Transcription
Mr. Jeremy, thank you very much for doing this. So, in the United States, I think most people, to the extent they're paying attention, are watching what's happening in Iran and have a sense that what's happening between Russia and NATO, Ukraine, United States, the festering war in Eastern Europe is kind of a stalemate and nothing really is happening there. I don't know if that's true. Assess what you think is happening between Russia and Ukraine and its proxies right now.
Yeah, I I think you're right. I don't think it is true, Tucker. I think that the the general sense in the West is that you'll hear it from some people that uh Russia's losing on the battlefield and that the Russian economy is about to fall apart. I mean, I've heard it time and time again and there's no evidence to support either of those things. The um the the the battlefield issue is poorly understood and I think and the reason is that people don't understand Russia's motivations and they don't understand what the strategy is.
Um, in an article I wrote recently on the coming war with Russia, I said that Clausewitz, who was the great political philosopher of war, said that the most important decision that a military man and a and a politician can make is to understand the nature of the war. And I don't think that the West has understood the nature of the war with Russia, nor for that matter with Iran. What what they haven't understood with Russia is that um this is, as far as Russia is concerned, is an existential war. You know, they are fighting to to make sure that Russia is preserved. And when you get people like Kaakalis saying that Russia must be broken up, who who can blame them? I think had we understood that, I think that would be a start.
Unfortunately, we're we're approaching the war, it seems to me, is a negotiation, a negotiation with arms. You know, if we increase a bit of pressure on Russia, then they'll eventually come back to the um negotiating table. What what they've missed though is that Russia, I think, has a clear strategy and I can't I can't be sure about it. I'm not in the Russian general staff, but I think it's got about five um key phases. I mean, we know that the run-up to the uh special military operation, Tucker, was um it was clear that there were so many warnings going back as far as 1996. And yet, unfortunately, we've we've uh ignored them all. Notwithstanding the warnings not only came from Russia, but from of our some of our very best strategic thinkers, from George Kennan back as far as 1996 and from John Mearsheimer uh in 2014.
But when you get to the start of the war um then it seemed to me as the war kicked off, and I have to say I did not see the war coming. I was uh involved in the offshore energy sector. But as I got to understand it, then the first thing that became obvious to me that this was not a war to or a special military operation to invade Ukraine. And the answer the reason was simpler. There weren't enough troops. You know, Ukraine is about the size of half of Europe and you're not going to do that with 190,000 troops. I cannot for a moment think that the Russian general staff advised Putin that they had enough troops to invade Ukraine. This was always about the Donbas and I think the first phase of the strategy was really the use of military force to support a diplomatic engagement and indeed that diplomatic engagement actually went quite well. The Russians had open negotiations with the um Ukrainians after day one. uh and you know, as as we arrived in March, then there was ready to they were ready to sign, as both sides were um, an agreement which would have have stopped the war. It was no NATO um neutrality for Ukraine, um self-determination for the Donbas, but that was ready to sign and it would have been signed, I'm almost certain, if it hadn't been for Boris Johnson, uh no doubt with Biden's support, actually going across and persuading Zelensky to to um fight Russia and that he would have all the support he needed. So that's phase one.
I think at phase two, when it becomes clear to Russia that they are in a going to have to fight um and are likely to have to fight NATO because of what they're hearing, what you then see is uh what I would call militarily a a withdrawing contact. So essentially what the Russians were doing were recognizing that actually the Kiev um attack and and the actions in the Donbas uh were although diplomatic, they would now need to withdraw to a line and what they did was they withdrew back to what's known as the Sarcan line, which was a defensive line um instructed by the general who was the expert in Russia in defensive lines. And that from about September onwards, they then moved into three phase three after the withdrawal, which is what I call attritional defense. And what that essentially means was meeting their two objectives, their objectives were denazification and demilitarization, both of which were were operational objectives. And the strategic objective though, Tucker, it was clear it was to preserve Russia's security. And what offensive what defensive attrition means is is wearing down the men and material of the Ukrainian army. And goodness me, we helped them a lot in that, cuz we persuaded them to to expend not one army but two armies against that defensive line for not a single penetration.
So you get to uh late 2023 and at that stage, I think what Russia does is they've uh started to they uh as the war got going, they started to mobilize uh and increase the forces they need, the industrial capacity. And so by late 2023, they're ready to move into phase three. Phase three was what I call offensive attrition. Not necessarily securing territory, but really going on and starting to continue um wearing down the men and material of the Ukrainian army. Don't forget the Ukrainian army had no uh air superiority, none of the things that you want fighting a an offensive or indeed a defensive war. And and moving slowly forward. Um, I think as well, they were probably starting to clarify what what it would would be their ultimate objectives. And I remember saying, I think to Danny Davis about a year and a half ago, I thought their minimalist objectives would be to secure the Donbas and the four eastern oblasts, Crimea. And their maximum objectives might be to go further, might be to go to secure the whole of Novorossiya, which is Odessa and the next four of the west. Um, I wasn't sure which way they would go, but I've heard Putin say quite recently that actually he's talking about not Russia and and the logic behind that is about security. It's about establishing what they believe to be a secure buffer protecting the Russian people within it. And the question really is how long it takes them to get there, if indeed they keep going in that way.
So I think when you start to understand that, then all of the stuff that we've heard, well, the Russians are going slowly, it misses the objective, it misses what they're trying to achieve. And when you understand what they're doing, what I think is a clear strategy, then I think what that does is to actually help you work out what they're doing, why they're doing why they're doing it, and how the West should be thinking. Because at the moment, we sort of see on the one hand, Russian army is not doing very well, it's not securing much much territory. That's not true. It's actually increasing, it's been securing territory for at least the last 30 or so months. But they're not securing, they weren't securing territory initially to simply to secure the territory. They were doing it to actually to wear down and attract the um the Ukrainian army with a high degree of success, as we know from the casualties. So I think when you when you get that topic, I think it's much easier to understand what they're doing and where they're heading.
