Transcription
Well, I have no intention of buying physical silver back into my account. I buy gold every month that I generate surplus cash, which is most months. And I'm sort of indifferent as to price. The only way that we can fund the nominal value of our obligations is a combination of artificially low interest rates and printing, quantitative easing. Both of those are very good for gold. If you told me, "No, Rick, you're wrong." If you tell me that we're going to have a real interest rate, which will in the US 10-year Treasury exceed the rate in the deterioration of the US dollar, I'll sell my gold. I don't know how to value Microsoft or value Apple or value SpaceX. Franco-Nevada and Wheaton and Agnico were part of a new portfolio allocation. But it's not hard at all to say that now. You look at the most recent quarters for any of the three of them. If you look at the balance sheets, if you look at the way that they will perform at this gold price, and I expect higher gold prices, it's very difficult for me to understand why a conventional investor, somebody whose investment precepts are set by reading the Intelligent Investor by Ben Graham, it's very difficult for me to understand why they wouldn't own these stocks.
So, I have no intention of buying physical silver back into my account uh unless and until I see hate return to the market. And we're a long way from there. I think people are disappointed in gold and silver. Uh I I It's interesting, too, when I listen to people's discussion of it uh to consider their time frames. When people tell me that gold the gold price is down, I'm sort of thinking, "Really?" Uh I began saving in gold in the year 2000. And if my memory serves me correctly, when I started buying gold, it was $253 an ounce. Now it's above 4,300, and people are explaining to me this down. Uh I think that has to do with their time frame. When I look at the price of various items that I buy today, Vlad, uh and I priced them in gold uh, against my purchase price when I began saving in gold in 2000 in 2000. I'm struck by how cheap everything is. I'm struck by how cheap houses housing is, how cheap cars are, how cheap gasoline is, how cheap food is. Uh, everything but tax. >> [laughter] >> Uh, and people tell me that gold is down. Uh, that's an interesting circumstance. It depends on your time frame, and I think it depends on why you own it. Uh, I don't own gold to make money. I own gold to maintain my purchasing power. Uh, by the way, uh, I buy gold every month that I generate surplus cash, which is most months. And I'm sort of indifferent as to price. Uh, for me, lower gold prices are a godsend. Uh, I'm not sure why I do this at age 73, but I'd like to become substantially wealthier.
>> If gold feels expensive today, that may be because your measuring stick is quietly losing value. As Rick Rule points out here, gold moved from roughly $250 to above $4,300. While most investors still frame success in dollars instead of purchasing power. The uncomfortable part is that falling gold prices can benefit disciplined accumulators more than rising markets. Savers chasing momentum often buy confidence and sell value. Next, Rick Rule reveals why investor disappointment may be the strongest bullish signal nobody wants to admit.
>> Uh, and part of the path to wealth from my point of view is preserving my purchasing power, which I do in gold. So, lower gold prices are in my interest. Uh, it is odd that people who profess to want to buy more gold would prefer to pay higher rather than lower prices. It's as though we all went into a giant store and when the store announced a sale, everybody left the store. Uh >> [laughter] >> it's an odd but common uh belief.
>> Yes, and do you think Rick we are um in something similar to 1970s bull market because you know some people look at 2011 and they look at the fundamentals they're quite similar. They're saying, "Well, we had this huge parabolic run and now we could have underperformance in precious metals relative to the US dollar for many years ahead." How do you view it?
>> Give me the use of the word could. Uh I'm all over it. Anything could happen. I believe that the US dollar loses 75% of its purchasing power in the next 10 years. Um I believe that we will never get a handle or we won't get a handle for a long time on government debt in the US. I don't believe that we'll get a handle on unfunded entitlement liabilities. And if we don't get a handle on those two things, the only way that we can fund the nominal value of our obligations is a combination of artificially low interest rates and printing, quantitative easing. Both of those are very good for gold. If you told me, uh "No, Rick, you're wrong." The political will in the in the US exist to have a balanced budget.
>> Markets celebrate higher prices, yet almost nobody celebrates buying assets at a discount. According to Rick Rule, the real debate is not whether gold repeats 2011 or the 1970s, but whether governments reverse debt expansion and monetary support. That is where the public narrative becomes uncomfortable because prosperity built on persistent intervention carries hidden currency cost. Investors waiting for certainty often end up paying peak valuations. Next exposes the condition that would actually invalidate the long-term gold thesis and why few expect it to happen.
>> And the political will exist in the US to fund 120 trillion dollars trillion in unfunded entitlement promises. And if you tell me that we're going to have a real interest rate which will in the US 10-year Treasury exceed the rate in the deterioration of the US dollar I'll sell my gold. Uh however, those three conditional conditions precedent probably occur on the 12th of never. Um when people say could it would be useful if they would explain to me the set of circumstances that would cause that to occur. Now, if somebody says differently to me, gold doesn't anticipate the future. I would rather own a world-dominating business like Microsoft or Apple or SpaceX. Something that can create real quantum increases in value. I get that. I don't want to do it because I don't know how to value Microsoft uh or value Apple or value SpaceX. But if there are people out there who are smart enough to do it and suggest that they would like to maintain their purchasing power by investments in equities in companies that have the ability to change the world, I get it. Uh I'm not one who is gifted enough in technology to understand the value offered by companies like that at these market capitalizations. So for me I'll in gold, thank you.
