Transcription
Why China is a civilization state?
We cannot treat Chairman Mao the way Kushov treated Stalin. Stalin. The mandate of heaven was lost, and then Deng Xiaoping started the reform and opening up. Ultimately, it's all about Taiwan.
It's surrounded by hawks who prefer to defend Taiwan despite the fact that, you know, militarily, it's already basically, uh, inconceivable. Is there a deal that can be done between the US and China?
It takes two to have a tangle.
Is it possible that, uh, in the future, Europe and China will be, uh, working closely again?
Cannot adopt the Western political system. That's a coffee shop; people debating, but nothing happens. Major threat to China will be external.
Jang Weiwei is a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai and the director of its China Institute. He started his career as an interpreter in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, where he had the privilege of working with Deng Xiaoping and several other Chinese high-level leaders in the 1980s. He's a graduate of Fudan University, Beijing Foreign Studies University, as well as the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, where he earned his doctorate. He earned international fame in the debate with Francis Fukuyama in 2011, where they debated the advantages and disadvantages of the Western liberal democracy model compared with the China model. He is a prolific author and a TV personality. He has started his "China Now" uh talk show in 2019, which is one of the best known and best-regarded international talk shows in China. He is a frequent speaker at international conferences and a great scholar of China's internal and external relations. It is a great privilege to have Professor Jang Weiwei with us for the OnChina podcast. Professor Jang Weiwei, thank you very much for doing the OnChina podcast.
Such a pleasure to see you again in Belgrade.
Thank you very much for, uh, being always there for us to talk. And today, um, I'd like to, um, go deeper than our usual conversations. uh, because here on the, uh, podcast OnChina, we're really trying to make, uh, China better understood, okay, by the non-Chinese, by the audience from outside, uh, even the region of Asia, uh, and, uh, you are, um, well known for discussing the concept, uh, of a civilization state. For us, uh, in our part of the world, um, we think of nation-states, um, that have a government, economy, that have borders. And, um, you talk about the concept of a civilization state. Could you tell me what makes a civilization state, and then why China is a civilization state in your opinion?
Yeah, in fact, you know, uh, academically, there are originally two concepts. One is civilization state. The other is civilizational state. Now, in the mainstream media, the two are interchangeable.
But originally, they are slightly different. Civilization state, or civilization-hyphen-state, means you're an old civilization, but you're not necessarily a modern state. And civilizational state, that's the phrase I, uh, coined in 2010, it means a combination, an amalgamation of age-old civilization and modern state. So, it's a slight difference, but now it's interchangeable. Now, for civilizational state, it's defined as, uh, an amalgam of the world's longest, or one of the longest, continuous civilizations with a large modern state. And why so? As you mentioned, in Western political science or international relations studies, usually, uh, they define modern state as nation-state, or the other way, nation-state as modern state with very clear borders, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, etc. Now, as I, you know, uh, study the Western narratives about China, about China today, it's overwhelmingly in terms of nation-state and modern state. So, the mainstream view is China is not a modern state. And originally, uh, Professor Lucian Pye, Americanologist, uh, he said China is a civilization pretending to be a nation-state. This, in other words, he's implying as an old civilization, you are not necessarily able to build a nation-state in the form of, say, uh, United States, separation of powers, constitutionalism, modern economy, modern science, modern education. He has a lot of doubts. Of course, he passed away a long time ago. So, when I look at his writing, I felt, actually, China today. So, by the time when I raised the issue in the 1990s and early this century, I said China is already a modern state. Uh, but these civilizational characters are still there. But I'll explain this later to you. And so that makes China very fascinating in terms of how to discuss, you know, political legitimacy, how to discuss, uh, the Communist Party of China, how to discuss the, uh, state, the nature of the state in China, and its influence. How to explain the China model, why China can rise so fast? So that has to do with civilizational state.
Well, one thing that I found really fascinating, uh, when I tried to study, uh, Chinese history, uh, obviously we're talking about a very, very long stretch of history, thousands of years, uh, and, um, there is a, um, very famous person, mythical or real, uh, the Yellow Emperor.
That's true.
And we're talking about 2,500 years before Christ. And, um, he became very prominent because two and a half thousand years ago, he reunited, uh, China, which kind of implies that China existed before. So, to me, it seems that unlike, say, Western, um, nations or civilizations that are very, very proud of its origins, uh, China doesn't seem to have a beginning. China has always been there.
So, um, this continuity that goes both back and into the future, how's that part of, uh, the civilizational state concept in the Chinese, uh, case in particular?
Yeah, if you talk about the origin of Chinese civilization, and now we talk about 5,000 years of continuous, uh, civilization. And this is very important in the sense that we have a very well-recorded literature and a very, uh, well, uh, discovery of the, uh, all kinds of archaeology, uh, whatever, you know, uh, remains around the ancient times. So, if you look at, uh, both China and the West, and UNESCO, except for just a few years ago, a huge city remains of the Liangzhu civilization, which is roughly 5,000 years or 5,500 years from now, which has already the shape of a city, huge population, uh, irrigation projects, and, uh, uh, the, uh, preparation of agriculture, and, um, all kinds of scripts and jade carvings, uh, and with the sign of dragons.