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That has always made sense to me. If foreign leaders gave speeches calling for the break up of the United States, I would of course do everything I could to support the defense of the United States. Um, I would see that as existential. If someone said, "We're going to break up the UK," you'd probably take up arms in its defense. Of course.
So, um, I've understood that since the first day. What I have never understood is the West's motive. Why would the United States and its whatever you call them, but its partners in NATO uh give this kind, why would they want a war with Russia and a war that has hurt them like, what is the motive there?
Um, it's a really, really good question and um I have said for quite a long time now that the Russian uh operations are being guided by a military strategy and the Western operations are being guided by a political narrative and with um objectives that that change quite a lot. I think the initial objective, and it depends uh which um particular party on the NATO side you're talking to, but the initial objectives were uh possibly to break up Russia. There's a very interesting RAND study written in 2018, I think it is, which is called "Extending Russia." Um, the um Russian intelligence chief Budanov actually um in a on YouTube um video which is on YouTube talked about the need to actually have a war with Russia to actually help them get into NATO. I think there's also what I would call um lag in thinking because a lot of the um the um people who were were proposing the extension, the expansion of NATO without um thinking through the consequences, did not anticipate this. I'm certain they didn't anticipate it because they weren't ready. Um, you know, another great failure of NATO, I'm afraid to say, they were not ready for the war. I mean, if they had had thought it through and said that if we keep doing this, then Russia will um respond, then actually they would either have made uh defensive preparations or they wouldn't have done it.
So I think we can say with a high degree of certainty that they they did not think it through. So I think there's some lag in there. And I think there's also, I'm afraid to say, and I think this is probably more European than um than than United States, although you will know better than the United States. There's a high degree of Russophobia, which I find it very, very difficult to understand. I think it's in part our press. It's in part the narrative that we've built. Uh, it's in part the nature of spin in modern Western politics where um, you know, an event kicks off and uh people spin to to help those um parties that are in power stay in power. And what that means is that um the population generally start speaking, start to get deceived. I don't think they're lied to, but they're deceived because they're presented with one side of the story. Now, that really matters in war because in war, you need to be able to look at all sides of the story, which is why I penned the article, "The Coming War with Russia," because nobody seemed to have thought what that war might look like. It's very difficult to be understand fully though the motivations, but I think within those factors, Tucker, you've probably got the answer.
I I I understand why the European populations are Russophobic because the propaganda has played upon their best qualities. Russia is seen as the aggressor. Ukraine is the underdog. I think Europeans in general root for the underdog. That's a sign of their decency. It's also allowed, you're allowed to hate Russians because they're white, so you don't have to feel guilty about painting them as animals. You're not racist when you do that. I understand all of that. And they just don't know any better because Europe is a biosphere in its media. Like there's no outside information comes in, right? Of course. Same in the United States. What I don't understand is the motive of the liars. Like why do European leaders seek a war with Russia? Why do American leaders seek a war with Russia? I mean, these are not stupid people and yet they are hell-bent on destroying their own countries in the service of this war against a country that doesn't need to be our enemy. I mean, it doesn't make any sense.
Um, if I had to to answer the question in one phrase, it's the lack of the ability to think strategically. Um, there was a a wonderful American general uh who I studied when I was writing on strategy called Andre Buffere, and he said that in war, the loser deserves to lose, cuz his defeat will be a consequence of poor of inadequate strategic thinking either before or during the conflict. I think um that the the institutional lag in in entities such as NATO um which had done badly in Afghanistan. I was in Afghanistan and let's face it, NATO lost.
Um, so the idea that NATO could prevail over Russia, having lost against the Taliban, it's just extraordinary thinking, but it's it's in NATO. I think as well that the advice um within the um the establishment, I'm I used to call call them the elites, but I've now realized that they're not elite because elites are about high performance, whereas we're not seeing that within the establishment. So I think the the um the establishments have what I can best describe as a sort of institutional lag and um uh sort of blinkered thinking. And we see that in many ways um and when you look at across the broad nature of the strategic context in which we're operating, and if you can be bothered to listen to what the Russians have been saying, then um, you know, the logic uh that they present is um, I find is sort of unequivocal. I mean, I've listened, of course, to your interview with um uh Vladimir Putin and of course Lavrov, and there was almost nothing that I could think of that I disagreed with. The problem though, the West is not interested in listening, it seems to me. And so I think this is more about incompetence, and it must be incompetence on the Europeans. uh that you know, there might be within the neocons and certain elements of um the sort of neocon-like establishments in the West, in the E3 in Britain, Germany, and France, that is um determined to break up Russia. Um, but it's obviously impossible, it seems to me. Um, you know, the one you hear Kaakalis saying that.
Well, can I can I ask you? I I was at a a dinner with her not long ago in a foreign country with a lot of uh foreign diplomats who are not mediocre at all. And she got up to speak and the feeling of contempt for her and bewilderment that someone this stupid could have a leadership position in Europe. People were shocked by just how unimpressive, how uninformed she was, how childish, how girlish she was. Everything was a kind of grotesque and dumb moral generalization. Hitler versus Churchill kind of level stuff. How does someone like that, how does a structure like the EU, a continent with the smartest people in the world, in my opinion, promote someone like Callas to a position of leadership? Like how does that happen?
Um, it's a very good question because you could ask exactly the same question about Von der Leyen.
