whenever they want. So for this kind of workload, and then if you do this and you look at like coding as an application, and you like look at these coding companies and how much they're paying for prefill versus decode, actually majority of their cost is prefill tokens, not decode tokens, because their context is just so large and it's switching all the time, even in agent modes. You know, if you can now not have to do the prefill, your costs go down dramatically. But that's a very complicated thing to do from a software perspective. You know, companies like Anthropic, Google, OpenAI have already done it. But what about the wide world, right? And so Nvidia is trying to make the open source software for this. And that's like CUDA mode, but it's like actually no, none of this is CUDA, right? Like it's like memory management and like, you know, storage management, and when do you call what, and how do you transfer it, and how do you like spread the KV cache across a bunch of different storage nodes, and what happens when you read it, and the network congestion, just like all these things. Yeah, it's like Nvidia's wheelhouse, but it's not CUDA. And I think like the easy way to say it is it is the CUDA mode, right? And so things like this KV cache manager and many other things they're trying to do to reduce the cost of inference, like is how they build the new CUDA mode. Because again, today it's, you know, it is quite, I mean, AMD is like not fully there yet, and TPU is being added right now, and Tranium is being added soon as well to VLM, but all of them will have a very good UX for download model, run model on VLM by the middle of the year, I think, right? Certainly AMD is already there by the end of this quarter. We have something that like tests this. It's called InferenceMaxer. It's open source, all the code is, and the results are uh, but we run across I think $60 million of GPUs, which are donated to us by companies like Nvidia, AMD, OpenAI, Microsoft, Amazon, on Crusoe, CoreWeave, Together AI, all these companies are sponsoring GPUs for us to run this. We're running VLM and SGLang every night on, you know, nine different kinds of GPUs on a variety of different models and different work uh context lengths and all these things, right? To see the performance, and you can see the performance moving every day or pretty often because the software changes all the time. And so like the fact that this exists is the CUDA boat, right? It's not that like AMD you can do this on their chips, Nvidia can do this on their chips. It's, oh, when the new model comes out, how fast does it get to peak performance? Because, you know, it's it's a moving target. Or hey, can I implement this KV cache management thing? How hard is it? How many engineers do I need? Oh, just one. Great. Like, or 10. Great. If I need a hundred people to develop it, like Google and, you know, so on and so forth did, then that's much harder.

>> Do you think AMD can uh catch up?

>> I think AMD will be caught up at times and very behind at other times. Like currently, they're super far behind, right? Because Blackwell is just way better than MI355. Um, and then, you know, Rubin comes out, and they'll be way, way behind. But then AMD's new chip comes out, and AMD will be caught up or even slightly ahead on a hardware perspective. Software's behind, right? And you have this like leapfrogging. And and AMD is a very credible second competitor. I don't think they'll go beyond like, I think they'll stay in single digits market share. Single digit percentage market share.

>> Single digit percentage market share is...

>> Still [laughter] pretty good.

>> Yeah. I mean, Nvidia's revenue this year is going to be like...

>> It's a lot.

>> The three gajillion dollars.

>> I think it's actually four gajillion. [laughter] [gasps]

>> What about all the startups? You mentioned a few. So there's a Cerebrus on the one end of the spectrum, and then newer ones, Etched, and others. If if AMD has a, you know, uphill battle in front of them, like do you think those guys can take significant market share?

>> You sort of the whole specialization game, right? You you have to specialize because you're never going to beat Nvidia at their own game, right? They're going to have the supply chain unlocked. They're going to get to the newest memory technology or process technology or whatever packaging technology, whatever it is, sooner than you, and they're just going to crush you, right? If you play their game, you have to. AMD is trying to play Nvidia's game, but AMD is like extremely good at engineering silicon, right? Everyone else has to has to has to try something weird or different, right? And so when you look at Etched or MadX or Positron or Cerebrus or Tenstor, you go to look at all these companies, right? There are unique things about what they're doing, and it's not clear if AI models will still be within that realm when that comes out, right? Uh, does oh, now people use like engrams and other sparse attention techniques. Is that like, does that change like some of the specializations people are doing? Or hey, people are now doing like, you know, models are now sparse instead of being dense models. Does that change things? There's so many optimizations and changes on the model side, and you can't predict what's going to happen with the ML research easily. At least you can't. The thing you're optimizing for today has to be a vision of where AI will be in two years. And Nvidia's fully accepted they don't know where that's going to be. That's why they have a portfolio of chips now, not just one GPU line, right? It's not just Hopper, Blackwell, Rubin. Now, it's going to be, you know, it's not Ampere, Hopper, you know, you know, it's not that line. It's like there's a variety of chips to serve the different markets, um, and different possible scenarios. They think each of them has this vision today, but oh, it might turn out the general purpose one sucks, and and actually AI models have developed in a way where CPX or Grock style chips are the best, right? Well, okay, now we have a solution for that market. And so, I think that's the challenge with the startups. With that said, I think they're all taking very interesting bets. I think it's I think it's much more exciting than the first wave of AI hardware uh bets. Graphcore, bringing the memory on the chip, they sort of just made a bet and they optimized for a certain kind of model, all similar kinds of model, and it didn't end up working out for a long time, right? They had to pivot and they had to work on a lot of things, and it took a long time. I think these companies have like a really clear vision of what they think models will look like, right? Like Etch does, MadX does, Positron does, and that's what's really cool about it between the three of them, uh, these new age. So, I mean, I'm I'm excited for them. I'm very, very skeptical. I don't know what uh what a venture capitalist views as likely chances of succeeding, but I think all of them are less than 1%. Right?

>> But, you know, that's that's that's a...

>> But the world where they win is a multi-silicon kind of world where any given customer uses a range of different GPUs. It could it could. Or it could be any given customer has like one workload they care a lot about. Anthropic clearly does not give a crap about video gen, image gen. They just don't care. Um, on the flip side, company like Midjourney cares a lot about image and video gen, right? Image and video gen is very, very like like I mentioned, like it's a very like it's not very memory bandwidth heavy. It loves, loves, loves compute, right? Whereas inference of large language models in the style of like, you know, these, you know, say for example, coding agents cares a lot about decoding for long streams of time, um, and that's very memory bandwidth heavy, right? And so there's like that's like a simple example, but there's a lot more nuance there in terms of like even like the size of like the matrix multiply, you know, the tensor cores that you, you know, the systolic arrays that you use, or the ratios of networking and memory, memory and like what's that memory hierarchy look like, and, you know, what are you doing for different kinds of attention and like, oh, like all these sorts of things, like there's a lot of specialization here. And so some people are betting big on on different types of specialization. And I I think like you could clearly see a world where companies do care about different stuff, right? Like, like if, for example, a chip optimized for video and image generation existed today, and it was better than Nvidia, or Nvidia made it. I think Midjourney would absolutely only use that for inference. I think for training, they'd still use the general purpose thing, and as would like Meta and Google would like they should do that, right? And hey, Meta actually has two lines of AI chips there. MTIA, there's a line that's focused on recommendation systems, and then there's a line that's focused on Gen AI. The Gen AI one is a new line, but that recommendation systems chip line is still continuing, right? It's not sexy, no one cares because there's no. And ByteDance also has a recommendation system line of chips, and it's not really focused on Gen AI, which is fine because, you know, this is a $200 billion business or something, which is just deciding what ad to serve me, right? And what order to put my friends' stories and, you know, things like this. So, so I think like it's perfectly fine for there to be specialized AI chips given the target market is big enough, and you have to have vision to know what that target market is, unless you're a hyperscaler, then you can like just like you can just use general purpose until you've like it's clearly there, and then you can make your ASIC.

>> Fascinating. Turning to the geopolitical aspect of of uh all of this, which is always fun. Huawei and Nvidia in China last year, that was like 10 or 12% of their overall revenue. And this year, they they were saying that their market share but has basically dropped to not very much. Is that Huawei chips? Is that restrictions? Is that tariffs? Uh, what's happening?

