Transcription
I, as a reader, sort of felt that you weren't really engaging with, uh, the human rights accusations, the human rights criticisms of China, which is so common in the West. Um, crimes against humanity, the UN's own term for what's happening in Xinjiang, or the high level of dissent against the CCP, whether in Hong Kong or on the mainland. So, how, how can we take your arguments in good faith if you, sometimes I feel dismiss these facts as a sort of "Westerner not getting China" um, response to those who, I suppose, would essentially call your optimism naive about those intentions? Away.
So, when a Westerner comes to China and says, "Why don't you loosen up? And, you know, it's okay, allow dissent, allow these things. You know, it's okay if you have a bit of chaos, don't worry, we won't take advantage of you." The Chinese will be very stupid to trust the West. Absolutely stupid. After what happened to them from 1842 to 1949, shows that the Europeans have not woken up to realize that the era in which European governments could pass judgments on other countries is over. So, so I think here, this is a time when it'd be good for Western minds to show a certain degree of humility in talking to the rest of the world, instead of telling the rest of the world, "We know better than you what is good for you." Please don't do that anymore.
This tense exchange took place in October of 2024 at the Asia Society in New York. On one side, the host Alec Ash, representing the mainstream Western elite perspective. On the other, the world-renowned Asian strategic thinker Kishor Mahbubani. Alec Ash clearly came armed with a series of sharp questions, preparing to interrogate Professor Mahbubani on everything from China's true intentions to sensitive human rights issues. But would this conversation go as he planned?
In the content that follows, you will witness an extraordinary intellectual confrontation. Professor Mahbubani, with his decades of diplomatic experience and profound historical insight, will launch a systematic challenge to the Western narratives we take for granted. Will this be a debate between equals or a one-sided masterclass? This is a rare opportunity to cut through the myths and understand the authentic Asian perspective. Let's continue.
Let's talk more about China. Okay. Given the remit of our podcast and publication, one of the arguments in your 2020 book, *Has China Won?*, is that it's normal for a predominant power, namely the US, to try and keep down an emerging superpower like China. Uh, but in effect, that this won't stop history. And while you engage with the titular question, "Has China Won?", it does feel like you think that China will be the dominant force, to me, in this, uh, Asian century. Um, and the relative decline of Western powers to China's rise is oft-remarked, but it's also easy to challenge, especially now with China's economic troubles and, um, internal dissent. So, can I draw you out on this more? Um, is the Asian century, is it really the Chinese century? Uh, and if so, how do you see that happening, and on what timeframe?
Uh, as you know, I begin my book *Has China Won?* with a fictional memo to President Xi Jinping saying, "President Xi, uh, we've, it's a fictional, fictional memo. We've begun this contest. We have a contest with the United States. Of course, China will win this contest to the United States. But, but, but China must never underestimate the United States of America. Now, the United States of America is a formidable society. It'd be a huge mistake to write off the United States in any way. Uh, in fact, with all the chaos that is happening, I think there are not many countries that can survive four years of Trump, but the United States can and emerge it, uh, after that too. So, I would say it is not a given, uh, in by any sense, that China is going to win this contest between the United States and China. You will find out, I think, in, uh, 10 to 20 years from now. But the main reason why I wrote the book, *Has China Won?*, was to send a mistake, that it was to send a message, uh, that it was a mistake for the United States to launch this enormous geopolitical contest against China without first working out a comprehensive long-term strategy. And I emphasize in the book that that insight did not come from me. That insight came from Henry Kissinger after a one-on-one conversation that I had with him, and he, he allowed me to share his insight with his fellow Americans, uh, in that book. So, I think the United States is a country with tremendous challenges, but also of extraordinary abilities. And China is also a country that has tremendous challenges and also has extraordinary strengths too. So, this, that's why this contest within the US and China will grip us for the next decade or two, because it's the largest geopolitical contest ever seen in human history.
This idea of the Asian century, or Chinese century as some people put it. How do you square that, um, with another catchphrase you've used, "a multipolar world," um, without a single hegemonic center? How, how can both be true?