Yes. Yes, you know, Von der Leyen when I was um serving was notorious for being the worst minister of defense that Germany had ever had. And suddenly we find that she is um in charge or the, you know, has a leadership role in the EU. You could also say it about about Rutte as well. And I thought the last um NATO secretary general was bad, but my goodness me um he's got very good competition now. I think it also goes across the Western leadership as well generally um in my experience. You know, I'm sort of um I'm I'm uh you know, started in my naval career back in '76. This is the worst set of leaders that I think we've got collectively for um for as long as I've been alive, I think. So I I can't answer your question other than to say that it's it's an ex it's a very difficult position to be in, but also it's an incredible weakness that we have in the West and explains so much of what's going wrong in the West is the lack of high-quality leadership. And I used to teach leadership and I look at some of the ways that these leaders are operating and it's it's um extraordinarily um well, the issue is competence. And I'm sure some of these are decent people. They're doing what they think, but they're obviously not competent. And I say that strategically, that for a for a strategic operation, the measure of success is, was the operation effective? Was it enduring? Were the results enduring? And was it was it efficient? Now, on all of the the um the interventions of this century, starting Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and now Iran, we failed at every one of those. I would say some people will argue about Syria, although if you think recreating a caliphate within Syria is a good idea, that's an open question. It looks to me like Iran is being lost. It looks to me like Russia is being lost. So, we've got a consistency in terms of um capacity to think and act strategically. I think this isn't just though about the politicians. I think it's also about senior military officers, about senior diplomats, about senior intelligence officers. So, you know, this is I I wouldn't want to blame the politicians entirely. I've operated right at the top of British government as the um executive assistant to our Chief of Defense Staff. So, I've watched people operating being part of that. Um, but strategic thinking is is the key shortfall and it's uh caused us a lot of harm and I think it explains as well why uh we're going backwards, whereas many other countries in the world are going forward.
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Um, so at at the point we're at right now, it it seems more dangerous in the West war against Russia than it has been ever. Um, can you describe where you think we are and where this is going?
Yeah, let me let me do it through the um the the um tool, Tucker, of the article I wrote on the coming war with Russia. And the reason I wrote it was I hearing a lot of people here saying we're we're getting ready for war with Russia. We'll be ready to fight in uh 2030. I don't think that's true because we can't afford to can't afford to be. But anyway, that's the um that's the narrative that's being sold to the European publics. Um, and the problem is that of course the Russians will be listening to this. Of course they'll be listening to it. So, um, uh, I thought it would be a good idea to say, well, okay, well, if we're going to be ready to fight a war with Russia, what's it going to be like? And the first, um, um, thing about the article was I said that, um, let's not assume that Russia is going to wait, um, doing nothing until 2030 until we're ready. So let's assume that because of the way that we're starting to promote attacks deep into Russia by the E3, that's um Germany, Britain, and France providing weapons and weapons with significant warheads as well, 250 kg and significant range deep into Russia. Let's not assume that the Russians are just going to sit back and let this happen. Though my um uh starting point was to say, okay, well, let's assume that Russia attacks uh Europe or attacks certain elements of Europe. And what the Russians have said is that they have not taken these attacks off the off the off the um the agenda, which is a warning. And it's a warning which we seem to be ignoring. So let's assume that the first attacks happen in September of this year. And and my um scenario, and and I should emphasize it's a scenario, not a forecast. So, it's trying to make people think about what could happen. So, let's assume these attacks happen in September of this year and the Russians destroy uh with hypersonic missiles the factories that are uh making drones and missiles in Britain, in France, and in Germany. And uh the question then is, what does Europe Europe do? And of course, the first thing Europe does is it says, okay, well, we're now going to invoke Article 5. As all of a sudden people realize what Article 5 really means. I mean, you've got NATO, which, you know, when I was serving in NATO, understanding NATO Force Mediterranean, we used to say that NATO stood for "No Ability To Organize." It's slightly unfair. Um, but actually NATO isn't this great omnipotent um coalition. People say it's the strongest coalition since the since since in history. I mean, that obviously isn't true. The strongest coalition in history, as far as I can see, was the Allied coalition in the Second World War with the United States, uh, Britain, the Commonwealth, Russia, and China. It's the strongest coalition by far. So NATO invokes Article 5. Um, and the three countries that have been attacked invoke Article 5. And they realize that suddenly that actually what Article 5 means is that an attack on one is an attack on all, but it doesn't doesn't mean that actually those the whole of the NATO forces have to respond, and people decide to respond as they think best. And in the article, I propose that um Hungary says, "Nope, we're not getting engaged." Spain says, "Nope, we're not getting engaged. We don't think this is in our interests." I think other countries might equivocate. Um, you know, it's difficult to say, but, you know, countries like Hungary, for example, obviously won't. So at that stage, we suddenly see um that this isn't all it means. But the the the big issue, Tucker, is what does the United States do? Now, of course, we know that Rubio has been um looking as if the United States is shifting back into support uh these operations, but at that moment, I think there's an open question about what United States do if it does if it says cease attacks into Russia, especially if those have been warned, uh that the attacks are warned and we've made no um response to them. And my guess is that the American will not want to commit troops into uh mainland Europe to fight a line a war against Russia on European soil and for the for US troops to fight and die on the European soils. I wouldn't, if I were in the United States. So you're then in the situation, well, now to what the Europeans do. And again, just to develop the scenario, I assume that the Europeans do the only thing they can do, cuz their land forces are not ready, is that they use air forces to respond to Russia. And that that doesn't go very well. That actually they find that they're up against Russia, which got a lot of experience in air defense. And one of my jobs in the Navy was to be the captain of an air defense destroyer. And um I was what was known as the