And with the sign of dragons.
So, all these were already there over 5,500 years ago. And if you look at the language, we are still using the same language which started from the, uh, latest discovery, roughly 3,500 years ago. This is the script carved into the bones and turtle shells. And you can imagine, you know, when this language already took shape at that time, which means there must be other, uh, writing, whatever, before that, simply because they were carved in turtle shells and the bones, they, they survived. If they carved in wood, they disappeared.
They disappeared.
It's, we have already around 5,000 characters, if not more. And, uh, all this shows it's a continuity of the civilization. If you compare with, say, Latin, whatever, it's more or less a dead language. But the language structure in China today, same as the same, you know, we can read Confucius in his original, 2,500 years ago, today. Yeah.
Yeah, this is one, one of the things that I really, uh, find fascinating, that the longevity of, uh, the language and the encoding, the preservation of the language and the encoding over this long period of time, uh, is something that, um, also, in a way, unifies China today. You not necessarily understand each other if you're talking different dialects in different parts of China. But when you write things down, uh, in this, uh, calligraphy, you can actually understand, uh, you can communicate. And I find this one of the three, I would say, um, important, um, aspects of, uh, Chinese, uh, civilization, or a civilization state. One is, uh, one is the language and encoding. And the other two structures that I find, uh, quite interesting is the system of governance, uh, that is, uh, based on meritocracy.
Uh, you debated famously with Fukuyama, the liberal democracy versus the democratic election, versus the selection based on meritocracy. Uh, if I'm not mistaken, it was during the Sui and Tang dynasties that the civil examination was introduced. Could you tell me a little bit more about this, uh, system of governance, and why does it, uh, actually, one can claim continuity, uh, from the ancient times to the modern CPC governed China?
And, uh, you mentioned Professor Fukuyama, and indeed, we had this debate, and, uh, on the Chinese political system. I use this argument about the civilizational state to share with him my findings. And I give him some credit because he said, and he wrote as well, he said that China was the first country that invented the modern state in many ways. Because he discovered, before, uh, 200, 300 years before Jesus Christ, before, it's around, you know, 300 BC, uh, 400 BC, China already began to select officials. It's not dependent on patronage or relative, whatever relations, but based on your performance. So, it's already the sense of neutral state that already took shape even at that time. Uh, so, I try to explain through civilizational state why China embraces this kind of, or invented this kind of system rather than election. For one thing, is the size of China. So, China already the most populous country in the world at that time. And furthermore, in terms of, uh, resources, especially in per capita terms, uh, if I compare China and the United States in the 19th century, let's say, 1840s, when the United States defeated Mexico, uh, and annexed this whole western region, California, etc. The US population was only 20 million. At that time, China's population was 400 million.
Mhm.
20 times more than the United States, more than America. And furthermore, this large population, 70% of them, if not more, lived in the east coast of China, due to this landscape. But only that part was, uh, with enough river resources and suitable for growing crops, rice, wheat, etc. As a result, in terms of per capita G, uh, possession of resources, China is much more, uh, uh, narrow and smaller compared with the United States. Mhm.
As a result, there is a tremendous trend towards, we need to kind of have a kind of impartial government.
Mhm.
That's how the system gradually moving in that direction, you know. And so, you mentioned in the Sui Dynasty, which is roughly, uh, 1,500 years ago, China invented this civil servant examination system. It's called the Keju. And of course, it took quite a lot of years to make it mature and really functioning as the best selecting system. It took about 100 years and gradually becoming the only channel by which you can become as high as prime minister. Yeah. If you are the top, uh, of the top one, you become prime minister, you can be minister. So, this is based on the Confucian ideology of education for all, irrespective of your background, your birth, or your peasant, you can sit for the exam. If you do well, uh, you can become a senior official. So, this is also arguably the most advanced political system at that time. And the British copied that in the 19th century, and they tried it out first in the, uh, uh, India, in their colonial system, and they found, oh, it's working, you know. So, it spread to the West.
And, um, today's China also has a very, uh, serious and elaborate, um, civil exam system. And there's this notion that, in order to progress in the Chinese apparatus, state apparatus, uh, you need to go through the, uh, um, cycles of, uh, increasing, uh, responsibility and exposure. In other words, running a, a small unit or, or a small place, and then, and then you go to a city, and then, uh, you do other things before you get to be selected for the next, uh, for the next position. So, is it fair to say that, uh, this current system of, uh, picking and progressing government officials, uh, is very much rooted in something that has been ongoing for actually thousands of years in its various forms?
Yeah, exactly. Because we have this kind of saying, uh, uh, if you want to become prime minister, you have to work at the grassroots as a county chief. So, if you become a general, you have to be a foot soldier. So, this tradition is very long in ancient China. It's already there. And then, for instance, we take Xi Jinping as an example. He is a leader who has worked in every stage of China's, uh, government hierarchy, from, uh, uh, small town party secretary for the township, and to county party secretary, and to a city deputy mayor and mayor, party secretary, then province, for three provinces.
