Transcription
Cédric Perrin, hello. Hello. You are the senator for the territory of Belfort, and you are also the president of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the Armed Forces in the Senate. Thank you very much for being with us. Beside me, as every week to question you, is Michel Cabirol, editor-in-chief at La Tribune, specializing in aerospace, defense, and transport. Hello Michel. Hello Jean-Baptiste. Cédric Perrin, you have been working for several days, several weeks now, on the update of the Military Programming Law, which provides for an additional 36 billion euros. [grunt] Well, a simple question, ultimately. Does this update of the MPL prepare us correctly to defend ourselves in the coming years? Listen, this update of the MPL aims to provide an additional 36 billion euros for defense, which is a very significant sum, obviously, but it does not allow for an increase in defense resources. It essentially allows for securing, or I would say sanctifying, the previous Military Programming Law, the one from 2023, which the Senate had very largely stated was underfunded and would not allow, given the allocated resources, that is to say 400 billion plus 13 billion, but which were uncertain revenues, to ensure, in any case, the level we hoped to achieve by 2030. So, there is an update today, which tends to demonstrate that the Senate was right at the time, and therefore this update unfortunately does not allow for a sufficient increase in resources because, as I recall, since 2023, a number of things have happened in Ukraine, in the Middle East, and across the planet, which do not necessarily inspire confidence. An update that does not sufficiently draw lessons from what has happened precisely in recent years. You mention Ukraine, we see what is happening in the Middle East with the executive itself, the executive itself has not stopped sounding the alarm for a year now. There is a tweet from the current Prime Minister, who was Minister of the Armed Forces in February 2023, sorry, 2025, stating that the army model is not correct, that we are missing about thirty Rafales, that we are missing three frigates, and that the navy's army model dates from 2013, so it is old, and that on land there are also a number of needs. You then have the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Armed Forces on July 12th and 13th, explaining in a speech to the nation that between 90 and 100 billion euros are needed for defense. You then have a national strategic review, which is, after all, worked on by the entire government, and notably by the SGDS, which depends on the Prime Minister, that the Chief of Staff takes up in September and then before the mayors in November, and which explains that there could potentially be a major shock in Eastern Europe that would lead us to a confrontation and therefore to new needs. And here we are with a Military Programming Law, admittedly with an increase, and I do not deny that, but which is not in line, or in any case, with the threats that have been referred to for a year. And so, I think we must draw the consequences and try to make this Military Programming Law a programming law that is in coherence with the threat. That is what the Senate will do. That is what I will propose to do in the Senate. Okay. And so, what we can say today, and if I understand you correctly, is that it is actually a recapitalization of the Military Programming Law, and we are still in a repair phase since there are very few new programs and very little increase in the capacity of the armed forces. That was the first point. And the second point, ultimately, are the 13 billion in extra-budgetary revenue, do they really exist or not? Well, that's a good question. It's a question I asked the Public Finance Council just last Tuesday, and they are struggling to answer. If we were at 413 billion in reality, when they say they are adding 36 billion, for me, I'm not very good at math, but that makes 449 billion. However, today, we have a budget of 436 billion. This means that if the 13 billion really exist, the increase is not 36 billion but 23 billion. So, I'll let you do the calculations and search, but the reality is that today, the Military Programming Law as it is presented to us in its updated form is 436 billion euros. And I recall that the Senate had requested, and Michel Cabirol is very well informed, he knows this well, the Senate had requested 400 billion in 2023 to make up the shortfall. The Elysee wanted 370 billion, and the President of the Republic had apparently decided on 400 billion plus 13 billion to make a good impression and that's where we are today. We can clearly see that with 436 billion, the Senate, which three years ago explained that the Military Programming Law was underfunded. So, it's... well, we mustn't throw the baby out with the bathwater, let's be very clear. We were at 30 billion euros in 2018, we are at 57.3 billion today, and we will likely be over 63 billion next year. A considerable effort has been made by the nation for its defense, and that is obvious, but it is insufficient given what is happening abroad. It is insufficient given what the Germans are doing today, who will have a defense budget of 160 billion by 2030. Obviously, our financial resources and their deficit are not the same. But Great Britain, which is starting from a