What Is the Meaning of Yadullah (the Hand of Allah)?

Assalamu alaykum everyone. Welcome back. I'm Jake Branatella, and I hope that for you this will be an exciting episode, an interesting one. At least for me, it surely is.

Now, what am I going to be talking about? I'm going to be talking about a fundamental issue in, and many people have seen that I have my criticisms, and sometimes harsh criticisms, against the, and their; however, they obviously have their criticisms of what we believe, what we—ef—now, of course, we believe that their criticisms are not correct, and that's why I'm here to clear up one important one. And what is that? This is the question about the ma of manna, the meaning of meaning.

And people may think that, Jake, you're being pedantic, or this is such a strange topic to discuss in front of the ley—in front of the lay people. And unfortunately, with the advent of the internet, everything is accessible. So these shubhat need to be uh refuted in public. That's the honest reality. There's a cost-benefit analysis, and I do believe that the benefits outweigh the costs, or the positives outweigh the negatives.

Now, I'm going to play a clip from someone who claims to be a hedi, but the criticism he gives. It's not so much about the person, but what he says and the fact that many, or those who criticize the, would have similar criticisms. So I'm going to bring that point up, kind of dissect it, and then I'm going to go through a critique of this position and what they have to say. Let's take a look.

We affirm the meaning of these attributes like Allah's hand in the literal sense of the word in a manner befitting his majesty; or if they were to affirm the, and they were to say it in a literal meaning, like the ascension above the throne, or settling upon the throne, or a nazul—descending—in a manner befitting the—his majesty. And so what is happening is you're taking two phrases that don't belong together, and you're smashing them together as if it's going to produce some type of real delicious fruit. It's—it's totally rotten. It's spoiled. I mean, you're saying one thing, and then you're negating it with the other part of the phrase. So when you say uh we're affirming the meaning in this literal way in a manner befitting his majesty, well, his majesty dictates that that's not what it is. Okay? So I hope that's clear. He's saying that capes or ethies are caught in a contradiction. How? Because we say that we affirm—and this is what he attributes to us—we affirm the ma. We affirm the meaning for the hand of Allah, for yadah. And we say that we affirm the literal meaning. Now, I don't really like this term literal. I think the term apparent meaning or the—the apparent meaning of the—the text is more appropriate than literal, because that could be a bit more uh confusing and would need to be hashed out more. However, he says you guys say that you affirm the literal meaning, the literal ma for yadah or these other, while at the same time you say in a manner befitting his majesty. And then he says, "But these are two phrases that can't go together. They're totally contradictory, and they're spoiled. They're rotten." Right? To try to make it seem like these can go together. That's his claim.

Now, the question we would ask is how exactly is it contradictory? We never get a clear explanation. And this is something, you know, important to point out from John Sterling. We never get a clear explanation of exactly why this is contradictory to affirm yada on its literal or apparent meaning while at the same time that it's an attribute that we understand, and it's completely befitting his majesty, subhanahu wa ta'ala. Why is this contradictory? We never get a clear explanation of that. But I will kind of do the explaining for you. What he intends is that if you affirm ye on its literal meaning, then its literal meaning is a physical hand similar to a human hand that is made up of flesh, uh, bones, blood, and it's a physical appendage. It's a limb. Right? This is what the literal meaning is. This is the hidden explanation or argument from John Sterling. And then when you say in a manner befitting his majesty, Allah subhana t's attributes could never be in such a manner as what we just described the literal meaning. So to say it's in a manner befitting his majesty, but yet affirm a limb for Allah. A limb can never be in a manner that is befitting for Allah. Therefore, you have a contradiction. That's the argument.

Now, what's the obvious way out of this contradiction is that when we saf—when we eth—say that we affirm the ma of yadah, we do not believe that it is a limb. We do not believe that it is a flesh and bones and blood—that it is a flesh, blood, and bones composition—that is a physical limb for Allah. We do not believe this. We do not say this. We do not use this terminology. So you are imputing this on us in order to derive a contradiction that doesn't exist, but only exists in your thinking or your accusations.

