Transcription
Every month, whenever I think you're the calmst human being I've met, you get calmer again. I'm like, how does he do this?
>> Well, thank you for saying that. It's a nice thing to say.
>> One honest question. When was the last time you yelled at somebody?
>> I don't know. Um...
>> Would you measure it in the weeks, months, or years?
>> Months. Months. Probably months. Yeah.
>> Oh, wow. Okay.
>> I'm human.
>> I just don't know. I just... I don't see you to be the person... you tend to be the person that we'd want on a negotiating table between countries like Israel and Iran. That's the type of demeanor that I get.
>> That's... yeah, that's... uh, better than hotheaded.
>> Um, actually, I know where to start actually. Um, um, now I spoke to... my first interview today was with um former Prime Minister Bennett, Naftali Bennett, and...
>> The goal of the conversation is to see how Israel would be if Netanyahu was no longer prime minister. My conclusion is different but not much different. Very small minute differences. Um, which gets me worried is: what does that mean? Because he supports maintaining the territory in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed. Disarming Hezbollah is no longer going to happen now because Iran won't allow it.
>> That's right. He calls for maintaining the territory in Syria until Israel can trust the president. Okay, but that's open-ended. Maintains no two-state solution. Um, still sees Turkey as a potential threat or as a hostile country.
>> And but yeah, but Erdogan, to be honest, I've been looking at Erdogan's statement. He's not... he's not a saint either. Not saying it's justified or not. I'm just saying that, you know, it takes two to tango. And on Iran, he's very hawkish. Um, so after that conversation, I came out of it and I'm like, what's the future of the region? And on top of it, we know that Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza all got bombed in the last 24 hours. Um, Yemen, there's a military buildup. The Saudi proxies are building up. So, I don't know. Um, and then there's the talks about... we've talked about potentially Trump and the US disengaging from the region. Well, you've got the admiral Brad Cooper heading to Lebanon, heading to Israel in the last couple of days. Marco Rubio's was in Libya's in the region again. I think he's in the Gulf. He did a tour in the Gulf. So, we're not seeing the US disengage from the region. We're not seeing a change of policy by Israel. We're not seeing a change of policy by Iran. It's not a good sign. And I spoke to, very, you know, Mark Montgomery and Professor Pay. Both concluded that there's an above 50% chance that... that's Professor P was my last interview, and the one before it was... two interviews before that was Mark Montgomery, former US Admiral. Um, they both concluded that there is an above 50% chance of war, you know, after the midterms.
>> Well, let me say at the outset that none of this is inevitable. Trump policymakers always have choices, even if they pretend they don't. And Trump has a choice. He can disengage if he chooses to do so. He can just get up and walk away. And uh, there's the Israel lobby. There's uh, you know, the neoconservatives in his own party. There's the Democrats. Um, there's the Iranians themselves, who basically are driving a very hard bargain given that they've basically won the war. All of these things will be pressures upon him. But he still always has the option of simply using his own volition and walking away, because that is his best option by far in the long term. It's his only option in my view, and the sooner he comes to that, the better. Um, and um, you know, the big sticking point behind the deal was always going to be the major sticking point was always going to be Israel, that Israel does not want to disengage from Lebanon, very likely does not want to disengage from Syria either. But Lebanon is explicitly in the deal, right? The need for a ceasefire in Lebanon, um, and respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, which implicitly means withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Uh, Israel doesn't want to do that. Israel wants to reignite this conflict, and as you noted, the Israeli opposition, of which Naftali Bennett is likely the major figure, uh, the most likely scenario of Netanyahu falling would involve Bennett becoming the next prime minister of Israel. He's at least as hawkish as Netanyahu is, arguably more so. At least he sounds that way. It's possible, by the way, that he's sounding more hawkish in advance of becoming prime minister, and that, you know, he'll relent once he becomes prime minister. I don't see major changes in Israeli strategy from Bennett. Bennett is no uh dove. There's nothing in his background to suggest that he's a dove. Um, and so Israel is the most likely scenario to break this agreement with Iran, to resume the war. Any resumption of the war would be catastrophic, because what Trump was facing and is still facing is the prospect of running out of oil supplies that we've run down. The United States and to some extent much of the world have run down oil reserves, and once that happens, yes, you're facing catastrophe. Trump stated this as explicitly as he could. He is facing the prospect of being Herbert Hoover, the president who presided over the 1929 crash and the initiation of the Great Depression. That's the prospect he's facing here. And he doesn't want to go down as Herbert Hoover, but that's what he's facing. And so if he resumes the war, that very possibly is what we're looking at here: some major economic catastrophe. And um Trump would be well advised not to do that. Um, how we'll go with this, I don't know. I think there is a significant chance of the war resuming. There always was. The deal was tentative. Um, everything about it is tentative. So I don't know how this is going to resolve. It could go either way.
