Transcription
Considered Asia's premier security and defense summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue begins this weekend in Singapore at a time of extreme geopolitical instability. Asian countries have been deeply impacted by the war in the Middle East, with lower energy supplies and rising energy costs putting economies under pressure. The headliner to kick off the summit will be US Defense Secretary Pete Hegv. Countries such as Japan and the Philippines, for example, will likely pay careful attention to anything he might say about Taiwan.
Now, notably, this is the second year in a row that China has not sent senior officials to the Shangri-La Dialogue. That's being interpreted by some analysts as a sort of "we don't need you, we're too big shot to engage with the rest of the region" attitude. After all, Chinese leader Xi Jinping just had his bilateral with US President Donald Trump in Beijing. Although that meeting had a lot of pomp and ceremony, it left more questions than answers. So, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, countries will be meeting in groups and on the sidelines with the aim of getting more clarity for each of their specific security and economic needs.
With so many things to consider, I'm glad to have DW's chief international editor, Richard Walker, and our Asia-Pacific Bureau Chief, Gayorg Matis, joining us from the summit venue in Singapore. Welcome to you both.
>> I'll start with a question for Richard. Uh, Richard, how would you interpret China's absence at the summit for a second year in a row? As I mentioned, do you buy that analysis from some that it's some kind of Beijing power move?
>> You know, Melissa, there are so many theories into why this no-show is happening. And you know, we've been talking to a bunch of people here. If you just take a quick look at where we are, we're like, both of us, Gayorg. You spot in the background there. Actually, you could see Gayorg kind of near that pillar over there. Hi, Gayorg. Good. Hello. Thought we would set up in different, different kind of different angles of the lobby here so you get a real sense of like, this the real kind of hubbub going on in this fancy hotel in Singapore, which has been a venue for this, uh, for the last 23 years, I think. And, um, yeah, it's always been a tradition that the Chinese would send their their deputy, their defense minister, pretty much always. It's been a long tradition, that's for sure. And yeah, now two years in a row, um, they have not been doing that, and a lot of speculation going on. I think this is one of the main sort of items of chatting here about why that is, and there are different theories. There's like, you suggested, the sort of power moves theory, uh, that, you know, we don't need this anymore. And also maybe sort of thinking, well, this is a, this is a conference that's put on by a British think tank in Singapore. Uh, whereas China is really the big country in this region. Why shouldn't China be the host of, of, um, of the premier security event? And they do have their own floor on which they've been kind of, um, trying to ramp up over the last few years. So that's one theory. Another theory is that the Chinese obviously, they've just had that big summit between Trump and Xi Jinping. There's talk of getting kind of military-to-military dialogue sort of back into action, you know, like more dialogue between the two military leaders, which would be seen as a good thing. But that the Chinese don't want to go fully commit to that until they see whether Trump is going to put a hold on arms sales to Taiwan. Something that the Chinese would love him to do. So that's another theory. Another theory is that all these purges have been going on in the Chinese military. That Dong Jun, the Chinese defense minister, might be hyper-cautious at the moment, not necessarily wanting to put himself out there too much, worried that he might be the next, um, target of a purge. There's the opposite theory that actually he's being strengthened. So that, that's the thing with the Chinese system. You know, this very well, is that it is totally opaque. We're all left to speculate on the outside, and there's a lot of informed speculation going on here, but seriously, it seems to be most people just say to me, I don't know.
>> Yeah. It's like reading tea leaves. Now, Gayorg, can you tell us a little bit about how other attendees are reacting to China's absence, particularly countries and representatives, uh, from Southeast Asia?
>> I think basically you have two opinions here. One, one is based on the fact that China clearly is, as Richard has pointed out, it is the biggest player here. Uh, not just when it comes to the economic influence, the impact, but also when it comes to defense. Everybody is looking at their new drone defense technology, their naval progress they have made. Uh, there are underwater drones. So, so when it comes to the military aspects, clearly China is the elephant in the room, but absent. And so that leaves a vacuum, and that leaves some space for other topics. And there you have the other part of Southeast Asian countries who say, "Look, we have enough to talk about. We don't want to be drawn fully, this summit to be fully drawn into a China-America power rivalry and all the issues that are related to it." Uh, like the issue of Taiwan. But we also have a lot of issues here. And so, for instance, you have, uh, Thailand and Cambodia, um, still in a cold border conflict, I would say. And now Thailand has acquired drones, which could mean that the conflict, if used in this conflict, uh, would move, um, the fighting lines. Then you have Cambodia in there where cybercrime and the scam centers are a big issue. That is a big concern for the entire region. You have neighboring Myanmar that is in a civil war still, and that has not been resolved. The latest ASEAN summit, once again, couldn't provide any solution to that long-lasting civil war here. So there's a whole host of issues. Last but not least, the economic aspects, as you have pointed out, uh, with the Strait of Hormuz being closed. So a lot to talk about, um, even though the Chinese are not here.