anti-air warfare commander. And I can tell you that we are in poor shape uh in uh Europe in terms of being able to defend our skies. Uh we would struggle to respond to saturation drone attacks. We've got extremely limited uh responses to to ballistic conventional ballistic missiles. I'm a great fan of Ted Ted Postol, who is an MIT professor on this. He thinks that the um uh the Patriot PAC-3 systems are possibly looking about 3% effectiveness. And when it comes to hypersonic missiles, we've got no response whatsoever. So suddenly we're making attacks that aren't very successful. But in res in return, I say that because the E3 have decided to respond to Russia's attacks, that they then take the gloves off and use um hypersonic missiles, probably with conventional missiles, to to do more damage. And the thing that I would go after, especially as an energy expert, would be to do the same thing that they've done in in Kiev and in Ukraine, which to surgically um start to undermine our our um energy infrastructure. And I can tell you that a a Resnik missile landing in a liquid natural gas terminal or an oil terminal in Milford Haven or um Rotterdam would do extensive damage. That would be bad enough, but unfortunately, of course, because of the sanctions we placed on Russia in the first place about 40 year four years ago, we've uh switched ourselves off from Russian oil, switched ourselves off from Russian gas. So that's 40% of our gas. We've also of the of the particular um products we've switched ourselves off to Russian diesel, who used to provide us with 40% of Europe's diesel. Now, as an energy expert, if you can explain to me how you can run a modern industrial society without diesel, then I'm all ears, but I don't know how to do it. It's respon diesel is critical for farming, for fishing, for food logistics, for construction, for running the other two primary energy sources, that's renewable energy and nuclear energy. Uh, I could go on and on. It is really is the critical fuel. And we've switched ourselves off to it. And of course, having switched ourselves off and increased our prices in in Europe, which of course is having an effect on our economies, especially Germany's economy, we're now in the situation when the straitforwards closed. And so we've got a a second WAM on top of the first WH. So talk about being in a very very fragile position. It's an extremely weak position, not least of all because we import um about 12 million barrels a day into oil into into the European region. Um, Norway is reasonably self-sufficient. In fact, Norway is completely self-sufficient. And we get about 45% or so of our um hydrocarbons from the North Sea, although that's reducing. But uh Europe generally is extremely um extremely vulnerable. So, what you got is a situation which is that our energy infrastructure is being written down at a time when we have no no chance of defending our skies against it. And again, this is why I was trying to actually uh make the the point to people who are prepared to think about this, what this war might look like, because the economic consequences of this would be profound. Mathematically, there's a really close relationship between the use of energy and GDP. It's extremely close. It's it's close to one. It's about sort of .99 or something. Yes.
So what that means is when you take energy out of the system, then you are going to have a consequent uh effect which is similar in rough order of magnitude on your economy. So if we take 10% of the world's energy away, then surprise, surprise, don't be surprised if we get a global reduction in GDP of 10%. Now, that's getting close to a depression. Indeed, it's on the borderline of a depression. But going back to Europe, um, it wouldn't surprise me at all if we're in a situation where were such an attack to happen, then we would be in deep economic trouble. Um, and I think that would lead to deep political trouble as well. Um, but again um, you know, it is a scenario. And the point of the scenario was to help people really think about what such a war might uh might mean and and really make sure that we've done the risk assessment. Now, I I developed it as a scenario because what I wanted people to think about was doing the risk assessment. At the moment, um the European's risk assessment of what they're doing, as far as I can see, is based on a guess. And the guess is, uh, we're going to keep firing long-range weapons into Russia, and we're going to guess that the Russians aren't going to respond. And I think that's a very dangerous guess. I mean, people say the Russians don't have red lines. And I keep saying to them, well, just a second. The Russians told us that if we tried to expand NATO into Georgia or to Ukraine, then it would result in a war. And indeed, all our clever thinkers told us the same thing. And surprise, surprise, when we did do that, a war happened. So, Russia do have red lines. So, I think it's wrong to have that guess. And the way that risk management works, I'm not a great fan of risk management. It's used by the financial sector to do risk analysis. And as far as I can see, it doesn't work for them. But what they do do is they say, if you're thinking about a risk, have a think about uh the um impact and the probability. Now, even if the probability is low of Russia doing what I've said, the impact is profound. So to me, that's a risk which you really need to work very, very hard to think through and to make sure that the population who you're exposing to that risk have been taken on board, rather than just um crack on without really thinking about it. So I think there needs to be in Europe a political debate about this and whether we're prepared to let our politicians lead us uh into into a situation where we're exposed to this risk. And we we've been here before in Europe. 2014 and 1914, I should say. You know, the run um the F Barbara Tuchman's famous book, you know, "The Guns of August," where we fell into the First World War. People thought it would be over in 4 months, and four years later, Europe was devastated. So let's at least try to do the thinking this time round and decide that if we are going to do these things and to poke the bear, uh for ready for a war which we would lose anyway, uh let's at least have a have a public debate about that and see how the country feel about it and other countries feel about it. Cuz I'm strongly of the view that actually if the country were exposed to what I'm talking about, the difference in terms of political support for it would be profound. I think the political support for it would fall away. It doesn't matter what the moral issue is. I happen to think the moral, that the moral high ground lies with Russia. What happens is the issue of power, and Russia has the balance of power here, and overwhelmingly so. Um, my suspicion is if we were able to have that debate, and I think we should have that debate, then I don't think Europeans would continue to feel quite so Russophobic because they do.
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I I think one disadvantage that the Europeans have is they don't understand how hated they are by the people planning these wars. I think it's true of all the wars of the last hundred years. I think at least in my country, the the foreign policy strategists, the neocons, uh who are driving all of this truly hate Europe and would like to see it destroyed. The Israelis hate Europe.