>> Do you worry that this could spread to other countries in the region? Well, naturally. I mean, if I'm not mistaken, I've heard a report this morning that Pakistan to send troops to Saudi Arabia. I'm not quite sure what that means. It could mean that Saudi Arabia is worried about possibly the United States uh forcing uh Saudi Arabia through military force to participate in any resumed war against Iran. Uh, I don't know. I mean, I'm just trying to speculate, but um the presence of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia is not a good sign. Um, the um, there are all sorts of ways this could spiral out of control. There could be nuclear proliferation. That's another concern I have. Um, so I think the sooner this war is shut down, the better for the region and for the world.
>> Yeah. I'm just trying to get that report. I know that Pakistan... so the report... yeah, the report... I don't know about new troops being sent. I know troops were sent to Saudi from Pakistan um early in the war, during the war, including fighter jets.
>> I'm not sure if any new troops were sent since.
>> Okay, maybe I heard... maybe I might have heard that wrong. I'm not sure.
>> No, maybe maybe I didn't hear about it. But there are Pakistani troops anywhere and fighter jets uh inside Saudi. So that's a fact. What really worries me is the military buildup we're seeing in Yemen. And also you mentioned Lebanon.
>> Yemen,
>> there's a new deal now.
>> Yeah. Have you looked into Yemen much? I'm not sure if that's something you've covered extensively before.
>> Not extensively. No. I mean, I know what uh, you know, the basic fact basically is the Houthis are at least loosely allied with the Iranians, and there's always the prospect... the Bab el-Mandab Strait is another major choke point. And Saudi Arabia, and many of your viewers may know this of course, that Saudi Arabia uh does have a significant port um that would have access to the Red Sea, that the Houthis are in a position to shut down effectively. Um, and that would increase the economic catastrophe of the Strait of Hormuz being shut down. And so that's another card the Iranians have to play through the Houthis: the shutting down of Red Sea oil traffic uh through, you know, shutting down the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Um, the Houthis are in a position to do that, and um, you know, if there is a resumption of full-scale war in the Gulf, that clearly is a card that could be and very likely would be played. Uh, so yes, expansion of the war on that scale. You know, Trump tried to shut down Houthis and that didn't go very well. Um, and so I think what we're seeing here is a very dramatic illustration of the limits of US power. American presidents, of which Trump is only one, have always had this um sense of the limitless character of American power. We're now seeing that countries we did not respect and did not see as particularly important uh can challenge us very effectively um in a way that um has been very dramatic, and there's no going back from this. Is this going to be a permanent blow to US prestige in the region and globally?
>> What do you think is the more likely scenario? The US would just walk away from this and accept the new reality, or keep fighting to try to change it, and that's where the escalation trap or we get into a quagmire. Which one is a more likely scenario based on the developments you're seeing now, including... you know, we haven't spoken in a few days. There were in those few days... there's the Iranian strikes on ships going through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz, and the American retaliation by striking the Iranian mainland. The most likely scenario is Trump will bluff and uh, you know, engage in tit-for-tat sort of raids like he's done, and then back down. That's the most likely scenario in my view. Again, that's the only real realistic option he has, because the other option is a resumption of full-scale war, possibly including the escalation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait that we just discussed, an economic catastrophe, and Trump becoming Herbert Hoover. That's the alternative Trump is facing. I'm not saying he wouldn't do that, because Trump is a very unpredictable figure who's capable of irrational rash action. Uh, so I'm not saying that wouldn't happen. I think that's less likely. I think the more likely scenario is that Trump just backs down and sticks to some version of the deal, giving him some fig leaf to disengage and walk away, which I think is how this is likely to end, probably sooner than later.