>> It's a variety of things, actually. In in some quarters last year, uh, it was even north of 20%, I think, but I don't remember exactly. But anyways, you know, if you look at 2022, China was almost the size of the US in terms of buying server hardware, right? Almost, not quite, but getting there, right? And it looked like they were going to be the same size as America in like a year or two after that, right? And if you look at like global data center capacity, global cloud capacity, etc., etc., etc., it's American companies and Chinese companies, right? That dominate the world. American companies obviously doing a lot better here, but both of those dominate the world. And if you look at like every industry, right, you know, it's it's very clear that like China wants to insource stuff, right? So in 2015, they made these five-year plans for two 2020 and 2020 uh five, where they set the percentage of semiconductors they wanted uh domestically produced, and they've missed the goal both times, which is fine, right? They set really aggressive goals, and even, you know, shoot for the uh moon, even if you miss, you hit the stars, right? And that's sort of what's happened, right? Like, look, China is not caught up on, you know, leading edge semiconductors, but microcontrollers from China are almost as good as the microcontrollers are as good and cheaper than the ones from Texas Instruments or ST Micro or, you know, etc., right? Or like this power, random power chip is better than or the same as the one from like another company, right? And so they've really built up a semiconductor industry and started insourcing a lot more. I don't see why China wouldn't be buying, you know, 30, 40% of the world's AI chips, and the US like 50, 60%, and then the rest of the world like, you know, and when I say US, I mean US origin companies. That seems like a more natural state for the world. But there are restrictions, and and hey, this is the biggest change in human history, maybe ever, knowledge work, and, you know, everything that's going to happen there, and and then eventually like robotics and all these things, like, you know, obviously there's there's a lot of geopolitical stuff, and so there are restrictions. Nvidia's been handicapped, handicapped from selling their best chips to China. And so that's obviously impacted the sales a lot because like, why would you do that? And so when you look at who rents the most GPUs in the world, it's three companies, right? So one of them is obviously OpenAI. Second one, actually, they were bigger than OpenAI. They are bigger than OpenAI today, or no, they were bigger than OpenAI, then OpenAI eclipsed them recently, is ByteDance. ByteDance runs rents tons of chips from Oracle and Google and and, you know, many other cloud companies because they couldn't get the chips they need in in China. They're mostly just serving TikTok, right? Okay. Well, they they're not allowed to buy them, and that sucks, but, you know, they're they're allowed to rent them. And so, okay, if I'm not allowed to get the best ones, I'm going to rent externally. And if ByteDance is the second biggest renter of GPUs in the world, that's substituting demand that would have been built in China in many cases. It's instead being built in Malaysia. And Oracle has over a gigawatt of capacity in Malaysia that ByteDance is going to take, right? So, things like this are, you know, you know, hundreds of thousands, if not millions of chips, tens of billions of dollars of cap capacity that would go to China, but it's not. It's going to Malaysia instead, as an example.

Another sort of point around this is China's like, you know, they've had these five-year plans. So and and, you know, the way these initiatives work from China is there is like some top-down ordering, but then they just kind of whip the whole like everyone just kind of gets into it, and it's really cool. Like, I don't think it's as top-down as many people think. Like, I think the entire country is like semiconductor pill. There are dramas where people fall in love in the fab, or dramas where people fall in love and they're photovoltaic, like solar cell researchers and engineers, and it's like, it's like this is just the backdrop, and it's like, actually, this is it's like super cool for your like significant other to be that semiconductor engineer or to be that photovoltaic, you know, uh, solar panel researcher.

>> As opposed to an influencer.

>> As opposed to an influencer. Right. Like, I'm sorry, Love Island is I I watched like for 10 minutes because I was forced to. I was like, this is freaking terrible. [laughter] Um, but, you know, like...

>> We are so cooked.

>> No, you know. [laughter] Seriously, we're cooked. We're cooked. And I think I think like when you think about like this happens, it's like it's diffused into drama. Even people like like there's multiple dramas like taking place about the semiconductor industry, and and they're like romance comedy, like the entire spectrum, right? Drama, like it's like it's like what the heck is going on? Anyways, you have all these provinces, you have all these local cities studying out ordinances and giving out subsidies and all sorts of stuff, right? It's truly like crazy. Like there's some national level stuff like, "Oh, no taxes on uh this. Oh, we're going to ban a few things." But as far as I understand, the national government has not banned Nvidia's H20 or H200. But the local ones have, right? A lot of local ones have said, "No, you know, you must use China manufactured chips." And it's like, who told you that, you know, you're here to uphold this? It's like, does it matter, right? I mean, like, it's it's it's cool because then you have this like survival of the fittest. All these all these provinces and cities are trying to attract different companies with different types of subsidies and grants and industrial parks and like all these different things.

>> And then like the ones who succeed actually develop an industry and they take over.

>> This is how one thinks of of China, right? It almost sounds like more like the US or like with the federal government and states where the provinces have authority over their purchasing. It's It's actually like uh great. There's this one um TikTok or not TikTok, TikTok and Instagram like uh person and they're like they they like sing it. They're like, "If you want to if you want to buy things in China, make sure you go to the right place." And then they just say the most random [ __ ] and name the city. And then you look into it and you're like, "Wow, this city has the entire supply chain for this." Um, and it's like lampshades, and then it names the city. It's like, "What the [ __ ]? There's a city that specializes in lampshades?" Like it's like and it's like microphone arms, like microphones. It's like it's like literally there's a city in China that specializes in...

>> Guitars as well, right? This one one city that became the guitar capital of the world.

>> It's literally everything.

>> Literally everything. There's a city, and it's not like, hey, specifically for uh camera arms, for example. There's ball bearings in this, and the ball bearings are like, there's ball bearings. There's multiple manufacturers of ball bearings for camera arms.

>> And then like most of the camera arms in the world come from that one city. It's like, what the hell is going on? Um, and and so like the semiconductor industry, I think people don't realize is absurdly specialized. I'm not answering your question. I'm just going a little bit of a rant because I think people don't understand China semiconductors. It's really sick, or semiconductors in general. But like, you know, like in Japan, they like focus on a few different types of chemicals, and they're the best at it, and it's like almost a cultural thing, right? Japanese people were so precise, like with sushi, and like it's all about the trade and the craft, and like, you know, the French food in Japan is better than the French food in France because the f the Japanese chefs went there and then come back and they perfected it in Japan, and like, 'cause they're so precise, and and there's so many different like things that like Japan is so good at because they're so precise and dedicated to the craft, and it comes out of like, I don't know, like samurai culture or something. I don't know, right? Like, I don't exactly know how that culture came up. And so when you look at like, and it's like across the world, there's different places where things like this happen, right? Like, oh, like the Netherlands makes EUV tools. Cool. I guess so. And you look across the semiconductor industry. There's a famous economic essay called "I, Pencil" or something like that, or talking about how the pencil, like a simple pencil, comes from like, oh, the rubber comes from like Indonesia for the eraser, and the graphite comes from this mine here, and the wood comes from these aspen trees in Canada, and like, you actually can't make a pencil without aggregating this entire supply chain. The semiconductor industry is like way crazier because like, I would say there's like 15 or 20 countries that could shut down the entire semiconductor industry, right? Even like Austria could, right? And and it's like, what? And it's like, well, yeah, there's two different companies there who have like 90% share in like some random niche stuff.

>> And it's like, okay, cool. I guess Austria can. And oh yeah, those two companies only like have less than a billion of revenue, but they just happen to have lynchpin critical things. And there's lynchpin critical things everywhere because the process is so complicated. And so China's been trying to replicate this. Um...

>> Is there one thing they're missing that they don't have yet?