>> I mean, you have mentioned Rick mining stock. So, let's talk a little bit more about um these type of companies. Um so, if you look at So, I know that you like the best of the best and some of the biggest companies like Wheaton, Franco-Nevada, uh Agnico. Um do you still see them quite attractive Rick at the current commodity price given that they're printing money, they're making some acquisitions?
>> Well, I mean, they're getting cheaper and cheaper.
>> The biggest risk to wealth may not be inflation. It may be believing policy makers will suddenly become disciplined. What Rick Rule is highlighting is that every bearish case for gold requires assumptions about fiscal restraint and positive real returns that markets rarely sustain for long. He also draws a distinction most investors ignore. Preserving purchasing power is not the same game as maximizing upside. Portfolio mistakes happen when people confuse the two. Next, Rick Rule unravels why world-changing companies and hard money may not be competing the way investors assume.
>> Which is to say their market caps are getting smaller at the same time that they're paying down debt, building up cash >> [laughter] >> in the treasury. Uh and they're getting cheaper, which is wonderful. Um there was a time, you know, sort of 5 or 6 weeks ago when it was getting more difficult to say on interviews like yours with a more generalist audience uh that Franco-Nevada and Wheaton and Agnico were part uh of a new portfolio allocation. But, it's not hard at all to say that now uh if you look at the most recent quarters for any of the three of them. If you look at the balance sheets if you look at the way that they will perform at this gold price, and I expect higher gold prices, it's very difficult for me to understand why a conventional investor, somebody whose investment precepts are set by reading, as an example, The Intelligent Investor by Ben Graham, it's very difficult for me to understand why they wouldn't own these stocks.
>> Yes,
>> And there's many people who An opinion as to value requires work. And most people are fundamentally lazy. So, the idea that money is made on the delta between price and value is a concept that makes them unhappy because they don't want to take the time to get some sense of what something is worth, merely to track what it's selling for, and the trend of that, whether it's up or down. I would suggest to you that knowing the price of something is irrelevant if you don't have an opinion as to value and expected value. Mercifully for me in my life, I've competed for 50 years against people who didn't bother to have a perception of value. Uh I joke, Vlad, that uh as a 73-year-old fat balding guy,
>> When balance sheets improve while valuations fall, institutions usually notice before headlines do. Rick Rule's argument suggests that shrinking market caps alongside stronger cash positions create the kind of disconnect long-term capital waits for. The uncomfortable truth is most investors study price action because valuation work is slow and emotionally unrewarding. That habit transfers wealth toward patient buyers during periods of boredom. Next, Rick Rule reveals why the market's obsession with momentum may be the exact reason value opportunity survive.
>> Uh I can win the 100-meter dash if I'm the only guy that shows up to run. And sometimes I feel like that in equities markets. I monitor discussion groups about something and there's all kinds of discussion about 200-day moving averages and price and you know, analyst report and a bunch of stuff that has nothing to do about what the thing is worth. And I think, you know, over time I can't help but [clears throat] outcompete these morons.
>> Donald Trump said let the oil flow. Rick, does that mean we have happiness and prosperity ahead because the markets look very positive at what's happening at this moment?
>> Well, uh if there's actually a succession of hostilities at the very least we'll have less unhappiness. Uh I don't think that uh anybody will be particularly satisfied with the deal. But if there is a deal, uh at least people will stop killing each other. Uh and at least people can go on attempting to live better lives. I haven't seen the details of the deal. Uh and I wonder given the track record of all three parties to the agreement, which is to say Israel the United States and the Iran uh their track their track record with regards to public prognostications that aren't true whether or not anybody will adhere to the terms of the deal. Uh I hope they will. Uh I genuinely hope they will for a whole bunch of reasons. Um first and foremost is humanitarian. Uh this while people have paid attention to the oil price and the interest rates and equity markets uh thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of people have perished in this conflict.
>> Markets price relief instantly, but rebuild trust painfully. This is where Rick Rule's thesis shifts from valuation to human behavior because cease fires can calm assets long before underlying incentives change. Investors often treat geopolitical pauses as permanent resolutions even when supply chains and political incentives remain unstable. Temporary optimism has repeatedly created false signals across commodities. Next, Rick Rule exposes the overlooked difference between low oil prices and actual energy security.