>> Yeah, I was looking at the quote. A few of my guests mentioned it. So Trump said, and when did he say that again? Just a few days ago. He said, "The one president I did not want to be was the late great Herbert Hoover," referring to the uh the depression, the economic depression the US went through. What was the context? That was Trump defending his decision to reach a ceasefire agreement with Iran at the G7 summit. His key quote was, "I didn't want to see economic catastrophe. If you kept this going, that could have happened, rather than possibly going into a depression. Herbert Hoover was always the one I didn't want to be." Um, he's made... so that's the thing with Trump. Sometimes he just makes up, and sometimes he tells you exactly what he's thinking in the truth. It's hard to differentiate between the two sometimes. Like, for example, when he talked about sending alara to Lebanon to fight to fight Hezbollah, um, sounds like probably the only thing he could do that's more horrible than the Iran war itself in some ways. Um, but like, was he... is that a similar quote to him talking about the Abraham Accords, or does he mean it? It's uh, it's hard to tell with him. It's very hard to tell. It's very hard to see that the Abraham Accords would have much relevance. Now, the whole idea of the Abraham Accords uh would be that uh, you know, the Gulf states, beginning with most importantly Saudi Arabia but the others as well, would simply accept the status quo with regard to Israel-Palestine and simply abandon fully and completely the Palestinians. They'd accept American hegemony in the region, and that seems to be all torn up. The whole logic behind that was based upon Israeli and behind American hegemony um to some degree, and that's all been torn up here. It's been torn asunder. So I don't see that being revived in any meaningful sense. I don't know what incentive the Gulf states would have to go along with that at this point. Uh, I don't know. What are your thoughts on that, Mario?
>> Um, I don't know. So my next question was the hardest question I could ever ask you. No one could give me an indication. I actually asked Naftali the same question. What happens to Palestine? If that's the core issue, like what the foreign ministers of Qatar, Saudi, Turkey, Pakistan, etc. have said a few days ago. If that is the core issue for all the instability in the region, which I think is an oversimplification—I think it's more complex than just Palestine; even if the Palestinian issue is resolved, the Bab el-Mandeb, Iran, Gulf, US control, Strait of Hormuz, all this would remain—but anyway, I think it is one of the core issues of what's happening in the region. What happens to Palestine now? Everyone seems to have forgotten about it. Meanwhile, there's negotiations. Uh, there's the U... today, just today, there's a delegation, a Hamas delegation, arrived in Egypt to resume negotiations on implementing the second phase of this Gaza ceasefire plan. Four main items are under the table: the immediate start of the national committee's work, frameworks for weapon storage, new missions for the peace council, and coordination on a stabilization force. But according to Channel 13, quote, "The Israeli army's assessment is that Hamas is preparing on a human and logistical level for the next battle in the Gaza Strip." So, and Gaza was bombed constantly, gets bombed. It's nothing new. So what happens to Palestine? What happens to the West Bank and Gaza?
