Transcription
Welcome back, uh, to this conversation that we are having with Professor Wang Gang Wu. Uh, we are now going to touch on the topics that we covered on, uh, week four of the course. And as you know, in week four of the course, we are making a transition from the past and the present to the future. So we'll try to focus our questions here on how the past is going to influence, uh, the future. And I'm going to start off by asking you, Gangu, a question starting in the domestic dimension because clearly, one of the critical sources of misunderstanding, uh, between the United States and China is about the role of the Chinese Communist Party and about its future. And I wonder whether you can explain to, uh, our audience why, in some ways, the word "party" may be misleading in terms of the impact of the CCP on China.
Throughout Chinese history and particularly among the Confucian Legalist, uh, you know, the theorists of, uh, Chinese governance, there's no "cushing" as a party. A party. The Chinese word is "dang," which translates the word "party." "Dang" is a kind of faction, but more than a faction, a strong faction, and it is frowned upon and completely, uh, rejected as a way of, of participating in political affairs because it, it divides people. And the whole underlying political theory, if you like, behind the Confucian state is that they all together serve the state, emp, in the name of the emperor. If you don't want to, you leave or you are thrown out. There's no, within that system, there's no party. And any kind of factionalism was disapproved of.
So when they, when they modernized China, this is part of the modernization of China. They took these words because they took it from the, from the Japanese. The Japanese, when they translated Western ideas, when they followed the West, they set up political parties, like in, like in the West. And when most of the Western ideas came to China from Japan, they took up all these words, including words like "warming down," "warming down," the "down," all the parties. They took the word "down." But deep down, I think they never quite got over this problem of what a "dang" means because it's totally against. But in, in the, when they were rejecting the past, they didn't think about it.
But underlying it all, they never really believed in it because the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek also believed that the party was the state. And in fact, the Communists called them a "party-state," and today we say China is a "party-state." Now, that's a contradiction because it's not part, it is the state. Yes. But the single word "party-state" is the key. This name is just a party, just call it a "party-state," but the state is a single, centralized, bureaucratic state. Is the key, and that's the tradition. So it's a misunderstanding to believe that the Communist Party is just a part.
It has always, once it came to power as the ruling party, that party is the state. And to this day, when he talks, and not only him, the whole membership of the Communist Party, in fact, most Chinese believe that the Chinese Communist Party represents the whole, which saves China. China is the Communist Party, the Communist Party is China. That's what a "party-state" means. So there's no difference between the party and the centralized state. It's not a part of anything. So no question of any other part sharing in power or anything like that. It's a contradiction to the whole idea that it is a "party-state."
And in fact, why supporting the Communist Party is a patriotic thing because it is saving China. Only the Communist Party can save China. So saving the Communist Party is the most patriotic thing to do. And saving the Communist Party is what Xi Jinping is doing with this anti-corruption campaign. That is, in that's what he says, openly, because otherwise the Communist Party would be ruined. And he was very concerned about how the Soviet Communist Party collapsed so easily in the 1990s. I mean, he said, "How could that happen? We must make sure that never happens." And that, that comes from the fact that it must be not corrupt, at least disciplined firmly, that dedicated to a purposeful set of actions that will save the country.
And how does the, so the concepts of yin and yang play in terms of the understanding of the political structure of China? Because the Chinese believe there are differences, always differences.
Yes. But the differences are always within the framework, is the wholeness of it, in which it has yin and yang, and they play against each other. And these are, these differences should be recognized. They are respected. They provide, as it were, interplay to ensure that the whole is healthy and works well, but harmoniously. They don't have direct conflict to go to war. You avoid war harmoniously, but they work together, and they, they affect, influence each other. What they are against, this concept against, is extremism of one kind or the other. Any extreme view which is absolute, this is absolute, and that is absolute, then they have to fight. That is something to avoid at all costs.
So, in a way, they survive on the idea, almost in Western philosophical terms, of a concept of relativism. M. It is a relative relationship which makes it possible to have a yin and yang of a whole, and that you can, and it's always in the middle, against extremism. So the Chinese idea of the doctrine of the mean stems from this faith in the fact that when they all gathered together and disagree on things within a framework, and that framework is safe and sound and protected at all times, then you can make achievements.