Well, if you, there's no contradiction between the Asian century and, uh, a multipolar world, if many of the independent poles in the multipolar world are Asian, uh, as you know. And, and this, I must emphasize, is not going to be the Chinese century by any means. Uh, one important statistic that every American should know is, uh, there are 1.4, 4 billion people living in China, but there are 4.5 billion people living in Asia, uh, by and large, if you include West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia. So, we have 55% of the world's population. And what, and to understand what I, uh, what I mean when I say that we're moving to an Asian century. What is actually quite shocking is that there are 52 member states, Asian member states in the UN. In the year 2000, quite amazingly, the US economy alone was bigger, uh, than the combined 52 member states of Asia, which included at that time Japan, China, India. Amazing. And that showed why the 20th century was the American century. M. Such an amazing economy. But today, the combined Asian economies are 1.5 times bigger than the United States, and by 2050, they'll be three times bigger than the United States. And that's what I mean by the Asian century, that the economic weight of Asia will become so much larger than that of the United States, uh, by, by, by a huge measure. And so that's why the economic power.
But also of the West, of the United States, perhaps. But how about incorporating the, uh, let me, let me give you an interesting statistic on Europe. Uh, the European Union, uh, used to be in 1980, I think, I forget now, 8 to 10 times bigger than China. European Union, 1980. Today, they're both about the same size. By 2050, the European Union combined will be half the size of China. So, you know, there are massive shifts of power taking place in the world. And I, and I want to emphasize that we, today, we who are living today are actually living in one of the most exciting moments of world history ever. Uh, because we're seeing the rebirth of strong Asian civilizations, not civilization. And, and, you know, I, I believe personally that we are on the cusp of a great Asian renaissance now, because of the, once you lift up people below a certain level of, you know, having to meet their basic needs every day, right? And Asia has seen this remarkable explosion of middle-class population. Now, let me give you another statistic so you understand what I mean by that. You know, the combined population of the three, the three growth poles in Asia today, I would say are the new CIA countries. CIA is not Central Intelligence Agency, but China, India, ASEAN. Okay. So, you add up the 1.4 billion people in China, 1.4, 4 billion people in India, 700 million people in ASEAN, Southeast Asia, comes to 3.5 billion people. Now, out of these 3.5 billion people, in the year 2000, only 150 million. Out of 3.5 billion people enjoyed middle-class living standards, by World Bank standards, middle class. And that number exploded from 150 million to 1.5 billion, an increase of 10 times in 20 years. And by 2030, which is six years away, that number could hit 2.5 to 3 billion. Now, the largest middle-class population in the world, uh, is going to be in Asia. And by the way, if you add up the population of the United States and European Union combined, it's less than a billion. And even if they were all enjoying middle-class living standards, but they don't, the figure is much smaller. So, I think it's important therefore to emphasize that we are seeing phenomenal changes in our time, and we have to psychologically get ready for the Asian century.
Now, I'm going to challenge you directly on this, and I know you enjoy a challenge. Uh, so I'm sure you'll take it just in the spirit of, uh, free debate and, uh, exchange of ideas. Um, the, the essence of the challenge is, but I don't think China sees it this way. I think China wants it to be the Chinese century, not the Asian century. Your remarks on us living through a time of unprecedented change is certainly something that Xi Jinping agrees with. In fact, he and Vladimir Putin, um, said the same remarks to each other in a private conversation. Um, I think what it boils down to here is a question of intentions and whether China's intentions are peaceful, and, uh, whether its actions are beneficial, um, to the world at large. Uh, there's a lot of talk from China about it being peaceful. There always has been. Some of its actions are, uh, beneficial, such as investments to other parts of the world, much like arguments about the British Empire to bring this full circle. Um, but just as the Brits were fundamentally motivated by mercantilist self-interest, I would argue that China's interests abroad have been and remain self-interested. And I think it's clear that those interests, Xi Jinping's interests, could be of great harm to international peace, not least across the Taiwan Straits. Um, so what would your response be to this idea that you want it to be the Asian century, China wants it to be the Chinese century? Um, and your response to those who, I suppose, would essentially call your optimism naive about those intentions?