And Europeans can't seem to admit that to themselves. Um, it's very obvious by the effects. So, let's say that the Russians did lob a hypersonic missile into Rotterdam or into the UK. Everyone knows, it's very obvious that that Europe can't mount a conventional war against Russia. They would lose instantly. The one thing they do have, however, is nuclear weapons. So, how much incentive would there be to use a nuclear weapon in response?
Um, it's the $64,000 question, and I I actually cover that in the article. Um, I think the what what what we're talking about is that if either um Britain or France, the two nations with nuclear weapons, chose to respond with nuclear weapons, that essentially is committing national suicide.
Yes.
I would expect the Russians to to respond. Don't let's let's forget that they got nearly 5,500 nuclear weapons, just short of that. And you know, I think Britain's got sort of I think there might be 200, is those sorts of figures. Um, I think that the um that that a prime minister or president of France who is prepared to use nuclear weapons to support a conventional war which we were likely to lose in the first place, I think that would be a very um it's a suicidal call to make. So I cannot see it um I cannot see it happening.
Really? Because they cheered the destruction of their own energy pipeline. They emulated the invasion of their country by, you know, North and and Sub-Saharan Africa, like they're suicidal. That's what it seems as an observer. So.
Yeah, I I think it's um it's that that it's suicidal by incompetence. But I would like to think um that within the um establishment, there are enough people who would by this stage, especially if we were starting to go to war, had really start to to to think this through. I would also like to think that, and I'd be interested in your view on this, that there were Americans who were saying, "This isn't very good. You, this isn't what we, you know, we were thinking that we could help with a break up of Russia. It's not happening. This war is starting to kick off. Uh, we need to get this to a close." And I don't know if that would happen, but I would like to think that actually there would be some voices um in America. You know, the sorts of people who would spring to mind for me would be people like JD Vance and um Tulsi Gabbard, no longer there, but the the voices of reason within the White House. Um, be curious to see what Donald Trump's view as well, but I'm sure the Americans would not want to be doing anything which open them to the possibility of a nuclear exchange with Russia. So, you know.
My sense is that Trump's views are irrelevant. I don't think he was for this war with Iran. He did it anyway. He's utterly controlled. So, so there's that. JD Vance is the only person I'm aware of in American national politics with any power at all to extend he has power who would oppose this. Um, but I don't see anyone other than JD Vance.
I hope I'm wrong.
Yeah. Yeah. Um, I hope you are too. I mean, there's no doubt that the voices of the independent media is starting to be heard. We've got a long, long way to go, but we're starting to be heard. But again, this is why I think this debate needs to happen now rather than later. I mean, Europeans haven't thought about this a lot. I mean, when when the um the attacks were conducted on the the um Russian strategic bombing force, I thought that was an act of incredible strategic recklessness because those bombers were out on the um the airfields on the tarmac so they could be seen by satellites as part of the START treaty. So it was part of the treaty and uh Russian nuclear doctrine is such that if there were if their nuclear triad, an element of the nuclear triad, is attacked, then their response is to respond with nuclear weapons. They chose not to do it, thank goodness. But we're playing with fire here. And and I think that um uh the the issue, I think, is not the nuclear response. And I I think it's a very open question. It's an open question not only for us but for the Russians as well. You I could imagine the Russians saying, "Yeah, actually that we've got um people who are so incompetent in uh Western capitals that um we perhaps don't want to respond this way," or they might do it in a more measured way. I mean, here's a very good question. What if the responses were not against Germany, France, and uh Britain, but against Germany? And what if the responses were such that they took out Germany's drone factories and Poland's drone factories? Would then Britain and Russia and France be prepared to sacrifice their nations and tens of millions of deaths uh to support um Germany in that situation? Very, very good question. And I don't know what the answer is. Um, but I mean, to me, the answer is, let's at least um think carefully about what we're trying to do with these long-range weapons in fighting attacks into Russia. And let's also think about diplomacy. I mean, the fact that we can have um have um you know, have have um meetings where we're where the West is talking about solutions to the to the Russia-Ukraine war and triumphantly exclude one of the belligerents, and it's diplomatic incompetence of the highest order, I can see. Yeah. We we in the very difficult uh uh British and Irish uh relationships during the the Troubles in Ireland maintained diplomatic, very, very subtle diplomatic engagement throughout the almost the whole of that war. And thank goodness we did. You what we need, I think, is to at least think about this alternative pathway to peace. I'm sure it's there. I often thought that one of the biggest problems is NATO. You know, NATO at the moment is is bit bit of a self-licking lollipop. But what what I what I once said, NATO exists to um confront um a threat which is created by its own existence, that doesn't have the power to confront the threat that his existence has created. So I think NATO, to my mind, is a key part of the problem here.
And what a beautiful formulation that is. NATO exists to confront the opposition it's created, but doesn't have the power to successfully resist that. I mean, that's that's the truest thing I've heard today.
Yeah, as it was in a real it was in a um um a one of the Quincy Institute's responsible statecraft articles about 18 months ago. I mean, it's so obvious, you know um and yet people think that NATO is omnipotent. Um, so I think that um understanding that actually the NATO guarantee is is I wouldn't say it's as little as paper, but it is much less um comprehensive than people think because it relies on military forces which are, to my mind, nowhere near as battle-hardened as Russians are. You know, the second best army in the world, I would say at the moment, in terms of battle-hardened, is the Ukrainian army.
Yes.
