Transcription
The um, we can move on to nomological harmony in uh later if you want.
So phenomenological motion, I'm not sure I understand the data that you're looking at, like experiential something about like experience and time.
I mean, I can give you what the argument I have to propose, and then I can go defining terms.
Sure. It's like nine premises, so bear with me.
Sure. Uh, premise one: All experienced reality is disclosed through phenomenological motion.
Experience reality is disclosed through phenomenological motion. And can I get a definition really quick?
Yeah. So I guess we can define motion. So, motion is just going to be the necessary transition from horizontal indeterminacy to determinate givenness with an intentional field, which would be what I relegate on intentionality, like when I ask you for like clarification, you throw in like, like a ton of words, uh, that would also need to be clarified.
Yeah, sure. That's how typical discourse goes.
It's not.
I suppose.
It's it's not.
No, I don't think so. But okay.
Well, I I do have a question. So, when we discuss God, you understand God is going to be a higher metaphysical, uh, philosophical inquiry. Correct?
And by higher, do you mean like by along which dimension?
No. Higher metaphysical philosophical inquiry. I'm just, I'm speaking as in terms of like academia or knowledge of specific concepts.
Yeah. I've read quite a bit of like Phil of religion, and they don't talk like this. you.
So for example, yeah, I read people like, uh, you know, I read people like Puce, like Rasmusen, um, people like Ryan Mullen's, um, they don't talk like this.
Okay. And that's a problem why?
It's, I'm not saying that it's a problem. I'm just saying that, you know, if your debate strategy relies on like obfuscation, then we're just going to go very slowly.
It's not an obfuscation if I said that I was willing to define terms.
Okay. So your definition for phenomenal motion specifically included metaphor in it. It includes like the metaphor of like going from like horizontal, which is a spatial dimension. Uh, and I, I don't know, like, is the horizontal there supposed to be referring to like time?
Um, no. Horizontal refers to what in like continental philosophy and phenomenology, horizon, which is going to be like a background framework of meaning that makes any intentional act possible.
Yeah. I don't know what this, I don't know what any of this means. Are you, are you, are you familiar with phenomenology specifically, that of like Husserian philosophy, Heidegger, um, Ponte?
Nope.
No. Okay.
No. I only read, uh, analytic. So if you want to use a term that's fine, you just need to give like a clear definition of it.
Okay. Do you want, do you need me to restate what horizon means?
Uh, let's go through, um, maybe what I could do. I'll just go through and like type out word for word. Let's get the notepad up. Okay. So, we have our definitions. So, your first premise was what? And then we'll get the definition for phenomenal movement.
Yeah. All experienced reality is disclosed through phenomenological motion. Okay. So, phenomenological motion means what?
Um, phenomenological is just going to be things that are relegated to intentionality or intentionality so far as what consciousness or experiences, right? So just basically experiences.
Well, I understand what phenomenological is, but...
Mhm.
But like the words together, like the definition you gave earlier.
The definition I gave earlier. Well, when I was explaining motion, I was just saying the necessary transition from horizontal...
Um, indeterminacy to determinate givenness within an intentional field.
To horizontal indeterminacy.
To what?
To determinate givenness.
To determinate givenness.
Within an an intentional field.
Within an intentional field. Okay. Uh, I don't know what this means.
Uh, I mean, I can try to explain it.
Please.
So, so basically, horizontal indeterminacy to determinate givenness, it, it can be cashed out from the understanding of what unfolding of givenness is, um, which is specific.
So, okay, you're defining specifically transition to horizontal?
Transition, transition from horizontal indeterminacy to determinate givenness within an intentional field can just be relegated to...
Oh, sure. Did I mis-type this? So I have necessary transition to horizontal indeterminacy. Is it from horizontal indeterminacy?
Yeah.
Okay. So, transition from horizontal indeterminacy...
To determinate givenness.
Mhm.
Okay. What do you, you're claiming this means what?
This just refers to unfolding of givenness.
Unfolding of givenness.
Yeah.
And so unfolding typically refers to, um, or like the literal meaning of unfolding here is like a, like a spatial thing. So, does does your definition or like your further explanation include like a metaphor?
No. So I mean, I can, I can sort of explain.
Is it literal unfolding?
No.
Like, like spatial. Okay. So it, it is like medical.
There, these are, these are, no, these are all just going to be in the realms of phenomenology and Husserian philosophy, okay.
Is what these terms are relegated to?
Sure. So does unfolding just mean like, I don't know, maybe, maybe let's, let's take a definition of like givenness. What does givenness mean?
Uh, how something appears or disclosed in experience, not a thing in of itself.
Okay. How something appears in experience. Sure. So when you say the transition from horizontal indeterminacy to determinate givenness, you're just saying like new experiences coming into experiences or...
You just experience does. Is this just saying like, you experience new things? It's just saying that thing, this is like how something is disclosed based on what you're experiencing. So it's like how some, like a thing may appear to you, but it's not...
Okay. How does that differ from what I said?
I mean, it may not. I don't know.
Okay.
If that's what you, that's what you said, that's fine.
Okay. Sure. So, so your first premise is just saying that all experienced reality comes about through new experiences.
No, I mean, what, what this is referring to is just saying there's a, like, there's a bunch of stages to seeing something and experiencing something, right? So like, you can see a mug, and even if you see like one side of a mug, there's still implications based on things that are not given yet within your experiences as well. And then...
Sure. I'll take the supporting argument for this one.
You want like P2?
Uh, no, like a 1.1, like what would justify the first premise?
All experienced reality disclosed.
Um, the justification would be the fact that we seem to have some sort of temporal disclosure of the things that we observe. So this just saying that when we observe things, there does seem to be an application of like retention, protention, and primal, uh, primal expressions.
Okay. Uh, what would 1.2 be?
1.2. Are you asking me to hold on? Are you asking me to give an argument?
Yes.
For the justification?
Yep.
Yes.
All experienced reality disclosed. And this would just be related to the temporal unfolding. Unfolding is just going to be how we see experience. So then I guess like, I don't, I don't know. I don't really have like a syllogism that's like prepped for explaining P1.
Okay.
Do you, do you have a disagree? Do you disagree with P1?
This is typically where...
I'm unconvinced by. I'm unconvinced by P1.
You're unconvinced that reality is disclosed through any temporal, like, a temporal means?
Through phenomenological motion is what I'm unconvinced.
So you're unconvince. Is this, is this an, like an unconvincing in the terms of like an appeal to incredulity, like you don't understand?
This is like a, I'm not going to accept this premise without further justification. I'm agnostic to it.
Okay. And the justifications along the lines are, what are you, like, is it based on unfamiliarity with the terms? Is it based off of there's a specific aspect of this in which you don't feel...
Motivated.
Motivated? I would just say this would be like justifiable through some form of coherency. It seems that our beliefs are interconnected in the sense that whenever we experience things and they're disclosed to us, we seem to have applications of again, the potential, retention, and primal expressions of things. So like again, like when you see a mug, you can only see a specific aspect of the mug, but there's obviously going to be implications based off of like those three things that I gave, the protention, retention, and primal expression.
So you're like 1.2 here would be what?
Of my 1.2 there?
Yeah. Oh, okay. Or do you think that the argument that you're giving, like in justification of the first premise, is valid?
Invalid in what? What aspect? I'm speaking a natural speaking natural language.
The conclusion is true. You are absolutely not speaking a natural language.
Wait, how am I not speaking a natural language? I'm not giving...
In so far as all of these words are terms of art. These are not words that are used in like everyday language.
It doesn't have to be used in everyday language. I'm just saying I'm not giving a formalization of something.
Does natural language to you, like when you give an argument in natural language, does that just like, you can use like, you don't need to give like a valid argument or...
