Transcription
Well, while much of the world's attention is focused on the Iran war, other conflicts are continuing, including the war against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A conflict that could shape Europe's security for decades. There's no end to the conflict in sight. And a bigger question may be what comes after. Regardless of the outcome, will Russia emerge weakened and contained or more dangerous and unpredictable? My next guest argues it's likely to be the latter. His warning is that Europe is entering a new era of confrontation with Russia with some analysts even calling it a new iron curtain. The widening band of tension stretches from the Arctic along Russia's border with NATO countries like Finland through the Baltic states down past Kellenrad and into Ukraine and the Black Sea. Borders in this region are hardening and militaries are being strengthened as both sides prepare for long-term rivalry and potential confrontation. And the concern is that while attention is elsewhere, this divide is becoming ever more entrenched and ever more dangerous. Eugene Rumor is director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Cariegi Foundation for International Peace. He authored their report entitled belligerent and belleaguered Russia after the war with Ukraine. A welcome to DW. Um in that piece you argue that Russia will come out of its war with Ukraine weaker but more dangerous. Just talk us through that.
>> Yeah. Well, it's hard to see how Russia will come out of it stronger and better off than um it was before the war. It has lost perhaps um over a million people killed and wounded. Uh untold hundreds of thousands of Russians. Some of the most skilled and enterprising Russians have left the country because they want to avoid being drafted into the Russian military. The Russian economy has been uh cut off from some of the most dynamic engines of the global economy and has been reduced to basically being a pro state. I'm exaggerating but not by much. Um and um you know Europe uh before the war really did not see Russia as a as a major existential threat uh to it. Whereas now as a result of this war uh Europe is beginning to rearm and really considers uh Russia to be uh its number one threat really an existential threat. So it's hard to see how Russia is better off as a result of this.
Okay. What you've described there, I can see we can see how Russia is weakened. Explain to us why you regard it as being more dangerous because I suppose the logical u uh assumption would be that after a debilitating conflict whichever way it ends the uh the tendency would be to look inward to rebuild. Why do you think that Russia would continue to look outward and that that Europe should fear uh this weakened adversary?
>> Well, as a result of this war, as a result of uh turning Ukraine into its um implacable adversary, uh Russia is subjected to daily attacks from uran uranian drones and missiles. Um NATO now includes uh Finland and Sweden. And the line of contact between Russia and NATO is now literally on the doorstep of what historically has been the Russian heartland. So uh if you put yourself in the shoes of Russian national security decision makers, it's not a status quo that they're prepared to tolerate. traditionally have they have looked at strategic depth sort of the territory the land between their hard land and the next biggest most powerful country in the European theater as the critical requirement for Russian security. They have now lost that strategic depth. Think about the cold war. Think about the Warso pack. Think about Barus, Ukraine. uh these countries that were effectively the buffer between Russia and NATO that is now gone and as I said before you know the Russian heartland including Moscow including countries sorry cities east of Moscow are now subjected to daily attacks. I mean, just the other night, the city of Caesar on the Vular River, sort of souththeast of Russia, uh was struck with 11 Ukrainian drones.
Um how is that sort of feeds into uh Russia feeling better off, more secure, something that is becoming a normal kind of state for Russia?
>> No, of course not. But and what's interesting about your analysis is that that that I think it's it's as you see it, it applies regardless of of of whether uh Russia wins, loses, or continues this war with Ukraine. It continues to be debilitated militarily and economically and it and the danger continues to increase whichever way this war goes.
>> Yes. Um, historically, I mean, we're returning to sort of the normal state of relations between Russia and the rest of Europe, which has been characterized by u, you know, hostility. Uh, that that's been the norm between Russia, the Soviet Union, and again the Russian Empire before that. uh and one of the major goals of uh Russian foreign policy in Europe has been the acquisition of ever more territory to acquire that margin of safety, margin of physical security.
>> Right?
>> So now that Russia has lost that margin, I'm convinced that it'll be looking for the next round to uh regain it because as I said,
>> yes,
>> I'm sorry to interrupt. except that how does a weakened, debilitated, economically struggling Russia that may or may not still be involved in a war with Ukraine, how does it have the financial and military means to start a war elsewhere in Europe?