very low point, admittedly, is investing significant sums today to reconquer its defense. Poland and all European countries that are today seeking more effective defense, and then quite simply our adversaries who are watching us. Finally, I think our budgets are being observed very closely by a number of observers, particularly in Russia. And when we say, well, we can't put more money in, we are naked, we can't put more money in, I think that's not the case. It's a matter of national priority today, and everyone must understand that if a war were to occur in Eastern Europe, between perhaps Russia and the Baltic states, and I don't know what other countries, the economic cost for France would be much greater than what we are asking for in addition for the Military Programming Law in the Senate in the coming days. Are we still in a phase of repair for the heavy disinvestment that occurred in the 2000s? No, I don't think so. The repair law arrived, it was implemented in 2018, and it allowed for a significant increase in budgets with an average of around 1.8 billion per year, every year. So, today, new equipment is arriving in the forces. We cannot say that it is still about repair, obviously. We are gradually gaining in volume, but not sufficiently for our liking. And I recall that in 2023, a number of programs for massifying our armies were postponed to after 2030 for budgetary reasons. And so, all of this, I just want to say, is a matter of coherence. Once again, we cannot say that the threat is potentially there within a year or two and postpone the acquisition of large volumes of equipment to after 2030. You know, it's Pierre Vandier who is in Le Figaro. Pierre Vandier, who is always extraordinary, and who says in Le Figaro, I believe that tomorrow is... well, we must make the efforts today because tomorrow is not in an hour, it's not the day after tomorrow, it's tomorrow, and tomorrow is truly tomorrow. And tomorrow must be prepared today, and we cannot wait until 2030 to prepare for hypothetical defense. And I say this for the listeners who are listening: the objective is in no way to prepare an attack or to prepare to be very strong to attack anyone. The objective is to prepare ourselves to have a sufficiently deterrent defense to avoid being attacked by anyone. I tend to say that if you have a nice house and you want it to be guarded, you don't put a chihuahua, you put a Doberman, and that's a bit what we need to do. We need to be sufficiently deterrent to our adversaries so that they avoid attacking us. And today, I think we have European partners who are making considerable efforts in defense. This is the case for Poland, it is the case for Germany, it is the case for the British, and we must be up to the task of history. 5%, 5%, this famous figure of 5% of military spending by 2035, is it credible? Well, the reality is 3.5%. 5% means that 1.5% is essentially dedicated to buildings, real estate, etc. No, for me, it's 3.5%. That's what France committed to last year, and that's what we must achieve. The difficulty is that today, for those who like numbers, we started from 2% in 2023 to reach, if we follow the budgetary trajectory voted by the National Assembly yesterday, 2.43% in 2030. This means that the effort we will ask of the nation and of future elected officials in 2030 would be 1%, a little more than 1% in 2030, between 2030 and 2035, which is neither reasonable nor achievable. And so, we must ensure that this effort is greater in the first period. We must perhaps, in any case, that's what I will propose in the Senate and to my colleagues, that we make an additional effort starting next year. Measured next year, but then we have a linear budgetary trajectory to reach, roughly, by 2030, 2.7% of GDP, so that the effort that our successors will have to make in 2030 will only be 0.8% or 0.7%. And thus, a balanced effort between the two periods. That is, in my opinion, the minimum we owe our armed forces, and it will also allow us to accelerate a certain number of capacity resources and thus give, I would say, a little breathing room to the Military Programming Law. Today, the Military Programming Law is extremely constrained. There is no more room, and so we need to give back some room, some flexibility, to be able to do some new things. Does that mean that, as it stands, you would not vote for the update of the Military Programming Law? I will vote for the update of the Military Programming Law, but the update of the Military Programming Law that we will have, undoubtedly, I hope in any case if my colleagues follow me, modified in the Senate next year, presidential year, but I announced in my speech 50-1 in the Senate on May 5th that we could not vote for the Military Programming Law as it stands and that we would need to make some modifications. I will state things clearly from the start. I said it publicly, at the tribune, the Minister of the Armed Forces was in front of me. So, things were very, very clear and very transparent. 