Three different provinces.
Yeah. Uh, Fujian, which is opposite to Taiwan. He became governor, uh, and then Zhejiang, with deep sea, it's, uh, yeah, province next to Shanghai, and then, uh, Shanghai, uh, party secretary of Shanghai, which is a rank of municipality, rank of a province. Mhm.
So, he worked in three provinces and then got promoted to, uh, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the vice, deputy vice president of the country. So, for another, uh, five years, and he became number one. So, it is, uh, it is safe to say that, uh, the next leader of China, uh, is already someone who is working a very serious job somewhere in the state apparatus, because there is no other way to get to a position of such prominence than to, to show your competence, uh, in running a smaller.
Yeah. From my study, you know, in most cases, members of the Politburo, especially the Standing Committee, uh, they've all governed, not all, but most often have governed, uh, two provinces or three provinces, uh, before getting to the, uh, before they get to the Standing Committee.
Yeah. Yeah. You know, they've already governed about 100 million people, uh, before they come to the current Standing Committee.
I also find it very interesting, uh, once we had a very senior diplomat here in our part of the world, and, um, this diplomat, uh, had to take a break from diplomacy, uh, to be sent to a small, uh, town somewhere in China, uh, to get the experience of a small town, and then the diplomat returned to the diplomatic service. But I, I found it really fascinating. You don't have it, uh, elsewhere. So, it's a very interesting system. And it's also very interesting to discuss, uh, from my perspective, the legitimacy, uh, as understood, uh, by the Chinese. And, uh, the early, um, the early structures, the, uh, the dynasties, uh, and the early writings, if you will, of, of China, they talk about the mandate, uh, of heaven, as something supreme. I mean, it comes from heaven, the emperor rules with a mandate, uh, of heaven. But, uh, but China had several, uh, revolutions in its history, uh, change of dynasties, and so on. And, um, there were, uh, moments where China was rising, that usually related to the moments of reunification. And there were difficult parts of history when there were divisions and internal strife, and a lot of, uh, people who governed China lost their, uh, mandate, in a way, lost the mandate from heaven, and then the change occurs. So, what does it mean in modern terms? Is it still something relevant, something that you can relate to in modern China?
If you compare China and the United States, if there is a natural disaster, say earthquake or, uh, flooding, heavy flooding affecting a huge region. In the case of China, either the general party or prime minister, at least the deputy prime minister will rush to the site to coordinate the fight against the natural disaster. It's part of the traditional mandate of heaven. Unlike the US presidency, you can still continue your holiday, whatever, you know, because it's rule of law. It's not necessarily to affect his mandate. You know, in China's long history, about 2,000 years ago, this school of thought on man, heaven was officially pronounced. I want to say, you know, this is actually very secular. It's not about something, uh, about God, God, not at all. It's originally 2,000 years ago. It's the idea is a kind of, uh, warning to the top leader, to the emperor. Heaven knows what you are doing. Are you working hard for the people? Are you making huge mistakes? So, they use the natural disasters, uh, occur.
If there was an earthquake or flooding or famine, they will say, heaven says, uh, this is a sign. This is a sign. No, your mandate is somehow out of the tomb. So, time will come to change. Same from the grassroots, from the people. Your people felt, you know, we were oppressed, we were so poor, we lived a miserable life, they can revolt. As the slogan, we changed mandate of heaven, man, heaven is no longer there, so I can be the emperor. So, many Chinese dynasties came to an end because of peasant uprisings, uprising. So, the Chinese emperor, even at that time, is not exactly totalitarianism, dictatorship. They have a kind of, uh, they must deliver. They must deliver to the people. This is the minimum. And also to ensure this country has good order and people are able to live a normal life. That's very important, you know.
So, it's, it's, I, I recently had a conversation, um, about a mandate, uh, of heaven, and its significance and meaning in the, in the modern China, CPC-run China. And it was very interesting. Uh, the Cultural Revolution was obviously understood as a big calamity, uh, you know, and a lot of people lost their lives or they were imprisoned, and, and there was, uh, vast destruction during the Cultural Revolution. And then, uh, Mao died, and several of his main lieutenants died in the 70s, right? And then there was a major earthquake, if I'm not mistaken. So, they all died, and there was an earthquake, and, uh, it was understood, if I'm not mistaken, by some, that, well, the mandate of heaven was lost, and now we need to start something new. And then Deng Xiaoping started, uh, the reform and opening up, which was obviously a new episode in the development of China. Is this a fair, uh, is this a fair assessment?