>> I think there's a lot of things. I think if you were to close your eyes and say, or if you were to cut off every country and say there's no more globalism, China has the most vertical stack in semiconductors today, and they're the best at semiconductors in the world because their fabs could still run somewhat on a lot of things because they have built some of these chemical supply chains, right? Like TSMC for certain kinds of chemicals, 100% share from Japan, right? Or Intel, same thing, right? Or, you know, for certain kinds of tools, 100% share from Netherlands, or 100% share from, you know, this American company, or that, you know, Austrian company, or this or that, right? Like there's just all these, you know, this Swiss company, like there's just all these different places have 100% share. It might be one company, might be three companies, but geographically or in the same area. And China's built that up, right? Because they've created this "Made in China" initiatives, which just plowed money into it, and they've got this culture of like the diffused, like, you know, these provinces, like, yeah, I just decided I'm going to [ __ ] focus on. Or might not even be might not even be the right. It may be the like, you know, someone brought it there and decided, and then people were like, "Oh, wow, you're doing that? Me, too." Like, I'm a Patel, and I grew up in a motel, and guess what? We like almost all the Patels I know grew up in a motel, and it's because some random Patel immigrated to America and like worked at a hotel motel and then bought a motel, and then like it just started happening, right? Like you sort of like these things are serendipitous of sorts, and like I don't know, like, and it's like, I I view it as the same kind of specialization, right? Chinese cities are like starting to do the these things. China's missing a lot of things, right? I would say like, if you say minus 10 years tech, China's complete, and no one else is complete, right? Taiwan is not complete. Their the fabs would shut down without foreign supply, you know, and you go down or you go across the stack. Uh, but if you go to 10-year tech, maybe maybe more like 20-year tech, you could get a fully vertical supply chain in China, which I do not think any country could do. Like America could not build a fully vertical fab without stuff from elsewhere, even if it's 20-year-old tech.

>> Um, probably not even 40-year-old tech. And so, so that's interesting. But then when the flip side is like, well, like you kind of do need specialization. That's how that chemical gets the purest, best, you know, most engineered, you know, or that that slurry of chemicals, or that, you know, that gas, or like that tool, because every smart person, or a lot of them in that country, grew up around that culture, and like every, the supply chain is there, and like everyone kind of knows, and like it's like a a driveaway, and like sort of like this is what makes supply chains work is that there is this specialization, and the best of the best only comes when you have that hyper specialization. So, China doesn't have lithography. Their lithography is like 10 years behind, and I think it'll be five years behind in a couple years, right? They're catching up fast. I don't think they'll be as good as ASML for a long time. You know, maybe I don't know, maybe they will be, you know, China. You shouldn't ever underestimate China, but like, and Chinese engineers, or, you know, but like for a while, right? Or like, you know, I don't think they'll be able to make leading edge chemicals like many Chi uh Japanese companies or many American companies, and their tools, and like you just go across the supply chain. They're not hey forefront on really anything in the manufacturing supply chain. On the design supply chain, there's some things that they're starting to be similar par, but like cheaper or like a year or two behind, but cheaper. And that's like fine for a lot of stuff. An example of that is Huawei, right? Huawei in mobile phones was on par with Apple like entirely. Yeah. And they had become Apple, TSMC's biggest customer, and they were designing the best thing, and they are number one in telecom, and their tech is just literally better. And so when you think what happens, you know, is is China missing anything? It's like they're they don't they don't they don't have the best of much, you know, today in the AI supply chain. They have a complete package and a couple years behind, and they'll figure out how to make it cheaper, slash do more, slash catch up, and and create a robust industry. But there's a reason like I don't think that like Jensen is scared of AMD really. He's paranoid. I mentioned he's paranoid. I'm sure he's a little bit scared of them, right? Like I think some of the things that they've done are reactions and competitive dynamics with AMD or Google's TPUs or whatever. Right. There was a CoreWeave deal today, and I think that's directly the result of what Google's been doing.

>> Yeah, the two billion pipe that Nvidia announced into...

>> Nvidia invested two billion in CoreWeave, but what's more important is that that's like sort of just like the sticker. What's really relevant is Nvidia is going to work with CoreWeave to uh acquire um and and backstop and all these things, the the land, the power, the energy, the transmission that help build the data center, all this capital side stuff that because Nvidia has so much money, they can backstop CoreWeave doing it because CoreWeave then can be the one who generates demand. Anyways, there's like because Google was doing. And they did that with like a couple companies such as Fluid Stack and Terowolf and Cipher. These are some public deals that have been announced. And so Google is doing that with TPUs, and Nvidia reacted, right? Um, and so in the same way, I think Nvidia's reacted to AMD. And in the same way, I think the thing is Nvidia is like deathly terrified of Huawei.

>> Because Huawei has caught up to Apple and actually surpassed them as TSMC's biggest customer before they got banned, right? They did just crush Nokia, Sony, Sony Ericsson, etc., right? Like the entire telecom supply chain. They just like completely destroyed them. And there's so many...

Other areas, like they straight-up made a folding phone, right? You know, I have a Samsung folding phone. They have a folding phone that's better than Samsung's folding phone.

And it's like, bro, what? Like, you know, you know, Huawei's really, really cracked. And so, of course, they're terrified of, uh, and and Huawei is the most vertical company in the world. No company is more verticalized than Huawei, which then leads to huge innovations. It's something that we don't fully appreciate in the US, but like when you travel in Europe, you see everybody who's like Honor phones, Honor phones, and it's like the the footprint of Huawei is huge in in phones in a way that people...

Not just phones, um, you know, security cameras. Actually, they think they have like, you know, a lot of training on the [laughter] that a captive group of testers.

Exactly. Exactly. Um, I think, I think Huawei is terrifying, right? And and so like, yes, their chips are not as good today.

And is that, is that already happening? I mean, obviously the US and China are the two biggest markets, but like for other markets, I don't know, UAE, Middle East, Europe, are Nvidia and Huawei already, uh, head-to-head in?

Well, they shipped a little bit, but like mostly just like sticker capacity. Like there's nothing like, no, no, like, I would say like a little bit as in like a few servers, not like a billion dollars worth of stuff, right? The thing is, China's supply chain has to ramp up, right? Um, China, China's express goal is to have all internalized. But then like a company like Alibaba's like, I, I don't want to use Huawei, right? Like I want to make, I want to use Nvidia and just make the best freaking models, right? Because that's my business. My business is not, you know, using a Huawei thing, but it's like, okay, it's being pushed upon me. There's other companies too, like Cameron Con and so on and so forth. And so the sort of like supply chain, you know, companies in China don't want to use. They're kind of encouraged, obviously, and pushed, you know, you must. Some local provincial government will be like, well, you're doing this much business here, you got to do this, right? Like there's all sorts of like crazy stuff that, you know, pushing of of companies to use Huawei.