No, I'm saying in terms or I'll say I'm not giving a formal one. I'm giving an informalization of this justification.
Okay.
But again, I'm getting, I'm getting very confused because it doesn't...
But what's the argument for why I should accept that?
What's the argument for why you should accept?
Yeah. Why should, like, an informal argument?
What's the argument for it?
Yeah.
Um, I don't know.
Do you need an ar, you need an argument for an exception of informal argumentation?
Yep.
Sure. Informal argumentations can still be valid in the sense that they're expressing constant in meaning of whatever sort of aspects we're speaking of.
So your argument for the validity of formal arguments is what? Or of informal arguments is what? Why?
This seems pretty incand not conducive and repetitive. Yeah. Are you gonna, are you not conducive? Yeah. It's like not conducive to, you know, a good productive discussion under unlike phenomenal motion, you know, the necessary transition from horizontal indeterminacy to determinate givenness within an intentional field, which of course, you know, just refers to the, the fact that we have a temporal disclosure of the things we disclose. And it includes like retention, pretention, and primal expression, you know.
Yeah.
Oh, yeah. Yeah. And and and who's certainly in philosophy and dealing with hide and pony? That would be fire. And I understand that completely, but I'm willing to disclose again what those content means. It doesn't seem like you're very...
Sure. Explain it to me like, um, explain premise one to me like I was like five.
Sure. So, premise one to you like you're five.
Yeah.
We experience things. The way that we experience them is the term phenomenological motion. Phenomenological motion is just going to deal with the understanding that experience seems to come in stages, or it's like, um, uh, it's like a dynamic, intrinsic thing, right? It's not, it's not like a static property of experience.
Okay. Okay, one just saying that...
We experience things, and the way that we go about experiencing things is that it happens in stages and that it's like dynamic.
Yep.
Okay.
Like you could say, you could say like, for example, um, Edmund Husserl would say like the things I talked about were protention, retention. You could easily just refer to it as like coming into present, being present, and passing away. So there seems to be like stages that go along with experiencing things.
Uh, sure. So then for the first one, are you claiming that this coming into being and this like going out of being is like a genuine real thing, or are you claiming that that's what we experience?
Um, that's what we experience via all experienced reality.
Um, via all experienced reality. I don't know if I would say that that's true of all experienced reality. um, that there's like an, like an innate, like I don't know if you're claiming that this is like universally true, I'd probably need an argument for it.
Uh, in what sense are you applying the univers, uh, universality of experience? Like what are you...
You're claiming that there's like no experience that's not experienced in like stages?
I don't know if that's not that like totally could be true. Um, I'm agnostic to it though.
Okay. Well, I mean, the way that we would say it's not static and it's going to have to deal with like a structured flow, which is going to be the coming in the presence, being present, and passing away and such would be that there's a form of intentionality. Intentionality is not going to be the same as what you probably understand it. It's going to deal with, um, an agent. An agent or a thing is conscious of X, right? You're conscious of something. You're aware of something.
Okay. Sure. Um, wait, can you say again what you just said?
Uh, yeah, sure. If we're talking about intentionality, this is going to be that an agent or a thing is going to be conscious or aware of X. That's what intentionality is.
Okay. Um, I mean, sure, that's fine. I can work with those semantics. That's what you mean by phenomenal. Um, and then in terms of motion, are you just saying that there's like a past, present, and future to the experience?
Um, I would say it's like...
It's like a clear, like a, it, it does have a horizontal indeterminacy in it, that there's like open stages. Um, and again, that like when I explained the mug, the mug was to explain that we can have intentionality so far as we're experiencing specific things, but we have, um, implications that aren't given. And implications would be like, um, there could be expectations of like what other sides of the mug may look like. You might have expectations of like, I don't know, maybe there's a design on the other side of the mug that says like, "Greatest boss in the world."
Right? And we would, uh, we would fall into a retention, which would we would go back to other experiences within reality to sort of formalize and try to fill in that gap.
Wait. Okay. So, uh, the openness that you're describing, is this present within the experience itself, or is it something like external to the experience?
It's present within the experience. Experience also works within retention. So, you do call back other forms of like past intentionality.
Okay. Sure. So, can you give me, uh, maybe that's what you just gave me, but can you give me an example of like an openness in our experience, just to make sure that I'm tracking?
An openness in your experience? Sure. Like I can give you another one. If I'm rolling a ball, but you're not fully aware of like what other disclosed aspects of the ball might happen like across the floor. It could be in past experience, there could be, um, a slight slant in the floor. It's uneven, unbalanced. And so you could expect based on those past experiences that the ball could, uh, slant left, and then maybe the room that gives you that sort of coherency for that would be the room, um, you know, is imbalanced in some way. And so there's like an implication, but it's not something that's given at the immediate, like sense of your, uh, phenomenon.
Sure. So, so there's like a present experience with like the things that are present within like our phenomenal experience, and then there's like open possibilities that we also experience.
Um, you could think of it in, in a way like that. Yeah. Um, and then we would just, and we would say that would be like the openness because that is more so explaining like the horizontal indeterminacy, which you can just say it's like a type of open.
Wait, what's the experience of like the ball could curve in like one direction or the other? Is that just like an experience of like expectation?
Uh, you could say so. Yeah, it would, it would just, it would just be like, um, open possibilities based on retentional phenomenology. So just like there's past experiences or knowledge based on other experiences in which you could have like an implication of some sort of event occurring, but it hasn't been given to you directly within the primal expression.
Which primal just means like present, like the present, uh, thing you had.
Okay. So then I guess like, to to take a second pass at the first premise, all experienced reality is disclosed through phenomenal motion. Uh, this is just saying that all experienced reality is experienced in like a present moment, and then there's like possibilities for what's going to happen in the future, basically.
Sense.
Uh, that seems like tentatively fine. Although if I think of like a counter example to this, I'll let you know.
Okay. And then did you want me to explain like motion in that sense where it's like, um, if there's like an openness?
Motion would be like sort of like a feeling, like you would say the possibilities get like filled in, the openness becomes more visible.
Is this, is this something like, um, I want to say like Whitehead's model of like...
You know, like you, uh, like you have like the present, and then the present is where, you know, the virtual becomes the actual.
Not that I'm aware of. I'm dealing specifically with, um, uh, Edmund Husserl and like Heidegger's position of experience.
Okay. Um, that's fine. I think I understand motion. Sure. What's the next one?
Oh, well, I guess motion. Yeah, motion in a sense would be what?
Well, actually, hold on. Were you saying you, you understand motion from that explanation or the horiz... Okay, because I was going to say...
You're saying like motion is like, like phenomenological, phenomenological motion is that you're just saying like experience is like the actualization of like future possibilities.
Um, yeah, in a sense, yeah, you could, you could say like, there, there's expectations, and then there's like an actual, um, thing that occurs. Um, but the, I think the intentional field is a little bit like, you could say the intentional field would be, um, a guided unfolding. So you could say that these things aren't like random. Um, I don't know if that really changes any of the clarifications, but I know that could be like, I guess a problem if someone knew about like phenomenological motion and they...
Um, I don't think that really changes anything for me, but sure. What's the, what's the next argument, or I guess like, what's the next premise?
Yeah. Uh, P2 would just be phenomenological motion presupposes intentional structure.
Motion presupposes?
Intentional structure. Um, and what's an intentional structure?
Uh, an intentional structure, kind of like, like consciousness would be directed towards something and then would like organize how that thing appears, like whether it's a thing or like an, um, an event that occurs.
Okay. Um, how would you explain the fact that you can have like an anxiety that's about nothing in particular?
Have an anxiety about something in particular?