2027, presidential election. Should we take this opportunity to review the format of the armed forces, a new White Paper? How... Listen, I have a number of colleagues, particularly in the Socialist group and colleagues from my own group, who think that we indeed need to accelerate the process. The current Military Programming Law, in any case as the government submitted it, envisioned a White Paper in 2028. Marie Recalde in the National Assembly submitted an amendment that was adopted to advance it to July 2027, and we believe that we need to go even faster and that the White Paper on defense should be studied starting in January 2027 with the participation, and we note this in the amendment, of Parliament, and thus to begin work that I would say is cross-party, on the threat and on the reality of the world we live in, and so that the President of the Republic or the President of the Republic who arrives in June 2027 has a working basis. Then, whether they use it or not, it's something, it's a working basis that will allow for the acceleration, I imagine, of a new Military Programming Law. What is your general view on the war economy and on how French industry is ramping up? First, I have always contested the term "war economy" because I think we have never been in a war economy. And history shows that I was somewhat right, since today we have, obviously, a very insufficient number of munitions, drones, and a certain number of equipment. The truth is that we need to implement a wartime economy, not the peacetime economy we have today. And so, it is indeed necessary for industry to make some shifts. There are companies that have made very significant efforts, that have accelerated production processes. But I think we need to go even further in the process, and above all, and this is what I have always defended, there must be orders, and orders seem to be starting to arrive in the industry. I think the DGA is making efforts. I repeat here publicly, since some believe I am against the DGA, but I would like to state publicly that the DGA is an extraordinary tool at the disposal of the French army, a tool that many countries envy us. It is a tool endowed with brilliant engineers and capable of doing extraordinary things today. But, and I have always said this, this DGA must gain agility, speed of execution, and reduce study times and processing times for a number of programs, because innovation is galloping today, and innovation is extremely rapid. We see it in Ukraine; it takes six to six days and a week or two for the Ukrainians and Russians to respond to a threat. And so, we must be hyperactive, hyper-reactive, hyper-agile, and so we have the tools. And so, the DGA also aims to try to change the economic model. And we have a very, very good example for me that the DGA has put in place, it's Corus, which is a partnership between Renault and Turgiss Gaillard for the large-scale production of drones, and drones that would go very, very far. So, these are good examples, but we need to move forward, to go faster, and I think that industry can reform itself if it has orders. And then there is also the entire model, incidentally, on which the Germans are embarking, which is to say that subcontracting, particularly in the automotive industry, and I am well-placed to know this, living 10 km from Sochaux, automotive subcontracting can also find a means of diversification in defense, and thus have a somewhat dual economy that would work for both civilian and defense, and thus try to save jobs that are today in great danger in the automotive sector. I recall that we have lost nearly 130,000 jobs in the automotive sector in the last two years, and that the hemorrhage is significant, and that defense can be one means among others to diversify the production tool and to provide work for French men and women. This week, we have had major industrial orders for export. Naval Group won a very good contract in Sweden. I also think of Airbus, which sold 6 MRPTs to Italy, ejecting Boeing in the process. Are you starting to feel a slight return to European preference? I tweeted to congratulate Ambassador Carlier in Sweden, who is a former DGA official, and who, with his entire team and the France team in general, with Naval Group, of course, and a number of other stakeholders, convinced the Swedes to buy these four frigates. It was a very, very great victory for France. It also shows that our ability to act quickly and deliver this naval capability quickly also made the difference. But it is quite clear that this partnership was also born from a broader partnership, since I recall that we bought Global 6000s to replace our Awacs, and that we will undoubtedly buy some rapid attack intervention boats to supplement our small fleet, and so there are exchanges like this that take place, but European solidarity must work, and one must not believe that European solidarity for the French means only buying French. So, European solidarity means France buying a certain number of equipment in Europe, and Europeans dedicating more of their budget to buying European. Today, I recall that 80% of European defense budgets are allocated to American purchases. These things must change. We must gain in European strategic independence and autonomy. And I can, of course, praise the formidable contract signed by Naval Group in Sweden, and I hope there will be others in other countries later. Has French industry broken through a glass ceiling with this contract by obtaining a contract in a NATO zone? Even if Sweden has indeed recently joined NATO, this zone is still very much a glass ceiling. Listen, I think, first of all, that we have an extremely high-performing defense industry, and that is