>> Well, there's never really been an effective ceasefire. I mean, this ceasefire seems to be a borderline joke. I mean, there's been a reduced level, I think, of violence, but reduced from an extremely high level before, and the Israelis don't seem to respect it as a ceasefire. So it wouldn't be surprising if Hamas is preparing some kind of response to that. That would be unsurprising from the standpoint of Hamas. That would be... what else would you expect them to do, really, uh, given what Israel has been doing and continues to do, even in the context of the ceasefire? One thing I mentioned before in your show, and I'll just say it again: I'm very surprised there hasn't been more of a reaction uh among the populace of the Arab world to this. I would have expected mass demonstrations um to the Gaza war, to the West Bank, to the whole of what Israel is doing. I'm very, very surprised about that. There's a long tradition in the Arab world of mass street protests. The Arab street will have its voice. I'm not seeing that very much here, and I can't really explain the quiescence of the Arab public on this issue. Um, but in any case, what you... um, I think that the elites—there's no doubt in my mind the elites of the major Arab states would like to bury the Palestinian issue and to see it go away, at least from their standpoint. And the problem from their standpoint is it's not going to go away. And it's um, and it's not going to solve all their problems either. I mean, basically the Iran war um that was really separate from the issue of Palestine. Um, and so I think basically what you have here is that uh all the um formulas Israel and the United States have had for resolving this have fallen apart. The idea was Iran was supposed to collapse like a house of cards. Um, you know, the Gulf states were going to accede to the logic of American-Israeli hegemony and sign a more generalized, broader version of the Abraham Accords, and all of that's over. I think that's dead and buried. Uh, American prestige in the region is gone. I'd be surprised if this ends with anything other than an American exit, complete American exit from the Gulf. I don't really see why the Arab states in the Gulf—UAE may be a weird exception, I'm not sure why the UAE is doing what it's doing—but apart from the UAE, I'm assuming there will be no US bases there in a matter of months. That's my guess.
>> Months. Wow.
>> Well, there a lot of them have been destroyed. We know that there has been massive destruction of US bases. And the key element of the US bases from the standpoint of the Gulf states was protection. It protects them from attack. It's done exactly the opposite. It's invited attack. So the strategic logic has fallen apart. And so I just don't see what the incentive would be to have continued US bases in the region. Uh, much better—and also, if America's the loser in this war, why would you align with the loser? Um, much better basically to diversify your sources of support, increase your activities with China. Yes, except basically that Iran is going to have augmented influence in the Gulf, and that does not militate in favor of continuing US presence in the Gulf. The exception is the UAE. And again, I don't fully understand.
>> Well, even the UAE... the UAE is um, it's already condemned Israel two days ago for their actions in Syria, right?
>> Yeah.
>> So, and um, obviously they've gone to Iran. They've accepted an Iranian delegation. So I think we're seeing even the UAE take a more pragmatic step to adapt to the new reality. And I think Saudi is another interesting example. It's like they're improving relations with Iran while also building deterrence. And what do I mean by this? Well, their forces, their allied forces—whatever you want to call them—the ones in Yemen that are aligned with Saudi and the UAE are amassing their troops for a potential conflict with the Houthis. So, it's um...
>> So the Saudis basically...
>> Right, they have their own plans for Yemen evidently. They have to, because they see it as... they have to, because they need um... so we've talked a lot about diversifying away from the Strait of Hormuz. Well, for the Saudis, if they diversify, why diversify to the Red Sea? Well, that means they're dependent on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is controlled by the Houthis. So there is that. You know, with the rise of a new power, against the fusibility trap um, there'll be resistance among other powers, and there'll be... you know, we're currently, you could say, we're in a semi-multipolar world in the Gulf. You've got Iran, you've got Israel, you've got Turkey, you've got—Turkey's not in the Gulf, but you've got um the Gulf countries that are building their own alliance with Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, etc. So you've got all these different poles, um, and it seems to be shifting to a potentially bipolar or unipolar world where there'll be one hegemon, or at least that's what they're trying to achieve. And that path could be fraught with even more instability for the region. So while I think this war created deterrence—I said this earlier today a few times—while it's created deterrence against direct conflict between those powers (US, Israel, Iran), um, it has created more um incentives for these proxy wars in other countries. So instead of um... Saudi will never fight Iran or allow the US to use their base to fight Iran, only under extreme circumstances, but instead they'll fight on other battlefields. They'll fight in Yemen.
>> Israel would not fight Iran directly, but they'll fight through Lebanon and Hezbollah. So that's um where those power struggles could start to shift the front from what it was—which is Iran was the front, Iran, the Gulf themselves, the US bases in Israel—to the other countries, the other pawns in this game.
