Transcription
A big war is bound to happen for sure >> Heavily preparing for the next war >> I think it is a method of showing power to come out and let people know that I still control the entire situation >> But if it does not end like I said just now, this matter is still long >> The Thai-Cambodian conflict might also be one character that China will have to make us and Cambodia stop fighting in order to prepare to accept the big war, which is World War 3 >> America having to retreat in this matter is no different from America showing failure or defeat. The Iran side will still have problems like this all the time, and it might eventually stumble upon the matter of shipping, oil prices, energy, those will come back again >> America will make war in order to seize the Strait of Hormuz, so there must be events like this as an excuse to attack Iran's military infrastructure in order to prepare for the next heavy war >> The thing that will give Iran the power to control and to charge transit fees, in the form of tolls or whatever, they will have to move the shipping route from the blue line into their front area. The way to move it is that they go lay mines in the light blue area >> Iran will probably not retreat, but the American side creates ambiguity. It seems like America will retreat to Iran in the MOU, but does not fully retreat. Iran, if ships can still enter and exit the Strait of Hormuz, right? America does not block the outer layer. Iran still has income from trading oil and various goods coming into the country, even though it is not as good as having the sanctions lifted, as America says. In the end, it is a quarrel. Iran says it has been specified that Iran will be the one controlling this opening. It will open, but must be according to Iran's conditions only >> In summary, Iran wants to make people in the Middle East understand and clearly realize that the green channel is only temporary. Besides that, there are still 2 more ships preparing to try this route. It turned out they were notified to turn back, and in the end they actually turned back. Those 2 ships, I got information before coming on the show with Khun Guitar, that they were from Saudi Arabia and from the UAE. But all of this, I think, will probably just be once, and the rest will be allowed to pass smoothly >> Which I believe that China is heavily adjusting its strategy now because China is starting to know that a big war is bound to happen for sure, unavoidable. The reason is regarding the blockade of Taiwan. China has sent signals that Japan and the Philippines have negotiations about maritime boundary delimitation in the South China Sea, with the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelves. China says, "Hey, in the South China Sea, China also has a part. Why not inform China? Why go agree between two countries, Japan and the Philippines?" Today itself, there will be 2 scenarios for what they call "Perfect World War 3," which is full-scale World War 3. Our goal is to take this channel to 1 million subscribers. Please hit Subscribe. We now have YouTube Membership. Just by becoming a member, you will get access to exclusive content and seminars from PRP and Team Business Tomorrow. It seems there will be a new round of negotiations after they exchanged fire in the recent period. Do you still think this round is buying more time, or will they actually return to the negotiating table and move towards true peace? >> The negotiation in Doha today is a strange negotiation because representatives came, and according to the latest news, they will negotiate each staying in different rooms, Khun Guitar. >> Yes. >> So before we get into the situation of what is likely to happen from now on, with the updated situation, I will rewind a bit so that the viewers and listeners can follow along. After signing the 14-point MOU, there was immediately an attack. The latest: Iran attacked a Singapore-flagged ship, which I call Singapore-flagged because the real owner is Taiwan, and attacked a Panama-flagged ship. Then, after Iran finished attacking, the US responded immediately by attacking the city of Sirik and the island of Qeshm, which the US expected both locations had to be attacked because they were missile launch bases, drone launch bases, and radar bases of Iran. After the US attacked, Iran announced that the reason for attacking the Singapore-flagged and Panama-flagged ships was because they were sailing close to the Omani coast without notifying Iran, because Iran declared that Iran would be the sole controller of Hormuz, with Oman co-administering, but the final decision rests with Iran. Therefore, they must notify Iran first. That is the reason Iran attacked. After that, when the US attacked Qeshm Island and the city of Sirik, Iran immediately retaliated by attacking 8 US military bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. Looking at this, I see that the 14-point agreement, which