Transcription
Welcome back. Today we are joined by Professor John Merchimer to discuss, um, a great speech you gave recently at the EU Parliament about the bleak future of, uh, Europe. Uh, so thank you very much for coming back on.
My pleasure as always, Glenn.
So, um, again, you you made your way to Europe to explain why we do not have a good future waiting ahead of us. Uh, what are the sources though from your perspective toward, uh, yeah, for this, uh, yeah, dark future awaiting us?
Well, I talked mainly about the, um, geopolitical environment. Uh, I could have talked about demographics and what, uh, the consequences are of Europeans not making many babies for the future, uh, because I think that, uh, is going to create all sorts of problems moving forward. But I didn't talk about that at all. I talked about geopolitics. And my argument is that Europe is in deep trouble, uh, for two reasons. Uh, and they both have to do with the fact that European stability is largely a function of the presence of a substantial US military force in Europe. Uh, the United States serves as a pacifier in Europe and really, uh, uh, it's NATO that matters here. And when we talk about NATO, we're talking about a US-dominated alliance. Uh, it's very important to understand that European elites for a long, long time have understood that it's important to keep NATO intact, which is another way of saying it's important to keep the United States deeply engaged in Europe because we serve as the pacifier. We keep the Europeans from fighting among themselves. We solve the major collective action problems that the Europeans face. And by the way, Glenn, when the Cold War ended, one of the principal reasons that the United States and its West European allies pursued NATO expansion is that they wanted to put the American security umbrella over the heads of the East Europeans as well as the West Europeans and turn Europe into one giant zone of peace. So my starting point here is that you cannot underestimate the importance for the Europeans and for European stability of keeping the United States deeply engaged in Europe.
Now, what I said in the speech is that there are two forces that are acting against keeping the United States in Europe. The first is that there has been a deep change in the distribution of power in the international system. Uh, as we all remember during the 1990s and roughly the first 20 years of this century, uh, we lived in a unipolar world, and in that unipolar world, the United States was able to easily maintain large-scale forces in Europe. But then with the coming of multipolarity, I would argue around 2017 and especially with the rise of China, uh, the United States faced a peer competitor, and that put great pressure on the United States to pivot to Asia, to use Hillary Clinton's famous phrase from 2011. But if you pivot to someplace, you pivot away from another place. And we're going to pivot to Asia because of this global distribution of power that has emerged in recent years. But at the same time, there are powerful forces pushing us to pivot away from Europe. Uh, we don't want to expend precious resources in Europe because we don't face a peer competitor in Europe. Russia is not a peer competitor. China is the peer competitor, and therefore there's a powerful structural imperative for us, the United States, uh, to shift resources out of Europe and to East Asia. And that cuts against the need for a, um, or let me put it differently, that cuts against the likelihood that the American pacifier will remain in Europe. So that's the first sort of force that's working against us staying in Europe in a significant way.
The second force is the Ukraine war. And the fact is that, uh, to keep, uh, the United States and Europe, it was very important that Europe and the United States have good relations and that they be able to work together closely, uh, on all sorts of diplomatic and political, military, and even economic issues. But the Ukraine war has caused huge problems on that front. And as we can see in the recent negotiations, uh, the Europeans are battling against the United States on how to deal with Ukraine. The Trump administration wants to end the war in Ukraine, and Trump, uh, and company want to pivot to Asia. They want to deal with, uh, the China threat in East Asia. They don't want to stay in Europe, uh, in the large numbers that we've had there, uh, since, you know, the end of, uh, World War II. They want to pivot. And, uh, uh, the bad relations that have developed between the United States on one side and the Europeans on the other, uh, has angered the Trump administration, obviously, and has given it an added incentive to be done with the Europeans, just to wash our hands of Europe. So you have these twin forces at play. One is the change in the global distribution of power that gives us a powerful incentive to leave Europe and move to Asia. And then number two, as a result of the Ukraine war, a deterioration in relations, political relations, or diplomatic relations between the United States, um, and Europe, which, uh, gives us further incentive to leave Europe and let Europe provide for its own security. And my argument is that this is not in Europe's interest.
And then the final point I'll make to you, and we can talk more about this, is that the Europeans and the Americans and the Ukrainians are never going to reach a meaningful peace agreement with Ukraine. This war is going to be settled on the battlefield. You're going to end up with a frozen conflict, and you're going to have poisonous relations between Europe, uh, and Russia for the foreseeable future. And those poisonous relations will obviously create a situation where there is lots of instability in Europe. So the future for Europe looks quite bleak at the geopolitical level.
