Transcription
Welcome to China Considered, a podcast that brings fresh insight and informed discussion to one of the most consequential issues of our time, how China is changing and changing the world. I'm Liz Economy, Hargruff, senior fellow and co-director of the program on the US, China, and the world at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
Today, I am delighted to welcome a very special guest, a close friend and colleague, Dr. Kurt Campbell. Kurt has served in a number of important positions in the Pentagon, in the State Department, and in the White House, most recently as Deputy Secretary of State in the Biden administration. Today, we're going to talk about his experience as one of the most important architects of US Indo-Pacific policy and what's happening right this very moment in Beijing between US President Trump and Chinese President Xiinping.
So, Kurt, you began your career uh in government at the Pentagon. um what were some of the operating assumptions uh about the US relationship with China in the 1990s? How different was it then uh from today?
>> First of all, Liz, it's just great to be with you and it's wonderful to be here at Stanford and um I've been looking forward to this conversation. Um my actually my first time in government was as a naval officer, not as a dazzy um at the Pentagon. And so I was beginning to teach up at Harvard and at that moment the United States and the Soviet Union then when the Soviet Union was still around they were beginning miltomill uh dialogues between our two countries and having exchanges between naval ships and the like and port visits and uh I had been in the Navy. I was a naval officer and my Russian was quite strong and so I was recruited to join the staff of then the chairman of the joint chiefs a man named William Cra and he was the last chairman before Goldwater Nichols and Goldwater Nichols the defense reform gave the chairman just extraordinary powers and that next chairman was Colon Pow. So I worked for about a year with um Admiral Cra and then about a year with Co and Pal.
And >> so which year was this exactly?
>> It's kind of 1988 1989. So >> um and and >> so early years of Gorbachoff at the time.
>> Yeah. Exactly. And and and a lot of confusion in the United States about whether this was all a faint or the Soviet Union was really changing. And so during that time we had a lot of diplomacy with with our counterparts at the time. It was >> um a a guy named Ogarov that is kind of a famous >> yeah Soviet uh theoretician on military power. He coined the term revolution in military affairs which we still use today. So I really learned in that capacity which was I was lowly and junior even though I had in my kind of my secret life I was going to be and I was a professor at Harvard in my l my lowly life I was a lieutenant so pretty much good enough to get a cup of coffee and like you know got to make sure that doors were opened and closed but it was a great education and I got to I worked closely with Powell who was incredibly effective and tough and through that process met Rich Armmitic who kind uh took an interest in me and helped support me in my career. So that was really my first experience and it was humbling um to be, you know, at the very bottom. You're not I wasn't even on the totem pole. I was kind of beneath the ground of the uh totem pole, but it was it was an incredible experience.
Um >> it was a safe space to learn >> very much. And also, you know, there was a tremendous sense of American power. We had basically just won the cold war and you know uh there was a sense that anything was possible at that moment the idea of a unilateral power and kind of globalization tremendous optimism and potential as far as the I could see.
>> And it was exciting too. I was um actually the CIA at the CIA in charge of Gorbachoff. was my uh sort of my responsibility from 1985 to 1987 and I remember that being a time of potential right as you said was it a faint or was it something real and it turned out to be something real and I think by the time you were working there there was momentum I think between the two countries and an understanding that garbage off maybe was going to do something a little bit different.
>> Very much so and it took Reagan's leadership of the Republican party to basically say look we're going to give this guy a chance and really The person more than anyone else behind the scenes that helped maneuver this doesn't get enough credit was actually Margaret Thatcher who did initial diplomacy with Gorbachev and then basically communicated to Reagan that this is a person we can do business with. And I remember we talked about this cuz both you and I come from this training um as Soviologists um and it was we one of our first conversations many years ago. you might not remember um Gorbachev gave a speech about Soviet power in uh the Pacific in 1986 when he was in Vladivosto and so there was a lot of speculation about what that meant was the Soviet Union reoring more towards the Pacific and away from Europe and that was one of our first conversations but that process that education actually served me well because you know I got to see like some really effective leaders up close the tools they used to motivate and you know how they tried to lead and like you know people like Armmitic and General Pal are rare and it was an honor.