You can have like a, like a move to feeling an anxiety, but the anxiety isn't like about anything, it's about like nothing in particular.
What are we, what are we denoting anxiety here specifically? Are you saying...
The phenomenological feeling of anxiety. Like, I don't know, I'm not sure how to give you like a definition of like a phenomenological state.
Um, anxiety, I mean, if we just want to say anxiety so far. Well, when I'm talking about consciousness, like when I, when I'm saying consciousness, it's just going to be the state in which you're aware of something, right? And then...
If your consciousness is directed towards something, the concept of whatever thing that you're anxious towards is still a directive order, right? Even if it's real or not, like if it's actualized physically.
Uh, okay. Wait, so can you get that answer one more time? I'm not sure if that answers the question.
Yeah. If you say you, correct me if I'm wrong. Your correction or your question was, um, how do you explain being anxious towards nothing?
Nothing in particular. Like you can just have like an experience of anxiety, but there's like nothing that you're anxious about.
Okay. Um, can you, can you explicate like what nothing about would be like? Are you saying this is nothing as in...
Object of your anxiety. There's an anxiety, there's an experience of an anxiety, but there is no object of the anxiety.
Okay. An object here, is this going, are you saying like a physical object, or are you saying object is like, there's not even a conceptualization?
Like a, like a mental object, in the same way that people might say like object of desire, just like something that it's directed towards.
Um, I mean, I could say there could be something there that's still going to be consciously directed.
Okay, but then it wouldn't be presupposed.
What? How does that even follow? What are you talking about?
In so far as there's specific phenomenological states that are not intentional, that is to say that they're like directed at something. Yeah, they're directed towards something and it organizes things and like how they appear. Yeah.
But what's the thing that it's directed towards in this case?
Uh, directed towards in that case.
Yeah.
Whatever sort of retentional experience is going to be relegated to your anxiety. If you're saying like, there is absolutely nothing, then I would just say there's no reason that you could be anxious. You have to give me like a reason, like you'd have to give me that there's like no conceptualization whatsoever in which someone is going to be anxious of.
So then at that point, you're just going to come up against like empirical evidence against your view, which is that a lot of people with anxiety disorders will swear to you that they have experiences of anxiety, and this anxiety is not, you know, they're not anxious about a specific thing, they're just anxious.
Yeah, sure. That anxiety can be relegated to some sort of like physical constitutions. I don't get how that's going to be explaining this sort of conscious intentionality here.
But what is the consciousness directed towards?
The consciousness is directed towards your experiences. So you're exper, if you're experiencing anxiety, that's going to be an, an intentional structure in of itself.
I don't get what this is like. How does, how is the physical action?
Sure. But let's say, let's say you don't have like the second order awareness. Let's say you only have the first order experience of anxiety, and that you haven't reflected about the fact that you're anxious. You just feel the anxiety.
So what would that, what would the first order feeling of anxiety be like about nothing in particular? Like, what would that be directed towards?
That's that in of itself is still going to be an intentional structure. Your, your, your very feeling of being anxious is going to be directed towards the fact, the experience of feeling anxious, gonna be directed towards like your physical, uh, attributes as well.
Like what?
Like whatever sort of medical phenomenon would explain unexplicable, like...
Is that, is like your neurochemical transmitters a part of the experience?
They can be, depending on whatever your metaphysical backgrounds are, but I'm just saying there's that's still going to be a sort of intentional structure. It's directed towards the fact that your body is doing something in which you're feeling anxious, and that feeling of anxiousness is of it itself an intentional structure so far as your consciousness is going to be directed towards it.
But are you saying that it's about itself? No, I'm saying under your view, when you were talking about anxiety, and anxiety is just going to be denoted to a physical sort of a, um, aspect in which like they're anxious physically, but they have no mental, um, acuity towards a specific thing. I would say then what the sort of understanding or experience of your, um, anxiousness is, is going to be relegated to you experiencing those sort of physical things, like it doesn't, it doesn't really...
Okay, maybe I'll just type it out because I have no idea what your answer to this question is still. Um, okay, so the question is, uh, when you feel anxious, but it's not about anything, or but it's not anxious about anything, what is the experience directed towards? Hello.
Yeah. Did you, did you ask that question again?
Yes. Yeah, I asked you that question.
When you feel anxious, but it's not anxious about anything, what is the experience directed towards?
The experience of your anxiousness will be directed towards what you said in the empirical data, which is going to be relegated to your physical constitutes. So...
Empirical data relegated to what?
I'll just say physical events.
To physical...
Events.
No. So you said empirical data. Empirical is going to be the things that are going to, uh, going to be physical. Correct?
And...
Uh, wait, what?
Yeah. Empirical data. I'm just, I'm just going to say that it's...
So I take empirical to mean something like sense perception. Do you mean something different?
Yeah. Your sense perceptions would be that of like physicality, would it not?
Um, I mean, depends on your view.
But sure, just like, like sense perception.
Okay. Your sense perceptions would be denoted to your physical aspects, right? Your biological coordination.
So wait, but what's the empirical thing that's happening there?
The empirical thing that's happening there.
Yeah. Like if you have like, if you feel anxious about nothing in particular, what is the empirical thing that's happening there?
The empirical thing that's happening there. You're the one who, you're the one who supposed there's some sort of empirical data.
This word came out of your mouth first. Wait, I'll play the replay for you.
Wait, hold on.
Oh, empirical.
You don't want to hear your own words.
You, you said this before I did, you know, to be clear.
No, I, I never mentioned empirical data.
Maybe I, I totally could have misheard, in which case, you know, my bad. But let's see, because I'm pretty sure...
Yeah. Um, I would like if we could kind of track the conversation we had.
Wait, wait, sorry. Let's, uh, let's just listen to the replay.
Experience of your anxiousness will be directed towards what you said in the empirical data, which is going to be really good.
Oh, there it is.
Oh, okay. Cool. Did you not hear what I said? You said, because that's what you...
Wait. Yeah, let's. Well, let's back up a bit. We'll back up, uh, to three minutes. Whatever sort of medical phenomenon would explain unexplicable like...
Part is like your neurochemical transmitters a part of the experience?
They can be, depending on whatever your metaphysical backgrounds are, but I'm just saying there, that's still going to be a sort of intentional structure. It's directed towards the fact that your body is doing something in which feeling anxious, and that feeling of anxiousness is of it itself an intentional structure so far as your consciousness is going to be directed towards it.
But are you saying that it's about itself? No, I'm saying under your view, when you were talking about anxiety, and anxiety is just going to be denoted to a physical sort of a, um, aspect in which like they're anxious physically, but they have no mental, um, acuity towards a specific thing. I would say then your sort of understanding, your experience of your, uh, anxiousness is, is going to be relegated to you experiencing those sort of physical things.
Like it does, it doesn't really...
Type it out because I have no idea what your answer to this question is still. Um, okay, so the question is, uh, when you feel anxious, but it's not about anything, or but it's not anxious about anything, what is the experience directed towards? You're about to say it. Let's, let's hear it. Hello.
Yeah. Did you, did you ask that question again?
Yes. Yeah, I asked you that question.
When you feel anxious, but it's not anxious about anything, what is the experience directed towards?
The experience of your anxiousness will be directed towards what you said in the empirical data, which is going to be relative.
Yep. There it is. So you did say it first.
No.
Guys, don't trust your, don't trust your phenomenal experience. You know, don't trust the fact that we just...
Don't worry.
How much of the replay would you like to watch?
Don't worry. When I post it, we can watch it together and...
Please. It's already posted. Big dog.
Wait. So do you want me to rewind? What I could do, what I'll do for you on this day, we'll rewind to the start of the conversation. We'll throw it in 2x speed.