>> Uh and the consequence of tens of thousands of people perishing is that their neighbors and their children are traumatized and hostile towards those who believe who they believe were responsible for this tragedy. So, let's put that one first. And hope for those [clears throat] reasons that the treaty is successful. Let's hope, too, that normal commerce uh begins to occur around the world, including through the Straits of Hormuz. It's very worthy to note that the media reported that 20% of the world's hydrocarbons travel through the Straits of Hormuz. Oddly, they didn't mention very often that over 50% of the world's export hydrocarbons move through it. North Americans, as an example, were insulated from the threat of shortages. Uh we felt the pressure at the pump because prices are set on world markets. Both the United States and Canada are exporters. And consumers in uh North American markets had to compete with foreign consumers. And it is also worthy to note that the oil industry had generated enough of a producing surplus that thus far, at least, we've got through the conflict in the in the Gulf with the oil price only reflecting the threat of shortages. Planes are flying. Ships are sailing. Cars, except for in certain countries like Sri Sri Lanka, are operating. Uh we got through this crisis so far based on uh public and private inventories. If the conflict goes on or had the conflict go gone on longer, you would have seen a much different move in oil in oil prices. If we priced oil in the face of real as opposed to proposed or apparent shortages. If you look at the drawdown in as an example the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the Chinese reserves, uh we got by on inventories. Uh and I I I I have no sense of the true nature of global inventories.
>> Oil never actually disappeared. The buffer that hid scarcity did. As Rick Rule points out here, the overlooked number is not total hydrocarbon flow but the concentration of export routes and the inventory cushion supporting global markets. Public commentary focused on price while ignoring stockpile drawdowns and deferred consequences. For investors, temporary stability can mask structural fragility until inventories stop absorbing shocks. Next, Rick Rule reveals why surviving an energy scare does not mean the system became stronger.
>> But I suspect that we were in some real danger of beginning to ration oil by price as opposed to the price being set in anticipation of shortages. So we probably >> [laughter] >> if we've gotten through this, we probably got through it by the skin of our teeth.
>> Many people are like say that well, this was a you know, $90 per barrel problem. And now that if everything goes, you know, everything gets solved, um oil prices should go much lower. And of course, I think right now there's a certain risk premium associated to that price. So, if we don't have any more hostilities, would that risk premium get cheaper in a way? And you would expect prices to go lower, let's say in 6 months or so?
>> Uh I would expect them to go much lower. One of the things that happens with 90 or 100 or $110 oil uh is that you kill demand in poor countries. In the West, we complain about the fact that the pump price went up, and then we fill our car and go on about our lives. In a place like Sri Lanka, a taxi cab driver parks his car. So, $90 oil uh kills demand. And I would suspect that that demand will be months in recovery in markets like Pakistan and Sri Lanka and Malawi and Bolivia. The consequence of that is that when the oil flows again, uh it will flow into a market that at least temporarily has two or three million barrels a day less structural demand. So, it wouldn't surprise me at all to see oil the oil price fall into the mid-60s. It wouldn't surprise me much to see uh oil prices temporarily in the 50s.
>> Lower oil prices can sometimes signal economic stress, not abundance. According to Rick Rule, high energy prices destroy demand unevenly, and poorer economies absorb the damage first through reduced activity rather than efficiency gains. That creates a misleading impression of supply recovery when consumption has simply collapsed. Investors who celebrate falling prices without tracking demand quality often misunderstand the cycle. Next, Rick Rule exposes why temporary energy relief can quietly plant the seeds of the next shortage.
>> It's not a forecast. Uh but it's important to note that for consumers at the bottom of the economic pyramid, uh there is demand elasticity associated with price. And I think we've tested that.
>> Yes. What about oil stocks, Rick? How do you view them at this moment?
>> Uh it depends on the response. I'm holding off buying them because I do expect that once oil starts flowing, if it starts flowing, that the price of oil declines and the price of oil stocks decline. Uh I believe that the prices that we're seeing now uh will be at this or higher levels by 2029 or 2030 as a consequence of deferred sustaining capital investments. Remember, uh Vlad, in prior interviews, we talked about the fact that the oil industry was deferring over a billion dollars a day in sustaining capital investments. That might not impact production in 2027 or even 2028, but beginning in 2029, uh we'll have shortages that aren't due to war. We'll have shortages that are due to sustaining capital investments. So, the circumstance that I see is if there really truly is peace and the cargo's north of the Straits of Hormuz flow through the Straits of Hormuz into a market that's structurally weak because of demand destruction, that the oil price could easily go lower, substantially lower, in the balance of 2026 and 2027. By 2029, uh I suspect that the oil price will be back at 90 except in constant dollars. Uh if the dollar loses 7 or 8% of its purchasing power, what you're really talking about isn't then uh $90 oil. It's nominal $110 or $115 oil. In that context, uh I think the oil stocks are good buys, but I think they're going lower. I don't think you need to buy them now. I think you need to buy them when they're hated.
>> Today's cheap energy can become tomorrow's expensive supply if investment keeps disappearing. What Rick Rule is highlighting is that deferred capital spending creates shortages years later, long after headlines move on, and investors lose interest. Markets tend to reward current cash flow while underpricing future production gaps. That disconnect can punish portfolios built entirely around recent price trends.