says that within 30 days the Strait of Hormuz must be opened, and within 60 days talks on nuclear development will begin, seems to be getting darker and darker. It looks more like buying time. But what I have observed, and you viewers and listeners following me, is that after this signing happened, what occurred? The Russia-Ukraine war erupted. Ukraine sent thousands of drones to attack Moscow. Now Putin is under heavy domestic pressure asking why he doesn't use Iran's strategy of attacking drone production bases in NATO countries or in Europe. Both the Russian opposition and Russia's own working team have reached a consensus that Russia must open a front in Europe. We have to watch and see what President Putin will finally decide, whether to attack like Iran, wherever there is a NATO base or weapon production base that destroys Russia, they must go destroy them all. That will 100% cause a regional war in Europe, Khun Guitar. >> Yes. >> Secondly, Khun Guitar, look at China recently. There have been unusual diplomatic operations, starting from President Xi Jinping flying to meet Kim Jong-un, then from now on, there will be invitations. Simply put, Cambodia, right? Signed already with Hun Sen. Then the Prime Minister will go in July upon invitation. And there are many other countries that are very busy with China. I believe that China is heavily adjusting its strategy now, because China is starting to know that a big war is bound to happen for sure, unavoidable. By what? China currently enhances operations near Taiwan, with a plan to blockade both air and sea. China is now drilling, sending ships into the Taiwan Strait. And finally, if an event occurs, I believe China will blockade Taiwan both by sea and air, establishing a no-fly zone north of Taiwan. The reason for blockading Taiwan is that China has sent signals that Japan and the Philippines have negotiations on maritime boundary delimitation in the South China Sea, with the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelves. China says, "Hey, in the South China Sea, China also has a part. Why not inform China? Why go agree between two countries, Japan and the Philippines?" Not only that, the latest is that the South Korean government and the Japanese government have announced full-scale defense cooperation. We must realize that South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines are all what? Allies under the US Indo-Pacific strategy, Guitar. >> Yes. >> There is movement now. Therefore, when China announces a maritime blockade through naval drills, Taiwan immediately raises its war readiness, Guitar. This is what happened after signing the 14-point MOU. >> Yes. >> Therefore, I see it this way. Today itself, there will be 2 scenarios for what they call "Perfect World War Three," which is full-scale World War III. I analyze this from many things happening simultaneously. Scenario 1: If the US, Israel, or NATO cannot hold until the US midterm elections, which affect the government's decision-making because it needs votes in Congress, both Senate and House, it might explode before then. Scenario 2: Trying to hold until after the US midterm elections, Donald Trump wins and can control both the House and Senate. Therefore, these 2 scenarios cannot avoid World War III. It is just a matter of whether it will happen before or after the midterm elections. We have to follow the situation minute by minute, because if it happens, it will occur in 3 major battlefields. 1: Regional battle in Europe, Russia vs. NATO, as Putin's team and Putin's opposition support that they must go out of the country, not just fight in Ukraine's 4 regions plus Crimea, but must go destroy the weapon production bases supporting Ukraine, because if Russia continues like this, Russia will lose. So we wait and see. The first battlefield is Russia vs. NATO. The second battlefield is the Middle East, which we see today, talking and negotiating while alternating attacks, each side having its own reasons. Therefore, if it happens this round, I believe it will be big. That is, the Middle East including India, near the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, it will be version 3 of the clash, but this version will be a decisive one because it will move towards what is called "Perfect World War T." The third battlefield is the most frightening, Guitar, because big brother China today shows what they call a clear reaction to respond to this war. First of all, Guitar, few people know that China is accelerating production of 1 million drones since 2024, to be completed by 2027, because China thinks that a big war with the US will be very difficult to avoid under the Indo-Pacific strategy, especially in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. This will pair up: North Korea vs. South Korea, and vs. Japan, China seizes Taiwan according to the annexation plan, which is a national plan, and destroys the Philippines and