And then with that, we can arrive to see o, because you know, you're wrong on this.
It's because you made a claim, and that claim is incorrect, and I'm sorry that that claim is incorrect. There was no reason for you to get egotistical with this, but you decided to...
Whoa. I don't know. I don't know what you're trying to like project, right? As soon as I pulled the replay up, you started like...
I don't know. You got like upset. You got pouty. I'm sorry, dude. Like, I'm sorry that the replay just proves you wrong.
Um, I'm sorry. Can you just acknowledge that you're wrong about this, or do we need to watch even more of the replay?
Where did I say empirical data? Wait, did do you want me to? How about, how about we re, how we do the replay, and then when I say the words empirical data, uh, you, you shout something, and then I'll, I'll...
Listening to a...
Just say you're wrong, dude. If you were wrong about it, just say you were wrong.
Ian, let me ask you a question.
Were you wrong or were you not wrong? Which one? You know, you pressing this wrong, or were you not wrong?
You were literally the one that pressed this point. You insisted that these words didn't come out of your mouth, that they came out of my mouth.
And because of that, I'm going to stick with this point. Were you wrong when you said this, or were you not wrong?
Were you wrong when you said this, or were you not wrong?
Anxious about nothing.
Were you wrong when you said this, or were you not wrong? Which one?
No. Okay.
Okay, then let's watch the replay, dude. If you don't think you were wrong about this, then let's start the conversation back at the beginning. We'll throw it in 2x speed, and as soon as the words empirical data come out of my mouth, you can say something.
This is horrible cope.
You think it's cope? I, I agree it's horrible cope. I wish you would stop doing it. You know, your horrible cope is on full display for everyone. I, I really wish that you would do less of it. Like, okay, I'm, I'm very sorry that the debate didn't go well for you, but you were the first person to make claims about empirical data.
Wasn't conducive. If you didn't follow...
You literally said that I was the first one to claim, make claims about empirical data. Then we watched the replay, and that's just false.
I just, I, I just wasn't, unfortunately.
Dude, where do you think the anxiety issue came from? That was something that was proposed by...
Did I say empirical data?
Yes. You said there was empirical data that was going to that was going to prove that my view on how consciousness directed towards something was going to be...
So the empirical data of people experiencing like the, the empirical data, like studies about people experiencing generalized anxiety disorder, you're telling me that that's a part of my experience? Like a study is a part of my experience?
No, I'm just telling you, you brought up the understand, not the understanding, the point of, uh, empirical data to sort of, well, if that's what you mean is going to be, yeah, my, my bad, then I actually did say empirical data first. I just, you know, that that point is like so unfaced obviously wrong that I didn't think that you'd be stupid enough to make a point like that. You're literally saying that there is studies within my experience that it's a part of my like sense perception to have like a [ __ ] like study like embedded into it. That's ridiculous.
Thank you. Thank you for the concession. You just basically just admitted that you did it. You did say something about...
Yeah, I was trying to be charitable to you. I didn't think you'd say something as stupid as that. That's ridiculous. Saying that, saying that the data of other people having generalized anxiety disorder is a part of your experience, and then that explains the fact that you have generalized anxiety disorder.
Then you didn't answer the question.
Why am I remembering your positions better than you?
Then you didn't answer the question.
What question?
It's literally on the screen. It is, it is genuinely on the screen in front of you. It's highlighted. Even...
I asked you when you feel anxious, but it's not about anything, what is the experience directed towards? And you said the empirical data relegated to physical events.
Yeah. So you're saying that within the experience itself is the empirical data of the fact that like people have generalized anxiety disorder.
No, I'm saying based on your proposition of, of saying that there's some sort of empirical data that was going to relegate my view to be incoherent or at least not going to be sufficient for...
Because you're denying the existence of people like that.
I'm not denying the existence of it. I said the conscious directiveness is going to be towards the physicality because that's the only other logical explanation.
You said that it was directed towards the empirical data.
Yes, the empirical data that you proposed.
That the anxiety is towards empirical data. I, when a person is feeling generalized anxiety disorder, wait, okay, so, so I guess just to put this into perspective, this guy's like absurd claim is this, that when a person feels generalized anxiety, that is to say anxiety about nothing in particular, what they're, what they're actually saying there is that they're anxious about the empirical data that people have generalized anxiety disorder, uh, which is ridiculous.
No, the explication, the explanation of the empirical data, as I said, really getting to physical events, is going to be the only logical, logical explanation for your proposition of empirical data to...
Then maybe you could answer the question. What is the experience directed towards?
The experience would be directed towards the, uh, whatever physical, um, aspects are going to cause the anxiety.
Okay. Whatever physical aspects, and are those a part of the experience?
Yes, we experience our physicality. Yeah. That deals with...
Okay. Whatever physical aspects cause the anxiety, sure. So, okay. So you are saying like my neurons are a part of my experience. So like I experience my neurons.
Do you experience your neurons?
Yeah. Um, in a sense, I suppose, it just depends on how you cash that out.
People aren't anxious. When people are anxious about nothing in particular, they're not anxious about their neurons.
No, we're speaking colloquially. Depending on the specific aspect of your physicality, yeah. Your neurons are going to be applicable in some grandiose like un, uh, aspect of your physical being, sure. And then like whatever is going to cause your anxiety to, uh, sort of increase is going to be, I don't know, a part of that. But asking specifically about the neuron seems pretty ridiculous, and I think you know that.
Okay. So you would say that it's, is the anxiety, anxiety about, I guess like, what is the anxiety about?
Dog, I've answered this at least four times. You got to track and actually...
Because every answer that you give is like nonsensical. You said that the anxiety is about the physical aspect. When a person is anxious about nothing in particular, they're not anxious about like their neurons or like their neurochemistry. But that's the answer you keep giving.
No, I'm saying that those, those sort of physical aspects are what are causing the anxiety based on...
I understand it, but what is the experience about?
The experience would be about the thing that is causing your anxiety, which would be whatever sort of...
So you think these people are anxious about the thing that's causing the anxiety.
No, when I say about, talking about the conscious directness, if you're saying specific...
Understand the question, it's literally on screen.
Okay. And you said...
Because I've said, you give me an answer, I ask the question, you give me an answer. I put your answer back into the question, say it back to you, and then you get frustrated and say, "No."
No, I'm not frustrated. I'm frustrated that...
Sure. Let's try this one more time, then.
Willfully ignorant.
When you feel anxious, but it's not about anything in particular. What is the experience directed towards?
Okay. So, anything particular, we've already answered that. Anything particular, you seem to claim, is going to be lack of conceptualization, right?
Claim lack of conceptualization.
Yeah. Is that what you're, is that what you're denoting?
So, okay, you're saying your claim is, and correct me if I'm wrong, that when you feel anxious, but it's not about anything in particular, um, that it's, it's directed towards, you seem to claim lack of conceptualization. Is that what you're denoting? Is that correct?
This is so low tier. It's ridiculous.
This is so low. The question is supposed to be about what's meant by nothing in particular. Yes.
Yeah. Some, because, because, well, my understanding was that nothing in particular, his proposition was, there seems to be empirical data that relegates my view of conscious directness in in accord.
Yeah. Because you're denying the existence of these people.
Yes. And then when you say nothing in particular, then what I'm asking is, what do you mean by that? Because if it's going to be the case that it's not what I'm explaining based on what I thought that you were proposing, then it must be something else.
Just that there doesn't exist an object towards which this mental state is directed.
There doesn't exist an object in which that mental state is directive, and this is, and this is presupposing that there are some sort of physical aspects that are causing the anxiety.
Yes.