>> Absolutely. And even though Gayorg, you've made the excellent point that, uh, the bilateral between the US and China is not necessarily the only thing, uh, that is of concern to many countries. Uh, of course, though, uh, just to bring it back to that issue, that meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, that happened, uh, was not very long ago. And I, I wonder, is there a feeling then, it feels like, um, this summit, whatever happens, is an afterthought. And yet, we know that, uh, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegv is coming. So it seems as if the United States still wants to show that, hey, we haven't forgotten about our pivot to Asia. Question for Richard to answer.
>> Yeah, I mean, Pete Hegv says, "Yeah, he will be here." And I think there's a lot of curiosity. That's the other big kind of topic of conversation, I would say, among people here, waiting for his speech early Saturday morning. That's the way it usually goes. Early Saturday morning is the US Defense Secretary. Early Sunday morning, usually, uh, the Chinese counterpart. Um, but yeah, Hegv, obviously, is the one in the limelight this time. And I think what's really interesting is to think about, okay, what kind of a speech is he gonna make? Yeah. So last year, this was his debut speech at this forum, and he came, and I was just going through the transcripts and re-watching his speech earlier, and he used the term "Communist China" four times in that speech. He talks of, it's kind of a pretty, sort of, yeah, slightly aggressive kind of terminology, you know, referring to Communist China aggression, say, you know, talking openly about, uh, the risk of China, um, you know, mounting an invasion of Taiwan, and while stressing that the United States, and you hear this from the US, from Trump as well, that they don't want a conflict with China, but stressing that they want to be ready for it, and they want to deter it, and if necessary, they will go in for that. Okay, so that was last year, so pretty fire-breathing, you know, Communist China. This year? Well, Donald Trump's just been in Beijing, and he's been schmoozing pretty intensely with Xi Jinping, coming away saying, "We're going to have a great relationship," talking up business deals, um, and starting to kind of adopt Chinese talking points about Taiwan, for instance, you know, suggesting that the current leadership in Taiwan wants to declare independence, that it's trying to provoke a war, kind of very much taking on Chinese narratives about Taiwan, raising a lot of questions in Taiwan and in the region about whether Trump is at some point just going to ditch Taiwan and think, "Okay, um, Trump would not fight for Taiwan if China mounted some sort of attack." So that's just happened a couple of weeks ago. So what is Hegv? What version of the Trump administration are we going to get in Hegv's speech? Are we going to get the fire-breathing Communist China version, or are we going to get something that's much more in tune with, uh, what the big man Donald Trump has been saying? So, I think there's, yeah, there's a lot of curiosity about that. So, we're going to be obviously covering that on DW News. That's going to be, um, yeah, 8:30 a.m. local time in Singapore, Saturday morning. Yeah. So, yeah, let's see. Nobody knows.
>> Well, Richard, um, you know, in all of this, of course, I think it was Gayorg who also mentioned that there's the context of the war in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which is a big concern for a lot of Asian, uh, economies. Um, and with Hegv coming, I, I was curious about if you could talk, if both of you could talk a little bit about this American pivot to Asia. What's the feeling? It, it's symbolic, important that Hegv is coming and the Chinese aren't there. Um, but on the other hand, one wonders, um, you know, there isn't a coherent US foreign policy on the matter. So, uh, would they even, would it, does it even matter if there is some attention being paid to Asia by the United States when there's no clear strategy? Why don't I start with Gayorg and then, uh, pick up, uh, on Richard's thoughts on that?
>> Gayorg?
>> I think when it comes to the promises of the United States,
>> Yeah. M.