allies. China's allies are Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam. The US allies are clearly the Philippines, Japan, South Korea. As for the decisive point, it is not in the South China Sea. The decisive point, if the Indo-Pacific regional battle occurs, is the Strait of Malacca, which is Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Guitar's Thailand. They will be in this battlefield unavoidably. Therefore, President Xi Jinping inviting Hun Sen, inviting Hun Sen to talk in Beijing, and about to invite our PM Anutin to talk, I believe the talk is about adjusting attitudes. Simply put, what is the perspective if the Indo-Pacific strategy actually happens? This will be a big deal for the whole world, and I believe the third war will erupt, whether before or after the US midterm elections. There will be many battles in one war. There might be 20 battles. We already see: Russia vs. Poland, Russia vs. Germany, Russia vs. England, right? Or Russia vs. France, or Russia vs. Finland. Iran might fight Israel, the US forces in the Middle East, including Bahrain and Kuwait, where Iran keeps firing rockets. So there might be many battles. But in the South China Sea, wow, I think it will be very messy because there are about 10 countries involved in this region: North Korea, South Korea, Philippines, China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia. I predict that from now on, we must watch. Looking at the overall picture now, the situation is continuously developing, and China is fully playing the big brother role now. And I see it this way: Today, the US ceasefire is for major reasons: 1) Oil prices in the US. Although the US is a major oil producer, both oil and gas, the state is not a major refiner; it relies on imports from the Middle East. Therefore, the US stop is to stop to adjust plans, to increase weapons, and to reduce inflation, because inflation affects the cost of living and affects bond yields, Guitar. This is what is likely to happen from now on. That is, the Thai-Cambodian conflict might be one character that China will have to be able to make us and Cambodia stop fighting in order to prepare to receive the big war, which is World War 3. >> In this case, does that mean Iran wants sole power and also cuts Oman out? Professor, Iran and Oman have very good relations, especially during the past war. Iran itself cannot reject Oman because it is the country on the opposite side. If Iran wants to completely control this strait, it cannot do it alone; it needs the Omani side to jointly issue regulations and so on. And Article 5 specifically mentions that Iran must negotiate with Oman to determine the management approach, right? Therefore, Iran and Oman are unlikely to lead to conflict where they cannot talk. They should be able to discuss and set a framework. But Khun Guitar and the viewers, I will say this: That MOU, I see it as a response to immediate necessity rather than aiming for complete long-term success and covering the immediate needs of each side. That is, many sides of America want to end the war and return to the country to handle domestic political issues, preparing for elections, right? The Iran side also wants to end the war to restore the country. Therefore, this immediate issue has produced a few important points. America wants to end the war, wants Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, and wants Iran to promise not to possess nuclear weapons. Iran wants to end the war and wants America to open the outer barrier of the Strait of Hormuz and return to revive its economy. That might be called the minimum success of the negotiations that will occur. Iran might hope for the lifting of any sanctions, right? If that is achievable, it is good for Iran. But if not, at least returning to the pre-war condition: Iran, if ships can still enter and exit Hormuz, and America does not block the outer layer, Iran still has income from trading oil and various goods coming into the country, even though it is not as good as having sanctions lifted, as America says. In the end, it becomes a quarrel again, because America says the sanctions relief money must be used to buy American goods, later added, right? Iran says no, it is our freedom; we will take the money to buy whatever from whomever. >> Yes, but regarding the global energy and shipping sectors, there is a short simple question: Will the Strait of Hormuz actually be opened? Because there are thousands of ships waiting, goods waiting to go out, oil needing to be shipped to the world. Will it become a prolonged war zone forever, or will there eventually be an end to the problem in the Strait of Hormuz, Professor? >> Two matters: 1) The reality or at least this period, how is it? 2) In the long term, what will the situation look like? IHS Markit has collected data on ships entering and exiting during the clashes from June 26 to June 28. There were still 48 ships entering and