Uh, you know, the first is the Russian army. Um, the Chinese will be watching extremely closely. So the idea that NATO um, you know, can with a disparate group of um countries with different levels of force, forces with different levels of um equipment capabilities, can actually be brought together into a coalition to defeat the most battle-hardened army in the world. You know, it just doesn't stack up, does it? You don't need to be a military man to understand that. It doesn't stack up. Unfortunately, a lot of the military people don't understand this. Um, they they're not really um interested, as far as I can see, in um understanding Russia. I just find it um profound. Um um I've been listening to a couple, I was listening recently to one of our former Chief of Defense Staff, and I said in a um meeting in which we were at, I said, "What do you think about talking to Russia?" And his response was, "Yes, I think we probably should do that." But he said, "But not Putin." I thought, well, that's just astonishing that anybody could say that. And it shows you the degree of Russophobia. I mean, I was, you know, I in my service career, I spent a lot of the time of my service career preparing to fight the Russians. But when the Cold War came and Partnership for Peace was kicked off and we started to engage with the Russians, nobody, we were, most of us in my experience were delighted that we could be in that position. So quite how we've got back to this situation of um seeing Russia as the enemy is a good question. A lot of it is to do with not listening to Russia and not hearing Russia, cuz when you listen to them and hear them, it's fairly obvious what they want, but people just don't seem to be able to to do it. It's a bit like um, I mean, I'm not a soccer player, but it's it's a bit like um getting your team ready for a um a match and um not bothering to study the opposition. Yes. I mean, how many football coaches would do that? How many American football coaches would do it? How many, you know, everybody would be studying the opposition. And if we were studying the opposition, then that would be a good start. Could then realize the challenge we've got, but we would also be in a much position to understanding the opposition.
Well, they're much more serious than we are and much more. It's not close. And so, that right there gives you pause. Why would you ever get into a conflict with people who are at least as smart as you and much more committed? Um, you wouldn't. So where you after your military service spent 15 years in the energy sector where you're qualified to answer this question, where is the West, the US, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, uh with energy right now?
I think um it's a very good question and I I my strong sense um this is intuitive with some analysis to to support it, but My strong sense is that we're um on the edge of a crisis. And the reason I say that is if you take um it's not 20 million barrels per day, and let's just stay with oil for the moment, not not natural gas, but just taking oil, which is the critical resource for almost all of the others. Um, if you take 20 million barrels of oil out of the sit out of the um strait horses, in fact, it's 13, then um sooner or later that has to show up. Now, what what um I was surprised with is how long it's taken. And of course, and when you start to see what's going on, you start to see what's happening. It takes um from the closure of the strait for it takes about 2 months for the ships u which are traveling at 12 knots, which is about the same speed as a.
bicycle, you know, to get to the United States and to, um, to places like Cushing. It takes about, uh, a month or so to get to Europe. So, firstly, you've got all the ships which had left were still moving. Uh, the inventories, of course, were significant. There was a bit of an old glut at the time. So those have been largely drawn down, as far as I can see. Uh, the strategic petroleum reserves as well, uh, have largely been drawn down. I think Cushing is now the American strate reserve, I think, is pretty low. Figure I have in my mind, you, you may know this better than me, is about 20%.
"That's right. Again, when you get start to get to the drags, um, you've got to think carefully about it. Um, even when the oil moves through pipelines, so from Cushing up to this, up to, um, to New England, it's traveling at between three and five, three and 8 miles an hour. So that, of course, takes time. And of course, the oil in the pipeline needs to, you need to have oil in the pipeline for the pipeline to work."
"Right?"
"So the oil in the pipeline isn't working. Uh, it's not working inventory. And last, but by no means least, is China. And what I don't think any of us understood was how China would respond to this. And I don't think we completely understand. But China, uh, reduced its, um, its demand by about 5 million barrels per day, which is a significant reduction. It's also home to the largest strategic petroleum reserve in the world. I think the figure I've got is 1.3 billion barrels per day. So it's a very significant, uh, reserve."
"Um, I also suspect, I don't know. I suspect one of the ways that China was thinking about this was not just about self-interest, but I suspect the Chinese were thinking that as an exporting nation, they were thinking long and hard about the impact that the Strait of Hormuz closure would have on the rest of the Far East because there are other nations in the Far East which are much more vulnerable. Japan had a very big, um, reserve, but places like Taiwan, you, the 90% of the semiconductors are made in Taiwan. A place like Taiwan were much more, much more vulnerable. So I suspect one of the reasons China may have done that is not just, um, uh, uh, not, not just for tactical reasons, but also for thinking about their export markets, cuz, um, reduction in oil in these other places could have a significant, significant impact."
"Um, I don't think anybody really knows. Um, but one of the, the other things to think about is that, sorry, I'll just finish. I think I would, would be surprised if we were not seeing consequences of this in August. Uh, and I've certainly heard some very, um, good analysts who I, I follow, um, talking about September as well. I'm a great fan of an American geo, geo physicist called Art Berman, who's an exceptional, um, exceptional analyst."
"The other thing though, of course, is that even when the straits form open, then there is a lag. There's a lag on actually those, um, um, the whole system getting going again. It's a bit like sort of closing off your plumbing in your pipes at home and then expect it to function perfectly."
"Now, one of the interesting things is that when the, um, I can't remember what the ship's name was, a ship, container ship, um, um, blocked the Suez Canal. And for every one day that that container ship blocked the Suez Canal, um, of there's a, there's like a very good merchant navy analyst called Sam Mogiano who said it was about 6 days for the whole logistics system to recover. So even if it's 3 days, you could be talking for, um, you know, as a minimum, it would be the amount of time that the straits been closed, it will take to recover, but it could be twice that or it could be three times that. So I'm expecting and forecasting that we'll be looking at a significant recession starting in the autumn, and that could tip into recession in the new year. Quite where that recession will play in the globe is an open question."
"I mean, the country that's most insulated from it, surprise, surprise, is Russia. You know, Russia's an anarchic nation. Uh, it's well understood the consequences of, um, uh, you know, of, um, of, of what's going on. I think although Putin's first degree is in law, his postgraduate work was in resource economics. So I'm, would be astonished if they don't understand this. I know that the Chinese have been looking at their own energy situation for decades. Um, there's good evidence to say that in 2003, when the, the Americans with allies went into to Iraq, that the Chinese thought that that was about oil, and they began, um, uh, increasing their, um, their, um, their own reserves."