I'm glad you're discussing all these traditional, uh, Asian concepts and ideas because, uh, I'm going to turn now to China's relations with its three key Asian partners: India, Japan, and Southeast Asia. And I wonder if you could sort of, very briefly, let's start with India and talk about, you know, how is it that these two countries have in general lived at peace with each other for most of the past 2,000 years? Indeed, the scholars collaborated, as you know, in Nalanda University, a project that you were involved with. So what, what does the history of China-India relations tell us about the future, you think?
I think what it tells us is that, uh, when the relationship had was not, never based on political power or the search for power or or dominance of any kind, but really based on trade, when there was trade and on interchange of ideas, and in this case, it was an exchange of ideas coming from India to China. M. Very few ideas came from China to India, as far as I know. But Buddhism and a whole related set of ideals, which are at the heart of what is the Hindu spiritual tradition, when they were brought to China, China was so taken by it that they actually looked upon India as a "Western Heaven." That's a "tenia" by itself, it's a heaven by itself. And all the devoted Buddhists in China, and we are talking about probably the large proportion of the Chinese people were Buddhist in one way or the other, uh, in their Buddhist context, they were always recognized India as the Western Heaven, and that's where wisdom came from. And Buddhism has manifested itself in China, and the Chinese accepted that. They reinterpreted it in some ways, but in a way that made them more comfortable, but they accepted it almost wholly. And so India was always a kind of mystical, wonderful place for a long time. But there were no other political relationships with India because India had other concerns. India's concerns were mainly with the West. Yes. Their problems with, with really was Afghanistan and the, and Persia. Yes. And in Central Asia, the Turko-Mongol, the Mongol, and so on. So they had nothing to do with China. And whatever there was to do with China was trade by sea. The Indians came to see the southern coast of China, and Chinese went to India for trade, in South India particularly, and that was peaceful, always peaceful. So no political relationship. They were fine for 2,000 years.
Where did the political relationship come from? It came from the East India Company in Bengal wanting to trade with Tibet. I mean, when people like Hastings and after that, all the way for a whole century, until the Younghusband actually sent, they sent the army to Lhasa. And you know, all that bayonets, it's a fun, fun book on that. So this was a different relationship where the British were thinking about how imperial India could somehow have a special relationship with Tibet, and in particular, they were fearful of the Russians reaching Tibet, coming in from Turkestan. And the Russians had an advantage because it was much easier to get from Turkestan to Tibet because there were no Himalayas, whereas the Himalayas was a major obstacle. Yes. So they didn't want the Russians to have that advantage. And one of the most interesting results was that the British found it to their interest, in their interest, to recognize Qing sovereignty. And they used the word "suzerainty," but they now agree that there's no real difference between suzerainty and sovereignty. They recognized Qing suzerainty over Tibet in order to keep the Russians out because by doing so, then the Russians must deal with the Qing on any matters pertaining to Tibet, and that protected Tibet from the Russians. And so the British actually supported China where Tibet was concerned, but using this vague word "suzerainty," which nobody was very clear about at the time. But in the meantime, of course, there were others who believed that Tibetans should have had an independent existence. So there were shades of disagreement about what that meant.
But what they left behind was really a question of drawing the borders between British India and Qing China. And then you have the famous, uh, debates that ended up with the McMahon Line and all that. The details are very complicated. The net result was finally India and China had a political border problem, which they never had before. And that's the source of all the problems that are. That's true. And as we know, it's that border problem that has become quite serious. But I hope that India and China will bear in mind their longer history. But this is actually the only real issue between India and China that is really difficult. There are no deep divisions.
And of course, I'm going to turn very quickly now and ask you whether, if if the Chinese regarded India at one point as the Western Heaven, did they ever regard Japan as the Eastern Heaven?
