Transcription
That's a uh caricature. I mean, even The Economist, which is not exactly a cheerleader for Singapore, has uh would say, as it just did on its in its um uh editorial form of when Mr. Lee Kuan Yew passed away, uh that Singapore has free, fair, and regular elections. We are a parliamentary democracy. Not in exactly the same mold as Britain or the United States, certainly. No, we are a parliamentary democracy, and an elected government makes decisions which it feels are the best in the best interest of the country today and for the future, and we, we are accountable for it.
>> Yeah. I mean, it's a democracy of sorts. You, you don't have a genuinely free, truly liberated press.
>> Not in the British sense.
>> No. Well, but not in any I mean
>> but in the much as I'd like to take credit for the notion of a free press, not a British idea. I didn't mean it entirely as a compliment, but I, but as a, as a description, uh
>> you, but as a description, you are missing page three of The Sun newspaper, and that's no great loss. I agree. But, but, but actually, there is a serious point when when journals that are respected and and have a role to play, like, you know, The Far East Economic Review for years and years areounded by no, the rules are very clear and simple. There are Singapore is an extremely open society by virtue of the number of foreign publications that are circulated, you know, well over 5,000. The fact that Singaporeans are probably more than any other society broadband penetrated. The fact that they're English educated and have have access to a whole world of information on the internet. It's an extremely open society. There's no doubt about it. We are unconventional in requiring in our laws that we have the right of reply. When foreign publications publish something that we feel is false or misleading, we just have the right of reply. And when publications, as you know very well, uh refuse to publish a reply, we impose restrictions on them that affect the advertising revenues. Unconventional. You might not agree with it. But the larger point is this. I think we all need some humility. We all need some humility on the ways that best advance a liberal order. To take Lord Griffith's point this morning, a liberal order economically, socially, and politically, we all need some liberty, some some humility as to how we achieve that, not just for today, but for tomorrow. How do you sustain it? How do you best sustain it? The most thoughtful observers in the West are of the view that you need some buffers, you need some margins of safety, and you need some compromises on some liberties in order to achieve others. And the a free med the freest possible media is not the only liberty we aspire to. I, I do think it's a good idea, by the way. It appeals to my ideals, but it's not the only liberty you aspire to. You do aspire to a liberty of being able to walk the streets freely, particularly if you're, you're a woman or a child, at any time of the night. You aspire to the liberty of living in a city that's not defined by its most disorderly elements. You aspire to the liberty of having an opportunity for an education and a job regardless of your race or your social background. and you aspire to a liberty of practicing your own religion without fear of bigotry or discrimination. Those are very important liberties in many societies, and they're lacking in many societies.
>> Well, I did, I, I think we're getting into a very interesting area, and Singapore to me is the sort of um body politic which we in the West struggle to define in a way because maybe we have a slightly sort of simplistic binary approach to this. We either want, you know, we look at free societies like, I suppose mine or Western European or the US models. We would say free societies. And then we would look at a, a China, for example, and we'd say a not free society. You know, they have capitalism of of a sort, but they certainly don't have democracy. And we'd say not free and dysfunctional politically. You sit in neither camp as far as we're concerned. We can't really pigeonhole you, but here's a thought for you. Maybe your system is coming to a, a crossroads or a turning point because the digital age is changing things somewhat. You know, the information flows and the, the top-down approach that your society has taken perhaps don't fit so easily into a digital age. And I just wonder, you know, when there are theories about the relationship between uh political economy and innovation and long-term sustainable economic success through innovation, whether Singapore is going to have to change and whether the authoritarian model, if you don't mind me using that word, is going to have to be reviewed and fundamentally adapted. What do you think?
So, uh, Lee Kuan Yew would never have expected that Singapore would remain what it is today forever. Uh, I don't expect, and I don't think any of my colleagues in government expect it's going to remain this way forever. It has to evolve. We start with the cards we're dealt with. We start with history shapes choices, and the history I described briefly earlier on did shape choices. It shaped social, social choices. It shaped political choices. But we must never be trapped by our history. We have to keep evolving. And it is, it is a worthy ideal to aspire for a system where individuals are well educated, are good judges for themselves of the information they read on the internet or on the media, are able to make their own minds up. I think that's a very, that's a worthy ideal to to aspire towards. But how do we do it in a way that's self-sustaining? And to, to think that you simply, if all forces are let loose, whether it's the media or anything else, >> that you're able to achieve the liberties that matter most to people, safety, freedom of of of religious belief, the freedom to aspire in life and achieve what you want through hard work. Very important liberties. But simplistically put, is there going to be room for more individualism in Singapore?