Um, the challenge is probably, can't manufacture enough, right? We've like done a lot of work on this. Um, and we've just put it for free, you know, instead of like to our customers because it's like something that's like national security. Which is how was Huawei actually building chips? Well, actually they were, uh, using shell companies to get chips from TSMC and using different methods of like sneaking HBM, which is memory, from, you know, Korea through Taiwan to China, right? Like all sorts of crazy stuff we've reported on and and people, it's like a whack-a-mole, right? They shut it down, or like tools that get shipped to China and they shouldn't be for, you know, making leading-edge chips, but they actually are. Um, and all these sorts of things are happening because they can't make everything. And if they want to make the leading-edge stuff, they do need to rely on the foreign supply chain quite a bit in terms of the upstream supply chain, right? Uh, memory, logic chips, uh, tools for fabs, chemicals for fabs, etc. Huawei cannot satisfy the market, um, because there's not enough advanced leading-edge capacity in memory, logic, you know, and all all these other things, uh, domestically. And they're trying to build it as fast as they can, but that means there's just not enough to satisfy the market. So, Nvidia has a market. I think they'll figure out how to sell chips to China. And Jensen's in China, I think, like right now, or was yesterday. And so, like he's clearly like wheeling and dealing to try and get his chips into China because, you know, I think Nvidia's argument is if we sell them chips, then they won't, you know, there won't be enough of as much of a domestic market. The feedback loop for software and everything else won't be there. That will sort of like really challenge it, right? Like most of the open-source software for AI has a lot of Chinese contributors, right? VLM and PyTorch, SG Lang, and like all of these other like libraries and things that are just like, you know, and and and it goes to low-level software, especially, right? Like a lot of the best open-source stuff is actually just from like a Chinese company who decided to open-source it. And same with models, right? And so like it's like, okay, well, if they can't use Nvidia chips anymore, then this open-source stuff won't be designed for Nvidia chips. It'll be designed for Huawei chips. And now does that like weaken the CUDA moat? And now like not only is China domestic, now they have like a feedback loop internally, and then they can externalize across the rest of the world, right? So this is the like argument Nvidia makes. I'm not sure if I am like, I'm like, you know, I think I think my AI timelines are so fast. I'm not that fast, like not in terms of like AGI, but like, hey, AI is a hundred billion dollars of revenue, uh, across the industry. I think the industry could hit a hundred billion ARR by the end of this year. Like 45, 50 for OpenAI, like 35, 40 for Anthropic, and then, you know, Vertex, DeepMind's, uh, models at Google, Gemini, right? Um, and then Vertex API for Anthropic models, and, uh, Bedrock APIs and Azure Foundry APIs. Like I think a hundred billion dollars, like end of this year.

That's a lot. And then what's the economic value of that hundred billion dollars? Now, how much of that is in China? Right? Like China's number is probably 10x lower, right? Because they just haven't been able to pervasively push AI, right? ChatGPT has a billion users, roughly. And, you know, then you add on Gemini, and Meta claims they have 500 million users. I don't know. I think people just accidentally click like generative sticker or something. Um, [laughter] but like, anyways, like there's like, there's like a lot of usage of AI in the West already, and it's going to climb. It's going to keep climbing, and like you kind of have to get used to it. And so like the question is like, do you, you know, what's, what's the economic benefit to the world, right? And at the end of the day, this is an economic war, right? If the US and the West win in AI and control, you know, more powerful AI systems that have this feedback loop that improved economic growth and weapons systems and whatever else, right? Engineering of grids and cyber attacks and all these sorts of things. They have this like advantage over China. Then China will not rise to be the global hegemony. But without AI, China definitely will rise to be the global hegemony. They're just going to outrun America. And so the question is like, you know, that's, I think like the other view, right? And how fast are super powerful AI systems versus, you know, China building a domestic ecosystem for chips and models and everything that is a few years behind, like what's, what's actually the value, right? Like that's sort of like...

...around restrictions and regulations.

Where, where do the, uh, US onshoring efforts fall in that category? What do you make of them? From the Chips Act to like all the thing that is being built, everything looks like it's massively delayed, by the way, which perhaps is not surprising.

I think TSMC's manufacturing wafers, and they're like building real wafers, and there's real fabs, and like, you know, there's some other fabs that have been announced, and like they're doing well, and there's like a bunch of like different kinds of plants, like a Korean company making a random gas plant in Texas for, you know, their chips, right? Like, for chips, and all these like sort of things are happening. Um, I think the Chips Act did really well with its $50 billion. It's just, I don't think people understand the scale of the semiconductor industry. It is the most complicated supply chain in the world, right? It's much bigger than, you know, say manufacturing airplanes. It's much bigger than like, you know, really anything else, right? If you look at the top 10 companies like of the world, I think eight of them designed semiconductors, right? Now, obviously, like Google designed semiconductors, but it's like, oh, wait, no, but their cost of search would be like 10x higher if they didn't have TPUs, and TPUs were super optimized for search, right? Or like, you know, you, you go down the list, right? Like Meta serves recommendation systems with their chips, right? Like you go down the list, it's everyone is making their own chips. Apple devices would be materially worse if they didn't have their own chips, right? Um, and you just go down the list, it's like it's the most complicated supply chain. And they, they're spending something on the order of like $150 billion roughly in subsidies a year to the chip industry.

We are doing 50 over like a decade.

Yeah.

There's a difference in scale here, right? The collective total amount of like capex that has been spent in Taiwan is like 500 billion plus, right? Across the industry, across all the companies that are making semiconductors in Taiwan. And Taiwan doesn't have a domestic industry. How is $50 billion of subsidies going to change America's needle? Right? It does move it a little bit, right? I, I want to be clear, like the Chips Act is awesome. I don't understand why like EVs or like solar was given this massive, massive like trillion-dollar package. Semiconductors were only given 50. Like semiconductors need a lot bigger package to actually incentivize onshoring. I think what's happened so far has proven that it's working well. TSMC is literally making chips for Nvidia and Apple and AMD and others in Arizona today, right? And I think that's really great.

Is, is your sense that the broad American government is just, uh, aware of, of all of this? That it's, uh...

I wouldn't say only passed because the automotive like prices went up because car manufacturers are like the worst because they do just-in-time inventory, right? Or not worse, but like this is just like a thing, right? Just-in-time inventory systems. COVID happens, sales plummet, fabs that were making, you know, random power ICs or random microcontrollers for engines got repurposed to the boom from COVID, which is which was data centers and PCs and smartphones. So, that stuff was booming. And then when people were like, "Oh, wait. Actually, like, you know, I have some money. I stayed at home. I didn't go out. I didn't drink. I have a lot of, I have some cash, right? Let me buy a car." They went out and bought cars, and cars started skyrocketing in prices. Oh, let's restart. And let's, let's, oh, yeah. Can I, can you sell me that microcontroller for the engine again? It's like, "No, I, I'm making a slightly different microcontroller that works for, you know, uh, let's say a keyboard or a mouse, right, or whatever." And it's like, and and and they actually didn't just leave me flat-footed, and they were like a partner through COVID, right? You know, versus you just left me. Screw you, Ford, or whoever, Toyota, um, or automotive OEM, you up that supply chain. And so, Chips Act did not get passed, only got passed because that happened. And people are like, "Oh my god, the semiconductors are why cars can't be made." If that didn't happen, we wouldn't even have the Chips Act. It's like it's like silly. So like I don't know, like I think, you know, whereas like, and and even though that's what was pitched to all the senators, like I know people who were running around Capitol Hill just pushing that narrative and story, and that's why it finally got passed. In reality, it was all for advanced leading-edge chips, right? Nothing that goes in a car, right? And so it's like this like funny thing. So, in other words, do you think my words, my words, not yours, but is it, is it hopeless that the US is going to...

I'm very optimistic.

Okay. I mean, do you think there's a world where the US just decides to invest in semiconductor at the scale that...

You know, I thought we just needed a bigger Chips Act, but...

Look, Trump's kind of gotten TSMC to promise to invest a fuckload more [laughter] and they're moving on it, right? They're like actually like just building it. It's like, I'm going to tariff the [ __ ] out of you unless you build a fab. But it's like, we'll build a fab [laughter] and they're building it right now. The timelines for fabs just takes forever, cuz again, it's the most complicated thing in the world. The cleanest space in the place in the world is not like a hospital or a biotech lab or whatever. It's a semiconductor fab. And the most expensive tools in the world are not, you know, any of these medical tools or whatever. It's it's semiconductor tools, or it's not a rocket. It's a semiconductor tool, right? Like everything, you know, I describe it as, um, I remember when I was a kid, I was like, I want to be a rocket scientist. And then I was like, oh, I want to be a surgeon. And I'm like, wait, chips are like rocket surgery, but even cooler, right? Like, I think, anyways, like sort of like, there, there are fabs being built in America.

