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We've undergone a sea change. We are now in a different world, and we are going to see the consequences of the sea change in the economy as well as in the security area in 2026 and for many years to come.
In terms of the underlying issues between the two countries, I don't think that they have been addressed at all, nor are they easy to address, and they remain there and they are very difficult to solve because the fundamental thing is the US is a status quo power, China is growing, developing, and China says, "Well, I'm happy to live in this world. I accept this framework." But the US says, "Maybe today, but what happens when, in fact, your GDP exceeds mine by 20, 30%? Can I still be sure that that will be your position?" And so the US wants to keep the Chinese, wants to keep the Chinese, if not down, at least some distance below them. And that's a fundamental contradiction because to the Chinese, their right to develop is a red line. They have to be entitled to grow and to fulfill their full potential. So how do you reconcile that? China is not a pushover. America is, for all its difficulties, not going to disappear. And as Henry Kissinger often said, a war between the US and China cannot be won and must not be fought. But that's not something which is top of mind, I think, right now in the decision-makers. If there's trouble across the straits, that's trouble not just for the U, uh, Taiwan and Chi and China or the US and China, but for the whole region and for the world.
And so we believe that it's important that there's peace in the Taiwan Strait, that we have had a One China policy which we've upheld for a very long time. We're against Taiwan independence. We're against unilateral changes to the status quo. The trouble is, in the real world, the status quo is never a static, frozen thing. It's dynamic. It shifts. And I think over the last few years, um, the shift has been towards tenser, more troubled relationships in the Taiwan Strait, and there have been actions on all sides, although all sides say that we are maintaining the status quo. So that's very troubling.
Uh, I hope that it will be a, we will be able to gradually calm things down, and there's some hope of that because between the US and China, I think if the US wants to avoid a breach with China for now, well, they will also be careful not to use, not to cause, not to allow Taiwan to upset them, and they have considerable influence in this matter. And I think with this administration, there are many things which people have views of of what it is doing, but on Taiwan, I don't think they have been doing wrong things recently.
We are very gravely concerned by the US military intervention in Venezuela. MFA put out a press statement, um, stating our views, and we are against military intervention in other countries because this is contrary to international law, is contrary to the UN Charter. Now, Venezuela is a complicated country. It's got, uh, very difficult internal situation. Its legitimacy of the government is questioned. It's causing difficulties to its neighbors because of drugs, because of, uh, refugees. It's destabilizing the environment, the neighborhood, and including, I'm quite, I can believe, causing some difficulty to the United States. But that does not justify a military intervention in or into by one country into another unilaterally and without, uh, any proper authorization.
Um, the immediate consequences, maybe it works. It's a spectacular military success. The longer-term consequences on the international system, I think that is something which we have to worry about. From the point of view of a small country, if that is the way the world works, we have a problem. To some extent, that has always been the way the world works. Um, the US has done this many times over, uh, in different parts of the world. I mentioned some of them just now, and other powers do it too. But you look at the situation, you look at the impact of it, and you ask yourself, is this a plus or a minus? And I don't think this is a plus.
I think ASEAN has influence over its members, but it does not have absolute influence over its members. ASEAN is not a supernational body with executive powers. It doesn't direct its members. It cannot override its members. It works by ASEAN consensus. It's a famous principle. We pride ourselves on it. It's the reason we're able to get along together. We are 11 countries. Uh, we have different policies, different priorities, different histories, different security concerns. It is not possible for us to be one country or even one federation. So when there are issues concerning an individual country or between them, you have influence, you have, um, interests involved, you would like the matter to be resolved, and we can help, but we don't have the greatest power.
Who has the greatest power? Well, who are their biggest trading? Who are our biggest trading partners? Amongst ASEAN, our intra-ASEAN trade is only about 20% of our international trade. Our biggest trading partners are with the developed economies, America foremost amongst them, and in our region, with China. And that is where influence can come. And apart from the economy, there's also many other ways in which the major powers can exercise influence on ASEAN members. So it's not surprising that the major powers have, uh, are able to nudge, encourage, uh, advise, even coerce other countries to do something which they would like to do.
What, what can we do to keep ourselves safe? First, make sure that the country's economy is successful, because if you're broke and poor, poor or broke, uh, you can't do anything about it. Secondly, look to our defenses. We've been spending about 3% of our GDP every year on defense for a very long time, previously even higher, and built up a credible SAF, Singapore Armed Forces. And we continue to do that, not to threaten anybody, but just to keep ourselves safe. Thirdly, work together with our regional neighbors, cooperating amongst ourselves to the extent that we can, and also using it as a platform to partner other, uh, economies and other centers of prosperity in the world. Whether it's India, whether it's China, whether it's EU, ASEAN, EU, ASEAN, India, these are all ties which we can cultivate in order, even if I don't have a full WTO system, I have got a network of countries which want to trade with one another and continue to want to do business under some set of rules which will prevent us from falling back to the law of the jungle.
And speaking as a government of, as a government of the country, if there's a fight between two other countries, we have to ask ourselves, what's in it for us? Is there a principle at stake? If so, we have to stand up for the principle. We don't, we, we just, we don't have a, we don't, um, support military intervention in a certain country, but that doesn't mean I'm the enemy of the country which I disapprove of, whose action I disapprove of. I still do business with them. I mean, we issued very strong statements in the case of, uh, when Russia invaded Ukraine, we had sanctions against Russia, certain targeted sanctions, but it doesn't mean we are, uh, hostile to Russia. I mean, we still have, we still have relations, we still do business with them. Similarly with the US, similarly with other powers.
We have certain rules in Singapore, certain ways of doing things, uh, certain expectations of, uh, people in politics. You must be honest. You must not lie. You must not take bribes. You must not let down the public trust in you. And if you do, there has to be consequences. Uh, we don't, I mean, it doesn't mean we don't have from time to time lapses in Singapore, but that's what we try to do. Other countries run their societies in different ways. It often works for them. I think it's very presumptuous for this tiny little island to go and pronounce on who's right and who's wrong and what we should do about it. So we just take the world as it is, and we leave other countries to work out their own affairs because we wouldn't like them to work out our affairs on our behalf too.