In a way, uh, uh, uh, it is true in the sense that in early, uh, 1976, there was a huge earthquake in Tangshan, near Beijing, uh, near Beijing, in Beijing was affected. And, uh, so the rumor began to spread, you know, not exactly mandate of heaven is lost, but something serious will happen. Indeed, in that year, three top leaders of China died and passed away. Uh, Zhou Enlai, China's premier for over 20 years, and Zhu De, the top one in the military, and then Chairman Mao in September of that year. So, there was a rumor at that time, you know, wow, some population, something happening, maybe heaven not happy with the Cultural Revolution, whatever. But of course, China as a modern state, they never discuss this in public. But among the population, this kind of thing goes there. And, uh, so when Deng began to start reform, that was actually 1978, two years, two years after that, this transition, uh, he got this new mandate. Many people felt, because today we will say, you follow the trend of history. As a leader, as a statesman, you should be able to feel the pulse of your society. That's important. So, in this way, the mandate of heaven is also very human. Uh, if there are a lot of disasters, difficulties, crises, you must change the course, you must have a new direction. So, even at that time, there were a lot of, you know, criticism of Chairman Mao, and especially among the intellectual elites, because they were a lot who were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. They were considered as bourgeois, as, uh, the rightists. We have to give credit to Deng Xiaoping as a successor to Mao. And he said, uh, we cannot treat Chairman Mao the way the Soviet Union treated Khrushchev.
Stalin, you mean?
Stalin. Yes.
Stalin treated Stalin.
Yeah.
Let me say that again. We cannot treat Chairman Mao the way junior Khrushchev treated Stalin. Stalin.
And, uh, he said Mao was 70% correct, 30% wrong. And he said, we are all students of Chairman Mao. We also make mistakes. These mistakes were made not only by Chairman Mao, by me, by others, because we were not junior officials. I was a party's general secretary. So, we're also to blame. So, the fair assessment, especially now with the passage of time, we feel, as I give this lecture yesterday, I mentioned Chairman Mao laid the foundation for New China, political foundation, economic foundation, social foundation, women's liberation, and, uh, basic literacy campaign, and basic health. Uh, all these are essential for China's rise. But indeed, by the time he died, China was very poor. If you look at the per capita GDP, China's per capita GDP was lower than most African countries, lower than Zimbabwe, lower than, not to mention South Africa. Uh, of course, you may say this kind of calculation may not be accurate, but I was in these countries in the 1980s, their capital was more developed than, uh.
But then, uh, then started a quite remarkable period in world's modern history, which is, uh, the reform and opening up. And, um, essentially, we're talking about, uh, less than half a century.
That's true.
Since the beginning. And probably the most, um, remarkable and dynamic story in the history of development, uh, globally.
Yeah.
In terms of, uh, the number of people that were taken out of poverty, and the level of, uh, uh, technological and economic prowess of a country, uh, in such a short period of time. So, we're talking about 50 or less, uh, years. So, what, in your opinion, were the, uh, the crucial secrets of, uh, this particular reform's success?
Well, I would say, you know, uh, the Chinese model of development is the key to China's success. And, uh, I can give a quick summary of what I perceive as the China model. Politically, uh, the Chinese Communist Party is a holistic interest party. Because in terms of civilization state, China has always been governed by a unified ruling entity since 221 BC when Emperor Qin unified the country. But the size of the country matters. If China adopts Western, what I call, partial interest political parties or partisan interest parties, the country would disintegrate. We experienced that in 19, uh, 11, was we call the Republican Revolution. Mhm.
Soon degenerated into warlords fighting each other. And, uh, then behind this is a system of selection plus election. Selection from Chinese tradition, election from the West. So, that's the political side of the more Chinese model. Economic side, it's a mixed economy. Officially, it's called socialist market economy. In other words, the state, the role of the state, and the role of the market ideally complement each other. If there are problems and tensions between the two, the role of the central government, the party, is to make sure the two complement each other. Now, people talk about China's EVs, China's fighting poverty, and China's internet industry is spending so fast, and to do with this mixed economy. The state sector is responsible for planning, strategic planning, and for infrastructure, including digital infrastructure. Each village, up to Tibet, up to Xinjiang, it must be 5G. It's done. And the private sector has made best use of this availability of infrastructure and deliver first-rate service. So, that's the example of the mixed economy. And socially, it's rather than, you know, pitting the state against society, or society against state, Chinese state and society are engaged in mutual interactions, very dynamic. Yeah. So, this is a, a very quick summary of what I perceive as the China model. And in history, same, you know, uh, in the past, we have this unified ruling entity. The economy of the state sector is always there. You, you went to say, 2,000 years ago, Chinese extremely detailed recording of the court were discussing the role of the state in terms of collecting tax for salt, tax for tea, etc. Uh, and the state sector over there. On the other hand, the private sector is very dynamic, always. That's a vast country, you need to have the initiative of private sectors.
And to which extent would you say, Professor Jang, the Confucian thinking and the Confucian thought, uh, is an important part, uh, of China's, uh, government at various levels, government action today in the 21st century?
I give you two or three quick examples. Uh, when Deng Xiaoping came to power, he said, we must quadruple our economy by the year 2000. And then he said, he used a Confucian phrase, concept called the, uh, "moderately prosperous."
Moderately prosperous society.
