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George, welcome back to this course on uh US China relations uh past, present and future. Thank you very much again for your reflections on what we covered in week one of this course.
Now we've just finished week two where we have talked basically about US China relations. uh in the second half of the uh 20th century starting from the the Korean War and indeed the Korean War was the only time that the US and China actually fought directly uh against each other from June 25th, 1950 to July 27, 1953. So the first question is could this war have been avoided and what what damage did this war do to USChina relations? China didn't want the Korean War. Mao had just proclaimed the People's Republic in October 1949 and they were massing troops to reinccorporate Taiwan into China and the whole business of economic construction had not yet even begun.
>> Now we know at the proddding of Stalin, Kimon decided to reunify the Korean peninsula. So they moved south and almost succeeded until Marta succeeded succeeded to do the intron landing >> and the Chinese signal when the Americans were moving northwards not to approach the Yellow River. >> But Marta had ambitions. >> He he fully intended to move into Yellow River. >> He fully was prepared to take on China and the entrment had to to remove him. Mhm. >> But that was a fateful decision when China mobilized volunteers to go into China. An event which was commemorated in a very elaborate way over many months uh in China this year >> when replayed the speeches made the meetings in China, how the volunteers were called the command by PTA the key battles during that period. It was a very it was a very brutal war. >> And one American said, "If there's one brick on top, another brick will bomb it." >> I remember a conversation with Congressman Charlie Wrango, a African-American, a very senior congressman whom I had to meet >> repeatedly in connection the US Singapore free trade agreement. >> Yes. >> So I had read in the CV that he fought in the Korean War. I wanted to engage him in a conversation. >> He said, "Minister Yo, I rather not talk about it." >> It was very painful. >> Despite it happening decades ago, >> it was too painful for him to want to recall it. >> But it had potent consequences because >> for example, >> the US now saw China >> Yeah. >> as an enemy. So the Taiwan policy, international diplomacy >> in India >> creating a Tibetan NTPRC Tibetan movement >> encouraging the Dalai Lama to leave Tibet and to establish a base in India. uh subverting Sukarno in Indonesia, the Pomesta rebellion, Sumatra, Sulawesi, >> eventually the role Americans played in Gastapo in ' 65. >> This had huge consequences. M >> so that decision by Mao it was a strategic decision >> that to have the Americans on your border >> will create a far situation for China >> and so he was prepared to pay the heaviest price.
>> I'm glad you emphasize how it sort of really soued relations uh and led to various anti-China actions taken by United States in the 50s and 60s. So what's what against that backdrop isn't it quite stunning the way Kissinger suddenly appeared [laughter] to the complete surprise of everybody in in Beijing right in uh 1971. So what what what were the forces that sort of enabled China and the US to move away from their deep hostility from the Korean war to beginning this period of rush reproshment uh following Kissinger's visit and a year later Nixon went to Beijing.
>> Stalin looked down on the Chinese communists and did not think that they were genuine communists >> because they were peasants. It was a Korean war >> which won m respect in Moscow >> and that peri then there began a period of deep cooperation >> between the Soviet Union and China >> which worried the Americans a lot. So the anti-China policies >> were part of a global anti-communist >> policies >> policy. >> Uh but but the late 50s there was the beginning of a rupture. between China and the Soviet Union. >> The death of Stalin Malangov that when Kushchov repudiated Stalin >> Mhm. >> the Chinese Communist Party objected that while much can be said about Stalin being cruel and doing making the wrong decisions. >> Uh I think Ma said it was 70% right, 30% wrong. >> Mhm. and that it was a mistake to debunk Stalin completely >> and the the ideological debate between the two communist parties in the late 50s and early 60s I was reading >> I read them as a student >> how going back >> to dogma to Marx and Lenin >> they debated each other and Ma was also concerned that in China the revolution was being lost because society was restratifying >> so he tried to break it they had the people's commune movement that the great leap forward and culminating in the cultural revolution. >> But in the meantime, the relationship between the Soviet Union and China >> was sorrowing so badly that >> there was a military clash. >> No, Brash Nef >> had a plan to invade China. >> Mhm. I was told by a Mongolian leader that during that period there were almost a million Soviet soldiers in Mongolia. >> Now mind you, so Mongolia even though a large territory of maybe one and a half million square kilometers >> has only about two three million people. >> Mhm. >> So the Soviet army in Mongolia had his own factories and farms and so on. >> Ma told his people is a paper tiger >> but tactically take them seriously because >> they were prepared to use nuclear weapons >> on China and if China knew that without the atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb >> you would not be able to stand up first to the Americans and then to the Soviet Union >> so that became top priority for them just as nanotechnology is now nanochip technology now is for China >> but uh The Soviet Union at a time in the 60s was a fearsome power >> and the US saw this fissure >> between Russia and the Soviet Union. >> Mhm. >> And Kissinger being a strategist, >> Union, >> China and the Soviet Union. Yes. >> They said there was an opportunity. >> Mhm. >> Ma also saw as an opportunity because >> paper tiger doing it was still a fearsome threat. Mhm. >> And during that period in China, they dispersed all the heavy industries, >> they dunk tunnel complexes below every major city >> and they prepared to fight the Soviet Union. >> So [snorts] the clearly saw that and and took advantage of it and that >> was while that was while the Indochina war was still going on. >> Yes. >> Which is why the Vietnamese saw the China move as a betrayal. >> Yes. >> Of their struggle in Indochina. Yeah, but it sort of it sort of proves the point in geopolitics is no such thing as permanent friends or permanent enemies. It's all about interests very clearly. So when the interests of the United States and China converge as they did, uh Kissinger and Nixon uh went to China. But of course the we went through another major uh revolution I guess uh in in in geopolitics at the end of the cold war uh when after the Berlin war Berlin wall fell and and especially after the Soviet Union collapse I guess the United States didn't need China as much as it needed during the uh cold war. So how how would what was the impact? How did the Chinese read that phase of uh US Chinese history at the end of the cold war which is also affected by tanun of course.
Yeah. I was not taker for Lie Kuwanu when he met George Bush senior >> uh in 1990 January in Singapore. >> And despite Tanman uh Bush Bush senior >> wanted to bring China back to the global system >> and I would say in that intimate conversation >> Bush expressed goodwill for China. Mhm. >> He of course had been American ambassador to Beijing before. >> That's right. >> And I believe he had genuinely warm feelings >> for the struggle of the Chinese people. And after Tanga Ping's new policy of reform and opening up, >> he saw it as being good for China and be good for the US >> and so wanted to help it along >> and that culminated in [clears throat] China joining the WTO >> in November 2001. Mhm. >> Uh that was a very interesting year because just a few months before that >> in April was the American spy plane incident. >> Mhm. >> Which which led to a period of high tension for a number of weeks. >> Uh but both sides wanted to put it behind them. >> Mhm. And the difference in April and November, >> no, and October >> when Bush flew into China for the Shanghai APEC meeting >> was dramatic. From China being a threat, >> China fighter planes escorted Air Force One to Shanghai >> to ensure it safety. >> But this is also after 911. >> It was after 911. >> Yes. >> Yes. >> Yeah. So it's this is a perfect example of how uh events and and shifting geopolitical forces constantly affect uh uh US China uh relations. >> No, you're right. The global one might say that the struggle between the US and China had to come. uh that confrontation uh was pushed back a number of years because of SE 11 in the fight against global terrorism.
So this is a good moment for us to now pause and I want to thank you very much for your discussions uh relating to week two of this course. Thank you very much. I look forward to our next discussion when we discuss week three of this course. Thank you George. >> Thank you.