I very much agree that, um, yeah, European security has been organized around, um, the United States being on the continent. This is the main pillar of European security, which is why it's also become the, it seems, the main strategy in Ukraine, that is, uh, for the Europeans, any deal or any strategy entails how do we pull the Americans deeper into this war? Because the assumption is, if we can only get commitment, that is the intent of America to stay in this war, then somehow this will lead to victory because it has infinite resources and it, uh, has all the capabilities. This, this is seems to be the assumption. But, uh, but we also end up in a strange narrative though, because we have to say that the Russians try to convince the Americans that Russians are a strategic, uh, adversary of the United States. So we come up with all these stories of drones everywhere and, uh, yeah, well, the, the traditional threat inflation. Um, but it's not very convincing, I guess, because Russia is not the Soviet Union. But at the same time, we also have to tell the Americans if they just commit the resources, then they would win because Russia's weak. So we have this incompatible position where Russia should be feared, but also it's hopelessly weak. So, um, but, uh, how, what should Europe do then, in your opinion, or what is its options? Because I very much agree that, uh, the, the benefit of having the US in Europe has always been that it functions as the pacifier. Makes it easier to work together in Europe, to harmonize these very different countries, prevent us from turning on each other. Also, of course, the US delivers, uh, cheap security. Uh, it used to give very favorable trade agreements. Um, you know, those who are against it would always point to the fact that, uh, we become too dependent on external rival to keep the alliance going. But whether or not the US in Europe is a good thing or a bad thing, it seems to be besides the point that is the era, as you said, is coming to an end. The US has relatively less power and its strategic interests and focus is shifting. So what is it that Europe can actually do at this point in time? Uh, you know, if we come to terms with reality, which is that in a multipolar world, America will have other things to do with its, uh, more scarce resources.
Well, I think that if you're playing Europe's hand, uh, you have two goals here. Number one is to shut down the war with Russia and do everything you can to avoid having, having poisonous relations moving forward. I mean, just leave the United States aside for a moment. If you think about relations between Russia and Europe today and what they're likely to look like moving forward, it's hard to see anything but poisonous relations. The Russians are going to have very powerful incentives to cause trouble in Europe. Um, and the Europeans, given the present situation and the likely future that they are facing, are going to have powerful incentives to cause trouble, uh, for the Russians, uh, especially in, uh, those areas of eastern Ukraine that the Russians have annexed. So you're going to have this situation where the Russians and the Europeans are going to be trying to cause all sorts of trouble for each other. The Russians, for example, will do everything they can to sow discord among, uh, European countries. They'll do everything they can to sow discord inside particular European countries. Uh, they'll do everything they can to sow discord in transatlantic relations. Uh, and given what a complicated political entity Europe is, there'll be plenty of opportunities for the Russians to cause trouble. And again, at the same time, the Europeans will do be doing all sorts of things to cause trouble for the Russians. Uh, and they'll be working with the Ukrainians who will be doing all sorts of things to cause trouble for the Russians. And then on top of this, as you and I have talked about before, there are all these flash points, uh, in Europe, uh, where you could actually get, uh, a shooting war between a European country or a few European countries and Russia. Uh, if you think about the Arctic, the Baltic, Leningrad, Belarus, Moldova, uh, and the Black Sea, uh, not to mention the war, uh, in Ukraine restarting once it becomes a frozen conflict. I mean, that's always a possibility. So there are a lot of flash points here, um, that are sort of, um, situated in this poisonous geopolitical context that I think are very worrisome. So what I'm saying to you, Glenn, is I think from a European point of view, the Europeans have a vested interest in fundamentally altering their relationship with Russia. Uh, is that possible at this point in time? The answer is no. And that's why the future is so bleak on that dimension.
Then there's the sort of second big issue, which is how Europe deals with the United States. And as you and I have just talked about, it's in Europe's interest to keep, uh, the Americans deeply involved, uh, in Europe. Uh, to keep an American military presence, uh, on the continent, which is another way of saying keeping the American pacifier in Europe. That's going to be tricky to do. Uh, there have been no major crises, uh, in recent years in East Asia. So the United States has not had to pay much attention to East Asia, has been able to concentrate on number one, uh, the Middle East, and number two, the Ukraine war in Europe. But, uh, if we have a major crisis at any point down the road in East Asia, and that is certainly possible, if not likely, uh, the incentive for us to pivot will be very great. Uh, and, uh, uh, I think it'll therefore be very hard, uh, for the Europeans over time to keep the United States involved, uh, in Europe. And also, as I said before, the Ukraine war is having poisonous effects on US-European relations. The Trump administration wants to end the war and it's pushing very hard to accommodate the Russians. Uh, the Europeans, on the other hand, do not want to accommodate the Russians at all. If you look at the 28-point peace plan that Trump came up with, or the Trump administration came up with, and you contrast that with the 28-point peace plan in response that the Europeans came up with, uh, they are very different, and you can see clearly that the Europeans are almost completely at odds with, uh, uh, the Trump administration. The Trump administration, uh, is trying to cut a deal with the Russians. The Europeans, obviously, if you look at their 28-point plan, have no interest in cutting a deal with the Russians. And Trump is therefore very angry at the Europeans, just as he's angry at the Ukrainians. And the question you have to ask yourself is where this all leads, because he has more than three years left in office. And this will contribute to further deterioration in relations between the two sides. So it would make good sense if the, uh, Europeans could, uh, shut down, uh, the war in Ukraine, do everything they can to accommodate the Russians, just so relations between, uh, Europe and Russia are no longer as poisonous as they now are and improve, uh, over time, and also to shut down that war, so that relations between the United States and Europe improve and the Europeans can go to some lengths to convince the Americans to keep troops in Europe.