Yes, moderately, moderately prosperous society. It's a concept from Confucianism. And then behind this is a Confucian ideology. It's always there. It's called, you may see, people's livelihood first. Whatever you do as a government, as a state, uh, in terms of political policy, economic policy, social policy, it must end up in delivering something to improve people's living standard, people's livelihood. This is crucial. In other words, in Chinese politics, the tradition up to now is always, we cannot tolerate empty talks. Uh, or Deng Xiaoping said, we cannot adopt the Western political system. That's a coffee shop; people debating, but nothing happens. No, it must be deliver something tangible for the people. Uh, as a result, you know, it's surrounding focusing on improving people's livelihood, both in material terms and non-material terms. Or in Bill Clinton's famous phrase, it's "economy, stupid." I see, uh, I would say that maybe it's, it's "civilization, stupid," a variant that we could use here. But, uh, but there are three, uh, distinctly Confucian values and instincts that, uh, that I find recurring through, through the writings and, and also through the speeches and, and addresses of the modern officials. One is balance and harmony.
Yeah.
The other is reciprocity.
Yeah.
Both domestically and the way you deal with the world. And stability, uh, as the main foundation of prosperity. Is it fair to say that those three, uh, combined with the, uh, socialist ideology of, uh, you know, equality and equal opportunity and other things for all? Are those now the main value drivers, ideological, uh, value drivers of, uh, the ongoing development of the Chinese model?
Mh, that is, uh, the case where you find that why we Chinese, or most Chinese, uh, tend to embrace the idea of socialism. That has to do with Confucianism. Confucianism is about equality. The famous line is, he said something, you know, 2,500 years ago, it's far more dangerous to have an uneven distribution of wealth than poverty or wealth. So, try to control this, uh, inequality is crucial. And this is why, even at the time when Deng launched his reform, he said, some people, some regions can become prosperous first, but they must help the rest to catch up. So, now we call this common prosperity. We are still working on that. So, you're right. This has to do with Confucianism. This is what we call the, uh, to, uh, combine socialism with Chinese conditions, national conditions, Chinese traditions, as well. Same with your idea of reciprocity. You know, something China has difficulty with Western political science or philosophy, which focus so much on individual rights rather than responsibilities. So, in the Chinese philosophy, rights and responsibilities must be, must go hand in hand, otherwise a modern society cannot function well. It's, it's so basic. And same with your, uh, point concerning the, uh, public order and stability. You know, during the time of, um, a lot of talk about universal values for many years, influenced by the United, by Washington, by the European Union. Yet, you know, we did a study a long time ago, and also other scholars did similar studies to survey, let's suppose there are, or there were universal values, say freedom of speech, freedom of, uh, other freedoms, press. But in the Asian society, where people use chopsticks, you know, whether it's, uh, from Taiwanese, Taiwan, or Hong Kong, or Singapore, or Chinese mainland, the number one priority is always public order. As always, with a civilization state, it's such a vast country, uh, the size of internal population, 100 average European states, uh, putting together. And so, from its long history, people fear chaos, fear chaos leads to wars, leads to hunger, and leads to famine, and leads to all kinds of crises. So, from a long history, people hate, loathe chaos. Chaos.
So, that, uh, one can observe, uh, if one tries to, to look at, uh, China's international engagements. Uh, China really does put, um, priority, uh, on stability, on, uh, reciprocity. So, common prosperity, once, once a moderately prosperous, uh, society is achieved in China, then the goal, if I'm not mistaken, by extending this thinking beyond China's boundaries or regions, would be to establish common prosperity for the whole world. Uh, is this one of the drivers, uh, of the, uh, Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century?
If you look at the origin of Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism, and even Taoism, they all talk about this common destiny of the people. At that time, they did not know beyond China there were other countries, or say Europe, or whatever. But this idea of "under heaven," which means everyone under heaven. So, China is one of the few, uh, uh, nations in the world which from early on did not have this, uh, uh, what's called, uh, racially based bias. It's always one, everyone under heaven. So, the emperor will take care of everyone under heaven, at least in theory. Uh, it's, uh, much more cultural than, uh, other reasons for the unity of the country, for the identity of the country, even for those foreign, uh, countries, which nations that conquered Chinese, China land, and usually, they were absorbed into this Chinese culture and cultures. They identified themselves as Chinese, and China accepted them as Chinese. So, this, uh, uh, you may say, universal type of outlook is always there. Uh, and then Xi Jinping developed this into this idea of a shared, uh, uh, community for a shared future. So, that's actually, uh, you know, rooted in, in those thinkings.
And, um, so let's talk a little bit more about, um, China's relations with the world. Uh, China is right now, uh, the second largest economy in, uh, in dollar terms. We're the first world economy in PPP terms, if you look at the GDP, but on a per PPP, uh, purchasing power parity. So, uh, profoundly consequential, a national actor, so economically, diplomatically, technologically, and so on and so forth. Uh, you like to talk about, uh, Chinese relations with the world as, uh, Chinese relations with friends.
Yeah.