They won't take America to self-sufficiency. I don't think that's a relevant. I don't think that's a goal relevant, like that's relevant, right? Like globalism is generally just good. Hot take [laughter] like in terms of economics.

We'll turn this into a short, a YouTube short.

Globalism.

Globalism is good. [laughter]

Dude, you're gonna get me like canceled.

[gasps]

I tweeted about ice and it was a complete joke, but so many people got mad at me because I can't be, you know, I'm too, I'm too much of a joker. You know, these are serious things.

Yeah. Yeah. No, I know the, I know the feeling. Yes. [laughter]

Anyways, um, I think, I think, you know, I think we are building fabs, and I think it's like going to move. And now even Elon's talking about building fabs now because he sees the shortages in the world, right? Uh, there's a lot of semiconductor related shortages for building out AI. And and so I don't think it's hopeless. I think I'm like very optimistic that we're going to do more and more and more. And maybe this administration threatens tariffs and they get the deals, and the next administration comes back with the carrot. If it is the Democrats, whatever happens, I don't know. Like I was at a comedy club on Sunday night and like he's like, "Oh, I use ChatGPT." And then like there were a couple people who booed, and he's like, "Yeah, I'm one of those guys. I know." And like it's like, "Wow, people hate AI."

And that has, has not even started, right? Like the actual impact of AI.

Or like New Jersey power prices are up, right? Uh, is it because of a data center? New Jersey, the governor's election, like I think literally fl, like there's like an election that changed recently in New Jersey because power prices were up, and people blamed a Microsoft Azure data center in New Jersey for that reason. But in reality, that data center has nothing to do with power prices going up. It's Superstorm Sandy, like five years ago, knocking or whatever, how many years ago, knocking down the state's electrical infrastructure, and then the then improving all these improvements, and then those improvements have to be paid by someone, and it turns out the consumer has to pay for them with higher power prices, right? And so like, you know, like there's like there's a lot like going on in that regard, right? Um, that kind of is, uh, sad. Um, and and people hate AI, and they're blaming AI on it. And artists hate AI, and like, you know, you see all this deep fake stuff. And like, I think, I think it'll be the hottest button issue, especially as like we're really getting into like, I think last year, Google spent $3 billion on Waymo, and we're waiting for their guide for this year. $3 billion on Waymo taxis, but their T, their Waymos went from like 300k to like 100k or 90k, the new Waymo car, and they're going to spend more than three because they've just launched in like four cities now, right, or five cities, and and they're testing it a lot. And the same, a robo-taxi, people are going to hate AI for that reason. People are going to hate AI because the slop on the internet. People are going to hate AI because, you know, the perceived job replacement. People are going to hate AI for all these reasons. And so, yeah, it's going to be a hot button political issue, don't you think?

Yeah. Talking about that, so, um, capex, is there a capex bubble? Are we, are we investing too much, or actually, are we investing not enough, given what you were saying earlier about the the rate of revenue increase and and therefore implied demand that you expect for this year?

I'm obviously a maxi. I think we're going to need a lot of infra. And I think I'm literally paid to like analyze the supply chain and do consulting. Like that's what my company does. So like obviously I'm very [laughter] biased. I think, I think we're pretty good at calling when when things go down though, right? Before like a part of the supply chain reb. Anyways, you know, again, going back to the economics of it, it's north of a hundred billion dollars of revenue exiting this year for AI from a base of, you know, sub-1 billion Gen AI from a base because ads and stuff is like already a multi-hundred billion dollar AI industry, right? You know, go back to 2023, it was like less than a billion, right? And 2024, I don't know exactly what number, maybe let's call it 10, and 25 was maybe like 30, 40. It'll be north of 100 easily. If you're talking about a hundred billion of revenue, let's say at a 50% gross margin. So that's $50 billion of gross profit, um, and $50 billion of COGS. That $50 billion of COGS needs to run on infra, which cost roughly, if a five, if you're talking about five-year depreciation, call it $250 billion, right, of infra.

For a hundred billion of revenue.

Mhm.

Okay. What is, what is the actual spend on AI infra this year? It's going to be like, it's, I mean, it depends on what layer. If you're talking about energy, those are longer-lived assets and all these other things, right? Um, data centers are longer-lived assets. The chips are not as much. People are putting capex down. Um, and the hyperscalers capex is going to be like $500 billion this year or something like this. And then besides them, there's also a lot more hyp, uh, capex elsewhere. Um, and so, you know, is it a bubble? I mean, theoretically, like, you know, it's twice as much as it should be, but it's also like, well, no, there's an R&D component to this, and the excess spent that wasn't revenue-generating last year is what led to models being so good this year, um, and led to like everyone who can using cloud code and like that changing their life. This is like, it's not a bubble, right? I don't think it's a bubble yet. Um, I think if AI model progress stops, and that's the main thing, right? The moment model progress stops, all the spending is for naught. But so far, we've had consistent improvement. As you put in more compute, you get more performance and better models.

Yeah. Model performance being the lagging indicator of hardware progress or data center.

Yeah. Of of capex, right? Yeah.

Ultimately, the capex that Microsoft spent in 2024 for OpenAI is what results in in 2025 for OpenAI, Cory, or whoever, is what results in their models being so good this year. Same with Anthropic and Amazon, Google, and their models now being so good now. Is that capex, and actually, they still haven't paid for those chips yet because those chips are still have a useful life for another few years, right? I think model progress is very clear. Um, the moment that stops happening, right, if we hit a wall, there's no new research directions, um, then then it's cooked. Yeah. Right.

And that assumes that better model leads to more demand, which is a reasonable assumption.

Yeah, for sure.

But, um, yeah, I mean, the scale, the adoption curve, regardless of how good the model is, in the enterprise.

Like 2% of GitHub commits today are cloud code.

As in committed by cloud code. You can disable that where it's not automatically committed, but 2% of GitHub commits today are cloud code. $2 trillion of software wages paid in the world.

If it was 2%, then you like you're like, wait a second.

This is this is an insane amount. AI is under-earning the value that it's producing in the world, by a significant margin already today.

Bor's journey from Cloud code, who had, who we had on the pod, was saying that what he's written all of Claude, what is it called, co-work, like the new product, entirely with cloud code, yet, so we're very much in that world. Yes.

Yeah. My, uh, one of my roommates, I was asking him because he's like always been a really low-level, good programmer, and he started, you know, I was like, he's like, he had this, um, holiday obsession, right? I mean, he was using cloud code for work already, right? Like, whatever. Um, but he had this holiday obsession. We got into playing Age of Empires 2. Myself, you know, my roommate, a handful of people from like OpenAI, GDM, Anthropic. We just would do LAN parties of AoE 2 over the holidays a bit. Not, not like Christmas, but like a little bit before, a little bit after, you know, cuz most of us went home for Christmas. Um, but like, we'd do these LANs. My roommate got so obsessed with like the game that during Christmas week, cuz he didn't go home, he just stayed in San Francisco, he just worked on an RTS game, and he built an entire RTS game. And I think I kid you not, I think he used like $10,000 of Claude in one week and built an entire RTS from scratch, uh, about a like, but instead of like being a standard RTS where it's like, oh, Age of Empires for advanced through ages or Starcraft, it is it is an RTS where it's China versus the US, and you're in the AI race, and you go from the start of the information age all the way through to, you know, AGI and like robots and humanoids and and and like all like space-faring civil, like it's crazy. He built it in a week.

And he didn't type a single line of code, right? He can only dictate it to the model. And he told me, yeah, like we have an indicator internally at Anthropic where you see how many people actually write code now. There's only a few holdouts left.

But I guess the question to the bubble is, is really a question of, uh, timing as well, right? Uh, it's, it's whether the build, which is supply side, and the demand side, are going to land sort of at the same time. Is that, is that fair?