Well, this is, um, it seems that since the '90s though, the, we, we were always aware of Russia's opposition to, to the efforts to create a Europe without it. But the, the intention, I think, or the solution was always just to roll forward, whether or not it was about NATO expansion, missile defense, some military adventurism, or color revolution. The assumption was always that Russia would have to adjust to new realities. So we'll just do it, present it to the Russians, and then, you know, they would have to adjust. Um, and the stronger we get, the more that is, the more stronger the collective hegemony becomes, the more likely the Russians would have to adjust, given that this is the only game in town. I think this is why the new distribution of power comes to such a shock to the Europeans because the, not only do the Americans now have other priorities and, uh, well, less interested in this continent, but also for the Russians, who are not the only game in town anymore, they, they, they can go other places for economic cooperation, political alignments, and, uh, I think this is what's hitting them. I mean, I, I saw a speech by the Finnish prime minister, uh, Stub, or Stub, who made the point to some, uh, Asian colleagues that multipolarity is not a good thing because this creates competition. We shouldn't have it, as if, you know, I'm not sure how you would negotiate your way out of multipolarity as a distribution of power. Should they just hand over their money and the [laughter] weapons to the Europeans? It was very unclear what the objective. It seems almost like this wishful, normative thinking is, uh, is elevated above it. Uh, I was wondering if, how do you see the European counterproposal through this? Because the European counterproposal again, it was just one big wish list of what they want, and they never addressed actually what Russia wanted, which is again, the first time we see the loser in the war trying to dictate their terms. It's, um, it's quite strange. I mean, they wanted everything: NATO expansion, they wanted security guarantees, no territorial concessions, Russian reparations. I mean, the, it was essentially calling for the capitulation of Russia at a very strange time, given that more or less a growing consensus emerges now that Russia won the war.
Yeah. And I would add to that that, uh, the original Trump proposal, the first 28-point plan, uh, called for a Ukrainian army, uh, that was capped at 600,000 troops. That would be unacceptable to the Russians. But, uh, the European proposal called for, uh, a Ukrainian army that was capped at 800,000, uh, which is clear evidence that the Europeans were pushing forward a plan that they had to know was a non-starter, uh, with the Russians. It was just going nowhere, dead on arrival, as people like to say. Um, I'm not sure what's going on here. Uh, one could argue that the Europeans want to continue the war. Uh, they're so deeply invested at this point in time. Uh, European soldiers are not dying, uh, and, uh, they think that, uh, it makes sense to try to hang on, keep the Americans engaged, and at some point, uh, the Russians will quit because, uh, the Russians are suffering enormously. God, the casualties that the Russians are suffering, it's just unbelievable how the Russians can continue on a day-to-day basis is hard to understand. This is their view, which bears zero, uh, uh, zero relationship to reality. I mean, it's just, you know, crazy. All you have to do is read accounts of the battles that are taking place in Bakhmut. The Russians are not losing enormous numbers of troops. They're losing small numbers of troops. Just look at how the battles in these cities are being waged. Uh, uh, so this is delusional. Uh, now, I think it's very important to emphasize, Glenn, that what the Europeans and the Americans do not understand is that this war is existential for the Russians. Uh, they think people in the West think that, uh, the Russians started this war because they have an imperialist bent. They wanted to conquer territory in Ukraine. They wanted to make Ukraine part of a greater Russia, and they didn't succeed, but, you know, we can cut a deal where they get some territory and they'll be happy, and that's the end of the story. That's the way we think. Uh, but they don't understand that that's not what the Russians are thinking. From the Russian perspective, this is an existential threat. What's going on in Ukraine and what the West is trying to do with regard to integrating Ukraine into the West, into NATO, into the EU, to turn it into a liberal democracy that's pro-West, pro-Western. This is just unacceptable to the Russians. It's a, it's an existential threat. They view it as a threat to their survival. That means they're not going to compromise on their demands for ending the war. You know, you read all the time that people in the West do recognize that Russia's demands have not changed. They've been the same since the war started. Well, that tells you something. It tells you that this is an existential threat from the Russian perspective. And that's why their demands haven't changed, and they're not going to change. They will fight it out on the battlefield. And Putin has made it clear that he actually prefers to fight this one out on the battlefield rather than to try to solve it diplomatically. He probably understands that all these diplomatic shenanigans are just a waste of time. He, of course, has to go along with it because he has to look reasonable both to his allies and to people in the West. But he surely knows that this is going nowhere because again, the West just refuses to accept, uh, that from Russia's perspective, what's going on in Ukraine is an existential threat. And of course, from the Ukrainian point of view, what the Russians want in terms of their demands is an existential threat. I fully understand that. You can completely understand why the Ukrainians do not want to cave in to the Russian demands. Uh, they view what the Russians want as an existential threat, which is what it is. So you have two countries, the Ukraine, Ukrainian, you have two countries, Ukraine and Russia, which both see the other as an existential threat, and the Europeans are backing the Ukrainians to the hilt, and the Europeans, uh, show no interest in backing off. So how do you get a deal here? And the answer is you don't.