Or potential friends. So, let's talk about Chinese relations with two potential friends. I dare to say they're, I would classify them as potential friends: the United States of America, and the European Union. But let's start with the United States of America first. Um, for many decades, America has been the most, uh, dominant global power, militarily, economically, technologically. One can also claim when it comes to the cultural influence around the world, America with Hollywood and everything, America was at the forefront. Um, now, this, uh, the situation seems to be changing, and, uh, China is definitely a very, very strong peer in a number of areas, and it creates tensions. Uh, Professor Graham Allison talked about the Thucydides Trap, and, you know, the inevitability of a clash between the incumbent and the rising force. Of course, it creates, uh, a lot of, uh, stress, a lot of apprehension around the world, because if there are, if there's a conflict between the two major powers, then the whole world, uh, ends up being on the losing end, right? So, uh, do you think that despite the rivalry that is obvious, there is hope, uh, that discussions between China and the United States, based on, uh, perhaps not so, uh, philosophically sophisticated concepts as Confucian thought, but a more like a transactional approach that the United States government, uh, and in particular, this government of the United States seems to, uh, seems to be more adept to? Uh, is there a deal that can be done between the US and China, uh, that keeps, uh, in a way, both sides, uh, if not super happy, then at least okay, uh, with, uh, with the terms of this deal?
And, uh, position with regard to the United States is always like this, you know, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. So, our position, both at the level of government, at the level of ordinary people, uh, we want to have a good relation with the United States, which is also in the interest of both countries, both peoples, and the whole international community. Yet, it's also true that, you know, uh, we cannot be too idealistic. We have to know the reality of the United States has a huge military-industrial complex, uh, which is driven by its own interests. I remember when the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, I made a quick calculation. They spent $2.3 trillion over 20 years for this disastrous war. I made a rough calculation, with this $2.3 trillion, if, in theory, if adopted the Chinese model of fighting poverty, you can eliminate worldwide extreme poverty, including the poverty, extreme poverty in the United States. But the industrial complex prefers this money spent on war. Of course, they make their own huge profits. The problem of the American politics, political system, that's something, you know, they should reflect upon and how to reform it or change it, otherwise, American people will suffer from the consequences.
I mentioned a long time ago, I said, when people talk about so-called new Cold War between the United States and China, I said, why should we become so stupid? You know, Cold War was based on, is based on the philosophy of mutually assured destruction. Yeah. MAD. MAD. I said, why can't China embrace something called mutually assured prosperity? MAP. With the current, you know, level of development for both countries, the two largest economies, we could really embrace this new concept, MAP. Yet, it takes time. So, we are also realistic. We think the United States is also a country that comes to terms with real power.
So, I would say, yes, China prefers, as you say, reciprocity. China prefers, you know, soft power and diplomacy, but it's really strengthened and backed by powerful manufacturing power, trading power, uh, technological power, and military power. We will not be too naive to say, United States, uh, it's really based on strength. In the end, we hope to achieve this kind of really mutually assured prosperity, prosperity.
But, um, thinking of, um, the, the big deal.
Yeah.
And, uh, and trying to study the elements of, uh, of the big deal that was done by Chairman, uh, Mao, and President Nixon, back in the 70s. Uh, I read Kissinger's, um, biography and Kissinger's writings on this, and he explained to Nixon that, uh, ultimately, it's all about Taiwan. And, uh, as a matter of fact, the main part of the deal was America's recognition of the People's Republic of China instead of Taiwan, and, uh, People's Republic of China taking up the seat in the Security Council, uh, that was until then occupied, uh, by Taipei, and so on.
Um, this remains a big issue. We spoke earlier about the importance, paramount importance of, uh, unification as a driving force, perpetual force in, in the Chinese thinking and statecraft. Don't you think that again, uh, Taiwan could be, uh, like in the 70s, that Taiwan could be at the heart, uh, of the new deal? Uh, because if, if China prioritizes reunification, and if America prioritizes something else, could be, uh, a very attractive economic or trade deal that makes a lot of people wealthy in America. Not necessarily every single American, but, uh, a great number of people who are in the upper echelons. Uh, don't you think that the, uh, the rudimentary structure of the deal could be, well, Taiwan is what we are really, really interested in resolving, and here's how you're going to make money, and then, uh, both sides are happy. Is that too naive?
Mh, well, you have a point in the sense that, uh, if I put myself in the shoes of Donald Trump, and I could imagine he was thinking along this line, let's have a deal. You know, for instance, why not, you know, China purchase our Treasury bonds, you know, I don't know, what's the number, two trillion. And then, you know, we give up whatever, uh, Taiwan. But the point is, the US political structure is a bit complicated, and he is surrounded by, uh, certain hawks who prefer to defend Taiwan, despite the fact that, you know, militarily, it's already, uh, basically, uh, inconceivable. Hopefully, God forbid, there'll be no military clash between China and the two superpowers. Yet, they are still, uh, uh, the right wing who somehow prefer defending Taiwan. And so, even Trump tried to have a deal with China, but he was constrained by those surrounding him. So, so I don't know to what extent, you know, uh, he will achieve that objective. So, China has made it very clear. I think Chinese leaders will explain this to the United States. Why is it in the US interest to support unification of Taiwan with China, hopefully by peaceful means? Uh, and if he comes to China, uh, in May, for this visit, I, I'm pretty sure China's leaders will explain this to him.