>> Yes.
>> In the future.
>> So if you look at Singapore today compared to not even 50 years ago, 10 years ago, it's a vastly different place. It's a vastly different place. Singaporeans are educated, discerning, skeptical, and critical people. They know what's what. There's no doubt about it. And Singapore continues to evolve. It's a function of course of the fact that we've had some success in education. It's a function of the fact that as you say, it's a digital world. It's an open world. So there's no doubt about it. But let's not think that we are all moving teleologically towards that destination that you now see in the United States or UK. We'll all have to evolve, and we all need some humility as to how we progress democracy.
But will Singapore always be the kind of society where the government says, ultimately, you can't live there because the quota for your particular ethnic grouping has already been reached. You've got to go and live there. Is it going to be that kind of society forever?
>> That's, uh, imponderable. I think it'll be naive to think that, uh, you can lift it and people will be will automatically gravitate towards diverse, uh, neighborhoods and you won't in fact get the reverse because if you look at the most advanced democracies, that's exactly what's happened. You have, you have in the United States, you have in France, you have in Germany, you have even in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, half the Muslim population lives in your bottom 10% of neighborhoods. Did it happen because of some random chance, or does it happen because that's the natural workings of society? We have to address these facts honestly and realize that, look, human beings aren't perfect. Everyone has biases, discomforts, a sense of liking or distrust for each other. And there is a role of government and elected representatives to unify people. And it doesn't happen through speeches. It means you need mechanisms, you need instruments. They mustn't be too constraining on individual choice, but you do need to constrain something. And do you end up a better society or don't you? That's the test. Not whether the government is right. Do you end up a society that people feel more comfortable in? That's the real test. Now, I'm, it's easy to talk about Singapore, but quite frankly, this is a challenge we all face.
>> Oh, absolutely. I mean, listen, I, I know full well that the sorts of issues that come out of making, uh, an ethnically diverse nation work are extremely important to a whole bunch of nations far beyond Singapore, not least my own. But, but it seems to me you are now facing some of the problems that, uh, other nations have have faced for quite a long time. Let's talk a couple of specifics. One, immigration. >> Big issue in Singapore today. In fact, one could argue it's one of those issues which is is prompting a new kind of very active, passionate debate where opposition is actually, you know, coming out onto the streets, using the internet in ways that we haven't seen before because your government looks at the demographics of Singapore, looks at the need to keep growth going and thinks, you know, our own people aren't having many babies. We are going to have to manage continued immigration into the country to the tune of, I think by 2030, the plan was to turn a population of what, 5.3 million into 6.9 million.
>> Not a plan, but there were, it wasn't a plan.
>> It was mooted anyway, and it drew an awful lot of opposition from native Singaporeans.
>> Uh, so what are you going to do? You know, you've got, you've got this problem. You need the numbers, but immigration, like in so many nations around the world, is now a hot and difficult political issue. What are you going to do?
So, it's a, it's a challenge that many countries face, and small countries face it more than others. Switzerland faces it in a very, um, pointed way. Another small country that, um, uh, not only needs people for the sake of numbers, but its companies need talent and specialized skills to compete internationally. But we are a society. We are not just, uh, St. Gallen, uh, or Stuttgart or San Diego. We are a country. We are a nation. And that means it has to be a nation that people feel is their own. It's got to have social mores and, uh, a tone that people feel is Singaporean, but with an openness that allows us to take advantage of the skills and expertise and track records and networks of foreign, for foreign, foreign individuals. So staying open but remaining Singaporean at the core is what we have to achieve. And it's a matter of balance.
What are you actually, are you going to bring in this new, uh, what, 30% of your population by 2030 or not?