certainly the case for Naval Group, and that the fact today of being in a situation of significant tension, of accelerating processes, means that when you are capable of delivering very good equipment very quickly, you are chosen, and I don't know if we have broken a glass ceiling, history will tell. We will see if other contracts of this type are solidified quickly. In Denmark, there was Greece, there are good things. There is something that is happening. I hope that this European solidarity will extend to all European countries, because we can clearly see today that the transatlantic link is complicated. We see that the Estonians, just a few days ago, were somewhat taken advantage of on the purchase of AARs, since they received AARs that were delivered very late, and they were told that some would be delivered much, much later. This should also teach some people the necessity of having a strategic environment and European strategic independence. Just a final word to finish on the unitary rocket launcher. Precisely, there are debates. Should we buy American? Listen, I submitted an amendment to the Military Programming Law in 2023 to request that the equipment be sovereign. We had a debate, and I withdrew that amendment. The Minister of Defense at the time, Sébastien Lecornu, came to the First Artillery Regiment. He announced 600 million euros for the purchase of new equipment, and he was an advocate for sovereignty on this issue. He saved the program twice because the senior administration tried to kill it, I think, to favor foreign acquisitions, and so I think the current minister also aims to favor a sovereign solution. It is necessary, I believe it is necessary. In any case, we have no choice. It's either American, or Korean, or a sovereign French solution. And it seems, according to all the information that is gradually emerging, that the latest tests of sovereign equipment that took place just about ten days ago were rather conclusive. So now it is up to the industrialists and the groups that have presented themselves to make a competitive, rapid offer that will satisfy the armed forces so that we do not have too significant a capacity gap. But I defend this issue because I think that in any case, we will have a temporary capacity reduction. So, a capacity gap with the Americans, because we must not believe that the Americans are doing this to please us. They are doing it to try to kill the French sovereign solution to prevent it from competing with them. So, let's be intelligent and choose the best solution, and if it could be sovereign, that would suit us very well. I'm going to get told off by the production team. One of our favorite topics with Michel, if I may say so, among the SCAF. Just a word on the SCAF. We still had statements from the Head of State this week. Listen, today in France, only the Head of State still believes in the SCAF. My conviction is that the President of the Republic wants to lead us to the next presidential election, I'll be blunt, to avoid being the one who abandoned the SCAF. However, all the time we lose by not abandoning it is time we lose in building a new one. And so, I believe that today, we must, well, call an end to the break, say stop or go, but we must have a definitive decision and then be able to move on to a new phase. We have already lost a lot of time. Cédric Perrin, thank you very much. You are the LR senator for the territory of Belfort and you are the president of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the Armed Forces in the Senate. Thank you for your invitation. It's time for the analysis right away. A and Defense, the analysis. Léo Barnier, hello. Hello. Editor-in-chief at Air Cosmos. Thank you very much for being with us. So, on the front page of Air Cosmos this week, Germany's ogre-like appetites in defense and space. It's a complete dossier to find this week, we often talk about it. But today, we're not going to talk about Germany with you, Léo, we're going to talk about Turkey. A few days ago, the SAHA Expo was held in Istanbul, during which Turkey displayed its ambitions in the defense sector more than ever, I would say. Yes, indeed, AUACARA has been pushing its ambitions for several years now, and there, well, they made a big splash by unveiling an ICBM, a ballistic intercontinental missile, that is to say, a missile capable of traveling more than 5,500 kilometers, thus reaching another continent, and this is a very rare capability today. I believe only seven countries in the world have this capability today. So, it was indeed a big splash. But that's not all. Turkey had already accustomed us to some coups de théâtre in the past. In 2019, at Le Bourget, they presented a mock-up of a 5th generation fighter jet. And today, that fighter jet is flying, it is still under development, but it is expected to be operational in the next decade. So, they are moving forward. And the last thing we saw at this exhibition was the Steel Dome. So, which is somewhat the Turkish equivalent of the Israeli Iron Dome or the future Dome of a Trump-decided shield. So, this is really a will to advance in several areas, and this Iron Dome is a multi-layered air defense system to truly cover and protect Turkey, whether against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or even drones. You say Léo, it's an exhibition, and by definition, there