"So, but, but as for places like Europe, you know, we're incredibly vulnerable. So is a lot of the Far East. Um, so I'm afraid to say on places like Africa, and there's an open question about the United States as well, that the, the Trump line that, that the United States is a, um, is an exporter of oil is true in as much as an exporter of refined product. But when it comes to to, um, crude, it's an importer of crude to the tune of about 6.5 million barrels per day. And even if you've got access, you know, through, for example, Venezuela or Canada, oil is a fungible commodity. So you may have access, but the prices of the oil are going to go up."
"So I don't know what it's like over there in the States at the moment, um, in terms of, you know, cost per per barrel, it's up here. Um, but if those costs were to increase significantly, um, in the next 2 to 3 months, um, I would imagine that would not be the sort of run you'd want into the midterms. And I would be surprised if they don't increase significantly. And even if you open the straits for, I would be surprised if the lag in the system is such that you're still not suffering from the consequences of those well into the midterms and probably into the new year."
"So oil, Brent crude was like priced in dollars, I think, $71 last week."
"M."
"Um, if you'd told me almost 4 months after the closure of the straits that it would be $71, I, I would never have believed that. What, how did that happen? Were you surprised by it, that it's so low?"
"Yes, very, very. I, I was just as surprised as you, and I think most of the analysts were, but I think a lot of it is to do with the, the, the lag. It's also, um, there's this distinction between the futures markets and the actual delivery. I was talking to a Singaporean colleague last month, and he said that, and I don't know whether this is still the case, that notwithstanding what Brent was at or what WTI was at, that in Singapore, they were buying crude for $200 a barrel. So, you know, the difference is, the difference is, is the interesting one. It's what, what people are actually paying for it. I mean, there may be a short-term lag. Who knows? But that's, that's the open question. The so-called crack spread between, um, you know, what you're paying, what, or what you're forecasting to pay in the futures markets and what you're actually paying on the day."
"How does a country exist at $200 a barrel?"
"Yeah. Well, fortunately, um, Singapore is an extremely efficient country."
"Yes."
"So, you know, but that must be having political effects, I guess, as well. It's quite a small country. I didn't, uh, I was so surprised when I heard $200 a barrel. I didn't ask, ask much more. Um, but again, if, if we, um, get up to those sorts of figures, you, I think back to to 2007 and 2008, the great global financial crisis. You, I was happened to be in Houston at part of that, and I remember vividly seeing the stock market red all over. I'll never forget it. I remember talking to an American who was working in the British Consulate in Houston. He'd lost half his, half his retirement savings in that, that crash."
"Um, and again, it seems to me that, that if you were to get up to those sorts of figures, $150, and if you've got a global economy which is already, um, not in trouble, but already very precarious, then it wouldn't surprise me if we have another great financial crash. I mean, who knows? You know, we might say it's, it's, I'm $150 an oil barrel, oil, a function of that. To me, it seems impossible that it wasn't a function of that. People will talk about, um, people talk about, um, synthetic, uh, collateralized debt obligations in the housing market. I think a lot of it's to do with the Eurodollar areas, actually, and how, how funding in the Eurodollar areas were actually tightening. But it seems impossible to me that actually that that oil, which is the primary resource, wasn't playing into that. I mean, it's playing into things like Lufthansa. I think canceled 20,000 flights, um, about a couple of months ago. Um, I don't know what bunker fuels are like. That's the fuel used for ships, but, um, when I was talking to somebody recently about those, those were doubled. So again, it's what people are actually paying rather than the futures market. And it's when those two come back into alignment, then we'll know probably more what's happening."
"The, the, the problem, I've said this before as well, Tucker, is that when somebody, Danny Davis, who I think you know, Daniel Davis, yes, said to me, he said, if you were the Tsar of the world, uh, what would you do about solving the energy crisis? I said, the problem is that the energy crisis, nobody's in charge. The whole of the energy markets are run by the market. So there is no single entity can say, well, we need to do X, Y, and Z to sort this out. You know, you can't just say, well, we need to actually, um, run more tankers through the straits. Almost cuz if the shipping companies say, we don't like the look of that, thanks, we'll wait until it's ready."
"Um, so there are a whole load of issues here which are really run by the market. And there, I think there's nobody who really understands the thing itself. And even if they did understand, there's nobody who can actually press a button and press five or six buttons to make the whole thing work again properly."
"That's right. Again, I'm, I'm hearing the same thing from other analysts. And, you know, I listen to this like a book, and I don't say that I've got the answers, but what I do say is that you take this amount of energy out of the system, it's bound to have economic consequences. It's a mathematical impossibility that it won't."
"And in a globalized economy, no nation can have real sovereignty. Of course, you can't act independently on behalf of your country because you're not in control of your country because you don't control its economy. So, yeah, I, no one kind of thought about that obviously in the post-war era."
"So let me just ask you a final question, which is, how long are these two conflicts likely to continue? Do you see hope of resolution in Eastern Europe or in the Middle East?"
"Um, I think if I take, um, the Middle East first, I've got a strong suspicion. I can't say for sure that as the continued closure of the straits comes home to the United States, and that as the midterms go, as I think it's almost impossible to avoid now, badly, and I suspect that that will create a very different political atmosphere in the United States if you've got very significant price increases and you're seeing lots of damage being done to the global economy. So my suspicion is that that's the thing which might bring the, um, uh, the Iran war to a closure. I can't say for sure."