Well, I'm, I'm very happy, uh, to be called naive by anybody, except that unfortunately, I've been writing about the rise of Asia for over 30 years, and so far, unfortunately, all my predictions have come true. So, uh, the, the reason why even the Economist, I think, calls me the, the muse of the rising Asia. Mhm. Uh, so I think the, your, your larger question was about China's intentions, I think. And I, I think it's very important, um, to make a distinction between two separate questions. One is whether or not China will be peaceful, and the next question is whether China will be benevolent. Mhm. Right. These are two completely separate questions. Now, I believe that the phrase "benevolent great power" is an oxymoron. Mhm. There's no such thing as a benevolent great power. All great powers, and this has only been true for 2,000 years, will put their own interests first and everybody else's interests second. M. And so, when any small country deals with a great power, the small country will be very naive if it believes that the great power will sacrifice its interests for the small state. But the question as to whether or not China will be peaceful is a completely different question. And here, the answer is actually given in the opening pages of Henry Kissinger's book on China. And as you know, he begins the book with a long discussion of Sun Tzu. And Sun Tzu, the great Chinese strategist, uh, believed that the worst way, uh, to win a war is to win it by fighting. And the best way to win a war is to win it without fighting. So, there's no question that China will seek to expand its influence and its, you know, uh, impact, uh, on the region and the world. But the Chinese can also believe that the stupidest thing they could do is to emulate the United States and start fighting a new war every few years. And, and from the, in this is Kissinger's book, I must emphasize. Uh, Kissinger says the Chinese believe that it's the height of stupidity to keep fighting wars when if you can achieve what you want to achieve, uh, without having to fight wars. And the Chinese certainly have emerged as a great power. And, and, and by the way, out of the 193 countries in the world, uh, the vast majority of the countries in the Global South now accept China as more or less an equal power to the United States. And the, and the Chinese have achieved this without fighting a single war. And so that's, that's the remarkable thing, uh, about the Chinese. So, I have no doubt that China will try to expand its reach and influence, because that's what all great powers do. But they believe it would be stupid to do so by starting or fighting wars.
And you don't see this as a potential problem if China seeks to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, claiming more of the South China Seas, um, influence across the Taiwan Straits? You don't see that as an effort to make the Asian century, the Chinese century?
Well, I mean, I'm glad you mentioned, uh, Southeast Asia, because Southeast Asia actually has lived with China for 2,000 years. And, uh, out of the nine states in Southeast, out of the 10 states in Southeast Asia, nine have an Indic base. Indian culture, uh, has had a far greater impact on Southeast Asia than China has had. So, Southeast Asia has, is used to living with many, uh, powers, uh, as its neighbors. Uh, so, uh, Chinese influence will grow in Southeast Asia. There's absolutely no question. I mean, I mean, again, to give you a simple example, uh, in the year 2000, trade between, uh, ASEAN and China, uh, was only $40 billion. In the year 2000. By 2022, it had hit hit $975 billion, almost a trillion dollars. It was the world's largest trading relationship. Surely, with so much trade, Chinese influence is going to grow, obviously. But at the same time, Southeast Asia is also very good at hedging its bets. And so the United States, for example, has now invested more in Southeast Asia than it has in China, Japan, South Korea, India combined. Mhm. Now, that shows a, a geopolitical shrewdness of the Southeast Asians that is completely underestimated by simple-minded Westerners who see the world in black and white terms and don't understand that in Asia, the name of the game is nuance. And don't try to put people into categories. You're either pro-Chinese or anti-Chinese, or pro-American or anti-American. No, we will. The Southeast Asians will protect their interests and, and very have developed wisdom over the ages of how to handle their interests. I give you one example. The one country that understands China better than any other country, I believe, is Vietnam. Now, they've had a relationship for 2,000 years. And Vietnam, by the way, was occupied by China only for 1,000 years. And the Vietnamese have a saying that to become the leader, uh, of, um, Vietnam, you must be able to stand up to China, and you must be able to get along with China. If you cannot do both, you cannot be a leader of Vietnam. Mhm. So, that's what the Southeast Asians are doing. They will get along with China, but from time to time, they'll quietly stand up to China if they believe that their interests are being affected. So, and of course, we don't have to do this publicly. We don't have to necessarily make a big song and dance about it. But at the end of the day, you look at how much progress, uh, Southeast Asia has made. And to give you another shocking statistic, in the decade 2010 to 2020, the 10 ASEAN countries, the combined GDP is 1/5 that of the European Union. But ASEAN added more to global economic growth in the decade 2010 to 2020 than the European Union did. I mean, there's some remarkable things that are happening in Asia that go unrecognized in the West.
So, uh, as a simple-minded questioner, allow me to present to you the second half of, you know, what, um, a challenge to your position. It'd be interesting. Sure. Sure. Lively conversation, and this would relate to China's policies internally. Um, which again, some likened to internal colonialism. Um, you said in *Has China Won?* that China has never really been expansionist, um, which is news to the people of Tibet and Xinjiang and Mongolia over its history. Uh, in, in this new memoir, you say that the statement "China has carried out a genocide in Xinjiang" is quote, "factually incorrect," which you could certainly argue semantically. Um, but you, you deflect immediately to a sort of "whataboutism" argument with America's role in leading to the Cambodian genocide. Um, and I, as a reader, I sort of felt that you weren't really engaging with, uh, the human rights accusations, the human rights criticisms of China, which is so common in the West, um, crimes against humanity, the UN's own term for what's happening in Xinjiang, or the high level of dissent against the CCP, whether in Hong Kong or on the mainland. So, how, how can we take your arguments in good faith if you, um, sometimes I feel dismiss these facts as a sort of "Westerner not getting China"?