On the contrary, I have to say, uh, the Chinese regarded Japanese as very peripheral to their, to their interests, and Japanese never troubled the Chinese anyway. They had their own problems and they minded their own business. And when the Japanese learned about Chinese civilization and in particular learned Buddhism through the Chinese, they were equally impressed with Buddhism. And they, they were in fact much more devoted Buddhists and probably more genuine Buddhists than most Chinese, even today. And they then took a lot of Chinese values and culture from China, including Buddhism, Confucianism, into the Chinese idea, the Chinese emperor, Chinese state. All that was influential in Japanese development. But Japan had its own political culture. The kind of feudalism which the Japanese have is different from the feudalism that the Chinese had because that feudalism actually gave the feudal lords real power because the emperor did not have power. He was really a kind of god. But the Chinese idea of the emperor was he was a semi-god but with political power, with armies, his own army. The emperor in Japan never did. So that political difference was very, very important. That gave the Japanese a different sense of political participation in the political process because they were not under one emperor's control. Every feudal lord had its own territory, and that, I think, cultural difference remained, and the Chinese never really understood that. And the Japanese didn't want the Chinese system in its purer form and took what they wanted and rejected what they didn't want. So that relationship was cool. As long as the Chinese tributary system was something the Japanese rejected. They never joined it. But when the Chinese took it, every time the Japanese sent any envoys to China, they took it as part of the tributary system. But the Japanese never acknowledged it because their emperor was equal to China's emperor, if not better, you know. So that was, but there were no other relationships. Nothing was really politically involved the two countries. It was only when the Mongols came, and the Mongols, of course, were talking about a very different political culture altogether. As they put it, Mongols, whatever they see, they must take. And when they saw that the Japanese were there, they asked the Japanese to pay tribute. The Japanese said no. Mongol sent a navy to try and attack Japan, which fortunately for the Japanese failed completely, and that was the end of that. That was, in fact, that was the only time when a force on the mainland, not the Chinese, the Mongols did trouble Japan.
So I guess if you look at the longer history of China-Japan relations, as also is well documented, most of the time they managed in one way or another to live in peace with each other. And I hope that that, until the 19th century, I hope that that will continue into the 21st century.
Finally, uh, we cannot leave our discussion without discussing our part of the world, uh, Southeast Asia. And, and on balance, I would say that, uh, the Southeast Asians also have had a relatively, uh, peaceful relationship with China. Uh, and I was going to ask you, you know, how do you sort of see the role of history in the relations between China and Southeast Asia, with, of course, with one possible exceptional jarring note, which is what's happening in the South China Sea? So maybe a brief discussion on the South China Sea before we turn to, uh, Southeast Asia in general.
The South China Sea has, and the dash line, has a problem because, uh, it has two, two different dimensions to it, in my, in my view. One is that China, who never saw enemies coming by sea, and they never had any enemies coming by sea, found that enemies can come by sea in the 19th century when the British opened up China in the Opium War. And then found that once the sea is open, Japanese, French, Germans, or everybody with a powerful navy could actually threaten China. And when China tried to build a navy and failed, they really felt helpless. It was an existential problem for the first time ever in the history that an enemy could come by sea. And by that time, they looked around, all that territory just outside China were in foreign hands. The French, the British, the Dutch, and the Americans in the Philippines, the Spanish, and then the Americans in the Philippines. So that none of them were actually even independent countries. They were actually in foreign hands. The very people who defeated the Chinese, and continue to defeat the Chinese. So I think that was a tremendous shock to them, and they've been waking up from that. They've been trying to remedy that for the last 100 years or so without much success, actually.
So when the Pacific War ended, and Japanese territories under Taiwan at that time, run by Taiwan, all that was to return to China, and the Japanese had absolute control over the South China Sea. It was a Japanese lake for two, three and a half years at that time. Uh, I think that it gave the Chinese the opportunity to see this as an opportunity to make sure that the Japanese lake became a Chinese lake. The South China Sea would, if not the Chinese lake, at least safe from enemies. And this was under the Chiang Kai-shek government. This is not under the CCP, it's under the Kuomintang. Then it was actually backed by the Americans because the Americans fed the Kuomintang soldiers. China didn't have a navy. So the Americans provided the ships that brought the Chinese troops to take over Taiping Dao in the middle of the South China Sea, a big island. So at that, because at that time it was part of the result of the 1945 settlement at the end of the war. At least that was what the Chinese understood that. As for the map, I don't know the real source, but my instincts tell me this, they really inherited what the Taiwanese government under Japanese governor-general had mapped the southeast South China Sea under Japanese control during the, during the war time. And I think the Kuomintang, when they took over Taiwan, they simply adopted that and they drew 11 lines, which became in their maps. I mean, I, as a young boy, I remember a map of the Kuomintang map of China by 1947. Yeah. Was the 11 dotted lines. So when the Communists won in 1949, they inherited that. At least they didn't have to do anything. They simply took the map and said this, and that's the whole map of China, and took it as being recognized internationally as the as Chinese territory. But they didn't, nobody did anything about it. In fact, as far as I know, nobody was interested until the 1970s when the reports came out that there was oil in the South China Sea.