"Um, but the, um, interesting thing as well will be to see the extent to which, um, in a, if were the situation to be improved between the United States on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other hand, uh, both, both China and Russia could actually have a hand in helping to bring that, um, that war to a close."
"What's for sure is that unless the United States is able, willing to, uh, deploy significant land troops, when I say significant, we're talking tens, hundreds of thousands, cuz nothing else is going to make a difference, then the, then, then the war cannot be militarily. Yeah. And we know, I don't think I'm, I'm overguessing to say that there's no political appetite in the United States to deploy land forces into the Iranian war."
"Um, I think as regards the, um, Russia-Ukraine war, that's a more difficult one to call. Um, my guess, uh, is that what you, what Putin will be thinking about will be about the coming economic crisis in Europe, cuz one of the things that he could be saying to himself is, okay, I could respond, um, by, as the Europeans start to ratchet up pressure on me, but actually, I can see what's coming. So by the time this economic crisis hits Europe, then at that stage, the Europeans will be recognized finally that they simply can't afford the weapons, and they're actually, because they're actually tipping into recession. I mean, arguably Germany is already in recession. I think both Britain and France probably, probably are on the, on the edge of it. That suddenly, um, they're in deep economic trouble, and the last thing they want to do is to actually invite their, their, um, countries to, um, to invest 5% of their GDP in fighting a war which, by this stage, they'll hopefully realize cannot be won."
"Um, if that happens, then I would like to think that it could be, could be, um, brought to a close by the end of the year if the, if the recession hits. Um, it's slightly sort of weird way to think about it, perhaps, um, if it were to be diplomacy, a lot will depend, I think, on again, it might depend on the midterms, it might depend on how the neocons see it. It might depend on the E3, uh, and their policies. Um, but sooner or later, people, I'm sure, going to recognize that the war cannot be, cannot be won."
"Um, the, the one other thing that could bring it to a close would be a change in policy by Russia, because the alternative to striking, uh, Europe, and I still don't do not think that's off the table, even though it's the scenario. The alternative could be a move on Kiev, an armored move on Kiev. And I think that would be done not for military reasons, but for political reasons. And if, uh, Kiev, the Kiev government were to collapse, then I think at that stage, I think it would be game over. So I wouldn't, Russia has never mentioned it, but I wouldn't be surprised if it's been something they thought through as a, a possible course of action."
"I do, I mean, Putin has got to be under domestic pressure. He doesn't rule as an absolute dictator. I mean, he's got constituencies in the GRU, the military."
"Lots of people would like his job. I mean, how much pressure is he under to respond with force, greater force, do you think?"
"I think he's under significant pressure. Um, but, um, I, I actually took the time when the, the war kicked off to listen to Oliver Stone's interviews with Putin to get to know the man. And I also took the time to actually read Philip Short's biography of him. And then you, at the, I came out of that thinking, this is a man who's extremely strategic. And whatever you think about him, um, due to what you've heard in the press, this is a person who deserves significant respect."
"Yes."
"So if I had been thinking about this, I would say, we need to think very carefully because this is a strategic leader who deserves significant respect. I think he is under pressure, but equally, I think he's the sort of man who will, um, be able to resist this pressure and do what he thinks best, which is what I think he's been doing until now. So, um, although I often hear people say, 'Oh, why hasn't Putin,' I hear podcasters and people in the alternative media saying that Putin not being affected, he should have responded by now."
"Um, I have a strong intuition that, supported by the general staff, and, and when I went to Afghanistan before I went there, I read the Russ, the Russian general staff's analysis of their, um, Afghan campaign. Uh, they did a 10-year campaign and got out in good order after 10 years. And the, um, the, the structure they left there took, took 2 years before actually things started to become again. We got out after 20 years, uh, much more money expended, and, and where things were collapsing around. Got out. I was really impressed by what the, the Russian general staff."
"So I would think that actually he's going to be very well advised as well by the Russian general staff. So I would think he's the sort of the man who will be able to hold his nerve, and I think he's the sort of man who will do what he thinks right strategically. So again, although I've pushed that scenario as one to think about, and I would think that he will have that on the table, and it wouldn't surprise me if that one way in which that, if I were to forecast how that scenario would play, play out rather than to to put a sort of worst-case, I'd say it's he, if he were going to use weapons, he would, the first thing he would do is he would ring up the White House and say, we are going to use weapons against, uh, the E3. Then having done that, he would then say, ring up, um, Macron and, um, uh, Burnham, as it will be, and say, we are going to use weapons against production facilities unless we have a clear, um, a clear response from you saying that you will stop providing Ukraine with these sorts of weapons. So that's what I would guess he would do, cuz he would escalate."
"So, sorry, it's a different type of escalation, but in terms of holding his nerve, I would think he will hold his nerve for a bit, but I think a lot will depend on, on firstly, how the war continues to play out, secondly, the economic conditions, and thirdly, the extent to which they, the Russians become nervous that they are going to find large weapons fired into the middle of Russia, which have been built in France, Germany, or Britain. And if they do start to think that is, um, that is going to happen, then I would expect, uh, Putin to respond. But in a very measured way."
"That sounds exactly right to me. What, what a wise analysis. Thank you for taking the time to do this."
"It's a pleasure, Tucker. And I think, keep, keep up the good work. I think we, in the, in the independent media, uh, it's important. I get so often, I get to the podcasts I've done with Danny and Glenn Dies and others, people saying, thank goodness, at last, some common sense. And we really need this common sense because the danger otherwise is that we'll, we'll do a 1914, which is the last thing we need to do."
"Yeah. I spent 35 years in traditional media, and the second I went to independent media, I thought, this is where all the smart people are. I wondered where they were, like, they're not in traditional media. So thank you, and you're a perfect example. So thank you for doing this."
"Yeah, pleasure. Pleasure."
"Thanks."