Now then, the next question would be—and this is where the conversation is going to go, and really the key focus of this video—Okay, Jake, I take your word for it. You're not lying to us. You don't believe that Allah subhana t's yed—ydah—is a limb that is made up of flesh, blood, and bones; okay, but then if you don't believe that, then what do you mean when you say that you affirm a mata—you affirm—and you know the meaning of yah—that's the better question to ask John Sterling, not to impute this false understanding on us that we don't actually hold. And then another question would be when we say we affirm the—of the—the apparent meaning of the attribute. What does that mean?

Now, before I get into what exactly we do affirm, I want to be clear on part of where this criticism comes from. And I'm not saying that John Sterling is explicitly doing this, but we need to get clear on terms, because as you saw in my conversation with uh brother Nordine, we should not be concerned so much with the terminology. We should be concerned with the content and trying to understand what each other is actually saying, and then see if we agree or disagree, and then explain why based on proofs from the Quran was—and the understanding of the salah of mana—for the important—and this is part of the reason why they don't understand what we actually believe many times, and there—why there's confusion—because for them, the—of theat—refers to the—the reality of the—and I'm going to put a link in the description of this video—a conversation that I had with one of Sed Fod's students about this issue, and he explicitly said that—and he used the term meaning and almost interchangeably in the discussion—such that they think that if we say that we know the mana or we know the meaning of an attribute of Allah subhana tala, then we are saying that we know the—or the ontological reality—in his fullness—we know what that is, and we fully understand that—and therefore that's problematic because we can't know what they—what Allah subhana t's essence and his attributes are in reality—in an onlogical real sense—as if we uh fully grasp exactly what they are—and so because they think—and they have that common understanding that ma means—when we say we know the mat—they think we're saying we know the—but we're not saying that—we—we are explicitly says—not only withdah but with Allah subhana t's knowledge, his—his power, etc., etc.—all of his uh—we have the same view that we do not know their—we do not know their reality. Okay, very clearly we're stating this.

Now, here's another term that is also used, because what do we say? We say that we do know the mana, but we do not know the—we do not know the k of the attribute. Now, many times the will respond and say, "But hold on a second, you're affirming a k for Allah, which just means uh the howness or sort of modality—you are affirming a k for Allah subhana t—but Allah subhana t does not have a k—does not have kia"—this is their claim. Now, here's the question: when we say—when we say that we know—or sorry—that we do not know the k or the kia for any of Allah subhanaa t's attributes—not only the disputed ones between asharis and salaf, but even Allah subhanaa ta's knowledge—when we say that we don't know the kia of those attributes, what does that mean for us? When ib uses this term, and when we more broadly say this—what we say when we—or what we mean when we say that we do not know the—the k or the kia of any of Allah subhana t's attributes—it means that we don't know their—we don't know their reality—we don't know their realities—so therefore, in actual fact, when the might say that he doesn't know the ma, therefore he does—and—and that he means he doesn't know the—we agree—we—but we just use a different term for that—we say when we don't know the kia, that means we don't know the—we don't know the reality—so then—Okay, we're clear on what the means by—is what we mean by—is—therefore, maybe there's more agreement than we originally thought. But the key issue is going to be on mana, and we will get to that in just a few moments.

So many times the will say that they don't believe that Allah subhana t has a—has a k or k. Now, we would ask—we would ask these asharis—do you believe that Allah subhana t's essence and his attributes are real—that they are real things—that they have ontological status—they are realities—they are realities—they will say, "Yes, of course we do"—and that's where there's agreement—if we affirm that they are realities, but yet we say that we don't know their exact reality—we don't have that precise knowledge of their reality—Then would you have a problem with that, Mr. Ashi? Well, no. Of course you shouldn't, because you affirm that they are reality, and you also affirm that you do not know their precise reality. Therefore, looks like when we say we affirm a k for Allah—a reality—but we say that we don't know the precise reality of what that is. There's no disagreement. When you say that you don't know the matna, you don't know the meaning. And by that you mean the—the reality—then we say we agree, at least in principle. So where exactly is the deviation then?