>> Well, I, I think when it comes to the, to the Indo-Pacific strategy that was long announced by the United States, it's still, you have all of Southeast Asia basically waiting, uh, for for this to happen, for some concrete actions to take place. And, uh, this is also true, I would say, uh, at this meeting here. Any presence of an American representative, in fact, any presence of Western, um, politicians here is highly appreciated, is seen as a sign that one is serious about this part of the world, a part of the world that economically, and I think there's a real self-awareness here, is becoming more and more important as, uh, in the backyard of China, as the economies here being strong and very vibrant. Uh, so, and strategically becoming more and more important. We lately had this case of a supposedly an underwater Chinese drone found in Indonesian waters, in a waterway that is the only safe waterway deep enough for Australian submarines to cross through into the South China Sea. So all of these aspects are becoming more and more clear, and the countries here are quite aware of that, and so they're waiting for, um, clear action, uh, when it comes to deterrence, when it comes to more partnerships, uh, when it comes to economic deals from the United States.
>> So Gayorg saying there that there is an interest in American, uh, engagement, sustained engagement in the region. Richard, do you believe this pivot to Asia, um, is going to move forward, or has it really, has the United States really taken its eye off the ball once again, uh, because of things in the Middle East?
>> Okay. Well, well, let me, I got to refer back to Hegv's speech from last year again, because there's a quote that I found in there which is kind of pretty amazing when you think about it, um, from where we stand now. So this was, so this was exactly a year ago. He said, "For a generation, the United States ignored this region," i.e., Asia Pacific. "We became distracted by open-ended wars and regime change. The costly diversions lacked clearly defined goals and were not tied to vital and core American interests." I mean, obviously, I mean, he was referring to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But since then, um, the United States has obviously got stuck in this war in Iran that it doesn't really quite know how to end. So I think, and this is having severe, as Gayorg have been talking about, severe knock-on effects in this region, um, you know, driving fuel shortages, driving inflation, you know, potentially tipping many countries into a recession. So I think there will be a lot of question marks about whether the United States is serious about this, this, you know, the pivot to Asia term that, you know, dates back to Obama, like long predates, uh, Trump. The Americans, you know, that will say in their defense, well, look at what we do in practice, though. They recently did this very big military exercise with the Philippines. For all of the skepticism about Taiwan at the end of last year, Trump did approve the largest arms, uh, deal ever with Taiwan. So, you know, the Americans will say, well, look at our actions, not just at words. But still, you know, people look at actions in the Middle East. They look at the war with Iran that has heavily distracted the US. It doesn't have a solution to that yet. It has used an awful lot of weapons in that conflict. So yeah, this, the questions certainly persist. And, um, as I'm sure Gayorg could tell us, also it's been very interesting knock-on effects also to approval ratings of the United States versus China in this region. You're starting to see opinion polls go. Tell us more on that, but like, opinion polls are really moving in China's favor, right?
>> I'm going to get to Gayorg next, but I want a quick follow-up from, uh, Richard. Uh, can you talk a little bit about the Quad? Because there was that meeting, another attempt at the, uh, the Asia pivot from the United States, the Quad meeting of four countries, Australia, India, and Japan, and the United States. How did that go? How, what's your interpretation of that?
>> Yeah, I mean, so that's being taken. So that, yeah, there's Quad meetings. So that's these four countries: India, United States, Japan, Australia. Um, you had Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, was in India for that. This visit to India was seen as a major sort of trying to kind of patch-up exercise with the Indians, who were very disappointed in the Trump administration for getting so cozy with Pakistan over the last year. Um, and yeah, then they had that meeting of the Quad. Um, Rubio also clearly, you know, attempting some sort of diplomatic overtures in the direction of these countries, which are seen as, you know, at least the other two of them, Japan and Australia, very close US allies. Um, but what we haven't seen yet is any signal that Trump will actually go ahead with, um, Quad summits, you know, on the leaders' level. That didn't happen last year. Will it happen this year? Open question, not for sure. Um, and yeah, I think overall, the, the very obvious impression that most countries in the world have at the moment is that it's not Rubio that matters in US foreign policy. It's also not what Hegv says matters. It's Trump who matters. Yeah. So, you know, what is the direction that Trump is setting? And Trump's direction is certainly not really interested in multilateralism. At most, it's interested in bilateral, um, rep, bilateral relationships, and he's quite happy to tear those up if things, you know, don't seem to be making him happy, as with the case of India the last few months.
>> Yeah, definitely American standing has changed a fair bit in Asia. So Gayorg, I will go to you and ask you about those poll numbers about how nations across the region are now viewing China in more friendly terms, it seems. Can you talk a little bit about that? And also, um, I'm a little curious whether any of that is tied to the economic pain being felt throughout the region as a result of the war in the Middle East? Our perception that, uh, China is a more reliable economic partner at this moment in time.
