Transcription
Gregory Palamus, who lived in the 14th century, promoted a deep spirituality. His work is pivotal in Eastern Orthodox churches.
The following quotes are taken from his work, known as the triads, translated by Nicholas Gendel.
"Deification is energy, not God's essence. But the deification of divinized angels and men is not the super-essential essence of God, but the energy of this essence." This establishes that the essence and energies are distinct. Essence is God's nature. Energy is the medium between God and the creature.
"Deifying gift of spirit as distinct energy. The deifying gift of the spirit thus cannot be equated with the super-essential essence of God. It is the deifying energy of this divine essence, yet not the totality of this energy, even though it is indivisible in itself." Take note: the deifying energy is not equated with the essence of God and is not the totality of that energy.
This creates an aspect of God's existence that is impersonal, since whatever is not equated with God's essentially personal nature cannot itself be personal. But God is essentially and wholly personal. Since Palamus holds that the deifying energy is not to be equated with God's super-essential essence, it therefore has no personal essence. It is not a person, i.e., Father, Son, or Holy Spirit, and it is not identical with the personal divine essence. This means the deifying energy is impersonal.
But Palamus also requires the energies to be essential and uncreated constituents of God's being. Therefore, Palamus requires that the essential characteristics of God's being are impersonal. But an essentially personal God cannot have impersonal essential characteristics. That is a direct self-contradiction within the Palamite system itself.
For just as there is only one single essence without beginning, the essence of God, and the essences other than it are seen to be of a created nature, and come to be through this sole unoriginate essence, the unique maker of essences. In the same way, there is only one single providential power without beginning, namely that of God, whereas all other powers apart from it are of a created nature.
Take note, he says, there is only one single essence without beginning. Yet there are other essences that are seen to be of a created nature and come to be through this sole unoriginated essence. So, Palamus claims the divine essence is without beginning, yet also claims that other essences come to be through this sole unoriginate essence. To say "come to be" is the language of origination. Yet those essences are without beginning. This is a contradiction. You cannot have both an essence without beginning and the essences other than it come to be through this sole unoriginated essence.
But since God is entirely present in each of the divine energies, we name him from each of them, although it is clear that he transcends all of them. For given the multitude of divine energies, how could God subsist entirely in each without any division at all?
Take note, the divine energies are plural in number, each of the divine energies, and God is entirely present in each and yet he transcends all of them. If God is entirely present in each of many distinct energies, then God is entirely present in many distinct realities, energies simultaneously. This requires that the energies are identical to each other based on God being a simple single nature. But this collapses the distinction, or on the other hand, God is instantiated in multiple energies. This contradicts the divine nature of God being a single instantiation. Either way, there is a serious problem.
But even if this man considers that everything that has a beginning is created, we for our part know that while all the energies of God are uncreated, not all are without beginning.
Energy as directed towards created things. Take note, all the energies of God are uncreated. Not all are without beginning. This is logistically incoherent, since it says that all the energies of God are uncreated, necessitating the eternal. Yet of those same energies, some have a beginning, not eternal. Not all are without beginning. This is a contradiction.
The super-essential essence of God is thus not to be identified with the energies, even with those without beginning, from which it follows that it is not only transcendent to any energy whatsoever, but that it transcends them to an infinite degree and an infinite number of times, as the divine Maximus says.
Take note, the essence of God is not to be identified with his energies. Therefore, his essence is not equal to his eternal energies, those without beginning. Palamus holds that the essence is not identical to the energies. This means that God's being consists of distinct, non-identical characteristics. This undermines the divine simplicity of God, in that God is a single thing. He is a single essence, not composed of parts. His essence, existence, and attributes are one identical, uncomposed, eternal, self-existent reality. But with Palamus, there is the risk of dividing God into parts, with energies that are created and energies that are not created, both proceeding from God's essence. This is incoherent.
But the divine essence that transcends all names also surpasses energy to the extent that the subject of an action surpasses its object.
Take note, the previous quote supports a distinction of energies from the essence via subject and object wording. The subject is one thing, and the object is another thing. But if the divine essence is the subject and the energies are the object of God's work/action, then the energies are the product of the divine essence's activity and distinct from it. That makes the energies the results or effects of the essence, which places them on the receiving end of divine action rather than being divine themselves. This subject-object relationship within God's own being introduces real composition by stating that the essence, the subject, is acting upon something other than itself, the object, within the divine essence that is not divine simplicity and infers that God is made of parts. A single unified essence, God, cannot contain within his own being a subject acting upon a distinct object. This implies a composition of parts within God and cannot be true, since God is one essence.
Summary:
One, the deifying energy is not the essence.
Two, the deifying energy is neither the essence nor any person, making it an impersonal characteristic of an essentially personal God.
Three, Palamus claims the essence is without beginning, yet other essences come to be through it. This introduces a contradiction.
Four, God is entirely present in each distinct energy. This either collapses distinctions or results in multiple instantiations. Both contradict divine simplicity.
Five, all energies are uncreated, yet some have a beginning. Uncreated and having a beginning are mutually exclusive.
Six, essence and energies are non-identical, dividing God into distinct parts. This directly contradicts divine simplicity.
Seven, the essence acting upon the energies as subject upon object introduces composition. This contradicts divine simplicity.
Conclusion:
Palamus's essence-energies distinction causes problems. It creates an uneasy relationship between God's energies and God's essence. The deifying energy is not the essence and not any person. This makes the energies impersonal parts of God's essence. The subject-object distinction further introduces internal composition into God's being. The energies are claimed to be uncreated, yet some have a beginning. This is contradictory, since uncreated and having a beginning are mutually exclusive. The essence is without beginning, yet other essences come to be through it—a contradiction. God is entirely present in each distinct energy simultaneously, either collapsing their distinctions or requiring multiple instantiations of God, both of which contradict divine unity. Clearly, these are contradictions in Palamite theology. The essence-energies distinction cannot be developed consistently without violating divine simplicity, divine unity, or divine personhood. Palamas's system strains against biblical theology and philosophical coherence by offering non-biblically grounded assumptions with logical inconsistencies. Therefore, it is best to reject this essence-energies distinction proposed by Palamus and accepted by the Eastern Orthodoxy Church, since it creates a multitude of problems.