The other potential friend, uh, is Europe. There was, you know, a history of difficult relations with European powers in the 19th and the 20th century, and then there was a period of great cooperation, uh, since the beginning of the reform and opening up, and now things again seem to be heading in a troublesome direction. Um, what do you think would be, uh, the key, um, elements of a potential new understanding between China and Europe? How to avoid, uh, continued divergence of views and positions, and especially when it comes to issues that are obviously common, is sustainability and the quest to make a green transition, and so on, in the economy. Um, is it possible that, uh, in the future, Europe and China will be, uh, working closely again?
From a Chinese point of view, as the saying goes, it takes two to have a tango. On the part of China, China is the only major country that's always been supportive of European integration and the EU as another pole in this multipolar world order. This position has been consistent for for several decades since China and the EU established diplomatic ties. And this is still China's position. Yet, somehow, and, uh, you may remember, I wrote this article, paper for your journal, Horizons. I tried to make a point, you know, somehow European or EU leadership lost sight of what's the real interest of the European and Europeans in general. As a result, as the Munich Security Report reveals, Europe is going through this lose-lose, the lost peace, lost development, lost many other things. It's from China's point of view. How can a leadership, you know, make one mistake after another? You see this so clearly. I give an example. If we talk about green transition, EU is the strongest advocate of green transition. Yet, you look at a major country like Germany, they just bombed this, uh, coal-fired plant, however advanced it is, clean technology, because we have absolute way to embrace green electricity, green power, not coal-fired power. And then they also dismantle this nuclear power plant, which is a part of green energy. As a result, Germany is in short of energy supply. So, German companies move to the United States, move to China. Sadly, you know, for for Germany, the largest economic engine for the EU, for the European continent.
So, as a result, this misjudgment, miscalculation, mismanagement of the overall European interest, this is a major problem. If there is, hopefully, a kind of leadership that really understands Europe's fundamental interest, I think they should really have good ties with China and restore some kind of normal relations with Russia, because Russia is Europe's, you know, geographical neighbor. It will be forever there, you know, in the next 500 years, 1,000 years, it will be forever there.
Mhm.
So, let's have a friend, a potential friend. Some Chinese wisdom: Russia can be a potential friend, you know.
Yeah. This is, uh, I mean, Russia is definitely, uh, part of, uh, the equation explaining, uh, European current troubles. It's, of course, very, uh, sensitive, and there are different views in Europe, uh, depending on different histories and geographies, right? But, um, one of the things that the Europeans, uh, see as a sticking point in their, uh, attitude when they try to kind of, uh, work with China on strengthening Europe-China relationship is, uh, China's very strong support of Russia, uh, in the context of the war in Ukraine. And, uh, do you think that this support, this partnership between China and, uh, Russia, uh, is strategic? Is it going to stay regardless of, uh, what the future brings? If, let's say, there is a successful deal tomorrow with America and with Europe. What is your view on this?
Uh, China describes the Sino-Russian relationship as a good model of, uh, big power relations. And it's not an alliance. It's mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and engaging in win-win cooperation. So, China said, China and Russia set a good example for the world how big powers should treat each other. We hope the United States will do the same with China, other countries will do the same. Uh, so both China and Russia are strongly against NATO's expansion. So, this five rounds of expansion, Russia condemned it. China also condemns. Same with the possible NATO expansion into Asia. China always has very strong concerns about that. So, whatever problems with the Ukrainian crisis, with, um, European complaints about Russia's aggression, whatever, yet you have to treat the root cause: NATO's expansion. Uh, so many voices from Henry Kissinger, from others, from Chinese scholars, warned the EU not to engage and support NATO expansion. But somehow, Europe lost its own, uh, position. And this NATO philosophy is very much, as American generals said, keep the United States in, keep Russia out, keep Germany down. This is not the Chinese philosophy in Asia. We prefer more inclusive. Every country, your geographic neighbor, your former enemy, troublemakers, you dislike, but we should be inclusive. That's the way, uh, to move ahead, otherwise, it would be very difficult.
And obviously, one of the, uh, obstacles in, uh, fulfilling this, uh, as you say, role model of, of a relationship, and, and generally working, uh, with others, not just with Russia, is the issue of, uh, the global financial system, uh, which is still very much dominated by the United States dollar. And once you are in this only system that you have, uh, you are vulnerable to, um, American coercive action.
Yeah.
Sanctions.
Yeah.
Or, you know, a seizure of funds, and, and so on and so forth, being cut off from the banking system, and the like. So, uh, China is definitely, uh, a comparatively big economy in comparison to the United States.
Smaller or bigger, depends on the metric.