Well, many Asharis and the Mutalim more broadly, they have this conception of manna which derives from Aristotle. And I'm going to briefly explain this and break this down for them—when they say that mana means the reality, right—and that if we claim to know the mana, that we must give a precise definition of each of the theat—each of the attributes—okay, I'm going to explain where this comes from and why it's so problematic—for them—for them, our position also doesn't make sense—which is a common criticism—them—when we say that we know the mana but we don't know the—the attributes' reality. So then they will say, "Well, Jake, how can you guys claim that you know the mana, but you don't know the reality of the attribute?" So their assumption is to know the meaning of something, you must know its full comprehensive un—you must have a full comprehensive definition and understanding of its reality. We reject this openly.

Now, where does this come from? This comes from Aristotle, right—and I'm going to give some Arabic terminology of what is called the definition proper. So for Aristotle, in order to give the—or in order to give—you must have what's called the genus and the differentia. Now, don't worry, this is technical, but I'm going to break it down. The five categories needed for a diff—for a definition—right—are the genus, the species, differentia, property, and accident. But really, in order to obtain, you need two things. You need what's called the genus and the differentia. And this is what the mainstream—who know their—actually believe. So let's give a common example. What is al—or what is the definition for a human being? Now, for Aristotle and many who followed him in this—he said—and those who followed him said—that a human is a rational animal. So we—if we ask what is the ma—what is the definition or meaning of human being?—They would say human is a rational animal. Now, where do you get the genus and the differential? Which one are they? The genus in the definition here of human being is animal. It's the greater or larger category of which other things fall under. Humans are animals, bears are animals, lions are animals, dogs are animals, etc. So if we just said a human is an animal, it wouldn't have a way to differentiate between human beings and dogs, bears, lions, etc. So then you need, according to Aristotle and the—who followed him in this—to understand the Ma or the meaning of this—you need what's called the differentia, which is the—something that distinguishes those different animals in that genus—in that class—from other animals. So what's the difference between human as an animal and a lion as an animal? Well, humans are rational, and lions are not. At least that's what the understanding was. Therefore, you have a human being who's an animal, and he's differentiated from other—or distinguished from other animals—by the fact that we say he's rational. He's a rational animal. So the genus is animality. The uh differentia is the rationality. Okay, seems simple enough.

However, what we propose and what we safi say is that what it—what they understand al to be—the genus and differentia combination—that is neither necessary nor sufficient in order for us to know the mana. That's what our position is. So when we say we know the mana, we're not saying that we know the genus and differentia for all of Allah subhana t's attributes. No, that would be absurd. We don't claim that. Okay, we say that we do not need to know the genus and differentia to have knowledge or a conceptualization of a meaning. Okay.

Now, for example, why is that the case? Well, in the case of an animal, let's take another example—or reason why—You don't necessarily need the genus and the differentia. You could have the genus and what's called the property. Right? For example, what is a human being? I could say a human is a—an animal that has the property of being able to write—at least—whether it's actual in—or in potency—and I could say, "Well, a human being—a human being is an animal, and he also has the ability to write"—or the ability to read, let's say—as an example—now that property of reading or writing can either be held in potency—meaning the ability to read or write—or in actuality—that you actually do uh read or write in real time. Now that is enough for us to distinguish a human being from other animals, even merely with the property and not necessarily with what's called the differentia. So this proves that the differentia is not needed. The property of being able to read or write—in whether in potency or actuality—applies to all humans. Therefore, it is sufficient to distinguish between humans and other animals because they don't have that property. So therefore, I'm showing that the genus and differentia combination is not needed in order to establish the meaning or know the meaning of something. You could have the genus and a property rather than genus and differentia. So that shows how it is not—not how—or their conception of being genus and differentia is not necessary. But why is it not sufficient? I'm going to go into uh more examples of why it's not sufficient and also why it's not necessary.

So again, let's take the example of human is a rational animal. What is the head for rational and animal? Because remember what they said for any of these terms, the genus and the differentia are rational animal. The genus being animal, the differentia being rational. Now then we ask a further question. Okay, you gave us the genus and differentia for human. So if you have established al or the def—definition proper—for human. Now I ask you this question. What is the genus and differentia for rational? What is the genus and differentia for animal? So now in order to def—define those terms and have a proper understanding of human—you need to define those terms in genus and differentia terms for rational and animal. Then once you give that, then I ask what's the genus and differentiia for the two terms and that definition, and then you have an infinite regress going back and back and back and no stopping point because you said that it's an absolute requirement to have the genus and differentia for every definition in order to establish the ma or—so you wind up in an infinite regress of definitions, never getting to a stopping point which has an effect on where you started from the beginning of human, because if you don't understand or you don't have the genus differentia for rational and animal, then you can't truly understand what human means according to them, and then you go on and go on and go on and further, and then you're lost in confusion. Okay. So that you have this infinite regress problem. You also have the problem that the genus and differentia are not necessarily necessary in order to establish the ma because you can establish it with the genus and the property.