>> So, we, we already at one-third of our workforce that is foreign, and we hope to keep it there as long as we can without letting it rise indefinitely. And that's, uh, something we implement through labor market rules. We've got levies, we've got quotas, and so on. Uh, but you, you can't have a free-for-all. You can, if you are one city in a larger country, but we are a country by ourselves, and you need a balance. And integrating foreigners in our society is just as important as thinking about the numbers, just as important as thinking about the quantity. Uh, you've got to integrate people as well as you can. And Singaporeans have to feel that, yes, this is my country, but I'm proud to be working in a world-class team.
Now, another challenge you face, uh, is on the size of government. You know, you've talked already with me about the, uh, investments made in housing, for example, and that's going to increase. I know it's a huge part of the public budget. Education, you know, we all, I mean, British politicians are in the election. They say we're failing in education. Look at Singapore and they cite your amazing exam record and your numbers of skilled graduates and the way in which you skill up your people. So you invest huge amounts in education. If you look at the figures, you know, your, your government is actually an advocate of massive state spending. I mean, that's the way you run your country. And because you've got such a successful economy, you've managed to do it without, you know, with budget surpluses until last year, where you just fell into into a deficit. And I don't know whether you are worried that looking forward, particularly if you mix demographics with the size of your government and the ambition of your government, you are going to run into real problems.
So, uh, I think we're a very interesting case of a country that has low government spending, by the way, by most standards, as a percentage of GDP, low taxes.
>> As long as your GDP keeps climbing.
>> Uh, yes, but, but our starting point is not a bad one. We've got relatively low government spending and revenues, but we are able to achieve the social outcomes that countries with much larger spending do. And how do we do it? I think one of the very important lessons of the last 50 years is that traditional concepts of welfare and social expenditure and government intervention have led to a weakening of private initiative and personal responsibility. Not because that was the intent. It never was the intent. It was never the social democratic intent to weaken private initiative and family responsibility. I mean, look at the Scandinavian countries. They're one of the, they used to be amongst the most hardworking countries in the world. The Swedes were incredibly hardworking, industrious people.
>> You're using past tense. Are you?
>> Sweden lazy or what's?
>> Present active tense? Uh, I, I, and I don't, I, you know, they're, they're, they're a good society in many ways. So I didn't mean to
>> Well, Swedes will get the chance to comment on this society in many ways. They're, and they're willing to pay high taxes to keep their system going. But the point is, there are ways in which an active government can intervene to support social mobility, to develop opportunities, and to take care of the old, which doesn't undermine personal and family responsibility. And that's the compact that we are trying to achieve. It's almost a paradox.
>> You mean you're a bit more, a bit more ruthless? Is that what you're?
>> No, we are, we are, we are achieving a paradox of active government support for personal responsibility rather than active government support to take over personal responsibility or community responsibility of a safety net.
>> So, we, we believe in a concept of support for you taking up opportunities. So we don't have
>> I believe in the sometimes simplicity of yes or no answers. What about this idea of a safety net? Do you believe, does Singapore believe in the notion of a safety net for those who fall between the cracks of a successful?
>> I believe in the notion of a trampoline.
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>> Yeah. So people are just bouncing up and down in Singapore.
>> No, it's a, it's a, I mean, it boils down to what policies you're talking about. If you provide help for someone who's willing to study in education, to study hard, if you provide help for someone who's willing to take up a job and work at it, and make life not so easy if you stay out of work. If you provide help for someone who wants to own a home, and we're very generous in our grants for home ownership, which is why we have 90% home ownership, and amongst the low-income population, more than 80% own their homes. It transforms culture. It's not just about transactions. It's not about the size of grant. It's about keeping alive a culture where I feel proud that I own my home, and I earn my own success through my job.
>> I feel proud that I'm raising my family. Keeping that culture going is what keeps a society vibrant.
>> Yeah. Actually, sorry to stop you for a sec, but I completely forgot to publicize this very important vote we're having, uh, which you guys have all taken up without me even prompting you. So, just by way of getting those who haven't voted to vote, you know, we have got this question which we're going to review at the end, but we can see where it's going already. After 50 years of growth and prosperity, Singapore will face the same structural challenges as the rest of the developed world. Well, uh, 71% of you disagree, presumably you believe, uh, as the Americans would say, in Singaporean exceptionalism, um, which is an interesting idea. Do you believe in Singapore?