Yeah. I, I noticed, um, it seems to me that the failure to recognize this, that it is an existential threat for the Russians, is really at the core of some of our problems and delusions because if this could be addressed, uh, suddenly all our strategies would have to be, you know, we would have to rethink some of these things. But, uh, but still, the slogans from the beginning has always been, if Russia leaves Ukraine, then the war is over. But, uh, this whole logic falls apart if we recognize that, no, actually, if NATO enters Ukraine, the war is by no means over for the Russians. This is, uh, again, something that they can't accept. But, uh, but, but the idea that this is about territory is also strange because it only became territorial as a result of the failure to restore Ukraine's neutrality all the way up, uh, to 2022. But it's very strange because you can argue with facts that is, no, nobody in Moscow was laying any territorial claims to even Crimea before 2014. So what happened in 2014? Why did it suddenly become, you know, one day Putin woke up and wanted the Soviet Union back or the Russian Empire? No, it's, of course, it was the toppling of Yanukovych. Uh, you know, it's, it seems that this should be self-evident. But we have, um, no, we've created this bubble, it seems, in the West, where if you point out, you know, common sense, it, it's seen as being pro-Russian because it excuses then what the Russians have done. So, but I wanted to get back to the Trump, Trump's 28-point plan, or according to Financial Times, it's now down to a 19-point plan after speaking with Zelensky and the Europeans. Uh, do you, do you see Trump flipping back again, uh, towards the, the more harsher policies towards Russia, and, uh, is there any success here, or do you still stick with the logic that, uh, this war will be resolved on the battlefield?
Let me make a couple points. First of all, if you look at Trump's original, um, 28-point plan, it's the, there are three plans here. We should be clear, uh, for the viewers' sake, uh, as to what's going on. There's the 28-point plan, uh, that the Trump administration put forth to get the ball rolling. Then the Europeans responded with a 28-point plan of their own. And now we have a third plan, which is a 19-point plan, excuse me, involving just Ukraine and the United States. Um, and the reason it's only 19 points and not 28 is that there are a whole slew of issues, really almost all the key issues, uh, that have not been agreed to in that 19-point plan between Ukraine and Russia. And President Trump and President Zelensky are going to either talk together in the Oval Office or they're going to talk on the telephone, and they're going to settle, uh, those contentious issues. But those are the three plans that are floating around out there. And of course, the 19-point plan at this point is the key one. But let's just start with the first plan, the Trump plan, the 28-point plan. Uh, Trump was hammered, or the Trump administration was hammered, for coming up with a deal, uh, that gave the Russians pretty much everything they wanted. I, I believe that's not true. I have read the original Trump administration 28-point plan very carefully, and it is, in my opinion, categorically unacceptable to the Russians, uh, on almost every key issue. Um, and if you look at the size, let's talk about the three big issues: the, the size of the Russian military in that original, size of the Ukrainian military that's allowed, uh, in that initial 28-point plan of President Trump's, uh, which is one of the three key issues because that's related to disarmament, Ukrainian disarmament. Second big issue is territory, and third big issue is NATO, uh, whether Ukraine will be in NATO, which is related to the whole question of security guarantees. So those are the three big issues: disarmament, territory, and security guarantees/NATO. Uh, with regard to the size of the Ukrainian military, uh, the Trump plan says it can be 600,000 troops. That's the cap. That's unacceptable to the Russians. Uh, it's a far larger force than was being negotiated, uh, at Istanbul in March, April 2022. Uh, second, with regard to territory, it says that, uh, the West will recognize de facto Russian control over the Donbas, and, uh, of course, the Ukrainians will be, uh, called upon to evacuate the areas of the Donbas, uh, that they now control. Uh, but those areas of the Donbas that Ukraine leaves will be turned into a demilitarized zone. So it's very important to understand what's going on here. Uh, it's not de jure recognition, which is what the Russians insist on. It's de facto recognition. And furthermore, Russia does not get control over those areas of the Donbas, uh, that, uh, Ukraine evacuates. It becomes a demilitarized zone. Uh, so this is just unacceptable to the Russians. And then on the whole subject of NATO and security guarantees, point number three, uh, says no NATO, that Ukraine will not