Okay. Then yes, your consciousness directive is just going to be about the physical aspects. You don't have to have a specific, like, um, neurological understanding about it, but it's just going to be a sort of qualitative state of the actual feeling itself.
That caused the experience.
Because when you're asking me what is that directed towards, but there's nothing in direction. It could be towards, but it's caused by physical. Like that's, that seems pretty incoherent.
But it's not anxiety about anything. Uh, it is directed towards the physical aspects that cause the experience. So, okay, let me get this straight. So your position is that when you feel anxious, but it's not anxiety about anything, uh, it's directed towards the physical aspects that cause the experience. Is that correct?
Yeah, I would see, I would assume that's the only logical...
Okay. When you say directed, then I, I don't know what this means.
Uh, directed towards means your consciousness is ar, your consciousness is aware and arisen based on something.
Okay. So you're literally just saying like caused. When you say directed towards, that just means caused.
Your consciousness directed towards something means you are aware of something.
I said this at the very beginning.
Towards mean. So could you experience anxiety, but not about anything in particular, without being aware of the physical aspects that cause the experience?
Repeat that again.
So, okay, wait, first things first. Gosh, I want to go super linear here. So directed towards, you mean, um, what you just said was that you're aware of the thing causing the experience. What was your definition of directed towards just now?
Yeah. You're just aware of, like, your consciousness is aware of something,
Right? Like there, there's always something your consciousness is going to be aware of, and intentionality arises.
So when when you claim an intentional state is directed towards something, you're just saying that it's aware of that thing.
Um, aware of it in the sense that intentionality occurs, and intentionality is going to be the awareness based on what your consciousness is of. Yeah.
Uh, sure. So then the important question that I want to ask, uh, can you feel anxiety about nothing in particular without being aware of the physical aspects that cause the experience of anxiety?
No, the anxiety itself is the thing that your consciousness is directed towards.
So, okay, maybe I'm just like not understanding you. Um...
That's pretty evident.
Okay. Uh, this seems to be saying like the absurd claim that when you feel anxiety, but it's about nothing in particular, that you have awareness of like the neuroscience facts that go into you having like a generalized anxiety disorder.
No, I don't think you're aware of the neuron facts. You, you brought that up, and I told you that that's pretty ridiculous. And I said that the neurons could play some sort of role in your physical aspects. But I'm saying the anxiety, if it is the case that it is elicited based on some sort of physical aspects, whatever that may be in the realm of like, um, you know, the medical field and how they may explain it. You're aware of that fact that you are anxious, that your consciousness is directed towards the fact that you're anxious. I think the issue here is you seem to be falsely equivocating anxiety with consciousness, like especially when the way that I'm using the term.
Would you agree that there is like specific neuroscientific facts about, um, or for what causes the experience of anxiety about nothing in particular?
Did you hear what I just said? Yeah. That you think that I'm conflating between consciousness and anxiety?
But yeah, you know, how do you think that answers my question?
No, I think it answers that we've been spending about like 15 minutes on this. I don't think you understand...
Like the yes or the no, maybe...
Your problem. Yes or no for what? Is there...
Question that I just asked you?
There's, there is neuros, neuroscientific fact, but nothing in particular. Neuroscientific in what aspect? What are you talking about?
Just that there's like a fact about your brain.
That would fall under like the domain of, of neuroscience.
Yeah. There's some sort of biological fact that is that you can say is prevalent during the occurrence of whatever like physical thing you're talking about. I don't get what this has to do, like this doesn't seem like you're actually...
Just calm down. Nothing to be upset about.
No, I'm not upset. I'm just...
You sound upset.
I'm confused.
So, a single biological or a single neuroscientific fact.
Okay. Can I experience anxiety about nothing in particular without being aware of a single neuroscientific fact?
Yeah.
Oh, then we have a contradiction.
Sure. Give me a logical contradiction.
Yeah, sure. Let me, uh, let me type this out. Um, uh...
I'd love to see this.
I can experience anxiety about nothing in particular, without being aware of a single neuroscientific fact. If I experience anxiety about nothing in particular, then that experience, um, includes an awareness of, uh, physical aspects that cause the experience. The physical aspects that cause the experience.
Mhm.
Um, are some neuroscientific fact. So the contradiction would be, I am both not aware of any neuroscientific fact and I am aware of some neuroscientific fact. Wait, what? That's my claim. That's not my claim. What? Okay. So which of these three things are you claiming you didn't say? Uh, I can, hold on, let me read the, I can experience anxiety without nothing in particular, without being aware of a single neuroscientific fact. Yeah, that's not a problem. If I experience anxiety about nothing in particular, then that experience includes an awareness of the physical aspects that cause the experience. Three, the physical aspects. Okay. What's the problem here?
You want to reject two, right? Maybe I'm, maybe I'm not tracking, but the problem is that it's nothing in particular, then that experience includes an awareness of physical aspects that cause...
Yeah. So when I say aware of physical aspects, like, are you somehow denoting that to mean that I have to have some sort of...
Like academic level understanding of my biology, just like you need to be aware of the fact. In the same way that you know we're aware of other facts. You know, I'm using it in the standard way. You know, when I say, you know, are you aware that you can't park here?
Um, or that, sorry, that's not a, it's not a proposition. Um, or no, I, it is a proposition. Sure. Um,
But yeah, I feel like the issue here is there's obviously going to be greater context to this explanation. So, first of all, the context is going to be based on your proposition of empirical data somehow relegating my view to, but which one do you reject or? No, I'm saying that this, that that's not, do you not understand how this is a contradiction? How this like leads to a contradiction?
Yeah, what do you mean when you say awareness of that thing? Because it sounds like, whatever you mean when you said aware earlier. Aware earlier, yeah. When I say aware there, I'm just going to say that like there's some sort of conscious like intentionality that's occurring.
Okay. Um, and you can say which of these three would you reject? State of, which? I'm asking you for clarification on two because when you say awareness, you seem, just in the same sense that you claimed it. I, no, clearly not because you seem to have an issue with my explanation of it now.
Well, the problem is, is that you've committed yourself to a contradiction. Whatever your definition of awareness is, unless you're equivocating on the term, I mean, you know, there's just a direct contradiction here.
Okay. You're saying awareness as in I have to be well-versed in, let's go, let's go one step at a time. Do you acknowledge that there's a contradiction here?
I am agnostic of that because I don't understand the context. You're not sure whether or not I'm not aware of some neuroscientific fact and I am aware of some neuroscientific fact. Is a contradiction?
I guess, like, to to be more specific, I'm not aware of any neuroscientific fact and I am aware of some neuroscientific fact. You don't think that's a contradiction?
Yeah, it just depends on what you mean by fact. Like, are you saying like if I'm aware of a neuroscientific fact? Yeah, I'm just, hold on, let me clarify. If you're saying like I'm aware of some neuroscientific fact, could it be the case that you are aware of some neuroscientific fact, but not in the sense that you yourself personally have some sort of like deeper understanding of that? But it is the case that you're aware.
Whatever you meant when you said aware, we can just go with your semantics. Okay, then this isn't a contradiction.
Sure. So which premise would you reject? What? What? I didn't, the fruits of continental philosophy. Yeah, I know. The fruits of someone who doesn't understand any of the terms. There's the contradiction that's right there in front of you. Which one do you reject?
Yeah, if you're using aware as in you yourself personally have to be academic premise, biological, are you like, are you like a, I don't know, allergic to like clarification?
Yeah, I'm like super autistic. Okay, I need you to tell me the premise, either one, two, or three. Yeah, sure. Um, yeah, I have like, go ahead and, I have like a disgusting fetish for, you know, getting clear on the premise that you reject.