Now, if somebody says, "Oh, wait, Jake. A way out for the eshi is that well, we define human as rational animal," and when we get to that point, everybody knows what rational and animal mean. So, we don't need to give explicitly a further uh uh definition in terms of genus and differentia in order to explain what uh rational and animal mean. Or maybe they don't do it at that level. Maybe they get to the third level and then they say, "Oh, the terms that are used to define um rational and animal, whatever those two terms are, the genus and differentia, those are very clear. So we don't need to go and now define them further." So they get to a stopping point, and we just say your stopping point is arbitrary. We stopped earlier. We don't need to go and ask somebody on the street, "Hey, what is the genus and differentia or what is the mana or for a human being," in order for a human to actually conceptualize that? Imagine you went on the street with this, right? We said, "Hey," or you asked your mother or your grandmother, "Hey, do you know what the genus and differentia is of a human being?" And after you explain the terms, they're not going to immediately say—unless they've studied philosophy or studied some of these things—"Oh yeah, it's what Aristotle said. It's a rational animal." And I'm not saying that that definition is wrong or not helpful or anything. My point is human beings don't naturally think this way, right? This is for weirdos. This is for the so-called uh philosophers or mutelim who go into these things and think about them in this way, right? Or people like me, but—and not to say that I am one of those people—but it's not for the common person. But yet we wouldn't say that a common person doesn't know the meaning of human being or doesn't understand what a human being is. They can have a conceptualization—an understanding—of what a human being is without going into this genus differentia type of stuff. And so we're just saying that we understand it the same way, and we stop sooner, and we say we don't need to give you a genus and differentia for a human being in order to understand the meaning, and we don't need to give you a genus and differentia in order to understand yadah, which was—understand—and should be understood as it was by its original audience in Arabic at the time of the prophet Muhammad—peace and blessings be upon him. That's how we know what the meaning is—based upon the language and the context in which it's used in. That's how we know. We don't need this genus and differentiate stuff.

Now, here's another example. So, if you're going to go back to axiomatic um knowledge, we don't necessarily have a problem with that. We're just saying that your stopping point is arbitrary, and therefore you have no longer a critique when we say we know the meaning and it's axiomatic in a sense. Yet, we don't need to give—or fit—and we don't need to give a genus and differentia in order to establish what the mana or is. Now let me give you another example and why we say that—so that's reasons why uh this understanding of—or genus and differentia—are not necessary in order to establish what is the meaning or in order to have a conceptualization. But now I'm going to give an argument for why not only is it not necessary, but it's not sufficient—meaning with it alone is enough to establish what the—

Mana is. Why? Here's an example. What is a donkey? What is the what is al what is the definition proper of a donkey? Well, commonly it is an animal who brays. Now, if you've been around donkeys, or you've seen them, or you've seen videos of them, you would know what braying is. It's a type of noise or action or activity that a donkey makes. Everybody is familiar, or should be familiar, with a donkey braying making that noise.

Now, here's the question. If you've never seen a donkey before, and I explained to you, a donkey is an animal who brays. Now, to a person who's never seen a donkey before, never heard of a donkey before, never heard the donkey bray, would they be able to conceptualize and understand what a donkey is if I just in terms of wording said it's an animal who brays? Well, let's take a look. They would be unable to understand the term animal because they know that bears are animals. They know that dogs are animals. They know that cats are animals. And presumably they've had some contact or experience with an animal. So they say, "Okay, we understand something from it. We understand it's an animal." But if they don't know what braying is, now I can explain what braying is, right? I can try to explain what braying is. But if they've never seen a donkey and never actually heard a donkey bray, would they really be able to conceptualize and understand what braying is? No, they wouldn't. Therefore, without actually seeing or experiencing or hearing a donkey bray, they would not be able to understand, just based upon my description of a donkey, what exactly braying is and what an animal who brays actually is. Therefore, merely in terms of wording, establishing or saying what a definition the definition proper is the genus and the differentia, that's not enough. You need to have an experience of the thing in order to really understand what the animal actually is. Right? So that's the argument to establish that it's not only not necessary, it's not sufficient to really have a conceptualization of the meaning of something.