>> And I want to come back to sort of what you took from them in your own leadership because I think people would say that you've been very effective in your ability to shape US policy and to lead US policy uh in the Indoacific but let let's stay with the fact that you started off like as a naval officer focused on the Soviet Union brought in some Japan.
Yeah. >> Um so when did China first enter your space and what was your thinking about China coming at it from two other countries and expertise in two other countries really?
>> You know a little bit Liz by happen stance I you know a few years later I had started teaching at Harvard and um you know was on my way to an academic career. But the truth is is what happens is there is a thing called PTOIC fever in which once you actually serve in policy it's exciting and you want to do it again. And so I applied for a White House fellowship. I got one um and I ended up spending a year or a year and a half at the Treasury Department. So I worked for Lloyd Benson at the beginning of the Clinton administration. I was a special assistant to then Larry Summers. I worked with Rahm Emanuel on NAFTA. So I did that for at the White House. So I did that for about 18 months and then I was literally heading back to Harvard to resume my teaching position. Um ambivalent about it, but you know that was what I was going to do. And I got a call from Joeai who had just landed at the Pentagon and he said why don't you come on over and you know we can explore whether you'd be the dazzy for um what we called East Asian the Pacific at the time. I had had a little ship duty in Japan, a little bit of experience, but really not very much in the Indo-Pacific, what we call now the Indoacific, then East Asia. And I remember when I first started, he had a really a group of incredibly accomplished Asian people that were or Asian specialists working with him like Ezra Vogel. And I I could tell they were all like,
>> "Who's this guy? >> This is this is not a good idea. This guy knows nothing."
But um you know I think it's probably true to say this this happens to everyone Liz but sometimes someone sees something in you that you don't see in yourself and I think Joe saw a you know kind of a determination and so I >> some talent too.
>> Yeah. But so I I I was in that job for 5 years even though Joe left after one. He went back to Harvard but to be honest you know we had a small office of about 20 25 people. Um, it is now an assistant secretary's office, but at the time it had like enormous sway.
Um, >> and this is now the Clinton administration.
>> It is the Clinton administration. Yeah, I'm sorry. It should be. It's like 1995 to 2000.
>> Um, and I am still with those people. It was a life transforming experience. It was just incredible. And I'm close to almost every person I worked with in that office. You know, Carl Iiken very well. He was my >> uh China uh officer was fantastic. Taught me an enormous amount. Um Randy Shrivever I could a lot of people I worked with closely for years but it was a great experience and and I think uh at that time I ended up seeing China through a number of lenses.
Um, we remember it was after the Taiwan Strait crisis of which I was involved with with >> Bill Perry, the decision to send aircraft carriers to the Western Pacific. But after that, there was really a a uh concerted decision to try to build stronger USChina relations. And at the core of that at that time was the miltomill dimension. So I was involved in hundreds of visits that we would have to manage between Chinese and American components as they try to
>> This was Perry. This was during Perry's term, right? He was a very effective in some respects a very effective ambassador for the US with the Chinese. I think
>> I think um you know the truth is there are a lot of people that are underrated. I I think Bill Perry is um one of the finest public servants and also a person that you could really deeply emulate his sort of careful and gentle leadership style underneath it a very sort of um tough and purposeful approach. But so I worked with him on refashioning our strategy towards Japan with Jonai the so-called NY initiative. I worked we rebuilt we had no relationship with Vietnam. So we started miltomill talks. I did that quietly behind the scenes. We did our first scenario in war games about North Korea collapse with the South Koreans. Um saw Indonesia through its um revolution and the the fall of Saho and did a lot of uh diplomacy with with the Chinese and quiet diplomacy with the Taiwans. And so the experience was incredible and I saw the hope of the relationship. But even then I remember I I was so deeply involved in this military diplomacy. I could see the challenges, the distrust, the attempt to kind of size up. And there was really always a sense on the Chinese side that they were anticipating a different kind of relationship in the future where I don't think many of my American counterparts thought that way. I think they thought that look this is a this is a you know a rising country but has decades to go before they're able to do anything. And you know um
>> yeah not only that but this was the really sort of a a ushering in the peak period of engagement right because this led into China's accession to the WTO and the sense that China was going to join the international system it was going to become you know what Bob Zach later termed the responsible stakeholder and you know along with that would come the rise of the middle class and an opening of China's you know political and economic system right sort of modernization theory
>> wrapped under the guise of engagement.