Wait, hold on. Wasn't it just something you just said that you're autistic and you actually are allergic to contextualization and clarification? No. What I'm allergic to is you trying to dodge. Do you reject premise one, two, or three? Oh, I'm trying to do, buddy. We've been stuck on P1.
Premise one, premise two, or premise three. There's a contradiction in your worldview. Reject contradiction in my worldview, but you don't understand. It's literally on screen in front of you. The formalization of it. Yes. Reject a premise.
Okay. What? Wait, hold on. What, um, what language am I using and where my, uh, this is like, is this what all continental philosophy is like? No, this is what people who actually read their material. Do you reject premise one, premise two, or premise three? It's a contradiction.
Okay, let's go back to the clarification. So, what are, your semantics, dude? It's your semantics. You said it. It's my, they're your semantics. Which premise do you reject?
Hold on. Yeah. If it's my semantics, then the clarification I just gave five minutes ago should be sufficient. Yeah. Which premise do you reject? Premise one, premise two, or premise three?
This guy. This guy is dead. It's your semantics, dude. Okay. So, I just gave you the clarification five minutes ago that you were, do you reject premise one, premise two, or premise three?
Okay. I, it seems pretty clear that you kind of signed out from this debate. Just reducing yourself. What I'm not interested in is letting you like skitso ramble. So, what I'm going to have you do is I'm going to direct you towards the premises.
Is skitso rambling meaning that I'm using correct like philosophical contextual? You can't do for some reason is track like a basic argument. Oh, I can't track a basic argument. Unironically, like unironically true. Yeah.
Seems like we're getting a little bit less productive than we could. Um, so, guest, are you saying that on your concept of, on the relevant concept of awareness, um, there's no contradiction between, uh, three and the, uh, preposition right under three? Or because it seemed like that's what you were saying earlier, but I don't, I don't think you.
So, my clarification was, you cannot be aware of any neuroscientific fact and be aware of it in the sense that you personally may not have some sort of like explicit biological understanding of this neuroscientific fact, but it's the case that you are aware of a neuroscientific fact that does exist. Yes.
Okay. Wait, so what's the, sorry. So, sorry. I just want to, so you, on your, on your use of the term aware, it can be true that I'm both aware of some fact and not aware of some fact.
It just depends on what, because he was the one who was proposing same sense and both of awareness. Obviously. Uh, this was a, seems like you can't be, wanted to say that, right? Sorry. Sorry. That's my bad. I interrupted. You could say that again.
Sure. I mean, look, I'm just going to concede the, uh, context of that and I'll just say, sure, this is a contradiction. Where in my view specifically am I making this contradiction? We'll just, well, that's a, that's a bit of a problem, bud. Uh, because contradictions are false.
No, clearly now it's the contradiction, right? Yeah. No, I'm asking specifically where within my view that I proposed am I committing this contradiction? Well, I mean, I asked you these questions. I'm specifically, your claim is that there's always an aware. Yes. Yes. It follows from your second premise.
My second premise? What second premise? Yeah. Specifically the clarification on your second premise that was given when asked about what intentional structure is that, um, like consciousness is directed towards something. So I gave you a counter example, an experience that is not directed towards something. Um, and then, uh, you said, actually, no, it, it is still directed towards something. It's directed towards, you know, the, the underlying facts. So I got clear on like what directed meant. Um, and you said like aware of, but then that's a big problem because, uh, you can in fact have anxiety about nothing in particular without being aware of the facts related to neuroscience in your brain. Yeah, I think this is, uh, if you, if you took a wrong turn, you can tell me.
No, trust me, I didn't take a wrong turn. Earlier, I already clarified that, uh, we weren't talking about specifications of neuroscience, right? I just said a physical aspect. I kept it broad and general. You said biological fact. Yeah, physical aspect could be some biological fact if it's mediated to whatever the empirical data that you propose, which would probably be something medical.
Okay. An explanation of your anxiety. Do you still stand by that? I'm saying based on your proposition, if we're going to relegate empirical data to that means, I've said you can be aware of your anxiety so far as that sort of empirical data is going to suppose that there's some physical aspect that causes your anxiety. Yeah.
Okay. I don't get. Are you like necessarily aware of that fact? Are you necessarily aware of that fact? I think you have a qualitative state of being, um, anxious, and your consciousness is going to be directed. So far as in there is a, like a thing that's occurring, or there seems to be an appearance of a thing that occurs, right?
Do you think that answers the question? Uh, I believe it did. I don't know. Do you, understand the question that I asked you and how do you think that answered it? Yeah, the question was something about whether or not that seems to explain those facts or have an awareness of those facts.
Okay. The question was, are you necessarily aware of the fact about like why you're having a generalized state of, uh, anxiety? Explain. I explained what that question is.
So, we're going to yes or no questions now when we're talking about clarification. I, yeah, cuz that's like clarifying for me. Yes or nos are clarifying? Yes or nos are clarifying for you. Do you disagree with that?
Um, I don't disagree with it necessarily. Yeah, I have my, uh, I have my, you know, sort of implications that you probably don't believe that. Okay. Um, I guess I could just ask you the question a third time. Mhm. Are you necessarily aware of the fact about why you're experiencing anxiety? Like the causal explanation?
Well, you, hold on. You added why and causal. That was never in contention. Uh, maybe I'm sure. So what do you, what do you think like the initial question or like what question were you answering? No, I'm talking, dude, you just added. Also, wait, I didn't add causal.
Causal is from the conversation earlier. You said that the thing that you'd be aware of in this instance, the thing that your anxiety about nothing in particular would be directed towards is specifically like the physical facts that cause it. No, I'm saying if it's the case that those physical facts of again, as relegated to your empirical data that you propose, which of course would be something that's going to be medical, we're assuming that's the case with some sort of physical attribute or aspect that's occurring, right? That's not in contention. We're just saying that if that's what your proposition is going to propose, then we can say that's the case. And I'm saying what you experience or what you're aware of is the thing in of itself, which is going to be the anxiety.
Okay. Sure. So, sure. So then the anxiety is directed towards the anxiety itself. No, this again is going to be that, uh, you're equivocating on anxiety and consciousness. You seem to be saying that anxiety is and of itself consciousness when we're talking about consciously.
I don't think I'm making that claim. Okay. Then why are you asking me if anxiety is direct? Because you said that specifically. You said that what in this experience you're like, it would be directed towards is the anxiety itself. Okay, thank you. You just made another blunder there. You didn't track anything I just said. So, when I was talking about conscious directness in terms of its intentionality, it's trying to get rhetorical to cover up the fact that what he's saying makes sense.
I mean, it's not getting rhetorical. I'm just making. I know it's not getting rhetorical, but it's certainly trying to. Oh, wait. So, you know, it's not getting rhetorical, but you just claim it's getting rhetorical. Yeah, I'm insulting you. You did a bad job of getting rhetorical. You're trying to get rhetorical.
Okay. Yeah. I don't know what I don't know what the people are saying, but, yeah, I don't think that's super relevant. Um, I, okay. So, so you're typically, you're not saying that the anxiety is directed towards itself, right? That the directedness. Yeah. I never claimed that the, like my specific thing that I said was consciousness is directed towards something. And then he started asking me about anxiety.
So I'm asking, does he think anxiety is consciousness? And he said no, he's not equally. Isn't an anxiety about nothing in particular a part of phenomenological experience? Like, couldn't you have a phenomenological experience about anxiety but nothing in particular?
Uh, nothing in particular in, in the sense that you think that there's no like mental constructs or something. But then you brought up empirical data, which means it's relegated to some physical aspect in which our conscious directiveness is going to be towards, uh, the, um, anxiety so far as it's going to be elicited from the physical aspects. Yeah. Because you already admit it. You claim that, um, anxiety.