>> Well, you know, a major issue that we've discussed previously on the show is the issue of whether or not a decline of American will lead to more conflict or less. My guess is less. Um, for in the case of the Persian Gulf, I've heard people discuss how, you know, Iran will then develop hegemonic ambitions. They'll act aggressively and so on. I just don't see any evidence of that either historically or presently. It seems what they're doing is—again, in a lot of ways they're not a very nice government internally, but that's separate from the issue of their foreign policy. We're seeing here is defensive. Iran. Everything Iran has been doing is to defend themselves against attack from very obvious and powerful enemies. And I'm just not seeing anything suggesting they have hegemonic ambitions. They do want to establish control over the Persian Gulf, but that would be to finance their recovery. Um, that's a reasonable objective from their standpoint. Uh, the toll booth that everybody's been talking about, that Iran is certainly going to demand in some form or another, uh, it seems to me that is for purposes of reconstruction. Again, I don't have a crystal ball and I can't predict accurately what Iran's going to do. I'm just not seeing any evidence of aggressive intention on the part of Iran here. Uh, again, what they're doing in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait through the Houthis, that's defensive. Um, what they're doing with Hezbollah, Hezbollah is the first line of defense. Um, the big question is um what would happen if Israel and the United States were no longer an issue for Iran? My guess is that the Persian Gulf would be a more peaceful place. Again, I can't guarantee that because I can't guarantee anything. But I just don't see any evidence to the contrary here.
>> Yeah. If I want to criticize Iran, I can criticize their actions in terms of projecting power through the Houthis, through Hezbollah, through the Iraqi militias. So they've actually used proxies as a way to expand their—through Hamas to a lesser extent—they've used proxies as a way to expand their influence in the region. And that, you know, might be seen, might seem as peaceful if you talk about Iran directly being part of a conflict, but it won't be peaceful to Lebanon, that's gone through years, decades of conflict between other groups. There won't be seen as peaceful. Um, with groups in Iraq that have been fighting for so many years. So it's uh, and obviously Yemen has had civil war for so long, and then you can even throw Syria into the mix if it breaks apart again. Um, so I don't know. I just think that all countries will advance their interests, and I think that the best path forward to project power right now is one of uh proxy wars, and that concerns me a lot for these countries and for the region. So much...
>> So much of academic realism—the kind of realism I was steeped in from graduate school—I think is based well, it's based on distant history pre-1945, but I think since 1945, it's based mostly upon the United States. And the United States has been a very aggressive country since 1945. Um, it's also been a very violent country. If you just look at... I can tick off some facts if people are interested in justifying that claim. Um, and I think that basically um the big question is: is this natural tendency to act aggressively when you get the chance to bully other countries—is that an innate feature of countries and maybe human nature, or is that the United States? All right. Is that something characteristic of the United States? My read is it's much more true of the United States. Um, and is it most true of the United States because the United States is the hegemon, so it's got the ability to do it the most? But if you got many other countries that are achieving the same thing or have tried doing the same thing through supporting different proxies...
>> Well, pretty much all countries in the Middle East have done it.
>> To some degree. In the case of Iran, though, most of what you've described, for example, could be argued as defensive. It is defensive. That's their forward line of defense. That if Israel attacks Iran, Iran has multiple ways of getting back at Israel, including through Hezbollah, through the Houthis. That could be viewed as defensive. I think from their standpoint, it is defensive, and that's how I would see it. Um, you know, much of what my analysis that I've just given you comes from studying the Cold War. I've been very impressed by, in so many cases, the Cold War was one of the Soviet Union acting mostly defensively and America acting offensively. Um, that's my read of the Cold War, and I know people are very surprised by that, but uh in case after case, um you know, the Cuban missile crisis, for example, people forget that that began partly because the US had previously established missiles in Turkey on Russia's borders. Well, naturally they would try and reciprocate. Um, so I would see much of people's concern about countries acting aggressively as projecting American behavior into a more generalized model which may not fit.