Another example would be that water is H2O. We know that water is H2O, as its um physical composition. Now when I say that water is H2O, that gives you an idea of about water even though it is not necessarily a definition proper, or so this is another example that we can know something we can know something about a substance like water when I say that water is H2O, that can give us a meaning or conceptualization of water to a certain degree even though H2O is not necessarily the genus and differentia or the definition proper, or so that's another example as to how we can know this. Now to be clear, we're not saying that al is not important at all. We're not saying that the this concept of genus and differentia is uh totally irrelevant. For example, he didn't say that al uh was not important. And this is part of his criticism of uh Greek logic or the Greek logicians. He has an entire text on this where he goes through it in more detail. I'm just trying to summarize what some of his criticisms are, and a lot of it has been taken up in western philosophy as well. He was way before his time with some of these very, very insightful criticisms.

Now even though, and some people misunderstand, even though Ibna Taymiyyah had his criticisms of Greek logic or this whole discussion that we're having about that it's neither necessary nor sufficient for conceptualization. However, he did not say that al was not important at all. Right? He merely said it's neither necessary nor sufficient for uh conceptualization. However, what he did say it it's important for is distinguishing one thing from another, or so it's it is important and it is helpful for distinguishing things from each other, but it's not absolutely necessary in order to have a ma'na or conceptualization of something. Now at the same time, after giving al, it's not only important to give the genus and differentia or definition, it's also important to list the distinctions or what makes it distinct from other things, right? Um, so you can list so many things that a human being is not, right? So it's also important when you define or try to explain what something is, also important to define or explain what it's not, to distinguish it from other things. So this is Ibn Taymiyyah's position. I think it's fairly easy to understand. It's not something that is strange that he just came up with.

Now, okay, now Jake, we've explained about ma'na and keya and al and all of these different things. Now Jake, we're still wondering when you say that you know the ma'na of what is it? Don't worry, I'm going to get back to that. But before I do that, another criticism of the Ash'aris is, well, if you say that you know know the ma'na and you say that the the ma'na or the meaning for Allah or Allah subhana wa ta'ala's knowledge or power or any of his any of his attributes, if you say that you use the same or a similar meaning for Allah's attributes and attributes in creation, then you are guilty of and you have likened Allah subhana wa ta'ala to his creation and don't you know the ayah there is nothing like Allah subhana wa ta'ala? So when you say that there is a meaning which is similar that you apply to Allah and to creation, you have likened Allah subhana wa ta'ala to his creation. Now I'm going to show that this does not follow, and I'm going to give an explanation why, but I'm also going to show that scholars themselves don't even necessarily agree with this criticism and they realized why it was problematic.

So for example, Arazi says, the famous the one of the great right uh scholars of the Med, especially the later Ash'aris, he says, "And if by anthropomorphist or one who's guilty of ta'shil you mean one who says that Allah is similar to his creation in some respects, then this does not entail disbelief or kufr because the Muslims have unanimously agreed that he is existing a thing, knowing and powerful, and animals also share in these attributes." So what is Arazi saying, and this is what we need to understand. A lot of people say to criticize others' theology in Islamic sects, "Oh, you're guilty of ta'shil," right? Uh the so-called Isha'ilis, and we don't even believe that they're Muslims, but we'll just use them for the sake of argument. They accuse the philosophers of because they say that they affirm attributes, and to affirm attributes, well if Allah has attributes and humans have attributes then that's then the philosophers will accuse the Ash'aris of when they affirm real distinct attributes from the essence and the will accuse the Mu'tazila or whatever different attributes that we disagree on, so each different group accuses each other of ta'shil, and one of their simple arguments is you have made Allah like creation. So their argument here is that if you affirm a meaning for Allah that is the same or similar as a meaning that you affirm for creation, you are guilty of ta'shil, and Arazi is saying, "No, no, no, not so fast. The anthropomorphist or the one who's guilty of ta'shil is not someone who says that Allah and his creation are similar in some respects. This does not entail kufr. This is not wrong," why? Because the example he gives is that Allah is mujidd, Allah is existence. Allah is a thing. Allah is knowing. Allah is powerful. Well, Jake is uh mujidd, is existent. Jake is a thing. Jake is knowing. Jake is powerful. So, we must affirm that. So, that can't what mean what it means that merely affirming these different aspects of uh merely affirming these attributes for Allah and creation doesn't necessitate ta'shil.