exiting, mostly oil tankers and gas carriers. But comparing to the previous period, there were 70 ships per day before that, and 54 ships the day before the clash. This shows that ship traffic is still ongoing, though reduced during the clashes, but not yet back to pre-war levels of about 120 ships per day. Before the latest clash, it had dropped to 70 ships, which was considered a big improvement, but then it stumbled during the latest clash, which I call a contest of legal interpretation. Now, in the long term, it will likely be necessary to agree with Iran. The US and Iran must agree on how to manage this strait. >> Iran will probably not retreat, right? But America creates ambiguity. It seems to retreat to Iran in the MOU, but does not fully retreat, ready to come back to use force if Iran completely controls it. This shows there is still much ambiguity. And we see that Iran is very determined that this strait must be under their control. They will collect tolls or not, I don't know, but entering and exiting must be reported to them. While America emphasizes that ships must have free passage, no tolls allowed, right? These are different perspectives. Ultimately, I see this, Khun Guitar and viewers: America under Trump may have to accept the reality that this war was not successful and that the strait has been taken over. >> Yes. >> Therefore, America having to retreat in this matter, right? It is no different from America showing failure or defeat. But if not retreat, the Iran side will still have problems like this all the time, and it might eventually stumble upon the matter of shipping, oil prices, and energy, those will come back again. In conclusion, for this matter to end completely, America may have to accept the reality that Iran is the controller. As for how Iran will control and collect fees for entry and exit, that can be discussed in detail. But if it does not end like I said just now, this matter is still long. There will be chances to stumble and use force again anytime. >> Yes, but could it become a trigger to escalate into war, or retaliation, or more severe attacks, Professor? >> Yes, possible. But I see that both sides, Iran does not want a big war to return at this time, right? While everything is recovering, and the US incentive measures for Iran to unlock sanctions, therefore, if things do not go too far, they are ready to talk or to negotiate, even if there is some occasional use of force. On the Iranian side and the American side, not having a big war again is the best solution at this time, and then they can create an explanation for their voters in the US about how they succeeded in this war. Therefore, if we look at it, I think both sides will benefit more from not having a big war, see? But there might be occasional clashes, which could happen, but not another major war. >> Yes, but currently we are still at point one, which is about ceasefire in all battlefields, up to point five about the Strait of Hormuz. Professor, we haven't reached halfway of the MOU yet. What is the chance that they will actually talk or make the MOU practically enforceable and more stable? Professor, do you think it's possible? Are there any new vulnerabilities in the MOU that will be discussed tomorrow? >> The weakness of the MOU of the 17th is haste. Haste, especially on the US side, they were in a big hurry to sign. You'll see they scheduled a meeting in Switzerland, right? Friday they were going to sign, but in the end they didn't; they signed online. They wanted to sign quickly, afraid Iran might change its mind. Now, this haste itself signals that they don't want to continue this war, right? But this haste also means the details were not fully discussed, Khun Guitar, right? That's why when problems arise, the interpretation leads to the use of force. Ultimately, it leads to needing to discuss details again. Tomorrow's scheduled meeting is about saying, "Okay, what should the details be?" But Khun Guitar, I don't know if I am too pessimistic, but in the history of political conflicts in this region, nothing ends easily or is solved easily. There will be interwoven factors everywhere that are obstacles. Let's look at an example: the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Palestine, or Israel and Lebanon – it hardly works in practice. It's just a ceasefire, a full ceasefire, but there is still use of force, still blockades, periodic incidents, see? That is what happens in this region. Therefore, hoping that the ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran will proceed smoothly within 60 days, I almost don't expect that. >> I think it will take a lot more time. Or in the worst case, it might only achieve the minimum to end the war, as I said. The ultimate issue, nuclear, is difficult to discuss, right? There are many details, and it will be hard to discuss. The nuclear issue, the issue of sanctions, etc., there will be much to discuss, and