So, is that, was like another yes or no question to be clear. Okay. So this guy, this guy wants to get into philosophical inquiry with yes or nos. I do. Yes. This guy wants to play 20 questions. I, I, I do in fact. Yeah.
Yes. You do. Is the answer yes or no? Ask question 13 for me and I'll, I'll answer. You know, I can't get to question 13 because I'm still on question 12 trying to get the answer. I'm, I'm attempting to get the yes or the no. Can you have a phenomenological experience about anxiety, but nothing in particular?
Yes. Guess if that nothing in particular is going to be denoted to what you propose, which empirical data is going to be relegated to physical aspects. Yeah. Okay. Sure. So then you can have anxiety. That's about nothing in particular. Um, and this would presuppose an intentional structure. Is that correct?
Would it presuppose an intentional structure? Um, in a sense. Yeah. But we're talking about consciousness. You're kind of, hold on. You're kind of jumping the gun because it, it seems pretty clear that you're very much unaware of anything that's going on around you in terms of this conversation and you're trying to jump to the conclusion of the princip because my phenomenological motion is, is, uh, pretty slow. It's not much motion going on.
Yeah, I know that neuroscience isn't, uh, really getting all active up in their brain. I know. I know. I'm aware. You know, I need somebody to come in here and pop like a, like an attie in my mouth or something, you know, anything to get the phenomenological motion moving.
So, okay. You said it would presuppose intentional structure, but just in like one specific sense. Is that not the sense, like, in, in the sense of premise two? Is it that sense? Okay. So the intentional structure is a whole another conversation because we're talking about you premise two, dude. Oh my.
Yes. No. Yeah. No, [ __ ] It's premise two. The talking about. What do you mean it's a different discussion? I'm just inserting discussion based on the, phenomenological motion, like an example of phenomenological motion into premise two and asking you if premise two holds.
Yeah. If you, if you're just, Oh my goodness. If you're just asking me, hey, is the intentional structure, um, going to be the consciousness always directed towards something and organizes how that thing appears true based on the fact that that very thing is occurring? Like, yeah, no, [ __ ].
Okay. So, so then just to clarify, to get like the, the point blank answer, um, in terms of like phenomenological motion, uh, you would consider a move to anxiety but about nothing in particular to be an example of phenomenological motion. Correct.
Wait, hold on. That's okay. Wait, this was supposed to be an entire discussion on the intentional structure so far as the consciousness being directed towards something. I'm just trying to plug an example in to make sure that I understand what you're saying.
Okay. If your, if your argument is more to look at or like listen to as opposed to one that you're actually supposed to get in there and like try to provide counter examples to, uh, then I don't think it's going to be very compelling to a lot of people. Oh, no, dude. I don't, here, I'll tell you how I know that, um, you don't understand what you're talking about. Nor did you.
I asked you another yes or no question, by the way. Yeah. No, I'm giving a clarification on your lack of comprehension. Yeah. Let me, let me clarify the argument. So, you're a fundamentally bad faith interlocutor, an ontological scumbag. I hate you and everything that you stand with. Like, okay, bud.
I don't know what that rhetoric was, but, uh, we need to work on it a little bit. No, it sure. Anyways, uh, the reason that you're not understanding what's going on is because phenomenological motion again deals with the things that are not static but intrinsically dynamic. Right. And I was talking about the, you know, the coming in the present, the being present, the passing away. Yeah. Um, how does that fit in right now with the understanding of intentional structures so far as a consciousness being directed towards something? And I ask you a yes or no question. Is the answer yes or no?
Dog, I'm asking you. Do you understand? Is the answer yes? Because the answer no. I just want to make sure that I'm understanding because I definitely don't understand the premise. You're correct, which is why I'm trying to get a deeper understanding of it by asking you this clarifying question. So, is the answer yes or no? It sounds like you don't even know the answer. In fact, I honestly wonder if you don't even know the question.
Uh, no. Actually, I don't know the question. Can you re-ask it for me? Yeah. Gosh, my intuition's phenomenal conservatism vindicated once more. Um, sure. So, would anxiety about nothing in particular be an example of phenomenological motion? Anxiety about something in particular being, about nothing in particular.
Emotion. About nothing in particular. And just to be clear, that nothing in particular is just going to be, there's not a mental image that seems to pop in our mind. There is no object that you're anxious, but there is no awareness of, like, anxious about. No awareness about anxious about. What does that even mean?
Yeah. You're not aware of anything that you're anxious about, but you are anxious. Okay. I'm not aware of anything I'm anxious about. Okay. So, is that going to be the mental images, the structure? Like, what is that supposed to be? I'm just asking, is that an example of phenomenological motion?
Um, anxiety can be an example of phenomenological motion. Yeah. But anxiety about nothing in particular, is that an example of phenomenological motion? If you're just denoting phenomenological motion in this sense to nothing in particular as being like things that there's no mental images or concepts in which you can like, I don't know with moral certainty, no seem to stay anxiousness is going to be relegated towards, then what are you? Okay, so then you're asking it like something that sounds pretty inco.
I'm just asking whether or not this is an example of the category that you've put forward. Yeah, I can't get a clear answer to it. No, I can't give a clear answer to something that doesn't seem clear in the first place. When you say you have anxiety that is not like about aware of anything in particular and that anything in particular means that thing doesn't exist.
I don't think that's the claim. I don't think the claim is that there's the awareness, like the lack of awareness means that there's nothing in existence. The idea is just supposed to be that, oh, sure. It seems like the idea is just supposed to be that this is maybe a counter example to the principle you gave in premise two, right? If, if maybe, maybe this could be productive. Is, is what you're saying in premise two something like, for every instance of phenomenological motion, there's an associated intentional structure?
Yeah, it supposes it, uh, presupposes an intentional structure. Like I explained, intentional structure is going to be that there is a consciousness that is directed towards something and organizes, uh, how that thing appears.
Sure. Sure. But to be clear, so part of what you're saying is that for every instance of phenomenological motion, there's an associated intentional structure, right? Yeah. I presuppose an intentional structure. Yeah. Yeah. Presupposition is, yeah, is the kind of association is, you know, sort of, I guess it presupposes it, but so what Ian is trying to say here is that for the case of like the sort of feeling of generalized anxiety, um, there's no associated intentional structure in the sense that the anxiety isn't about any, anything in particular, right?
So, is your, so, so I guess there could be a couple things you're doing. Are you trying to deny that people really do have that sort of experience? Or are you trying to deny that when they have that experience, there's no associated intentional structure?
Um, it depends. So, first of all, can I get an, um, an explanation on what you mean by aboutness? Because how I use aboutness is probably going to be completely different in the realms of phenomenology. I don't know, man. I think that might be the issue is that, um, it seems like, yeah, it seems like you guys might be using aboutness differently. I feel like a super trivial way. Just like when you can say that something is about something else. That's what I mean.
Well, I think there's the worry is that there's going to be a lot of ways that you could mean that, right? So, I think, yeah, maybe guest, you can also call you a guest. Is there something I should call you instead? No, you can call me whatever. It's fine.
Sure, sure, sure. Um, so it seems like the worry might actually or the the confusion might be about what you mean when you say aboutness, right? That your, it seems like, so Ian, are you, is your position that your experience isn't about something if you're not aware that it's, about something? Because it seems like the, it's clear to me. Well, okay. So, the, the problem is, is that probably like the cause of this is going to be because of like some underlying like brain neurochemistry, which means that in fact, there is not an object that that this stands in like an aboutness relation to. It's not just that you don't know what it is, um, or that you don't like understand it, or that you're not like, you know, aware of it. Um, it's that you're having an experience. It's not about anything. Yes, that I think you want to deny, right? Yes. Okay.