>> No, I don't. I don't at all.
>> Very little of what Singapore does is invented in Singapore. Very little. Uh, our whole, to use the jargon, SOP, you know, standard operating procedure, whether it's in cabinet or statutory board or a small public agency, is look at the rest of the world, try to get some idea, some technique, some method that has worked well, and see how we can do it in Singapore, if possible, better. Try to avoid the mistakes that have happened. So that's an advantage of smallness. By the way, we never thought that we had it all in our minds. We never, we never think today that we've got it, we've got it all worked out, and this is a successful model, and that's it.
>> We are never in a golden mean. But actually, getting back to smallness, what you described, and it's fascinating, the, the interventionism of the Singaporean government in the, in the housing, uh, system, for example, or indeed in the education system. I mean, it, it's, it's been so successful, but it is so, um, micromanaged. I mean, that that couldn't happen in a large country, could it?
Well, I think the, the thought experiment that's more, uh, useful is what has happened in a large country and how could you have avoided it? How could you have avoided the, what's happening in the, how do you pronounce the French term, banlieues?
>> Banlieues. Uh, how could you have, what I described about your minority populations in Britain? How, how could you have avoided Baltimore? How could you have avoided Ferguson? It's not rocket science. There are many thoughtful observers who point to what was happening decade after decade, and it's not about left or right, by the way. It's not about Democrat against Republican or Labor against Conservative. Partly about centralization and authority. In the United States, whether we're talking about policing, or whether we're talking about education or housing, in the end, Americans want their decisions to be taken, uh, at a much more local level. By and large, you know, there's a fear of big government and washing, washing intruding in people's lives, and many decisions are taken not just at the state level, but at the municipal level, including things like policing, right? Whereas in Singapore, you guys are quite straightforward. You've got an extraordinarily centralized nation-state, city-nation state, and it is all run from one place, the center.
>> Yeah, it is a city, of course, and if you want to compare it, you can compare it to other American cities. Sunalan, by the way, is larger than Singapore. Uh, and you have to ask, what is the responsibility of elected representatives? If we believe in social inclusion, if we believe in opportunities for all, we have to accept it doesn't happen automatically because of the invisible hand of the market or the invisible hand of society. It happens because you've got policies that seek to foster and encourage it. And what happened in the examples I've just cited, >> is that you've got policies that went in the other direction, and they trap people. They trap people where they started. If you're black, if you're low income, you end up where you started. I may be oversimplifying, but that's the tragic truth. And that comes out of 50 years of evidence.
>> And you,
>> and we try to elude.
>> You are the world's perhaps greatest example of a meritocracy.
>> No, I'd never put it that way.
>> No. All right. Well, I'll put, I'll put it that way for you then. You are.
>> I would say, I would, I would simply say we've taken lessons from abroad. We've tried to do what makes sense in our circumstances, and we've got to keep evolving our methods.
>> Right?
>> We've got to keep evolving our methods.
>> I've got to shut up and let the audience ask proper questions in a moment, but one more from me. You've got a problem. You, you made, I mean, Singapore made its great strides in the 60s, 70s, 80s when the rest of Asia was, as we touched on earlier, you know, uh, many of its countries were under terrible misrule, misgovernment, their economies were shot to pieces, and and you guys, because you were extraordinarily efficiently governed, could make great competitive strides. It's a bit different now. I mean, Asia's full of, of tearaway growth economies, you know, obviously there's China, but there are many others too. Uh, suddenly the, the idea of Singapore being the, the great tearaway success of Asia in relation to all the others isn't so true. And maybe foreign investment, for example, might begin to think, you know what, Singapore's gone as far as it can go. There are other places we could put our money and see it, see it, uh, bear fruit better than Singapore in the future. Are you worried about that?
Well, Singapore wouldn't be where it is today if it didn't have to compete very hard against formidable competitors. They weren't always in Asia. They weren't always in the immediate neighborhood, but it's always been about competition. And that's how we've moved up from one level, from, you know, highly labor-intensive, low-skill, low-wage, uh, production to what is now basically high-skill, high-wage enterprise. And it's a constant race. But don't forget the intangibles. Don't forget the intangibles. There's some advantage in being constant, in keeping to your promise, sticking to the contract, and building confidence amongst every investor that in 20 years' time and 30 years' time, the rules are not going to change.