be in NATO. That's fine. But if you look at points number five and points number 10 of the agreement, this is the original 28-point agreement. It says that, uh, point number five says that Ukraine will get reliable security guarantees. And then point number 10 basically makes it clear that the Americans are giving a robust security guarantee to Ukraine. And it says that if Russia reinvades Ukraine or attacks Ukraine, uh, that there will be a decisive, coordinated military response. This is under the US guarantee, right? There's a section, section 10, called the US Guarantee, and it says if Russia again attacks Ukraine down the road, there will be a decisive, a decisive, coordinated military response. That's a legitimate security guarantee, right? The Russians will not accept that. It's just unacceptable. There are other provisions in this, uh, 28-point plan that are unacceptable, uh, to the Russians. Uh, I won't go through them here because it's not necessary because, as I made clear, on the subject of territory, disarmament, and security guarantees, the deal, the original deal, is unacceptable. So that's where you start, and then you go to the European response, which is far worse from a Russian perspective. Uh, and, uh, then you look at the third iteration, which is the 19-point agreement between Ukraine and the United States. This is the most important one at the moment. It leaves open the question of what will be done with regard to security guarantees. It leaves open the question of what will be done with regard to NATO admission. It leaves open what will be done with regard to territory. And the only issue on which they have to say something is disarmament. And as I said before, we apparently agreed to lift the six, 600,000 troop cap, uh, which is going to lead to some number like 700,000 or 800,000, which is going to be categorically unacceptable to the Russians. So the idea that now the Ukrainians and the Americans are coming up with a deal, independent of the Europeans, by the way, but the Ukrainians and the Americans are going to come up with a deal that satisfies the Russians, that the Russians are going to sign on to. I think that's extremely unlikely. Zelensky would never agree to a deal that would make the Russians happy.
Yeah. Well, there's even more problems with this though, that is the [clears throat] well, the US security guarantees to Ukraine. They're supposed to not apply if Ukraine attacks first. However, it's under a political leader like Joe Biden, for example. It's very hard to imagine any Western leader admitting that it was, uh, Ukraine that attacked first because during this war, we watched, for example, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant being attacked over and over again, and every time our political leaders and journalists insist that it's probably Russia attacking themselves. I mean, this is, it's very hard to see any condemnation coming against Ukraine and risk being seen as taking the side of Russia. It's, it's almost unthinkable. We will, you know, go to great lengths to pretend as if, again, Russia's just bombing itself if required. But also, the whole deal seems like, um, or the security guarantees, it positions NATO now as a non-participant, just upholding the security guarantees. But, but from the Russian perspective, though, they again, they see this as being a proxy war. That is, NATO using the Ukrainians. Indeed, on our side, from Boris Johnson to Marco Rubio, they also confirmed that this is a proxy war. So it would allow NATO, though, to keep on holding Ukraine as a more or less a powerful proxy, possibly 600,000, 800,000 troops. And if we ever have any conflicts with the Russian in the future, and you mentioned other possible flash points, um, then we can always activate Ukraine again. So it's just very hard to imagine the Russians being willing to have, have this axe hanging over their head in the future, hoping that, uh, NATO will not use this against them and, and the Europeans themselves do not really cover up where very well that they don't really want an end to this war. So that might be sooner rather than later that this war would restart. It's just, um, it's very hard to see why there's no interest in finding a common, common ground because I agree, the Ukrainians would need, they need some reassurance. They're not going to get it, probably, that Russia won't attack again, but the Russians also need some reassurance that NATO is not going to go into Ukraine again and start this thing up. So, um, but, but there's no interest, or seemingly, to find that common ground. But, uh, yeah, that also takes me to my question that is, uh, how do you assess Trump's, uh, plan now going forward? Will he try to gradually pull Zelensky towards accepting the, you know, this main draft? Will he ignore the Europeans, and is he going to sanction the Russians into getting them on board? How do you see him moving forward from here on?
