Transcription
Now, as one looks at the Nixon-Kissinger relationship, it's a fascinating thing to know who did what and with which and to whom. Um, there was continually in the press this image of you as the the hard guy, the taking >> or as the British say, the orary guy. >> The orary guy. Yes. And the uh, the British. Yes. Uh, and at the same time, of K Kissinger in his conversations with the press and so on, uh, seeming to take a softer line. Um, was that uh, deliberate? Quite deliberate, and uh, with both uh, his knowledge and mine, and uh, uh, with our joint cooperation, it was a quite different relationship than Eisenhower had with Dulles.
Dulles was Mr. Bad Guy, basically. He was not a bad man, but on the other hand, he was, he was tough and strong. He testified before the Congress. He made the hardline speeches and the rest. Uh, President Eisenhower was always portrayed as the good guy, uh, restraining Dulles from taking as hard a line here, there, or someplace else. Now, actually, I think both Eisenhower and Dulles knew what the game was. I knew what it was. At least Dulles willingly played that game, and Eisenhower, of course, graciously and probably quite gladly accepted the role because politically, it was much better for him to appear as a good guy.
Now, the point that I make with regard to Kissinger and my relationship, it was almost directly the opposite. Kissinger, in his negotiations, uh, uh, wanted and did have a great deal of flexibility. Uh, he was not one, he was not as rigid as Dulles, for example, uh, where negotiating came, although Dulles has got to be given high marks for negotiating the Japanese peace treaty, which required a great deal of flexibility. Uh, but on the other hand, uh, Kissinger, uh, was an improviser. Uh, he was one who believed in making uh, startling plays, uh, and unexpected plays. Uh, and consequently, uh, he wanted a great deal of uh, of uh, flexibility in terms of his instructions. I gave him that flexibility because I knew he would uh, use it responsibly, but always under the proper direction.
Uh, but when Kissinger would get into a negotiating uh, situation with others, uh, he would tell the North Vietnamese, for example, well, if, if you don't settle, uh, as he did before the elections, he says, "If you don't settle now, uh, it's going to be tough later." Or as the television ad goes, "Pay me now or pay me later." Uh, uh, because basically, uh, he knew, and they knew, that if they waited until that for the election, uh, that it might be tougher. And the same was true in some other areas as well.
People who think that Kissinger was basically a softliner and I was a hardliner, uh, just don't know what each of us believed. For example, in the softline, hardline dialogue, the first crisis, so-called crisis, I guess we should say, 'cause we had so many that this gets now into perspective, uh, was very early in the administration when the EC-121, you may remember, transport was shot down by the North Koreans, uh, and uh, all the crewmen were lost. Uh, it was an unarmed, uh, reconnaissance plane, and it was shot down over international, uh, waters. Uh, options were presented, uh, the, everything from doing nothing to uh, taking out two or three airfields.
Kissinger came down hard. This was in that very, in about the third month of the administration, for the hard option. He said that the Russians, or bas, possibly, or the North Koreans were testing us. If the Russians weren't testing us, the North Koreans, and the Chinese, and the Vietnamese are all going to be watching to see how we reacted to this. And he said, "We must react strongly." And he advocated the, the option of taking out two or three North Korean airfields as a result of this. Uh, I considered the option. Frankly, I tilted toward it. Uh, Bill Rogers, Mel Laird, thought it was too early in the administration for us to take such an option of this sort. Our ambassador in South Korea thought it would be a mistake, that it would have Kim Il-sung, the North Korean, take some action against us.
There was the question of what would happen, and this is what I think probably delayed me more than anything else, or at least brought me to the conclusion not to take the hard option. I was concerned not so much about the effect on, on the, on the Russians, but I was concerned by the effect on the Chinese. After all, we had fought the Chinese >> in Korea. As a fact, did you know that one of Mao's sons was killed in Korea fighting Americans? He never mentioned it to me, but I knew that that had happened. Uh, and I was concerned about that. And my other reason for not taking the hard option at that point, the other major reason, uh, I didn't know whether that kind of uh, of action, protective reaction after they had shot down a plane, taking out an airfield, might escalate into a war. And I figured having one war in our hands was enough without getting another war in our hands, particularly one in which the Chinese were very close, and the Russians, too.