it will be difficult. So the minimum is to end the war first, and let each side get the minimum they can accept. I see that from what I said earlier, about 3-4 points, yes. >> Yes, Professor. For those who view the situation as untrustworthy, during the negotiations, both sides might go off to build up their forces and military strength, then come back to fight again. A moment ago, Professor, you thought that looking at interests, not fighting might be more positive for both sides. But as time passes, Iran becomes stronger, America gets past the midterm elections. Are there any future risks that could make both sides return to war or conflict? >> I think internal political pressure is important, both in Iran and the US. In Iran, there are right-wing, centrist, hardliners, softliners in the government, right? In the US, it's clear. Domestic politics heavily affects Trump's policies. For example, in Iran, if the right wing thinks there is too much compromise and loss of benefits, they might push the government to show a tougher stance and use force again. In the US similarly, Trump's challenge now is what? To make Americans see that he did not lose this war, right? The issue is how to campaign to voters, to say he won, he didn't lose. That is a big challenge for Trump. I had a chance to read an article by Trump's campaign aide, and people in the Republican party are looking at how Trump and his close circle view things. The article by "On Frego" in IHS Markit, the Trump aide, let's call him that, says that this MOU is not a peace agreement but a tactical ceasefire, like Khun Guitar said earlier. It's to buy time for each side, on different personal reasons, based on mutual distrust even a little. This means it's a reason that both sides cannot move forward, but in the meantime, they are buying time, ceasing fire to replenish forces for each side. And Trump's aide, this "Frego," talks about Iran's past behavior that America should not forget. For example, he says history shows Iran only agrees to negotiate when facing heavy pressure. Once signed and pressure reduced, they go back to old ways, violating agreements again. That is what he said. For example, in the JCPOA in 2015, Trump's argument was that the agreement was okay for nuclear, but it gave Iran money to support its proxies and develop weapons, and in the end Iran did not stop nuclear activities. And Frego says Iran's nuclear goal has never changed. Iran deliberately tells the world they are willing with the IAEA, but in the end they don't cooperate. The ultimate goal is to possess nuclear weapons. So if we assess the thinking of Trump's aide here, he still sees that this agreement does not solve the Iran problem sustainably. It is a truce. If we talk about peace, there are two types: negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace is just ending the use of force, ending the war first, nothing more. Positive peace is not just ending force, but also solving what are structural problems in the relationship, cultural and mindset issues, structural problems from the past, such as nuclear issues, sanctions, legal rules that were issued. If these are not revised and detailed solutions made, in the end, it risks returning to use of force again in the future. Or as Khun Guitar said, it is just a temporary ceasefire to later have another war. What Trump's aide says here is trying to say that we must go back and tackle the structural problems, especially nuclear and sanctions. Okay, the MOU signed on the 17th did try to address the nuclear issue, but I see it as a very superficial touch. If we compare it to the JCPOA, which had many details and hard work, the details of the latest MOU are like solving immediate problems rather than long-term ones. Whatever it takes to end the war is better. In the end, I might see it this way, Khun Guitar: even the Iranian nuclear issue, Iran might go back to the pre-war state, which is to assert that they don't have nukes and don't want to make nukes, but at the same time, it is not resolved, not cleared up; it remains protracted and dragging on, just enough to explain to Americans: "See? Iran says they don't have nukes anymore," but the detailed inspections, point by point, might never be achieved. >> Why did another clash occur, sir? Is it because of misunderstanding, or do you think it was intentional to cause trouble in the Hormuz area this time? >> We have to go back to the agreement or MOU between the US and Iran that they made. Of course, both sides had to retreat on some issues, but looking at it, it seems the US had to retreat on more issues than Iran a little bit. Certainly, both sides will have groups within their own countries that are dissatisfied and see it as conceding too much to the opponent, something like that. In the US as well, especially the lobby groups and including Israel, were dissatisfied and saw it as too much concession to Iran. However, Trump revealed