M. Well, I mean, um, you know, when you mentioned the case of Tibet, uh, as you know, the boundaries of all contemporary states today, uh, are set by the realities of the 20th century, right? And these boundaries, as you know, were accepted by the United Nations, uh, when, uh, the PRC became a member, uh, of the UN. Uh, no one challenged those boundaries. Uh, in fact, even when it was represented by the Nationalist government for many years, uh, even though they only physically controlled all of Taiwan, the maps of China showed Tibet. And, uh, and I think, you know, so if you, if you want to say, well, Tibet should be written to the Tibetans, do you want to go back and say that taxes in California should be written to, uh, the Mexicans? I mean, so, you know, the question is, sovereignty. We're talking, we're not talking about issues of sovereignty. No one is questioning that Hong Kong is part of China. No, no, no. But many, many people question it. There are, there are people, as you know, in the West. My question is about internal policies and human rights abuses. Those. Yes. Yes. Well, I would say that at the end of the day, the China has got to decide what kind of political system, uh, it's going to have, and it's got to find its own balance. And clearly, the Chinese believe, uh, that they are better off with strong, uh, central control. And the history of China shows that when China becomes, when the central government becomes weak, the country becomes divided, chaos emerges, and many Chinese people die. And there are far greater deprivations of human rights, uh, that take place when the center is weak. And, you know, Chinese, as you know, experienced that very recently in their century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949. And the Chinese also, and this I hope you will acknowledge as a fact, found that when they were weak, they were trampled on by the Western powers. And, and, you know, as at the end of the 20th century, the British and French looted and bitched, uh, the Summer Palace, like the Taliban, you know? So, I mean, these, these are historical facts you cannot take away. So, when a Westerner comes to China and says, "Why don't you loosen up? And, you know, it's okay, allow dissent, allow these things. You know, it's okay if you have a bit of chaos, don't worry, we won't take advantage." British view, the Chinese would be very stupid to trust the West. Absolutely stupid. After what happened to them from 1842 to 1949.
How would them loosening up their internal policies allow them to be taken advantage of?
Well, I mean, if, if you do have chaos in China, if once again, uh, the center becomes weak, and there's, and you know, great powers do take advantage, uh, of divisions. And so, I think, you know, the, the point at the end of the day, you know, the most important statistic that every Westerner should know is that the West makes up 12% of the world's population. In a small global village that we live in, the rest makes up 88%. The rest have been quite passive for the last 200 years of Western domination of world history. But the rest are waking up now. And the, the these countries will find their own ways and means of adjusting, uh, to the modern world, their own systems, and so on and so forth. And I think we in Southeast Asia believe that we cannot advise the Chinese on what is the best form of government for them. It's for them to decide. But it's also not up to the Chinese to tell us what our system of government should be. We choose our own form of government. You choose your own, uh, form of government, and we'll live with each other. And the same is true of India too, by the way. You know, I mean, India also is going to choose, uh, its own balance, uh, of, uh, freedom and authority, uh, in, in many of these areas. And all societies are struggling to find, uh, the right balance. And, and I think even in the West, there will be, I believe, a move away from emphasizing too much individual freedoms towards emphasizing some degree of need for national cohesion, uh, in addition to having, uh, individual freedoms. But again, every society has got to make that decision, uh, for themselves. And, and, and certainly, uh, apart from the West, you'll notice that most countries in the Global South don't go around lecturing other countries on what is good or what is bad for them.
Lecturing certainly is bad, but surely we, uh, all have the right to talk about it openly and criticize, just as we criticize our own, our own government.
Uh, well, certainly, I mean, as individuals, you can criticize. But I think it is unwise for European governments, for example, to go and lecture the Chinese government on what is good or what is bad for them. It shows that the Europeans have not woken up to realize that the era in which European governments could pass judgments on other countries is over. You know, we are, we are making a fundamental turn in history now. Fundamental turn. And it is the, the, the European governments don't seem to realize that the world will no longer accept, uh, lectures from European governments at a time when the Europeans have shown their absolute geopolitical incompetence in failing to prevent a war from taking place at their borders. You know, at the end of the day, I believe we should make this an example. Peace. Like in peace in Asia reflects geopolitical competence. We find ways and means of dealing with problems in such a way that we avoid wars. Wars reflect geopolitical incompetence. And the Europeans created all these wonderful institutions like OSCE and all that, but couldn't prevent a war. So, so I think here, this is a time when it'd be good for Western minds to show a certain degree of humility in talking to the rest of the world, instead of telling the rest of the world, "We know better than you what is good for you." Please don't do that anymore.