>> Yeah, I I think all of that was in play, but at but I I think we tend to forget some of the es and flows after this period of really intense military diplomacy. There was substantial push back from conservatives on the hill that thought this was the wrong direction. And so they put many restrictions on a variety of things. you know, things that you could do with respect to information sharing or any kind of cooperation in space or the like. You know, one of the reasons why we never were able to do very much in our space programs even though we had done so much with the Soviets was because of legislation that was introduced at that time. And then I you know what what I think happened more than anything else. President um Bush came um to power with the initial idea that they were going to center their foreign policy on the idea of China as a strategic threat to the United States. We tend to forget that but that was an animating perspective. And then 9/11 changed all of that fundamentally complete reorientation uh refocus towards the Middle East and and frankly I I would say uh uh our foreign policy got substantially out of balance uh at that moment and it's frankly in many ways continued since then and so for those of us who have been very focused on the Indo-Pacific and Asia it's been a constant struggle to try uh make the argument that the lion share of the history of the 21st century is going to play out in the Indoacific and not in some of these really hard places in the Middle East.
>> It would seem that that's a function of the fact that there are the crises right in the Middle East. I mean then you have you know uh we had the Afghanistan we have obviously what we're seeing right now we had Iraq you know we there the Middle East is a constant you know source of immediacy for us whereas the Indopacific tends to be the longer term strategic play right the rise of China there was the rise of Japan uh it doesn't have the same degree of um you know sort of heightened conflict and urgency
Exactly >> the only thing I would say to that list I think that is a misreading of the kinds of challenges that we are facing. Um I we and we would I think both of us agree some of the challenges may be subtle in technology and the like but they are very much urgent and they require um immediate attention. And so I mean one of the surprising things about what's happened in um the last couple of months I I think um President Trump made a powerful argument about avoiding political quicksand in the Middle East. And and and remember the most brutal critiques of the Iraq war do not come from Democrats. They came they come from President Trump. But in many respects, what he has undertaken um here is likely to have longer and more important implications in some ways uh than what we've seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those were both countries that were largely irrelevant to the global economy. But Iran is so important with respect to the provision of you know fuels and uh a variety of associated capacities like in a fertilizer and the like. And I think the changes in the Persian Gulf straight of Hormuz that flow from this are going to make the region much different than it was before. And and I think the hard thing for the Trump administration is that they face very, you know, difficult challenges. They either continue on in some way which will be expensive and difficult and will take us away from the drama of the Indo-Pacific or they acknowledge that maybe this we made some mistakes here and cut a not very good deal.
But don't you think looking at the discussion right now that's underway um in Beijing between President Trump and President Xi that that linkage really between the Middle East especially Iran and the Indoacific and China I mean has been made right quite explicitly so there's there's no separating the two I mean China is Iran's most important patron economically security they're deeply invested um so these two have now come together I think in important way. And I'm just going to remind you, you you may or may not remember, you said to me, um, when you became deputy secretary of state, you said, you know, Liz, you said, we think dealing with Asia is hard. Let me tell you what's really hard is the Middle East.