>> And being constant, does that mean that Lee Kuan Yew's family will always be in charge?
>> No, I, I think that that'll be most, uh, uh, unusual. It's a meritocracy. It'll be most unusual if that was the case. Certainly, it's not the way in which I, if I can, I can't speak on behalf of them, but it's not the way most Singaporeans would expect it to be. And certainly, you really wouldn't want it to be a situation like, um, I mean, if you look at
>> I thought about the United States, either the Bushes or the Clintons. So let me, let me, uh, I mean, to be frank, if you look at, um, parliamentarians below the age of 30 in India, every single one of them is a member of a political dynasty. Every single one of them. So let's, we believe in meritocracy. It's hard work. It's sometimes imperfect. There's always advantage in family connections and wealth. But we've got to keep working against that. But all countries, including Singapore, face this problem. And it's interesting that no Muslim country today has condemned China on the Xinjiang policy. But when I was cruising in Croatia, someone told me what an Italian professor in Chengdu said. It's quite interesting. Take it in the right spirit. You know, he said, the Chinese, the Americans are not known to love Chinese. They're not known to love Muslims, but somehow they love Chinese Muslims a lot. In 1984, 1982, Margaret Thatcher visited Deng Xiaoping and muted the idea of another 50 years of British rule. She was badly advised. Deng Xiaoping, with great accuracy, spat into a spitoon, you know, and Margaret Thatcher was so rattled when she left the Great Hall of the People, she tripped on the steps, and they knew that that's not negotiable. So in 1984, they had the Joint Declaration. Now, the Joint Declaration is asserted by the British as a treaty which bound China post, uh, 1997. China never accepted that. The Joint Declaration is called a Joint Declaration because you make your declaration, I make my declaration. We put it up together in order to facilitate a smooth handover on June 30th, 1997. It was not the treaty. If it was the treaty, like the Treaty of Nanking, it would have been called a treaty. So I have a very interpretation of Hong Kong, and it's based upon my own experience living there and the sort of things which were happening that when they stormed the legislature, I think it was Nancy Pelosi who said, oh, what a glorious sight, until January 6th happened, then it didn't look so glorious after that. So the double standards were so thick, you could cut through it with a knife. Yeah. Germany was divided because it was an aggressor. China was divided because it was a victim. So the moral cause of German reunification is on any balance greater than German reunification. I thought that was a very powerful message that Wang Yi put across, but it was hardly reported in your media. Uh, they don't support invasion. They've said that in their first principle, but at the same time, they say there's a history to it, which was NATO's relentless expansion to the East, which the Chinese have always opposed because it bifurcates the world and it is divisive and and aggressive. So China is saying, look, if you want peace, you can't just look at a snapshot. If you, you've got to look at the entire video, then when you look at the entire video, you'll find a way to the future. But if you just look at a snapshot, you won't find a way to the future.
>> Well, thank you so much, Professor Yo, uh, for your insightful, uh, speech. My name is Mahmed Jawadi. I'm a second-year master's student here at the School of Transnational Governance. But my question is a bit about the, the state of play and the status quo and the future of EU-China relations. In 2019, the European Union characterized China as a competitor, uh, rival, and also partner. And since then, until now, different European officials just describe China as an an assertive power, or sometimes describe it as a country trying to rewrite the international order. But two weeks ago, again, Mr. Borrell submitted a paper at the Gymnich meeting stating China as partner, rival, and competitor. So there is no change in characterization of China. So my question is that, how accurate is that characterization and that vision, and, uh, if you think that it is not really accurate, what would be your prescription in order just to characterize China for Europe? Thank you.
For a number of centuries, the West has been used to being dominant in the world. I talk about Jesus Christ from being Chinese to being European. A equivalent process must not, must now take place to bring us to a better balance point. It will take time. That the Americans, from helping China rise again, now fear China's rise is to be expected. There should be a Western response should also be expected. China will not escalate because it knows it's getting stronger and philosophically has a deep sense of itself. But at the same time, they cannot afford to show weakness. And just by being firm and being independent, the Chinese are giving hope to others. They, they too can stand firm and be independent, even though they are weaker. And this will help crystallize a multipolar world. But this is not a process which the Americans can take lightly, and not even a process which the entire West will take lightly. So we are in the period of a great transition, but it will come about, and to some extent, the global economic situation and the Ukraine war will help precipitate gradually this future.