>> Yeah. Well, there are, I think the polls that Richard is referring to is mainly polls from, from Indonesia, where people have been asked, you know, what are the role model economies they've been looking at, and so far, that was always Japan, and now it has, uh, changed towards the Chinese economic model. Now, when people were asked how to, to what extent they are concerned about foreign influences, uh, from China or from the United States, now the concern is much more from the United States. And I think that can, in the case of Indonesia, but also in most of Southeast Asia, can certainly, in recent months, be linked to the Strait of Hormuz. You have there a situation that is worldwide of concern, but the consequences, the economic consequences, are most felt in Southeast Asia and in East Asia. Uh, not just because of the fuel prices, but also because plastic, the raw materials to make plastics, um, come from raw oil. And we might even see a crisis in terms of fertilizers that are coming through the Strait of Hormuz. And so, if you look at the countries, if you look at Thailand, that predominantly, uh, takes its, um, fossil fuels from Iran, they are now having a major energy crisis. They have asked for air conditioning in public offices to be shut off. They've asked people to restrict their travels. They've asked public servants to stay one day in home office in order to save energy. The Philippines have called out a public energy crisis. Cambodia, Laos are struggling with the prices. And then there you have the case of Indonesia, which is at the moment, on the surface, if you look at it, if you look at the, um, gas stations, looks still fine for the public fuel because it's heavily subsidized. And here's a big problem for Indonesia. It's not only that the oil prices have gone up, so those subsidies have become more expensive. But it is also that the, the rupiah, the local currency, is not staving and has lost in value against the dollar. And so it's becoming even more expensive to subsidize the fuel. And, uh, it'll be a question of how many months more the Indonesian government can keep the fuel at the same price until they have to pass down the prices to consumers, and that will certainly not go down very well. Yeah, it's very clear that the economic issue has clearly been entwined, uh, with security issues. Um, Gayorg, I'm a little curious, um, after, uh, we, we talk, both of you guys will be rushing around trying to get gossip, chasing down, um, representatives from various countries. What are you going to try to find out about some of the goals of, of, uh, particular countries? I'd love to hear a little bit about your, your plans, and because there's plenty of people I see behind you. Uh, Gayorg, over to you, and then to Richard.
>> Well, I tell you what, normally, friend, I come from Jakarta. I fly and I take the airplane straight into Changi Airport. Well, this time I flew to Batam, which is on the opposite side of the Singapore Strait, and crossed with a boat via the Malacca Strait, one of the key choke points. Um, new, the new discovered, we can always say, geoeconomic choke points, because one Indonesian representative said to me, "Look, I didn't know we're so powerful. If anyone would confront us, this is a big deterrence. If we would start making controls," as one minister suggested, "one could even ask for money for ships passing," and then retreated that comment quickly, because it, any disruption to these choke points where a hundred thousand ships per year are passing through, it's a, it's like a highway for ships. Um, would cause have major effects. So I crossed that shipping route, um, to to get a feel and want to talk to people here about it. The other topic I have is like I mentioned, the drones that Thailand has acquired that could change that conflict with Cambodia. And another drone type is the underwater drone that has been discovered in Indonesia. Potentially a Chinese underwater drone. There's a whole idea of mapping, uh, underwater, a whole system of mapping this area underwater. Also, Indonesia has acquired lately a ship that has been worked on in Germany and given by Germany the highest technology to scan underwater for fossil fuels, for natural resources, but also to map the ground. And that has clearly strategic interests. So, um, a lot of new topics, uh, here. No, not no longer just border quarrels or, um, or the old power rivalry between the United States and China.
>> And Richard, who are you going to try to chase down? Any particular representative of a country? Um, and I can't help but, uh, we've managed to not talk about Taiwan too much. So let's get to that. Is there even an informal Taiwanese delegation that you're going to try to, uh, connect with, Richard?