Yeah. But also the economics of, like, say you, you spend, let's say you spend, you build a gigawatt, you put down roughly $50 billion across, you know, the data center, the chips, the networking, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, right? Let's say it has a five-year useful life, so it's $10 billion a year. Is it a bubble if the first year you have, you didn't make any money, it's zero? The second year, it's zero, and then third, fourth, fifth year, you're at 50% gross margins, and so you make 20, 20, 20. Now you've made $60 billion off of this $50 billion investment. It's not the best return on invested capital, but it did pay for itself.

Yeah.

Um, is that, is that a bubble? Well, that's what's happening today is that people are spending all this infra money on infra, and there's no return for a lot of it, right? A lot of it is just doing research and like trying to get adoption and is free users and like, what does that mean?

Yeah.

Um.

Depends a bit on...

The timing. That's the timing though. Yeah. But oh, that $50 billion capex was spent in year one.

What about energy? In the, in the data center world, you had this fun post about the gas replacement for for energy. So, is, uh, is AI basically, uh, uh, destroying the grid?

It would if the utilities were willing to let it, but I think the utilities are so slow and dumb that they don't want to. Not destroy, but like expanding the grid. Yeah.

Um, I think the US could have a way better grid, but we just don't want to. Like, no one's made the effort or initiative. You know, there's not enough power. America's not built power for 50 years, really, right? It's like converted from coal to gas and like things like this, but like really just have not built wholesale new power on a large scale. And there have been a lot of times where the industry blew up, right? Independent power producers, IPs, have blown up multiple times in the 2010s when, uh, Korean and Japanese investors like flooded the market with because they saw such a good return there, or before in the early 2000s, power was growing a little bit for a little bit, and so people overbuilt on power. So the power industry has been burned a couple times, but no one really built power. And then you've got data centers now, all of a sudden coming online and going from 2% to 10% of the US grid in just a handful of years. And so you've got this humongous, humongous change in the industry. We don't have the labor, right? I think ultimately that's the biggest problem is the equipment and the labor. And equipment is basically, you know, again, labor and time takes time to build a factory so you can build the things. I think the equipment side of things will be solved like more reasonably. And one one example was like gas, right? People initially thought, oh, you can only use like the two vendors, right? Uh, Siemens or G-V-Nova for gas turbines, but they have the they have the best ones, the most efficient ones. It's like, okay, well, like, okay, also Mitsubishi exists, and they're ramping up production fast. Oh, Doosan and Korea exist, and they're ramping up production fast. Oh, actually, I can just take Cummins engines, right? Like, you know, if you've ever like ridden a pickup truck or like, you know, like diesel trucks, like everyone loves Cummins, right? You know, you see the Ram on the street and has the Cummins like badge. It's like it's like a that's like an aura symbol for a certain kind of redneck from South Georgia, which I have a little bit of. Anyways, I, I don't have a, I don't have a truck. [laughter] I have though. Um, but anyways, like the, there's like all these engines, like people are figuring out how to make the equipment. You know, solar sucks. It's too intermittent. Wind sucks. It's too intermittent. Nuclear sucks. It takes forever to build. Coal sucks. It's way too dirty. How do you make power for data centers besides gas? And like, okay, the grid's not willing to put the gas on your site, right? That's what Elon did. Now everyone's doing it, right?

This other cool post just, uh, last week or two weeks ago that was about water consumption. Uh, did you want to talk to that?

Yeah. Yeah. So there's this annoying thing where everyone's like, "Oh, AI is using all the water. Oh, wow, AI and data centers are going to like use up all the water and now we don't have any water." And it's like, that's so silly. Uh, water is a distribution problem, not a like, we don't have enough problem, right? Like you look at California. So California has shitloads of water. But people decide to make oat milk, which consumes like 1,000x the water of like anything else, like regular milk, even. And and cows obviously eat a, you know, consume a lot of water. Um, but anyways, like, you know, data centers consume very little water actually, right? So the US grid will get to like 10% of power by like '28, '27 is data centers. For water consumption, it's not even going to crack 1%.

Yeah.

By the end of the decade.

And what was the metric? Um, and so, so the the comparison we made is because like, you know, it was a bit of a [ __ ] post, but it was like serious research. Yeah. Basically, like we were doing serious research because we keep getting this like question and debunking it, and we would do it seriously, but then I was like, no, no, no, this is like too like complicated, like let's make it very simple. So I was like, "Guys, why don't we just compare it to like hamburgers, right? Cuz cuz you know, I've heard that argument from some like vegetarian people before, or some Hindus, or like I'm Hindu myself, although, you know, and I, I do eat beef sometimes, but, you know, like I'm Hindu, but like, you know, so, so we made this comparison to hamburgers, right? Hamburgers require a shitload of water cuz cows, you know, when to for them, they require a ton of water, and when a cow's taking a lot of water, it's not the cow itself, it's all the feed you're feeding them, right? Because no one grass feeds their cows, you know, and just lets the rain take care of the grass. They like either rain the the grass, or most likely they do mass industrial farming of corn, soybean, alfalfa, etc., which uses shitloads of water, right? Like, you know, or like almond milk, like uses tons and tons of water. Like produce is like the main user of water. I think the, uh, metric was the entirety of Elon Musk's Colossus data center, right? Uses as much water as two and a half In-N-Outs. Um, because that's, you know, you do the calculation on how many, what's the average revenue per In-N-Out, and how many hamburgers does that translate to, right? If everyone's ordering like a combo, right? Okay, let's ignore the drink, let's ignore the fries, let's just talk about the hamburger, let's ignore the bread, which does use have grain, let's just do the meat.

And the cheese. And all of a sudden, all this water is, there's so much water, right? Like a single query, like all of your AI usage from ChatGPT, of the average user, is like a hamburger, right? Like it's like, okay, this is nothing, right? You know, because these things, the data centers actually are like, they're mostly closed loops, and like, sure, they evaporate some water for like cooling reasons, but like, by doing evaporative cooling, they're using less power, right? And that's actually better for the environment than, uh, than not using evaporative cool. There's all, all these reasons why this myth or hoax of AI of AI using all the water is just nonsense, right? Like Meta's data center in Louisiana is getting protested because the water, it's, it's going to be the largest data center in the world. It's going to be like four or five gigawatts at least announced so far. We're tracking some other ones that are may be as big or bigger. Uh, but Meta is getting protested because the local population around that area is like, "Oh, the water's dirty. It's because of this Meta data center." And like, there's these trucks on these big trucks on these back roads that used to be empty completely. They're just like mad and annoyed about that, right? But at the end of the day, what actually made the water dirty is that that's an area where you go fracking. Like,

Fracking is absurdly worse, and almost all of that gas is being shipped to an LG terminal and being shipped to Asia. Like, you know, you know, like Japan or Taiwan or China or Korea, and some Europe as well, right? Like, like actually all of this water is dirty because of regulation fracking. Like, I support fracking, by the way, but, you know, that's that's an insane take too, maybe. Um, but like, water usage is, is, is like not a relevant argument.

Are you bullish on the sort of energy, uh, companies? I'm thinking Constellation for nuclear, or Vistra, I guess, is an independent power producer.

I think IPs will do well. I think IPs can secure contracts at premiums to what they've previously been able to for new power plants that are either, uh, dedicated or grid-connected, but come with a pairing of a grid load, right? For example, utilities won't let you just do data centers now, but if you come with a, a pair, right? You're like, "Hey, I'm going to build this massive data center, but we're also going to have this massive, uh, power generating asset, right?" Say, you know, whatever it is, right? Some IP, they're going to partner with, and they'll build the load and the, uh, consumption, even if it's connected through the grid for better stability and more reliability. Um, or it's not, it's behind the meter, i.e., not connected to the grid at all. Um, like some part, some data centers, like partially, like Colossus from Elon, uh, the original one, or part of Abene's Texas OpenAI, right? Like Cruso, there's a lot of room for power producers to get outsized returns. I'm not necessarily bullish nuclear. Um, existing nuclear, fine, yeah, it'll, it'll, it can find a higher buyer, higher-priced buyer, but majority of it will be gas. But like, you can do like renewables backed by gas, and then just turn off the gas, and like, it's cost more, but whatever, right? Or you can do wind backed by gas.