Okay. And then everybody's got very interested. The before that, the only quarrel was between China and Vietnam. Mhm. And they were over the coast of Vietnam, and they settled that, in part, by removing two of the lines in the Gulf of Tonkin. So now nine dotted instead of 11. Yeah. Was part of the settlement between the Vietnamese and the Chinese. But it's only a partial settlement. The rest of it, the Chinese didn't budge, and the Vietnamese didn't budge, and the quarrel continued between the Spratlys and the Paracels. That was a dispute between China and Vietnam. And I think that's how the Chinese saw that, until this report about oil came out. Because then the question influenced everybody, talked about the continental shelf and who has rights to look for oil. And of course, Malaysia with Brunei and East Malaysia with oil possibilities with others also interested. Then the issue became more drew attention. And of course, the oil companies, which are then of course all European, either Anglo-Dutch for Shell or American, Esso and all the others were interested to look for oil and were invited by the Philippines and other countries to come and help them. And then the matter became more serious. Starting from that, the argument became worse and worse.
But if you leave aside the South China Sea and focus on the intrinsic dimensions, traditional Chinese relations with Myanmar or Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, even in Malaysia, Indonesia, what, how would you characterize them?
Throughout Chinese history, China paid very little attention to this region. Only the traders came down. And the traders were in fact the main pioneers of the trade were really the local people. I mean, people of Malayo-Polynesian stock who were great sailors, they were traders. And there were Indians or West Asians, Persians, Arabs, together with South Indians or passing through Southeast Asia who come around to Southeast Asia trading with Southeast Asia. To them, of course, it was also a regular trade, ancient, very ancient trade, and continuing to China, even to some of them reaching Japan, but mostly to China. Was quite a natural thing, and that was going on all the time. The initiative came mainly from more from the West, but Chinese got more and more interested as southern China became more and more populated, and more and more people got into the maritime trade. So it was merely a trading thing as far as the sea was concerned. As far as the land was concerned, and they were difficult terrain, not good for agriculture. The Chinese weren't terribly interested. There were all kinds of tribal people whose descendants are still there, the Miao and the Lao and the Yao, you know, also Yao, also different tribes in Guizhou, Guangxi, in Yunnan. These southwestern provinces which are now part of China were actually populated by the same population of people in Vietnam, in Myanmar and Thailand today. They're all more or less related. And in fact, if you look back, the ancestors of the Burmans and Thai actually came down from Yunnan and Guangxi, Guangxi. When they came down, and the only the Khmer, the ancestors of the Vietnamese, and the Mon-Khmer side were really ancient occupants of the mainland Southeast Asia. The Thai and the Burmans really were latecomers. So when you bear that in mind, the land relationship was always caught up with the whole question of how the mountain land people and the upland people got along with each other, how they traded, and how they fought over valleys and so on. But they were not major, major battles. They were all tiny battles on the frontiers. The Chinese state was never really interested.
So that's how the back history. I think the story changed, began to change again, because of the Mongols. I keep on remembering bringing the Mongols, but they were a wonderful bunch of conquerors. If you want to look at conquering people, the Mongols were number one. And when they conquered China, they conquered part of the army came through Yunnan to conquer Song China, and they stayed. The Mongols took over Yunnan and they made it a province of China. And so when the Mongols were driven out, the Ming dynasty had a decision to make. Do they take Yunnan or not? And they decided, otherwise they'd be threatened by the Mongols. So they took Yunnan. So it was that way that Yunnan became part of China. And after that, of course, the population mixed. More and more Chinese traders went in there. But they were still a very small minority. Only Chinese traders, no, no other settlers, some Chinese garrisons and Chinese trading. So that relationship over the border between Burma, Vietnam and Thailand and so on, which Thailand doesn't even have direct with China, they're all similar people with a very ancient complex relationship with the Chinese state, but nothing very serious until again modern times.
You know, I, this is actually, even though we seem to be ending the discussion on a sort of halfway point, this is actually a good point to end the discussion because it will, I'm sure by now, you have raised the interest of our audience dramatically in the long history of relations between China and its neighbors. And at the end of the day, I think anyone who's looking at the future of China and the future of US-China relations and its impact on the world, I hope, I hope will take away a key message from you, which is that all these relationships go back thousands of years, and we have to understand the longer history if we want to understand the future. And I think for, in that sense, you added a tremendous amount of value to our course, Gangu, and I really want to thank you from the bottom of my heart for your magnificent contributions to this course. Thank you very much.
Thank you for the chance to talk about this. Thank you.