that he had to sign because it was necessary. The US strategic oil reserves could probably last no more than 4 weeks, something like that. And if Iran still closes the strait, it impacts oil prices in the US too, food becomes expensive, so it was necessary to sign. Now, after signing, many points were specified. For example, on the issue of Iran needing to open the strait, Iran says it was specified that Iran will control this opening. It will open, but must be according to Iran's conditions only. Iran will facilitate, but the US probably didn't focus on that point, thinking, "Okay, since it's open, it's open." The US also wanted to save face regarding its prestige or superpower status, because not being able to control one of the most important strategic straits in the world, the Strait of Hormuz, is a loss of superpower prestige. So the US wanted to open its own shipping route without having to rely on Iran's route. Iran opens for entry and exit, but only via the channel Iran specifies. For other channels, Iran does not guarantee safety. The US said, "Okay, Iran doesn't guarantee safety, and the US will guarantee safety itself," something like that, and tried to create a shipping route along the Omani coast. But Iran's shipping route goes along the Iranian coast. So when the US wanted to save face and open its own shipping route, there might have been a campaign or something to make some commercial ships dare to try this still unsafe route. It turned out an incident occurred. But before this, was the US fully prepared? They were fully prepared, because there were reports of aerial refueling tankers flying quite a lot, 6-7 at the same time, which signaled that there were probably many fighter jets operating there, likely to protect oil tankers and cargo ships to pass through the US-defined route, not needing to use Iran's route. It turned out they were attacked. Iran did not claim responsibility, but the US saw it as Iran's doing. So the US attacked the Iranian coast, mostly signal towers or radar stations of Iran. When such an attack happened, Iran saw it as a violation of the agreement, because the US clearly claimed responsibility, while Iran's drone attack was not claimed. So the US claiming responsibility was like announcing, "Okay, this is a violation of the MOU." Because the first point in the MOU says both sides shall not threaten each other's security. Launching a clear attack and admitting it is de facto a violation. Therefore, Iran retaliated by attacking US bases in Arab countries, especially Bahrain, which hosts the US Fifth Fleet, very large, and also CENTCOM, the US Central Command in Qatar? I think Qatar was not attacked; Bahrain and Kuwait were attacked mainly. Many locations were hit. That was the first time. Then the next night, it seems just last night, there was again shipping on the US-defined route. Simply put, it was like a test of Iran. It appeared Iran attacked, though they didn't say it, but it was known that it was likely Iran, attacking ships that did not follow their regulations that ships must pass only through Iran's defined route. Passing is free, no toll within 60 days, but must go that way. There was an attack, and the US did the same, attacking again. But this time it seemed heavier than the previous night, attacking signal towers, and also underground drone depots, and some IRGC strongholds. Iran retaliated and heavier this time, including attacking radar systems (very expensive) and also attacked US command centers, and there are reports of attacks on shelters or bunkers of US troops, perhaps in Kuwait or Bahrain, I'm not sure, but it was like a semi-bunker, quite strong. Many analysts see this as a preparation or something. Some might see it as an event to prepare for the second round of war. Because the US knows that if they want to fight Iran to seize the Strait of Hormuz, they must eliminate all these Iranian radar masts on the coast, because radar can detect violations and ship movements, and then send drones to attack. And it's not just radar, because the US does heavy jamming, yet Iran can still send drones to attack, meaning it might be optical or lens systems, not just ordinary radar. It must be some undisclosed technology. If the US wants to wage war to seize the Strait of Hormuz, they need to clean these up first. But just shooting them out of the blue would be difficult, so they need events like this as an excuse to attack Iran's military infrastructure. This is the view of some analysts. If this is true, I believe Iran also sees it this way: the US uses these events as excuses to attack Iran's military infrastructure to prepare for the next heavy war. Therefore, Iran retaliates in a similar way, attacking US infrastructure too, so that if there is a second round of war, the US will be weakened to some extent and unable to attack smoothly. So this is a plausible view. Both sides might know that there will definitely