And why not nuclear?

Takes too long.

No one can build nuclear fast.

Even China takes like five years to build nuclear, right? Like it's, it's complicated, it's unsafe, right? You know, I love nuclear, I wish it would work, it's just not relevant in the time scale that like AI's power is going crazy. Um, but yeah, there's a lot of interesting stuff. Like have clients would like had a client buy a coal plant, and we were advising them on the transaction based on, they just like showed up and they're like, "Yeah, we want to buy, we want to buy power assets. We believe in this power story." It's like, "Okay, great." So, yeah. So, here's all of the like power plants that we know of, like you can get some of it from EIA, blah, blah, blah, um, which are these like, and then we like worked through the economics and we looked at the new data centers being built in the region and all this, and then they decided to buy a coal plant and they restarted it, and they're like making tons of money now because now someone, a certain hyperscaler wants to buy the entire pipeline of power and put a load, load near it, right, instead of just being a grid-connected asset. So it's like a super awesome investment. So like, you know, power is, power is going to do great.

Yeah. I was going to talk about peace dividends of the whole AI boom. Uh, generally yes, right? Like hyperscalers are paying for, uh, transmission grid upgrades, which people will benefit from, right? Or like, you know, investors are obviously going to benefit, people who work in the industry, electricians' wages are skyrocketing, you know, etc., right? Plumbers' wages are skyrocketing. So there's like a lot of trades that are doing really well too. I think that's definitely also, um, part of it. Yeah.

I wanted to come back quickly to, uh, that, um, Nvidia and CoreWeave deal that you mentioned, as we sort of close the discussion on, on capex and a and a bubble. It seems like there is circular deals, but also a lot of debt kind of like flushing around. So I don't know the specifics of of that deal, but like I did hear variations of this where effectively you have a large player guaranteeing the debt, being the last recourse, uh, for a lot of infrastructure build. Is sort of, this plus the whole like Oracle commitment, there, there is a fragility into this whole thing that can be a little unnerving. What do you make of it?

I think it's like completely fine, and I think like people are like freaking out and making narratives where there really is shouldn't be one. It's like, well, okay, Google doesn't have enough data center capacity. They need people to build data centers, but no one can build a data center because they don't have the capital. Like, don't have, you know, in many cases, capital is not the, you know, they don't have capital, right? Or like no one will give them a loan because they don't trust some random [ __ ] company. And it's like, but then Google's like, well, no, we've due diligence to them, we think they can build it here. We'll like even guarantee, we'll buy the thing or start using it once they build it. You know, just having a customer alone spoken for it was enough, right? Um, in the case of CoreWeave, they were actually able to, no backs stop, right? Right? They were able to just say, "Hey, hey, look, here's our Microsoft contract for this many GPUs. I want to put in that data center, that data center, that data center. Here's the contract for renting those GPUs. I want to hire these people. I want to do this." No one will like, they don't have any money, but then they were able to like have it work out because they were able to get people to lend to them. I think like CoreWeave did that, and there was no circular financing. But that was when there was like the scale of investment was like single-digit billions or less than a billion, right? Now the scale of investment is hundreds of billions.

Yeah.

Um, and so the question is like, oh, well, if I want data center capacity, how do I, how do I get data center capacity? I just go to everyone who's going to build it, looks smart, is smart enough to do it, but can't afford to do it, and tell them I'll, I'll take it. And in fact, I won't just take it. I'll go to your debtor and be like, I'll guarantee you. Yeah.

Because, you know, obviously you're a new company. I've vetted you, but the debtor hasn't. And so, you know, like, you know, you know, they don't want me to just be able to walk away because like in the Microsoft CoreWeave deals, Microsoft could have walked away if CoreWeave [ __ ] it up.

Right?

Yeah.

There's no, I mean, yeah, there's there's always like, uh, sort of like cancellation or whatever possibilities. And so, this is just a further form of guarantee, um, as far as on like a lot of these backstops, as far as on like Oracle getting the money and then OpenAI getting money and Nvidia, you know, paying, and it's a whole circular. It's kind of nonsense because it's like Nvidia's getting equity in OpenAI. They're basically saying, "Hey, every gigawatt you buy, we'll also buy some equity."

Yeah.

Right? Okay. Well, cool. Now, Nvidia owns an asset which they think is valuable, OpenAI. Right? OpenAI is turning around and is like trying to rent those, uh, use the equity they buy. What do they, what was their use of equity? People's cash pay isn't that great, right? It's mostly just 99 plus percent of their spend at the company is probably just compute.

Yeah.

Uh, so, so sort of like it's like, okay, well, then I, I raise this money. I'm going to do the, the whole thing I explained earlier, right? Year one and two I lose money. Year three, four, five, I hope to make money on it, right? Um, and OpenAI has been doing that, right? So, I'm going to, okay, I'm going to go out there. I've raised $50 billion. I've raised $10 billion. I'm going to raise it. I'm going to rent a cluster for five years for $65 billion. And I've rented that contract, and now I only have enough to pay for the first year, to be clear. But I think, you know, you trust me, Oracle, you think I'm going to grow, and you think I'll be able to pay for it. Oracle's like, "Yeah, or if you're not, I think I'll be able to sell it to someone else." So like, okay, cool. I'm going to spend $50 billion this year.

Yep.

To build that data center. And and and this, this is like for a gigawatt. Um, and so is it like circular that OpenAI is every amount of GPUs they consume and gives an investment, that investment is turned around to pay for the first year of the rent to the cluster? Um, or second year, then first two years go, you know, it's sort of like it's fine.

Yeah. Yeah.

Like it's like it's like it is a little bit funky, but like I don't think it's a big deal.

Yeah. Love it. Contrary take. Maybe let's finish with the models and the software side of things. We talked extensively about hardware and supply chain and all the things. I get a sense that you are super, super bullish on, uh, what's happening next in in AI. Your roommate Schulto, I assume, was the roommate that you were talking about earlier on this pod, effectively making the point that we're just starting to scratch the surface, and there was so much low-hanging fruit around, you know, RL and all the things. You were in Silicon Valley circles. Is that, is that your sense as well, and what are you tracking on the model side?

One thing is like, you know, simple stuff like, uh, GitHub commits, other things are like, what's the amount of usage? How much are people using? Like all these sorts of things. I think there's so many different alternative data sources for tracking AI model progress. Area tokenomics, uh, token economics, tokenomics. And so that's like an entire practice for us.

Are you rebranding the term from crypto?

I, yeah, I don't believe in crypto. People, like, I've always hated them. [laughter]

Um.

So now you're taking the term.

Yeah. Yeah. And Jensen's used it now. So I've like, I've convinced him to use the word. He's used it as sovereigns, and so I think I think we've won.

That's awesome. Congratulations.