are often a phenomenal number of announcements. Are there things that are still very concrete today? So, indeed, we must be careful about announcements. Consultants told us that. We need to be careful about that, especially concerning the ICBM. For now, the technological choices are still unclear, particularly because no industrial partner has been designated. The project was presented by the Minister of Defense, but the industrial partner who will bring this to life is still missing. Also, the project remains somewhat unclear on the concept of employment. Are we talking about pure deterrence? Is there a desire to, well, scare everyone a bit? Will it be a purely conventional missile, or is it potentially a missile that will have a nuclear role one day if Turkey aims to acquire nuclear weapons? Yes. So. Regarding the Steel Dome, however, we are a bit more on concrete ground. Yes, we have an increase in component deliveries, I believe, of 50% this year. Contracts have been signed that are quite significant. We are talking about several billion dollars, but for now, there are still doubts about Turkey's ability to cover its entire territory and, above all, at what cost. And precisely, Steel Dome also leads us to missiles. There seems to be a pronounced interest in the Franco-Italian system, the SAMP/T. Indeed, Ankara has been announcing its desire to acquire this system for several years, and for now, Paris has always refused, because relations between Paris and Ankara are always a bit complex, even complicated. And this is due to one thing in particular: in the deep rivalry between Ankara and Athens, Turkey and Greece, Paris has always sided with Athens, by supporting them but also by selling them equipment. Yesterday, Mirage 2000s, today Rafales and frigates. So, this has always been the case, but we feel that it might change a little. Well, there is a first element that might suggest this: Paris has accepted the partnership between Safran and Baykar, which is the main Turkish drone manufacturer, a true world leader, particularly known for its Bayraktar TB2, which we saw in Ukraine and Azerbaijan, and which could receive a Safran pod, a FLIR pod, and we will see, perhaps in the coming weeks, that the situation might also change regarding the SAMP/T, under the impetus of Emmanuel Macron. All of this can be read this week in Air Cosmos. Many thanks to Léo Barnier, editor-in-chief at Air Cosmos, with us every week on A and Defense. It's time for weak signals, and indeed, weak signals this week: the Vampire is waking up, as Swedish truck manufacturer Scania will deliver about a hundred military four-wheel-drive vehicles, named Vampire, to the Army. They will be manufactured at the Angers plant in Maine-et-Loire. This is a report by Nathan Cocampo. 500 trucks pass through the Scania production lines every week. Chassis, cabins, and engines are assembled in less than 8 minutes before heading out onto our European roads for freight transport. Among them, a new arrival, smaller and camouflaged, but which does not go unnoticed: the Vampire. Vincent Durnerin, Director of Defense Activities. So, today, these are vehicles intended exclusively for the French army, particularly for all ground-to-air protection, including with Mistral missiles, 20mm cannons for anti-drone warfare, and radars that we have the chance to offer in cooperation with the company SAB. After the main assembly on the historic production line, followed by about fifteen hours in a workshop to adapt the vehicle for the army, the Vampire is received at military bases, where all that remains is to clip on the equipment and weapons before sending it into operation. Laurent Lemire, Director of Technical Support. We started producing the Vampire 4 or 5 weeks ago. Today, we are manufacturing them at a rate of three vehicles per week, with the ambition of producing a hundred by the end of this year. 90% of the machines were already in place to accommodate the production of the Vampire at the plant. A perfect illustration of the war economy desired by the President of the Republic, emphasizes Benoît Tangi, President of Scania France. The Ukrainian conflict began to prompt reflection and also led to reflection, saying that conflicts are changing completely, and the modes of approach and response to certain conflicts are changing compared to the means used. And then the escalation in the Middle East also means that we have moved up another level. Scania has always manufactured military vehicles, but not on an industrial scale and at today's pace. The plant is now ready to respond to a high-intensity conflict. The French army is a customer we can call a major client or a large slot. This means that we know how to adapt our pace to the client's demand, and indeed, we will know how to adapt the flows and also the resources to meet this demand. Industrial diversification and important sovereignty issues for the French army, which consolidate the long-term viability of the Angers site. As the Choose France summit approaches, new investments from the Swedes are being discussed with the government. Report from Angers with Nathan Cocampo. This is the end of this episode of A and Defense. We will meet again next week, same place, same time. We will be hosting the head of air drones, Bastien Manini. Have a good week. A and Defense on BFM Business. Amen.