>> Yeah, you put the words in my mouth, Melissa. I was going to mention Taiwan. So, so yeah, so Taiwan, as is usual with these big international conferences, Munich Security Conference is the same, don't have an official delegation, you know. And it's often extremely striking because a lot of the current speculation about, you know, what could be the next major crisis in international affairs is about something related to Taiwan, where the Chinese may attempt a blockade or a quarantine or even an invasion at some point in the next few years. Um, and the Taiwanese themselves are not at the table. They do not have a voice. But there is a small delegation that's on the unofficial level. So people are not going to be speaking at panels, and they don't have government positions, but for instance, you know, people who are, you know, previously in politics and so on. So we're going to be talking to them, certainly. And I think I'm going to be talking to a lot of other people here also about Taiwan, because the signals that came out from that recent meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, we've been talking about a lot on DW News also, the signals that Donald Trump sent out into news after, uh, that summit, indicating, as we just mentioned earlier, he's kind of beginning to take on, uh, Chinese narratives about Taiwan. What does that mean for the Taiwanese? How are they really thinking about it? They're trying to put a brave face on it publicly at the moment and trying to sort of say nothing has really changed in practice. But what is it meaning for them in terms of the kind of, you know, the psychological factor? And what does that mean for confidence among other countries in the region, particularly US allies, that think, well, if the US is beginning to question its commitments to Taiwan, will it also question its commitments to Japan, to the Philippines, to Australia, and other countries in the region that are really heavily dependent on, uh, on the US? And I think there's another level that's quite interesting. Even for the countries that are not necessarily aligned completely with China or completely with the United States, a lot of countries here try to kind of stay kind of in the middle and not have to pick sides. You know, previously they were worried about the US and China going at it and landing in a war. And the US and China typically would come here and shout at each other, and everyone else would think, "Oh god, guys, can you work it out?" Now, if, you know, if Donald Trump is now currently trying to tip things in the opposite direction, he's talking about getting friendly with Xi Jinping, maybe, you know, starting to make deals over other countries' heads. Well, what does that mean for countries in the region? They don't, don't necessarily want that either. So what is the kind of optimal level of conflict between the two big powers for this region? I think that's a vibe that I want to kind of get a sense for while I'm here.
>> And I think this is a good opportunity just to pull up a map very quickly that we have prepared, which shows the First Island Chain, this thing that you, this term that people might have heard about, which paints the security picture, because it's not just a US-China issue. You can see this map, you can see that Japan is impacted, the Philippines, and a whole bunch of other countries in Southeast Asia in terms of that security chain. If, if China were to take over or in some way be able to impact Taiwan, it changes shipping lanes and all kinds of other issues in that region, which is why it's not just the bilateral that is, uh, important here. Now, um, thanks to both of you guys. I want to ask if you have final thoughts. Uh, uh, Gayorg, first, and then Richard.
>> I think one really interesting aspect in these days, uh, in a conference like this one, is this that the definition of security. And I think it has radically changed in recent years, particularly with the discovery that, uh, geoeconomic choke points can really become an issue when it comes to defense politics. Then you have the technological development. You have drones, uh, in the air, weaponized drones, underwater drones, mapping. All of these issues have really redefined, uh, what security used to be about, but about border conflicts and about how borders are run. And so that will be something that is really interesting to see. If you take again the example of Thailand and Cambodia, for instance, uh, the border row was so far only on land. Now Thailand has canceled a key MOU. So the question about the sea, the Gulf of Thailand, where they had an MOU with Cambodia that they agreed they will deal with natural resources in that area mutually. Now that is up in the air again. And those are the topics, I think, how the understanding of security has radically changed, and it'll be interesting to talk to delegates how they feel about it here.
>> Richard, your final thought.
>> Yeah, maybe I, I kind of have this feeling of, it's one of those, everything is connected moments. Yeah. That, that at the moment, we have the United States in this, uh, war with Iran that has created this crisis over access to energy. It's having this ripple effect almost anywhere you go. If you talk to people in Germany, what are they worried about? They're worried about inflation. You know, petrol is getting too expensive at the pumps. I was in Morocco recently talking to people there. What are they worried about? Everything has got too expensive. You come here to this region, as we've just been hearing from Gayorg, um, it's even another level, you know, it's even the level that, you know, governments are saying to their ministers, you can't travel. Um, all of this coming from one conflict, which Donald Trump evidently hoped would be over with very soon. Um, we had the same kind of feeling in the early stages of the Ukraine war. And the more these kind of, you know, conflicts bubble up, the more you have that interconnectedness feeling. But, but yeah, the more you have a real concern that the world is destabilizing to a point that is getting too much for ordinary people.
>> Well, there you have it. DW's chief international editor, Richard Walker, and Asia-Pacific Bureau Chief Gayorg Matis. Thank you to you both. Go chase and doors, stop your sources.
>> And that is all for now from DW. We'll be covering the Shangri-La Dialogue throughout this weekend. Keep an eye on our social media platforms, on YouTube, and elsewhere. I'm Melissa Chan. Thanks for joining us, and until next time.