Well, in the realm of phenomenology, aboutness can be attributed to things that don't exist or even impossible. Uh, because when we talk aboutness in terms of phenomenology, it's not about like what exists. It's about how the consciousness would be directed. Um, if it's the case that your anxiety isn't your consciousness, as you've already explained, then what your consciousness is going to be directed towards is the various state in which you are, um, anxious, even if there is not a thing that which you're anxious about. Wait, say it again.
Yeah. Um, hold on. And I got to leave in like five minutes, so. Okay. I look forward to rhetorically posturing. Be nice. Be nice. That's, that's cool. I think I think the issue really is just that, is tell me if this is wrong again, but it seems like you want to say that it's really strange for there to be an experience that's about something that you're not aware of.
Well, no. It's just that I, I don't think that this experience is about something. Maybe I don't, maybe there's like some other usage of about than, uh, that I'm familiar with. Like, what's the usage? Like, what's the sense of about that's present here? About is just that your mind is going to be directed towards something.
It's not like just specifically having a state, but like aboutness again, if you say your mind, I can just say that like the mind is going to be like your consciousness, at least in this context. And then, um, it can just be directed towards something, even something impossible. So, like a square circle is logically impossible, but that doesn't mean that our consciousness isn't directed towards it in the sense that we are having a real thought and a, genuinely about the square circle. Sure.
Yeah. Uh, sure. Um, but then in like this circumstance, you'd say that the object that your thought is about doesn't exist. How again? I couldn't hear you. So you would say like in this circumstance that the object that the, that the thought is about doesn't exist. I was under the impression that was your proposition that there was not a thing that exists in which your anxiety was elicited. Yeah.
Okay. Sure. I think the existence talk might not be. No, I, I already explained it doesn't matter because like square circles don't exist in any real sense, but they can still be, uh, directed towards in terms of your consciousness. So, I guess like in the squared circle, like the thought of a squared circle example, what, what are you aware of there?
In terms of square circle? What am I aware of? Yeah. When we talk, when we have like thoughts about squared circles, uh, we're aware of the aspects of the squares and circles and we are aware of some sort of, um, attempt to formulation of some abstractness about that thing that is going to be illogical, right?
Sure. So you're just like imagining like, I don't know, like kind of what's included in the thought is just like the idea that there's like a shape. It's, it's less so like a mental picture or something like that and more so just like maybe like a list of properties. They could be, uh, mental images. They could be list of properties and which you're trying to create mental images and of course with square circle you're going to fail on doing.
But, okay. Sure. So, so then in this instance, what your thought would be about, what it's directed towards, the thing that you're aware of is just like, kind of like a list of properties? For square circle. Yeah. Sure.
Okay. Sure. Um, and is the awareness like the thing that causes the thought or like the, the thing that causes the experience or is it something else? No, your experience is the very fact that you're aware of something.
Okay. The very fact that you're aware of something. Um, man, I feel like this just didn't resolve the problem with anxiety at all. Yeah. Um, it sounds like you're using anxiety in place of consciousness. I, I don't think that's the issue. I think the idea is just that if what you're saying is that for any, for any instance of phenomenological motion, there is this intentional structure where there's this aboutness relation, um, then, and if this is a genuine example of phenomenological motion, um, Ian is just unclear on what the intentional structure, what the aboutness relation is stands, like what, what stands in the aboutness relation to the anxiety, um, because it seems, I mean, you, you definitely don't want to say that it's like the neurons in the brain. You definitely don't want to say that it's the anxiety itself. Um, but I guess it's unclear what your answer.
I know. I mean, I, I, I find it confusing because we are, uh, experiencing anxiety. So to sort of propose anxiety, which does seem very obviously in place, equivocating it with consciousness when the understanding of consciousness is not going to be relegated to what anxiety is, then, um, isn't why you think that there's any equivocation between anxiety and consciousness here?
Sure. Because when I talk about experience, experience is like, um, the way reality is given or shows up to consciousness. The way that it's d, the thing it's going to be directed towards is going to elicit the experience, right? It's something that's be meaningful structured. It's something that's being directed, you know, um, they have all these inner time conscious relations and, uh, intentionality structures, you know, as per like Edmund Husserl might say.
And so when you say like, is your anxiety aware of something when the conversation is about your consciousness being directed towards something, then it seems like you're claiming that the anxiety is the consciousness. Yeah, I don't think that's the question. The question is isn't about, um, awareness anymore because we've moved past the, or yeah, it's not quite aware, yeah, it's not about the awareness talk, it's about just the, the sort of aboutness, right? The aboutness relation, right? So, so the question is again, just what is the anxiety about? Right? What is the anx, if the anxiety is a genuine example of, um, phenomenological motion, and for all phenomenological motion, there's there, there's, you know, something that it stands in this, about relation, the aboutness relation was really getting to the consciousness and directive in terms of the intentionality when we're talking about the anxiety again.
Yeah, the aboutness in terms of the context when we're talking about the intentional structure, which is going to be the consciousness being directed. Right. When you start applying that to anxiety, I don't see how that's not equivocating because even if you're talking about what the aboutness of the anxiety is, right, the aboutness. It's not about what the aboutness, it's, it's about what the aboutness stands in relation to, is the question. About it stands in relation to, and what, how does this, how does this relegate, how does it hold on, how does this relegate the view of the intentional structure, like how does this make it like, how does this affect?
I'm not sure exactly what's meant by relegate here. Well, I misspoke that there. How does this like make the intentional structure seem like insufficient when you start talking about the aboutness relations in terms of conscious directiveness when we're talking about?
I don't know that Ian is saying that it's like insufficient. I think the idea is just supposed to that again. So premise two is saying something like, for every phenomenological, for every instance of phenomenological motion, there's an associated, there's, there's some object that it stands in an aboutness relation to, maybe, yeah, is that true? Do we agree on that?
Wait, repeat that again. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Sure. Sure. So, is premise two saying, or, or is maybe, maybe this isn't all it's saying, but is part of what it's saying that for every instance of phenomenological motion, there's some object that it stands in an aboutness relation to? No, I mean, unless you, I.
Well, do you think, hold on. Is it the understanding of you two that the intentional structure is about the aboutness? Uh, no. One sec. Let me look at it. It depends on the sense of about, right? But, uh, uh, I don't think so. What I'm trying to get, yeah.
Intentional structure is just the fact that consciousness is directed towards something. And where directed is just means like it's like aware of something. In, yeah, sure. So I guess like, okay, just that phenomenological motion presupposes that you're like aware of something. That your consciousness is directed towards something. Yeah. Intentionality exists because your consciousness is directed towards something. Intentionality is the only way that you can have any understanding of phenomenological motion or experiences.
Okay. Wait, so is the premise literally just saying like, when you have an experience, you have like an awareness? In a sense? Sure. Like if you want to dumb it down, you could say, um, the understanding of the stages or unfolding of your experiences presupposes that you are experiencing something.
Uh, I mean, that seems like trivial. It seems trivial in what sense? If all you're saying is that when, when you have like an experience, when there's like a, like a coming of experience that's like, you know, open to to possibilities in the future, you know, a present experience with open possibilities in the future, um, that there's like some sort of like awareness of something there. Well, I don't know. It seems like there isn't like an experience that you have where you aren't like aware of the experience. There's not an experience in which you are aware of the experience.
Otherwise, you're not really trying to say, right? Experiencing it. Bro. Anyways, I'm going to go eat dinner. Okay. Y'all have a good day. Brutal, bro. Yeah, maybe I don't know. Do you think I was being like intellectually, like unverirtuous? Um.