be a round 2, and this agreement probably won't last long. >> Yes, so we have to keep watching. But at the same time, Professor, there are news reports that after exchanging blows, they will return to the negotiating table. How do you weigh the possibility of moving forward with technical negotiations? Or do you actually believe they are waiting to attack each other for another round? >> Yes, there is news that they will come to negotiate, which is from US channels or media. But on the Iranian side, there are whispers that after the clashes over the last two nights (two consecutive nights), Iran seems reluctant to continue with detailed technical negotiations. However, it is possible that Iran might go ahead because, looking at another angle, the US did not respond a third time. The US attacked, Iran retaliated, then the next round the US did not continue. It seems like an escalation. Starting from Iran attacking a commercial ship, which actually is not US territory or soil, but instead of attacking Iranian ships, the US attacked Iranian territory, which is considered an escalation. So Iran escalated back by attacking official US bases, to show they are not afraid if there is another round of war, they are ready to continue, not afraid of this escalation. At this point, the US did not continue. When the US did not continue, it is possible that Iran might proceed to negotiate or not. At this time, we have to wait and see. But it is possible now. >> Professor, what are your observations on the attack events at the Strait of Hormuz, even though there is a peace agreement and MOU, but ultimately there were attacks again? >> To explain these events simply for the listeners, I sent a map to Khun Guitar. If you bring it up, you'll see the map. There are three navigation channels: light blue in the middle, which is the regular shipping route before the war. Light blue is the route in the middle, a safe and wide point. Khun Guitar and viewers will notice there is a thin white line running between the middle of the strait. You'll see that the light blue route is below the white line. The white line is the boundary between Oman's territorial waters (below) and Iran's territorial waters (above, north). Oman is south. Simply put, the pre-war shipping route was in Oman's territorial waters. But now, Iran wants to control the Strait of Hormuz. How do they want to control it? They want to be able to say that oil can come out little or much depending on them, which ship goes first or later depends on them. Therefore, the Arab countries inside cannot oppose them. Moreover, the customer countries, who gets what first, also depends on them. So, countries in Asia like India, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, must be very friendly with Iran. Who knows, one day it might escalate to the point that the currency for oil passing through might be required to use only Yuan, for example. Therefore, the thing that will give Iran the power to control and charge tolls, they need to move the shipping route from the blue line into their own waters. The way to move it is that they go lay mines in the light blue area, right? So when mines are laid, the normal shipping route is unusable. Even though the MOU says Iran will try to clear the mines within 30 days, I bet the chance of Iran actually clearing those mines is none. They did all this to force ships to go along the red line. Khun Guitar, you'll see that when ships go along the red line, they go right into Iran's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. That's exactly how they can collect fees. They will claim it's a service fee, safety service. They will try to guide the channel for passage, indicating which areas are safe. That's where they will collect the fee. Now, how did the green line come about? The green line is entirely in Oman's waters. The reason for the green line is this: The IMO, which is a UN body, saw this and tried to negotiate. They negotiated with Oman, saying there are hundreds of ships stuck on the left side, inside the Persian Gulf. Those ships have crews totaling 11,000 people, all stuck for 3 months. Not only stuck, but food is scarce, and they can't easily get supplies from shore. They live in fear, seeing drones and missiles fly overhead from both sides. The crews desperately want to go home. So the IMO negotiated with Oman to open the green line temporarily, as a special case, to let the stuck ships out. Now, the green line, after negotiations, started operating. It appeared that some ships, I guess, were stuck and came out. Iran observed that this was temporary and not a route for many ships, especially oil tankers, to pass. That's why they attacked one ship that had already passed through the green line and exited the Strait of Hormuz. It was a light attack, not much damage, but it was a cargo ship. Besides that, there were 2 more ships preparing to try this route. It turned out they were