Okay. Now what about when it comes to the ma'na or the meaning? Could there be a similarity in meaning of these attributes without it implying a similarity in reality in ontology in right? Can you affirm a similarity in meaning without a real real shared ontological reality shared between two things? We Atharis say yes. And guess what? So does Arazi. He says, "As for the first possibility, namely that his existence meaning Allah subhana wa ta'ala," so he's investigating this question, what does it mean when we affirm that Allah is existent or that he possesses existence, right? What does it mean? Does it mean the same thing when we say that Jake is existent as it is when we say that Allah subhana wa ta'ala is existent? So he goes through three possibilities and tells you what's the correct one. He says, "As for the first possibility, namely that his existence is entirely different from the existence of possible or contingent beings, this is invalid." So to say that Allah subhana wa ta'ala's existence is completely different from human's existence, this is invalid according to Arazi. So if you want to say that affirming any similarity in meaning between Allah subhana wa ta'ala's existence and human beings' existence, then you would have to say that is guilty of ta'shil. You want to come out and do that, be my guest. So he says, "Namely that his existence is entirely different from the existence of possible contingent beings. This is invalid based on the previously established proofs that existence is something shared amongst existence." So it is a property or something which is ascribed to different things and it's shared and it doesn't have a completely different meaning. Okay. Okay, what about the second possibility which is that existence is shared between the necessary wajib and the possible mumkin in in the concept of being existence, yet is nevertheless not concomitant with his essence. This is the view of the majority of the philosophers, but it is in our view invalid, and if these two possibilities are invalidated then nothing remains except the third which is indicated.

Now what's the third opinion which he says he holds as well as the other? The third opinion it is that the application of the term existent or to both the necessary being and the possible being is based on a single concept, meaning the same concept or the same meaning, and that concept is an accidental attribute of the essence of the true oneing. True one meaning Allah subhana wa ta'ala exalted and transcendent is he and of his specific reality, right? This is the view chosen by us and by a great group among the scholars of. So Arazi is saying, we say Allah exists, we say human beings exists, and yet it's not that we say that the meaning of existence when we apply it to Allah and we apply it to human beings is entirely different such that we don't know the ma'na, we have no idea what the meaning is for existence when we apply it to human beings. I'm sorry, when we apply it to Allah subhana wa ta'ala. No, he's not saying that. He's saying that we do understand the meaning and it's a shared concept which he says is unical or identical between the meaning for Allah and the meaning of creation. Now just like I said, when we give an understanding or a conceptualization or a ma'na or even of a term, we have to be careful to also distinguish it to avoid ta'shil. Yes, we say that there's a similarity in meaning between when we say Allah exists and we say that human beings exist, such that we understand what we're saying; however, there's no ta'shil or ontological sharing in reality, why? Because of all of the differences, Allah Allah subhana wa ta'ala is a necessary being, he is eternal, right? He's all-powerful, etc., etc., etc., all of those things which human beings are not. We are limited, we are temporal, we have a beginning in time, we're ignorant, we're have all of these deficiencies where Allah subhana wa ta'ala has all of the perfections. So what I'm saying is there can be a similarity in meaning of what it means for Allah to exist and what it means for human beings to exist when in reality, there is no shared reality or shared properties between Allah subhana wa ta'ala's existence and our existence. They're entirely and totally different. And the same is true for yad. It's the exact same thing.