From >> Oh, you're from Iran.
>> Oh, okay. Then, then I will elaborate later.
>> Yes. My name is Tamasuch. I'm from Hungary. Currently here for a one-year, uh, visiting fellowship. I, I work for the European Commission otherwise. And, uh, thank you for the amazing, uh, lecture. Very insightful. And, uh, my question is basically also specifically because you have been minister for culture and also minister for foreign affairs, among many other titles, uh, how do you see the role of culture in foreign policy in general, and the role and use of soft power, uh, in China in particular, because they're quite controversial views, especially since Xi Jinping took power. So basically, that's the question. Thank you.
In my years in government, I found that, uh, culture touches the opposite party the most and is the most remembered. I knew Frank-Walter Steinmeier when he was foreign minister, and what we most remember is a little project when I had a piece of the Berlin Wall in my constituency, and I asked Helmut Kohl, whom I was a minister in attendance to in 1994, and at that time was already a recluse, I asked for a message from him through hostile ship, and he gave me that message. I don't think Steinmeier remembers me for anything else. In my relationship with India, I was for 10 years involved in the revival of an ancient Buddhist university called Nalanda, which was recorded in great detail by a Chinese monk in the 7th century, but which history was long forgotten. It had, it was the world's first university. It was destroyed by Afghan invaders after Oxford was established, but before Cambridge, and in India, they did not know the history. But in China, that history is immortalized in Journey to the West and the story of the Monkey God. Never lost. In the 19th century, the British archaeologist Alexander Cunningham, who started the Archaeological Survey of India, a great institution, he read a translation of what the monk wrote in the seventh century. He was astonished by its accuracy. And after that grew in India, a group of, uh, Buddha sahibs, they call them, you know, who were archaeologists working off Chinese records of India. So the Indians remember me and gave me a very high award for this university project. And I, with the Russians, I help, I'm still helping them establish a church in Singapore, and the Russian foreign ministry remembers me not for my work in the trade ministry or foreign ministry, but for my work in helping them establish a church in Singapore. So culture touches people the most deeply. They'll forget everything else, but they never forget how you treated them in their identity. Yeah.
Uh, Morton Bergmann, the director of Silver Up, the Center for International Law Research and Policy. We have an office here in Florence. Thank you for your, uh, brilliant presentation. Uh, in, uh, the question of Xinjiang and the Uyghur, the US State Department and various British actors are saying that there has been genocide, whilst the leading scholars of the law, of of genocide, they say that there is no evidence, there is no proof, and that the US State Department should stop using this classification unless it produces the proof. By making use of such classifications as genocide and crimes against humanity, one also generates feelings of blameworthiness, and that there is a threat, uh, from the Chinese, uh, government. What are your thoughts on the way the US and and British actors use human rights terminology, the human rights narrative, and soft international law, uh, in the contest which you refer to between the United States and China?
>> Well, it's part of, uh, the information warfare that makes it very difficult for us sometimes to know what to believe and what not to believe. I first accompanied Lee Kuan Yew to Xinjiang in the year 2000, just before he stepped down as Prime Minister.