Uh, but nowhere near, uh, the role of the US dollar, uh, is the position of the Chinese RMB right now. So, uh, there are several obstacles to this becoming the case, and, you know, capital controls and, uh, limited availability, uh, is one problem. Uh, the lack of deep financial markets is, is another. Do you see, as part of the future, uh, not necessarily this five-year plan, but, uh, the strategic planning of China in the future, do you see, uh, internationalization of RMB as a currency, uh, as one of the scenarios that, um, that you can imagine, let's say, 10 years down the road?
Yeah, let me put this way, you know, from Chinese point of view, this American model of, uh, treating dollars as a weapon, or weaponizing the US dollar against Russia, against other countries, even against China, will be self-defeating, which will lead to more people to use other currencies, including the Chinese RMB. Uh, furthermore, in the broader, uh, picture, you will see that it's more a problem for the United States. The financialization of the US economy is a major problem of the US economy today. Because of the financialization of the economy, you have lost industrial capacity. Your economy is hollowing out. That's why Donald Trump said, we should have "America First," rather than, you know, we need to have local industries, factories, companies, whatever.
Historically speaking, if you look at the, uh, several empires, the Dutch Empire, the British Empire, today the American Empire, they all resort to financialization of their economies, and then they somehow go down and decline. Killed, killed the real economy.
That's true. That's historically so obvious, so evident. So, we don't envy, envy the United States. China will not become the next United States and financialize its economy. We focus on the real economy. Then, in terms of currency, that will show something very different. So, what I could imagine is a parallel, uh, currency structure. Because if you look at SWIFT, as a payment system, there are two parts. The largest part, 85%, if not more, are the virtual economy, the financialization of the financial market and everything and economy and derivatives. China has been very cautious on that. Mhm.
So, China avoided so many financial crises in the past. Asian financial crisis, 1996, it avoided. 2008 financial crisis, China avoided. Actually, China helped the rest of the world come through out of this crisis. So, most likely, that in the real economy, in trading of goods, Chinese currency, RMB, will be used more and more, uh, for the, for the goods, for the, for the actual things that you sell to each other. Yeah. But for the financial part, China is far more cautious. We don't envy that. Yeah.
Uh, then if you look at the, due to this Iran crisis, uh, the petrodollar percentage of petrodollar is declining sharply, and the petroyuan is going up also sharply. I checked a few days ago, it's about 41% already, vis-à-vis US dollar, it's 52%. So, it's, uh, rising about 20% over just one month. So, things are changing and moving fast. We are really witnessing fundamental shifts of different powers, economic, financial, technological, even political, uh, influence in the world today.
Um, let me ask you one last thing. Um, to be, uh, a little bit of, you know, moving away from this very, you know, analytical and, uh, deeply intellectual conversation that, that I truly, uh, appreciate and I'm grateful for. Um, you're obviously a scholar who has studied your own country and your own country's relations with the world, uh, for a number of decades. Uh, you had the privilege of working with leaders of your country, and also with young people. Yeah.
Teaching, bringing them up, intellectually, and so on. Uh, as a person, not necessarily as a scholar, but could be both, both person and a scholar. Uh, what was the one thing that you can say you were surprised by? Uh, when it comes to the last 10 years in China? >> What was the development that now you say, well, I'm really surprised that it happened. I didn't see it coming.
Mhm.
What would you pick?
You mean something that I expected that did not come true?
No. Something that you did not expect, yet it happened in the last 10 years in China.
I see. I see. You know, uh, I sometimes say, you know, because I lead a leading think tank in China, and we tend to make all kinds of predictions, forecasts. That's all the requirement of the Chinese central government. For instance, we predicted the outbreak of the trade war, and the United States will lose. The outbreak of the tech war, the United States will also lose. So, uh, in other words, we have less, uh, surprises. Yet, in the world today, I was, uh, meeting the press the other day, few, one week ago. As you know, China just promoted its 15th Five-Year Plan. And then, uh, one reporter, RT, from RT, asked me about what will be the major challenges for China's Five-Year Plan. I said, uh, uh, if you look at the past 10 years, and also the coming five years, major threat to China will be external. In other words, something unpredictable. See whether the Ukrainian crisis will become nuclear, whether the Iran crisis will also become nuclear, whatever. So, these are something less predictable.
Mhm.
And that will have global consequences. And, uh, however, the Chinese approach is always, as a civilization state, we always prepare for the worst.
Mhm.
And, uh, and if there is a good example is energy supply. Back from 25 years ago, China began to say, we must have our own reliability. So, in the end, today, China's energy dependency on foreign countries is only 15%.
15%?
Overall.
Overall, yeah. So, China is handling this crisis well. So, from a civilizational perspective, as Chairman Mao said, strategically, we think nothing will be terrible. We treat it as a small thing. But tactically, how we handle these things, we think in detail, and we have our plans.
Yes.
Professor Jang Weiwei, thank you very much for this conversation, and I very much look forward to seeing you again in China or elsewhere. Thank you very much for this inspiring conversation, and we stay in touch. All the best.
Thank you.