So now we get to the point. Okay, Jake, you explained about this whole idea of ma'na and keya and what the meanings are for. And maybe there's more point of agreement than we understand, but where's actually the difference? And what is al and it's neither necessary for nor sufficient for conceptualization, and you went over human nature and all of these different things. Then you went through Arazi explaining what ta'shil is and what it's not, and uh you talked about what I should have mentioned earlier earlier is called the mushtabah, which means it is a common factor or common meaning that is applied to Allah subhana wa ta'ala and to creation. The many of them today who are completely ignorant of their own say that if you affirm a mushtabah in the meaning between Allah subhana wa ta'ala and creation then you're guilty of ta'shil. I just showed you that Arazi affirms it. So you would have to declare him guilty of ta'shil, which you're not going to. So you're not consistent. And you need to understand that similarity in meaning doesn't necessarily entail ta'shil, or the ilm of that is not necessarily that there is a shared reality or ontology.

Now okay, Jake, but we're back to square one. We still want to know what is the meaning of yad. Okay, so let me explain what it is. Now after I explained when we say that we know what the ma'na or the meaning is and what we don't mean when we say that, now I'll explain what it is and hopefully this clears it up. So when we say that we know the ma'na or the meaning of yad, what we might mean by this is that yad is an eternal is an eternal attribute that subsists with Allah subhana wa ta'ala's essence. It's not something that had a beginning in time. It's not something that he didn't have eternally and then came to acquire it. It is an eternal attribute just as Allah subhana wa ta'ala's knowledge, power, etc. It's an eternal attribute that subsists with him eternally. It's not something that he acquired also. It cannot be reduced. Yad cannot be reduced to another or another attribute, which is something that I discussed also with Brother Noradin where he said, "Oh, Jake, what you're describing about yad basically seems similar to power and therefore we can reduce it to power." No, no, no, we say that yad is an eternal sifat which cannot be reduced to any other attribute, including Allah subhana wa ta'ala's power. Okay. So it's an eternal attribute that cannot be reduced to other attributes. It's its own distinct attribute. Now what else can we say about yad? We can say that part of the meaning or ma'na of yad is that it is that which grasps. It is that which Allah subhana wa ta'ala grasps things with. Grasps. And I will get into the hand motion which I went through in another video that it's not problematic to make hand gestures when speaking about the sifat of Allah subhana wa ta'ala because the Prophet sallallahu alaihi wa sallam did it himself and I'm going to show that. So it's an eternal attribute which cannot be reduced to other attributes and we know its meaning based upon the Arabic language and the context in which it's used. So yad is an eternal sifat of Allah subhana wa ta'ala by which he grasps things. Okay. And this is something that would have been very clear to the Arabs at the time. Right? They understand from yad it's a thing which grasps; there's nothing strange about that whatsoever. And then one of the key ways we know the ma'na of the different sifat or attributes is from the texts of the Quran and Sunnah. So in the Quran, the Quran says, Allah said, "O Iblis, what prevented you from prostrating to that which I created with my hands? Were you arrogant then, or were you already among the haughty?" So what is yad? It is an eternal sifat by which Allah subhana wa ta'ala grasps, by which Allah subhana wa ta'ala created Adam with his own two hands. That's what the ayah says. Now some people say, "Oh, but no, that just means with his own power. He created Adam with his power." But that wouldn't make sense because if he says he has two hands, Allah subhana wa ta'ala doesn't have two powers. So that doesn't work. Also, it wouldn't make sense of his argument where Shaitan was trying to say that he's created by fire and Adam is created by a lesser substance, at least in his mind, of clay or mud. Well, Allah subhana wa ta'ala says, "No, in a unique way, Adam was created with Allah subhana wa ta'ala's own two hands." And we know from the Quran and a hadith that there were only four things created by Allah subhana wa ta'ala's hands, including Adam. So that gives him a unique status. Okay. Now that argument wouldn't make sense if yad Allah meant power.