Well, the $64,000 question is whether Trump can formulate a plan or a proposal that the Russians find acceptable. That's the only really interesting question at this point in time. Can Trump come up with a 28-point plan that satisfies the Russians or comes close to satisfying the Russians so that serious negotiations can start? And as I said to you, and that's why I spent so much time talking about the original plan that Trump came up with, it did not come close. Just very important to understand that the original plan that Trump came up with, that he's getting bashed over by people in the West, people in Europe, and the Ukrainians, did not come close to satisfying Russia's demands. And what's happened since then is that he has backtracked. And the idea that he and Zelensky are going to have telephone conversations or meet in the White House and come up with a plan that satisfies the Russians is not a serious argument. It's just not going to happen. Trump is not skillful enough, doesn't have enough political capital to pull that off. So, you're not going to get a deal that the Russians are going to accept. This one's going to be settled on the battlefield. I just find all these negotiations, hapless, uh, foolish, just hard to understand what people are thinking.
Yeah. This is the strange thing, cuz in the media, the Western media, there's this speculation whether or not Russia authored the peace, the, the peace agreement and handed it over to Witkov. But again, if you listen to the Russian side, they wouldn't accept it. So it's a very strange argument to make. But of course, you can't really, I think the Europeans are trapped a bit, though, because they would like to say, you know, Russia won't accept this, so, you know, we can blame them. On the other hand, they're so appalled by it that they want, you know, they to make us think that Russians, the Russians did write it. So it's a, it's a very strange situation to be in. But, uh, again, the Russians, if, if we want to figure out what the Russians actually would accept, though, in a peace agreement, cuz they keep saying we have to address the root causes, what would those root causes be in terms of translating into an actual peace agreement? I'm just thinking if we start from the, the Russian end to see if there's any pathway at all towards a diplomatic solution to this war. What, what, what would such a peace agreement require, though, based on the, uh, yeah, the Russian demands to look at the root causes?
Well, two points. Because the Russians view Ukraine as a Western bulwark on their border, because they view that as unacceptable. They insist that, uh, Ukraine cannot be NATO. It cannot have meaningful security guarantees. They insist that the West recognize de jure, uh, their, uh, annexation of the four oblasts in eastern Ukraine plus Crimea. And the Russians insist that Ukraine be disarmed to the point where it's not an offensive threat to Russia. And these are not negotiable demands. They're just not negotiable. That, that's point number one. Point number two is it's very important to understand that this is really not a proxy war. You use the term proxy war. The fact is that the United States and the Europeans and the Ukrainians are at war with Russia, right? We're involved in a war. We in the West are not pulling triggers, right, and not pushing buttons, but in every other way, we are profoundly involved in this war. And the Russians believe they're at war with us. That means that this existential threat just doesn't simply involve, uh, Ukraine not being in NATO or Ukraine not having security guarantees. There's a much bigger story at play here, which is the Russians have to think about how they're going to deal with this mortal threat from the West and Ukraine moving forward. This is why Europe's future is so bleak. People just don't understand this. We got into a war with the Russians in February of 2022, and we had a chance to shut it down, right? And it would have been actually quite easy to shut it down in April 2022. And that's why significant progress was being made at the time. But we in the West, and here we're talking mainly about the United States and Britain, told the Ukrainians to walk because we thought we could defeat the Russians. And then the war escalated. And you want to understand, Glenn, the war escalated in two very fundamental ways. It escalated in terms of the size and quality of the fighting forces on both sides. You started off with relatively small militaries, but those militaries grew in size and they became quite formidable militaries over time, to include the Ukrainians. Certainly the Russians. The Russian military today is a much more formidable fighting force in terms of size and quality than it was in 2022. Right? So you had that kind of escalation, escalation in the size and quality of the military forces on both sides. But you also had escalation in the goals of the two sides, right? And the Russians are not content now with cutting a deal that looks like the deal that was on the table in Istanbul in April 2022. Right? The Russians understand they want at least those four oblasts plus Crimea. And the more they think about it, they want additional oblasts. And they want to go to great lengths to make sure that they wreck Ukraine, that they turn it into a dysfunctional rump state. Again, this war has gone much further than it had gone in April 2022. You could have cut a deal then. The idea that you can cut a deal easily now, it's just not in the cards. You've been, you have been waging a major war against Russia since 2022. That'll be six years this February. I mean, four years this February, excuse me. Four years. This is, you know, like World War I. This is a huge war. Backing out of this, cutting a deal is going to be really difficult to do. You know how World War I ended? It didn't end with a deal. It ended with the Germans quitting. They were defeated on the battlefield. You're in an analogous situation here. And on top of that, to go back to my original point, the fact is that we fail to recognize that this is an existential threat to Russia. We are unwilling to see this war through their eyes and willing to cut a deal that accommodates them. So again, uh, this one's going to be settled on the battlefield. You're going to end up with a frozen conflict, and that frozen conflict is going to be followed by poisonous political relations between Russia on one side, Europe and the United States on the other. And there's going to be great potential for future conflict, future shooting wars because you have all these flash points, uh, to include, uh, a restarting of the war in Ukraine.