So, this is a great segue to my last question. Um, we, we get a lot of China books on our desk at China Books Review. Um, many, if not most of them, in the English language, are critical about the PRC's current and past policies. Um, one of the reasons I took this opportunity we got to have you on the podcast is that yours is a more counternarrative. Um, one might say even a contrarian voice in this English language space. So, do you think there is an anti-China bias in Anglophone or Western works on China? What, what do you think of the many other books, uh, that also offer a big picture view of China's vision for the future, but that all come to such a different conclusion to you about it?
Well, I, you know, I would say that most Anglophone or Anglo-Saxon, uh, commentaries on China tend to be jaundiced, uh, and don't provide a fair and balanced view. And I've, for example, I, I do believe, for example, the Economist, a lot of the time, only writes negative stories about China. And although, sometime to be fair, the, the recent cover story for the Economist shocked me when it said that China has arrived as a scientific superpower. I said, "Wow, even the Economist acknowledges this." That was quite a shock. Uh, but, uh, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, no, you don't get fair and balanced commentaries on China. And, uh, I would say that that, unfortunately, because, as you know, the book publishing industry is dominated by the West, and most of my 10 books, by the way, were published, uh, in the West. Uh, in fact, this book is published by Public Affairs, which has published five of my books from New York. So, I would say you have to move away from Anglophone commentary. And, you know, there, there are historians in, in Asia which give a different perspective, uh, on, on China. There's one, uh, who's a good friend of mine, uh, he's, I think, Asia's greatest historian, Professor Wang Gungwu. He's 94 years old. And if you look at some of his writings, he tries to describe, uh, how, uh, the role of Chinese history and its impact on how China is emerging and how what influence it has, uh, on China today. So, I think it's important, uh, for the Anglophone commentaries to make a deeper effort to understand Chinese history, and why, and why the Chinese, for example, believe very, very strongly that you've got to have a very strong central government if China is going to succeed and, and to thrive. But I'm sure even within Chinese literature, there are all kinds of hints that show that if you have too much central control, it's bad for China. Uh, and that's why even Ronald Reagan used to quote, uh, Lao Tzu when he said, "If ruling a country is like cooking a fish, better to do it lightly." And I think there is Chinese wisdom that also advocates that every Chinese government should rule China lightly. So, you've got to see these things within Chinese tradition, uh, and culture. And I, at the same time, also say, and I'm not Chinese. I'm ethnically Indian, as you know. Uh, it's up to the Chinese people, uh, to decide their, their form of government. And, you know, that, and you do know, surely, that that was something that every Chinese ruler does, that you can lose the mandate of heaven. And if the Chinese people rise against the Chinese government, nothing can prevent it.
What we have just witnessed was an exceptionally brilliant intellectual exchange, one that perfectly illustrates the great divide between the narrative of the Western mainstream elite and the perspective of an Asian insider. Throughout this confrontation, the host repeatedly raised typical Western-style questions, focusing on China's intentions and its human rights record. Professor Mahbubani, in turn, delivered a series of sharp, challenging responses. He deconstructed the moral imagination of state behavior with the cold reality that a benevolent great power is an oxymoron. He used the demographic reality of 12% versus 88% to declare that the era in which European governments could pass judgments on other countries is over. And ultimately, he attributed the prevailing negative views of China in the West to the biased reporting of the Anglo-Saxon media.
This profound dialogue leaves us with several questions to reflect on. First, the nuanced, non-black and white Asian wisdom that Mahbubani describes versus the Western position based on universal values. Which is more helpful for understanding our complex world? Second, to what extent are our common perceptions of China based on objective facts? And to what extent do they stem from the narrative framework constructed by Western elites and media? And finally, and most critically, in a world that is no longer dominated by a single party, should we continue to interrogate others with our own standards? Or should we, as Professor Mahbubani suggests, begin to learn to engage in dialogue with more humility and openness?
We are eager to hear your thoughts in the comments below. If you believe this top-tier intellectual exchange has provided valuable insight into the central conflict of our era, please like, share, and subscribe to our channel. Thank you for watching.