Okay. Now let me give another ayah to explain how why we are using the term grasp. Okay. It says in the Quran, "They have not appraised Allah with true appraisal while the earth entirely will be within his grip on the day of resurrection and the heavens will be folded in his right hand, exalted as he and high above what they associate with him." So we see very clearly that Allah subhana wa ta'ala will seize the heavens and the earth in his hand. The Prophet sallallahu alaihi wa sallam demonstrated this by clenching his hand, opening and closing it as he explained this. Now is this ta'shil, as Brother Charged and other might say, "No, because then that would be accusing the Prophet of ta'shil and being guilty of ta'shil by doing this hand motion when speaking about yad, uh rolling up things in his hand." So what is the point of doing this? It is an affirmation of yad as a distinct sifat, not something that's metaphorical and can be reduced to Allah subhana wa ta'ala's power. And it also shows that the Prophet sallallahu alaihi wa sallam is affirming the the attribute or the sifat of yad in a real sense to show that he's not making that he doesn't know the ma'na or the meaning whatsoever. He knew it and gave the analogy of his own hand of clenching. That shows that he understood some concept and had a conceptualization even if he didn't need to go into al, right? So the point of it of the demonstration is to show these are not metaphors, it's a real attribute and he's affirming it on the zahir or apparent meaning known to the Arabs at the time. Okay, it also demonstrates that the Prophet himself um understood the act being described, the clenching, right? He didn't make ta'shil of the yad as if he was not aware of the meaning. However, we must also say that this does not entail that yad is composed of flesh, blood and bones, etc. It is completely unlike human hands or the hands of creation. Similar to the example we mentioned earlier that the term existence or power can have similar meanings when applied to Allah subhana wa ta'ala and creation without that necessitating that there is a shared ontological reality or property between Allah's existence and power and the creation's existence and power. We can use similar meanings to describe these realities without falling into ta'shil or affirming that a real similarity or likeness between Allah and creation exists, while at the same time affirming that we know the ma'na and know the meaning without also saying that we know al or the keya or the okay. So I hope that helps. Let me just show a hadith here that also is in line with what I just said. So the hadith says, "I heard the messenger of Allah sallallahu alaihi wa sallam say on the pulpit, 'The compeller will seize his heavens and his earths in his hand,' and he and he clenched his hand and started to open and close it." So this is the Prophet sallallahu alaihi wa sallam opening and closing his hand to demonstrate what this is like. Then he will say, "I am the compeller. I am the king. Where are the tyrants? Where are the arrogant?" And the messenger of Allah sallallahu alaihi wa sallam was leaning to his right and his left until I could see the pulpit shaking at the bottom. And I thought that it would fall along with the messenger of Allah sallallahu alaihi wa sallam. So I just wanted to show this to show you guys that this is very clearly being used and explained and demonstrated by the Prophet sallallahu alaihi wa sallam in this way. And so you cannot accuse people of ta'shil by doing this. But also we have to be careful. But we're not going to do this with anything. We're that our demonstration should be in line with the Quran and Sunnah, not just making them up as we go along. We want to follow the example of the Prophet sallallahu alaihi wa sallam. So I hope all this is clear now. What is the ma'na of yad? It is an eternal sifat by which Allah subhana wa ta'ala grasps, by which Allah subhana wa ta'ala created Adam. There's no shared reality or in reality between Allah subhana wa ta'ala and creation, no more than there is when it comes to Allah subhana wa ta'ala having or knowing or having knowledge and Jake or human beings knowing or having knowledge. At the same time we don't know, it's neither necessary nor sufficient to know the ma'na. So when we say that we know the ma'na, please understand when we say that we know the ma'na, what we mean by that. Now I want to ask, just as I did Brother. If I say that I affirm Allah is an eternal sifat that does not have a beginning in time that is eternal and subsists with Allah subhana wa ta'ala, that it is something that he grasps things with, by which he grasps as the hadith mentions or the Quran mentions, by which he created Adam with his own two hands. If I

Explain Yadah in this manner, am I guilty? Am I wrong? Is there anything wrong with this position? Do you hold this position? I can show you that Abassi actually did hold this position, and that some earlier did hold this position as well. So you'd be criticizing them if you criticized this view.

But I think most honest people, if they understand what we just said, what we affirm and what we reject that we reject, then they should not have any argument against us, and nothing wrong really with our position. So it's an invitation for them to really seriously consider what I've presented and try to understand from our point of view; because if we can't do that, we're not going to make any progress in these dialogues and discussions.

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With that being said, guys, until next time, inshallah.