>> Well, don't forget that it is an immensely rich country. Yes, it has been um you know it has suffered a major setback as a result of this war but it is still the biggest country uh in in in Europe. It still has the biggest military uh in Europe. It has a militarized economy which is benefiting from support from China. uh massive deliveries of equipment for Russian defense industries from China. Um and you know combination of this mindset, vast almost inexhaustible resources, a population that is basically accepting uh the war as a necessity so far at least. Um all that makes for a more dangerous and I should add also a committed leadership. All that makes for a more dangerous um insecure belligerent Russia.
>> And do you see the the the the end the the apex of that danger and belligerance? Do you actually are you actually contemplating outright war between uh Russia and Europe?
>> Well, I think a lot will depend on how Europe uh and to a large extent the United States will respond to this new situation to um uh to to Russia sort of looking for revenge. I don't see the war between Russia and Ukraine ending in a way that World War II ended or World War I ended. Uh I see it perhaps as a um you know frozen conflict or some kind of a ceasefire uh after which both sides begin to prepare for the next round. And the critical question is, you know, will Europe be ready and willing to engage in this kind of uh competition against Russia and prepare its capabilities to defend against possible future aggression against a European NATO member and continue to deter Russia as it has over the course of the entire Cold War and actually since the end of the Cold War as well.
>> But isn't that where we are now? Forgive me. Isn't that where we are now? A a European countries and NATO countries increasing their defense spending and military readiness
>> precisely because the United States has been has become unreliable and Russia has become an active threat.
>> You're absolutely correct. This is something that is underway in Europe. Uh it is unfortunate that the relationship between the United States and Russia sorry the United States and Europe is in the in in the state that it's in but that's the reality and it's an encouraging sign that Europe is waking up to this new reality. Uh but there's a lot more to be done. It's not just a question of money. It's a question of the mindset. It's a question of the populations, you know, European populations being prepared for um, you know, this new threat environment uh, that is upon us, upon Europe, uh, and really coming to terms with it.
So would it be fair then to to say that you you you see there to be a sort of shorter midterm danger zone, if I can put it that way, the time between now and when NATO countries have finally put in place the preparations, they're only just starting. Is that where Europe is is most vulnerable?
>> I think you put it well. Uh I I think you're right. Uh Europe is vulnerable. I you know I I remain convinced that um it's a relatively low chance of Russia attacking another European country such as one of its Baltic neighbors. uh but um a cannot rule it out. And I can also see that Putin who uh has a tendency to double down in the face of setbacks and defeats could actually seize this moment to show that NATO is a paper tiger's a hollow alliance and stage some kind of a provocation in one of uh Russia's Baltic neighbors.
>> Right?
>> So I do believe that we are in a dangerous moment. All of which supposes that Russia's posture towards Europe and towards NATO remains hostile. Vladimir Putin is 73 years old. He can't go on forever. So what sort of Russia do you see following him?
>> That's right. He cannot go on forever. But I and and and there will be some kind of a you know generational change if only because as you said you know a function of time. Uh that said, I do believe that these kinds of long-term drivers of Russian insecurity having to do with strategic depth, having to do with new technologies emerging and being acquired by European countries uh that have the ability to strike deep into Russia will continue to feed um the next generation of Russian leaders, Russian national security thinkers. Um I I'm I'm I'm convinced of that. That said, um I do believe that uh there's going to be, you know, some kind of a lessening of tensions perhaps called it a dant when the new generation comes in and realizes the situation that the country is in. The Russians have a word pedishka kind of a break. Uh but it does not change the long-term trajectory of adversarial relations between Russia and the Europe.
Okay, that's yeah, that's that's I think Mark Carney was saying this this week that that's crossing your fingers and hoping is not really a plan. So what's the main thing that European policy makers do you believe should now focus on?
>> They should focus on their comprehensive integrated plans for defending Europe, deterring Russia, for developing options to deter uh deal with what is likely to be Russian nuclear blackmail um and preserve as much as they can the transatlantic relationship because in the long term I do believe that the United States and Russia will resume their adversarial relationship notwithstanding the Trump administration's preference for closer relations with the Putin regime. Uh I do believe that regardless of that, Russia views the United States also as a source of existential threat. So those issues will not go away and I believe that protecting preserving the transatlantic relationship is absolutely essential.
>> All right, that gives us all plenty to get on with in the meantime. Good talking to you. Thank you for talking us through that. Uh Eugene Rumor from the Cariegi Foundation for International Peace.
>> Thanks for having me.