>> Yes, interesting point. But funny enough, you make the comparison to the Cold War because Naftali made that comparison. He's like, "Mario, the way I look at Iran is... and I would treat Iran as..." he sees Iran as a threat. The way I would respond to that threat is the way the US dealt with the Soviet Union, using any means except direct conflict to try to weaken and collapse the Iranian government, like the US collapsed the Soviet Union. That was a point he's making.
>> Well, there's no doubt that uh part of the model here that people have in Israel and to some extent in Washington is to try and break up Iran, to try and collapse Iran as a state. Somewhat as yes, the Soviet Union collapsed as a state, doesn't exist anymore. I should add I think that's also been the model of how to deal with Russia, uh, and openly discussed in the United States and Europe. But again, that's extraordinarily aggressive to talk that way. Iran isn't talking about breaking up Israel. Well, it's not true. That's not true. Um, they are basically saying Israel is illegitimate. So I guess you could say that. But I'm not seeing anything to actually destroy Israel. I'm not seeing that as an Iranian objective here. Um, you know, from Europe, basically they often talk about we want to break up Russia. I believe Kaya Kallas has said things like that. Russia doesn't say things like that about their enemies. Um, and so I think basically you're getting one side is much more aggressive than the other here. Um, and it's not America's adversaries that are aggressive. It's the United States and its allies that are aggressive. Um, for the most part.
>> Yeah. I didn't know about that quote by Kaya Kallas. Uh...
>> Kallas. Yeah. It's often been said that um, you know, breaking up Russia would be in our interest.
>> That's a crazy thing to say.
>> It is a crazy thing to say, and it's especially crazy given that Russia has 1,500 nuclear weapons. I mean, if there were a serious possibility of Russia breaking up the United States, what would the United States do? They'd start thinking about using nuclear weapons. That is very dangerous indeed. Kaya stated that the disintegration of Russia into smaller states would not be a bad thing, as she believes the existence of smaller nations could benefit European and global security.
>> This has been talked about for years as a western objective, not always quite so forward as Kallas. Bear in mind she's effectively the foreign minister of the EU. Uh, so that really is—and I have to be frank here, I don't like to speak so directly—a very reckless thing to say for somebody in her position.
>> Agree. That is a wild thing to think. Um, so to wrap up, professor—I'm just looking at a statement—to wrap up, um, where do you see this heading in the next few weeks and months? You still... I'm still in the optimistic camp. I think it's over just because it's over between the US and Iran as a direct war. So I stand by that position that I've had for a while. Um, but I'm, as you've already indicated, I'm a lot more worried about the war spreading to other countries as an alternative. So I don't believe in war, but I don't believe in peace either. I just believe in a war on different fronts, a different type of war. What's your stance on what we could expect in the next few months?
>> I'm moderately optimistic. My optimism is, as I said, that basically the United States, you know, it hems and haws, and it maybe engages in some pinprick strikes like it's been doing against Iran, and then ultimately accept some version of the deal and walks away. Um, Israel effectively will have to do so as well, at least have some kind of ceasefire in Lebanon, if not withdrawal from Lebanon, and then the conflict gradually winds down, and then followed by an American departure from the Gulf region for the most part, uh, reducing the overall level of violence. Iran would not then have a need to encourage the Houthis to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It would reduce the perceived need for Saudi Arabia to back the enemies of the Houthis and thereby reduce the level of violence in Yemen. So I would see an overall reduction in violence resulting from this as the most likely outcome, but that's not guaranteed. Trump could act irrationally and basically try to reignite the war in some fashion and insist basically on um not letting Iran win, which is what the alternative would be. Reigniting the war and producing an economic catastrophe, because economic catastrophe is what would result from the latter possibility.
>> Agree. Professor, always a pleasure to speak with you. Thank you so much for joining.
>> Sorry. Thank you for having me, Mario. Sorry.
>> What an end. That was a mic drop. That was a mic drop. Professor, thank you so much.
>> All right. Bye-bye.
>> Have a good day. Bye-bye. All right, guys. I'll be live again shortly. Talk to you soon. Bye.