No, that's a great point to make, though, that is, uh, all the deals the Russians were willing to make in Istanbul, which was primarily no NATO. That was it. Uh, but, uh, yeah, since 2022, the main change, of course, is that NATO entered the war. That is, uh, I mean, but that takes me just to my last question because NATO went to war against Russia. We rejected the peace, and even now it's gone to the extent that, as you suggest, or I agree, a diplomatic solution seems very unlikely. But, uh, if there will this will be resolved on the battlefield through a military solution, and Russia is winning, what happens to Europe then after this war? Because we went to war against Russia, and Russia won. Europe has lost this war. What does this mean for the European security architecture or European security at all?
Well, one big question is what happens with the American pacifier? Uh, if the American pacifier disappears or is greatly reduced, and the Europeans are on their own, they have to provide for their own security, then you have really significant problems. Uh, leaving aside the Russians, just the whole question of how European countries relate to each other. As you know, Glenn, we like to talk about Europe as if it were a single political entity, but it's not a single, uh, political entity. Ursula von der Leyen would like to think it is, and that, uh, she runs, uh, Europe's foreign policy, but Europe is a constellation of countries, and they're still sovereign countries. And you take away the American pacifier, and each one of those countries is on its own. The collective action problems come racing to the fore, uh, and how to think about security will vary from country to country. And then you throw in the Russian threat. Remember, the Russians will have a powerful incentive to cause trouble in Europe. Uh, not necessarily military trouble, uh, not present a threat to conquer Europe, but they'll cause all sorts of political and diplomatic and economic trouble in Europe because the Europeans will be doing the same with regard to the Russians. Uh, so there's going to be trouble for as far as the eye can see, uh, in Europe. As I said before, I just don't see, you know, how there's a happy ending for the Europeans unless they can fundamentally alter, uh, uh, their relations with Russia. Unless they can fundamentally change their thinking about Ukraine, uh, cut a deal on Ukraine or get the Ukrainians to cut a deal and have the Europeans back that deal, have the Americans back that deal, and then just go to great lengths over the next couple decades to improve relations with Russia. That's the best possible outcome. But I don't see any evidence that that's, uh, happening or is likely to happen. I think exactly the opposite will happen. This is why I said to you, and this is what I said in my speech to the European Parliament. I think that, you know, Europe has a bleak geopolitical future moving forward.
Let me squeeze one last question in there, though. But how, why is it this way? Because even from Ukraine now, you see growing voices about the need to end this. I mean, the, the former press secretary of Zelensky, she came out and said, we have to take this 28-point deal because no matter how horrible it is, um, it will only get worse from here. Every day that passes. And why are we listening to the Europeans to keep on fighting? They, they don't have any money left. They don't have any weapons. They don't have any geopolitical influence. They don't even talk to the Russians. Why, why are we continuing to fight?
But that's a great question, though. Why the Europeans have so much to lose from continuing the war against Russia? And, uh, again, we already rolled the dice. It went wrong. We, why, why are we doubling down when there's no pathway to victory? It's, I, I always make the point. I very much understand what the Americans are doing. They, they went for efforts to weaken a strategic rival. It didn't work. You pull away and hand it over to the Europeans. Uh, I can understand the Ukrainians. They're fighting an existential war. I understand the Russians. They're also fighting an existential war. But the Europeans, how are they the most stubborn ones? This is the, yeah, very perplexing to me, though.