>> It's okay. That's not Xinjiang. Yeah. Uh, I was surprised when I went there to find that road signs were in Roman characters, in Chinese characters, and in Arabic characters. So I asked accompanying Chinese officials. I said, when did that happen? Oh, say Mao Zedong wanted it. In fact, when the Communists took over, they restored the names of many places to their Uyghur names. But of course, the Chinese attitude is, you're a minority, you threaten me politically, I smash you, like they did with Yakutsk in the 19th century, the Qing Dynasty. But if you don't threaten me, then I'm very generous to you. In fact, I treat you better than Han people. So the population policy never applied to the Uyghurs, and that's why there are many more Uyghurs today, in proportionate terms, than Han Chinese or any other group. So there's certainly no physical genocide. In 2011, August, I went back to Xinjiang, the trade delegation, and I went to Kashgar. In Kashgar, I saw women in Central Asian burqas, which is a whole basket put on top of their head. I was shocked. I asked Chinese officials, say, why do you allow this? They said, "No, it's a custom." When I was a young girl, they took me horse riding. I can ride a horse to save myself. So they don't worry a young girl or boy will hop behind you, a Kazakh, and they'll gallop the horse, and it was very exciting. I tried to speak to her in my poor Mandarin. She could not understand me. So again, I asked the Chinese. I said, "Why aren't you teaching them Chinese?" He said, "No, they're nomads. We leave them alone." They did not realize then, it was two weeks before September 11th, that the Salafis had been working on their minds, and from 2010 to 2015, there were a spate of terrorist incidents in China to a point where the Han people in Xinjiang had to arm themselves. I also knew this from my cousins in China who used to go to Xinjiang, and then during that period, they say it's no longer safe, and now they're all over Xinjiang again because peace has returned. So this whole story that there's genocide in Xinjiang, to me, does not reflect what's happening there. Yes, they have been draconian in making sure that Salafi influence is controlled in China. But all countries, including Singapore, face this problem. And it's interesting that no Muslim country today has condemned China on the Xinjiang policy. But when I was, uh, cruising in Croatia, someone told me what an Italian professor in Chengdu said. It's quite interesting. Take it in the right spirit. You know, he said, the Chinese, the Americans are not known to love Chinese. They're not known to love Muslims, but somehow they love Chinese Muslims a lot. So that's my answer to your question. Yes, please. Thank you very much. I'm Sonia Punerikman, a member of the external advisory board and of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Thank you very much for an utterly inspiring speech. I have tried to keep track of Chinese development, reading a lot, but, yeah, I will certainly not, uh, have reached the point of Matei. Uh, I have a question which is a political philosophical question. How would you, um, estimate the Chinese capacity to deal with discontinuities and to integrate that into the Taiwanese question? Perhaps you will now tell me that I don't understand anything of Taiwan, and I would take that, but it is a democratic state. Is that not the case in your opinion? And if so, um, how would, in a Chinese reading, uh, to be dealt with with this democratic development as a different one as China has experienced, uh, in order to perhaps assess the whole question of independence in a different way? Is that at all feasible, thinkable, etc.? We had a similar development with Hong Kong, hadn't we? Uh, where there was this solution of, um, one country, two systems. And, um, well, I don't think that China really lived up to that. But, yeah, perhaps you see this differently. Thank you.
China never accepted the Treaty of Nanking which ceded Hong Kong in perpetuity to the British as being a valid treaty. They never accepted that the issue was not put to the test because a large part of Hong Kong on the mainland side was leased to, uh, Britain for 99 years, and and even by British law, that land had to be returned, and when that land is returned, Hong Kong is no longer viable. In 1984, 1982, Margaret Thatcher visited Deng Xiaoping and muted the idea of another 50 years of British rule. She was badly advised. Deng Xiaoping, with great accuracy, spat into a spitoon, you know, and Margaret Thatcher was so rattled when she left the Great Hall of the People, she tripped on the steps, and they knew that that's not negotiable. So in 1984, they had the Joint Declaration. Now, the Joint Declaration is asserted by the British as a treaty which bound China post, uh, 1997. China never accepted that. The Joint Declaration is called a Joint Declaration because you make your declaration, I make my declaration. We put it out together in order to facilitate a smooth handover on June 30th, 1997. It was not the treaty. If it was a treaty like the Treaty of Nanking, it would have been called a treaty. So the Chinese are saying, once we have a smooth handover, sovereignty has returned to China. But China, in its declaration, said that it will promulgate a Basic Law, which it legislated in consultation of Hong Kong people, under which one country, two systems would last for 50 years. In that Basic Law, a national security law in Hong Kong must be enacted. So for 20 over years, it was never enacted, which means that in terms of performance, Hong Kong failed to keep up its side of the bargain. So the mainland then imposed a national security law on Hong Kong, but still requires Hong Kong to make subsidiary legislation, and that's right now being done. I lived in Hong Kong during that period, uh, and my wife and I no longer felt safe. I saw the way the social media was systematically demonizing the police and Hong.