notified to turn back, and they actually turned back. I got information before coming on the show with Khun Guitar that they were from Saudi Arabia and from the UAE. In summary, Iran wants to make people in the Middle East, in the Arabian Peninsula, understand and clearly realize, to stamp it firmly, that the green channel is only temporary. Oman hoping to keep this and collect service fees competing with Iran will be difficult. And anyone hoping to use this channel to reduce Iran's power will not succeed, because Iran will have drones to enforce it. Actually, I looked into the details, and the green channel's geography: the Strait of Hormuz is wide at the top and narrow at the bottom. Looking at the terrain, the Iranian coast is flat, while the Omani side (behind the green line) is mountainous. So, the green line area is cliffs. But if ships, especially large oil tankers (VLCC), go out via the red line, they are heavy and sink deeper. The turning radius is wider, safer, and the spacing between ships can be closer. But the green line is tight due to mountains, sharp turns, making it inconvenient for large ships. Large ships need to clear other ships away. From my data check, it seems it cannot be a two-lane route. So naturally, the green channel has its own limitations; it is not as convenient as the light blue middle or the red line (Iran's). All of this, I think, is a method of Iran showing power to come out and warn, to let it be known that "I still control the entire situation." And all this is temporary. To make it clear. So, looking at this, today, after the morning incident, in the afternoon, the IMO released ships. It is now known that Iran showed power, and they observed but did not confirm. They eventually confirmed they were the ones who attacked the Singapore-flagged ship. But all of this, I think, will probably just be once, and the rest will be allowed to pass smoothly. >> Yes, but does that indicate that whatever happens, the Strait of Hormuz from now on will be primarily controlled or managed by Iran? It will not be free or safe all the time like before the war, even though the MOU says this area is free and can be transited, Professor? >> Oh, certainly. In my opinion, the MOU reinforces to the US, to the G7 at the meeting in France, and to the world, that now it is spread all over the world that the one who controls the Strait of Hormuz is Iran. But okay, they wrote that Iran controls jointly with Oman, but Oman is like a child compared to Iran, which is huge in size and military power. Oman cannot compete. Besides, it is clear that Iran wants to control the Strait forever. Going back, in the previous year or two, Iran suddenly closed the Strait of Hormuz and wanted to collect tolls, control oil output, and decide who goes first. Before, they couldn't do it because if they suddenly did, Arab countries would condemn, the world would condemn. But Trump opened the door for them to do it by joining with Netanyahu to attack fiercely. In the first week, they killed a new leader, his wife died, his children were killed. Moreover, there was property destruction, possibly 200,000-250,000 billion dollars, and many deaths, 3,000-4,000 people, with the first ones being little girls. They fired missiles into schools. So it seems the world understood and accepted it, seeing the events that led to Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, as Khun Guitar said, the Strait of Hormuz from now on will never be the same again. And I think Iran will control this strait forever, until someone can find a way to force Iran to let go, which I still can't imagine who could do that. >> Yes, Professor, but during the time they took control of Hormuz, it was early in the war when fighting was still ongoing. But now the war has ended, and everything is moving towards peace negotiations and lifting sanctions. Does Iran still have sufficient reason to control this area? Simply put, what is happening now? For the Iranian people, if the government retreats and lets go of the Strait of Hormuz, the people will not accept it because now it is in their hands. There is a professor at an American university, Professor Peab? He says he studied history going back to Roman times. He says that whenever a country takes control of a certain point that gives it power over other countries, he has never seen that country voluntarily retreat from that point, voluntarily release its grip on that point that gives it special power, without pressure or a necessary event forcing retreat. In conclusion, the chance of voluntarily letting go is zero. >> Thank you everyone for following us all along. Our goal is to take this channel to 1 million subscribers to create a wider learning society for economics, business, and investment. We now have YouTube Membership. Just by becoming a member, you will get access to exclusive content and seminars from PRP and Team Business Tomorrow. Please hit Subscribe.