I don't think the Europeans are the most stubborn. I mean, the Ukrainians are incredibly stubborn. Uh, you might make the argument, as you were alluding to, that the Ukrainians face an existential threat and the Europeans don't. So you might be able to explain the Europe, the Ukrainians' stubbornness, but not the Europeans. But what's going on here, Glenn, to get back to a point I made a few minutes ago, is that, uh, once the Istanbul negotiations collapsed, uh, and this war escalated, and once it went on for four years as it has, uh, it just becomes extremely difficult, and I'm choosing my words carefully here, it becomes extremely difficult for the Europeans or the Ukrainians or the Russians, uh, to cut a deal. Just take it from the Russians' point of view. The Russians understand that the West and Ukraine represent a mortal threat. Uh, if you just look at what's happened over the past four years, as you know, well, the Ukrainians, with permission from the United States and from Britain, invaded mother Russia. They invaded mother Russia from Ukraine. Furthermore, they launched missiles at one leg of the strategic nuclear triad that the Russians have. Right? These are really momentous events. Furthermore, the West has made it manifestly clear that it wants to defeat Russia in Ukraine. And with that defeat, coupled with sanctions, it wants to bring the Russians to their knees and knock them out of the ranks of the great powers. This is our goal. We've made this manifestly clear. This is why we told the Ukrainians to walk away from Istanbul. We thought we could deliver a hammer blow to Russia. That's why we told the Ukrainians to walk. This is what the Russians are up against. And the United States is an incredibly powerful and ruthless country, run by Donald Trump. So if you're the Russians, you have a very powerful incentive to get all you can in terms of Ukrainian territory to solidify yourself for a future conflict, and furthermore, to make sure that Ukraine is wrecked so that it doesn't present much of a threat to you, and furthermore, is not in a position to join either NATO or the EU. This is the Russian incentive structure at this point in time, and it's a result of all the escalation that's taken place since Istanbul.
Then you go to the other side. You can understand, as we talked about before, from a Ukrainian point of view, why they don't want to lose four oblasts plus Crimea forever. You can understand why they don't want to be disarmed to the point where they really can't defend themselves against the Russians. Uh, you can understand why they want to join NATO or want to have security guarantees and don't want to be told they can't have those, um, things. You can understand that. So the Ukrainians are intransigent. And then you have the Europeans, uh, and this, of course, is, uh, of great interest to you. But what I would say to you, Glenn, is that the Europeans have gotten themselves deeply involved in this war. Again, they're not dying on the battlefield. They're not pulling triggers, but the Europeans have been in this war since, uh, it started. And it would be a tremendous blow to Europe if they lose the war. And it would be a tremendous blow to NATO if they lose the war. And again, NATO means the American commitment to Europe. If this war, uh, led to the disintegration of NATO, you're basically saying that that would mean the end of the American pacifier in Europe. The Europeans don't want that. They want to win this war. They want this to be a great victory for NATO, or at least a stalemate that they can then dress up as something of a victory so that, you know, NATO feels good, the Americans stay in Europe, and so forth and so on. So the Europeans are profoundly committed, uh, to this war. That leaves the Americans. Trump and Vance are, I think, uh, uh, basically in agreement with you and me. I mean, I think they understand this conflict, uh, in ways that are very similar to the ways that you and I understand it, but I don't want to say they're lone wolves, but I would say they're not many people in the American national security establishment who share their views. Congress is just filled with superhawks. Uh, Trump has been surrounded by people like, uh, Keith Kellogg, Marco Rubio, uh, and assorted other superhawks. So Trump has great difficulty just negotiating his way through the obstacle-filled waters inside the United States, not to mention having to deal with the Ukrainians and the Europeans. Uh, and there are limits to what Trump is willing to give up either. He just can't make, uh, uh, he can't make a deal that gives the Russians everything they want because that will come back to haunt him in his mind. So he comes up with that original 28-point proposal we talked about, uh, which he thinks, uh, the Russians will be happy with, but as I was saying, the Russians will not be happy with. Uh, so he, he can't get out of this mess, right? He, he, he's trying. I mean, he's not exactly Machiavelli, I second, but he's trying, and he's unable to do it. And, uh, the end result is that this one is just going to go on until you get, uh, a Russian victory, an ugly victory on the battlefield, and you get some sort of frozen conflict, uh, uh, followed by poisonous political relations between Russia on one side, and Ukraine, Europe, and the United States on the other. I think, Glenn, you know, you've heard me say this before. But when you think back to that April 2008 decision, uh, to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, and what that has led to, and the fact that we have doubled down at every point, especially with regard to Istanbul in April 2022, it's just hard to believe how foolish we have been, and how catastrophic those various decisions, of course, starting with the big one in April 2008, have been. I, I see no end, uh, to trouble over this issue for as far as the eye can see. Now, I may be wrong, and let's hope I'm wrong. Let's hope I'm completely wrong, that my analysis is, is deeply flawed, and I'm just missing the obvious. Let's hope that. But I'll tell you, I've thought long and hard about this. I've spent a lot of time talking to people like you, Alexander, and so forth and so on, and, uh, I hate to say it, but I think that my analysis, which, uh, is so pessimistic, is correct.
Well, sadly, I agree with your analysis as well. So your, the title of your speech, the, the bleak future of Europe. I think that's very appropriate. You're painting a very bleak picture indeed. So, um, well, John, thank you as always. Uh, I know everyone wants some of your time, so I appreciate talking to us.
My pleasure, Glenn. Thanks for having me on and thanks for going back over all these issues again, as depressing as it is.