I've said it to him. We've written it in articles. It's an entire practice of consulting that I just, I started in like '23, 2023, was token economics, and we've been trying to build out these like, you know, but basically, I think the main things are like, people who don't code can use cloud code now, right? I think people don't understand that like, even if you don't code, you've never had any training in software development, you've never take had a job as a software developer, you can code. Let's take an an example of what one of the one of the analysts at my company did, right? Comes from an engineering background, but on like semiconductor systems, right? Uh, like worked on mechanical systems, worked on these sorts of things, and they coded this thing, which was they wanted to do an analysis of area of clean rooms, right? Clean rooms are the building that you, the fab has all the tools in, the most complicated kind of building in the world, has every, all sorts of chemical systems and all this area of that a company who builds systems, builds these systems, and revenue of that company, right? And so it was like, okay, uh, we have this fab data set. Pointed it at it was like, "Hey, here's this fab data set. What's the square footage of all of them?" And we have this like thing that we built, which, uh, just pulls with cloud code separately, which for data centers and and and fabs and everything else, just calculates the area of something from a from a satellite image, right? Very simple. So we have the square footage of all these things. Points at that. Here's the company name. Okay, go find the filings. So it dug, dug through all these filings. It it pulled the data, right? Okay, great. Now told it to, um, compare these two. Make a chart. Great. Oh, wait, there's this like weird inflection. Oh, that's because they bought a company five years ago. Can you do a pro forma of this analysis without those financials of that of that company they acquired? Okay, great. And then like, we were able to like, like figure out an investment case for our clients, as well as like, you know, some other interesting details from someone who's never really coded, just using cloud code and it like doing this all, and this is like not even their, and it wrote the note, and they just like, they didn't even like work on this full-time for like three hours, right? They just told the model and would go work on other things and told the model and worked on other things they

Just did this. People don't understand that, like, the skill sets that, like, I think, like, if you go talk to an analyst, right? A very junior analyst at any, right? Whether it's venture or especially growth venture or public markets or private equity, their their job is like finding data, cleaning it, making charts. It's like this is cloud code now. You don't need junior analysts. Just like a lot of companies have stopped hiring L4 engineers because it's useless. Why would I hire an L4 engineer? I just tell Claude to do it. You you sort of like have this has happened and this is a really big like shift, I guess, like is that like low-level knowledge work just doesn't matter, right? Why would I why would I use Excel when I can just tell Claude to manipulate CSVs? Why would I use Word when Claude will just generate the markdown and I can copy and paste the markdown directly into our WordPress and then, you know, and that WordPress is fully formatted now and it's like, oh my god, like what's the point of Word, right?

Um, and what's the point of doing all sorts of stuff? I think when we look at model progress, that's just for Opus 4.5. OpenAI's new model, I think will be better than Opus 4.5 and it's coming like somewhat soon in Marchish, um, time frame. I maybe February, Marchish, but yeah. Um, because OpenAI has a better RL stack than Anthropic today. It's just their pre-trained models suck compared to Anthropic's pre-training, right? And so like if they catch up a lot on pre-training and keep their better RL stack, they would actually have a model that's much better, right? Flip side, Google has a better pre-trained model than Anthropic or OpenAI, but their RL stack sucks. So if they catch up on RL, like these models are going to get ridiculously and then Anthropic is obviously advancing as well, right? And so and then and then you look across the ecosystem, everyone's advancing really fast progress. These moments are happening, right? You know, ChatGPT was a moment. Gibbly was a moment. Those were more consumer. Those were less like, I mean, there's ChatGPT everyone using it for work too. But like I think cloud code is like a new moment, right? 4.5 on cloud code is a new moment where the way you work has forever changed. And so now we're trying to force everyone in my company. There's 54 people here. I think like half of them have coded. The other half we're trying to force them to use like cloud code. And it could be like, oh, well, actually you come from a consult a semiconductor consulting background. Oh, you come from like a semiconductor like engineering of like package. Oh, you worked in a fab, right? Like these kind of people, they're using cloud code now, right? And and their productivity is being boosted.

>> And it's like, >> you know, workspace, cloud workspace is new. It sucks compared to cloud code, but it'll get there, right? He he he said he coded it entirely in cloud code. You know that, right? Or that was on your pod, right? Yeah. Yeah. So, like um I've heard that and I think maybe that might have been from your pod uh original uh disclosure. >> My pod was before that, but yes. Oh, okay. Okay. It was >> I had as the guy on my pod subsequently said that. >> Okay. I think it's like a brand new age and and like there's so much low hanging fruit as Shto said on the episode when he was here. There's so much low hanging fruit. Yeah. I mean for for the models progressing and I think model progress will translate to revenue. Adoption is difficult but like actually the UX of cloud code sucks but like give it 6 months the models will be good enough that the UX can be like talking to it. Yep. >> And you don't even have to have like, you know, CLI integration, right? It's something even easier. or like cloud for XL was released recently and it's like not bad, you know, building models and like all these sorts of things are just going to be like, tell someone, right? Like why tell a junior analyst, right? When you can just do it yourself? I think it's a whole new world and it's a $2 trillion of software work but also of wages but it's also we have more north of 2% 2% is claw and then, you know, there's codex and cursor and all these other guys so probably like 5% of code committed today is AI generated if not higher marked as AI generated. What's going to happen when normal workers who do spreadsheets and office processing start automating their workflows? I think it's a whole new world.

>> And speaking of Schultoe, we both agreed that he was a a perfect specimen. >> Dude, [laughter] I' I've been I'm straight, but I've been accused of being uh homosexual, which is perfectly fine for for how much I like praise this man because like, think about it, right? He's like 6'4. He's like really good-looking. He's like Australian accent. Sounds amazing. Like you've heard his I I have like a annoying voice probably. His voice sounds amazing. He's absurdly good at coding. He was an Olympian level fencer. Like like he picks up any sport, he's really good at it, right? Because he's athletic. It's like, "Holy crap, you're a specimen." >> Yeah. Yeah. >> This clip and sent him [laughter] for sure. >> Yeah. It must be uh, you know, I guess uh may maybe some people don't follow the play-by-play on on Twitter and like don't haven't haven't heard of like the fact that all of you guys are roommates or you roommate with Scholto and then with Dwarish and Darkish is like the podcasters podcaster. So it must be absolutely >> What's a podcasters podcaster mean? >> Uh the podcaster that other podcasters uh aspire to to to become or learn from. >> Yeah. Yeah. His his when he's preparing, you know, it's like he's he's he's so locked in and he prepares so hard for interviews. It's great. >> No, he's he's just uh incredible. >> And then and then he might only say like a hundred words on the episode, >> but he's prepared so hard and then like I think people just realized, oh wow, he's not just like, you know, it's like, oh, he just has good guests. No, no, no. Like he's preparing really hard, but you can't tell if you're not like realizing that. And then once he started writing more and he started writing more, people like, oh wow, he's actually really really smart. It's like, yeah, cuz he's studying like crazy. Like it's like, "Oh, I'm interviewing an AI researcher who worked on this. I'm gonna try and train a freaking model." Yeah. >> Right. It's like that's the level of like commitment he goes to when he records this stuff. >> What do you guys talk about when you bump into each other? Is that is that AI non-stop or you talk about everything but AI >> with Shoto? It's like the Age of Empires game, you know, because we we got super into it for a bit. We talked only about that and his RTS that he made. Uh with with with Dwarash, it's I mean, it's all sorts. It's like normal roommate stuff. It's like, [laughter] "How's your dating life?" "Oh, okay. You went on a date. It wasn't well. It didn't go well." "Okay, well, okay." Yeah. you know, like, oh, you know, like that's me. That's me. You know, my days don't go [laughter] well. No, I'm just kidding. Um, or like it's like, oh, you want to like have dinner? We can invite a few friends. Like, yeah, great. Or like, you know, it's like all sorts of like normal stuff, too. Um, al obviously we also do talk about a lot about tech, right? Like we are like this is our lives. Um, and tech is the most fun thing.

>> Awesome. Well, great. Great San Francisco lore. Uh, Dylan, thank you so much. Uh, that was absolutely fabulous. Really enjoyed it. Learned a lot. So, really appreciate uh your coming on the pub. >> Thank you so much. Hi, it's Matt Turk again. Thanks for listening to this episode of the Mad Podcast. If you enjoyed it, we'd be very grateful if you would consider subscribing if you haven't already or leaving a positive review or comment on whichever platform you're watching this or listening to this episode from. This really helps us build a podcast and get great guests. Thanks, and see you at the next episode.

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Dylan Patel: NVIDIA's New Moat & Why China is "Semiconductor Pilled”

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