Yeah. >> Right. So, you said you think that this Iran conflict is is going to be transformative over the long term. Maybe play that out a little bit.
>> Yeah. Maybe just >> So, so look, I think you are right. the the linkage has now been made but I think the reasons um are manifest first you know the the closure of the strait have had it's had impacts on the United States that you know we can feel in the gas pump and we're starting to feel it in certain areas secondary and tertiary areas but it's have profound impacts across Asia so much deeper much more um uh impactful than most people in the United states. No, there are a variety of countries that are teetering with respect to shortages of fuel, of diesel, of jet fuel. Some airlines literally have a week or two left of supply. So, there are going to be major consequences there. China is among all the Asian powers the most insulated, but they too are starting to feel it. I I think I if I could say um China has had the ability to watch us as a great power for 20 or 30 years. Um and you know these they are very attentive students of global politics. If we have taught them anything it is to be wary of the Middle East and it and the challenges that it can present. And so I fully expect as we sit here that President Trump is asking for more from President Xi with respect to, you know, trying to help in that end the conflict. And to date, the Chinese have been very general in the things that they said. You know, they they have asked people to go to the negotiating table. They've played a little bit of a role behind the scenes, but not much more. Now the question is if uh President Xi decides that he is going to consider, you know, doing more, what does he ask for in return? And I think what we're all waiting for and uncertain about is what's taken place behind closed doors on Taiwan? Um, and we'll get to that in a bit, but but I would say, Liz, generally speaking, you're right. the the connections between the Gulf and Asia now are profound and deep and there is an expectation that we do what we can to close this you know this basically festering um economic and energy related stoppage that is having massive global implications much more so than we realize in you know here in the United States more generally um and I I I think what's hard is that much as the Trump administration tries to explain why this made sense and was a good strategic move, I think to most strategists, they would view this as a as a very challenging detour, which will have substantial short-term con, you know, consequences for our economy, for inflation. But not just that, like one of the things that both you and I have been involved with is the patient accumulation of military capabilities to support deterrence in the Indoacific. And that means the provision of you know uh ballistic missile defense to Japan and South Korea. Um substantial marine expeditionary capabilities, two and a half aircraft carriers basically on station. You can go on and on. more fighter aircraft at Kadina. What what people don't understand is that this new capacity in the Middle East that is being used to stand watch and to inspect and to most of that comes from Asia and and so the quality of our deterrence has definitely been affected in a downward way. And so as President Trump goes to Beijing, I think first of all it is understood that this has not played out. This has not been Venezuela.
>> Um you know that for whatever reason the um uh Iran has not sort of modeled themsel after the Maduro regime, right? And so that's very clear. Um and I think it becomes clear and clear that the president took this decision um impetuously and you know just he's an improvisational player and this bet after talking with a couple of foreign leaders not really consulting the experts inside our government um is going to turn out to be a dangerous one. And the Chinese know that and so they're hosting him at a moment that I think they appreciate that the correlation of power in many respects has shifted against President Trump.
>> Yeah. I mean, I think it's it's interesting certainly um Admiral Paparo, you know, our head at Indopaccom has tried to make the case. I think that um our deterrent capability has not been affected um by Iran. But I don't think that's probably the view of many people.
>> You have to make that argument. If you're the commander, I mean I mean what is he gonna say? Like like I'm I'm in dire need. But all you've got to look at >> the the the the MW in Japan has vacated. I mean we don't really have an aircraft carrier in station. You can go through a variety of things. Yes. And the perception is shared not just in a couple of places but across most of our allies and partners. There is a worry about this.
>> No. I think I think maybe the one thing that we can be grateful for ironically um is that uh the head of the KMT, the chair of the party was recently, you know, Taiwan's opposition party was recently in Beijing and seemed to you know smooth some waters and grant perhaps Taiwan a little bit of space oddly enough where Xiinping you know can maybe make the case that peaceful reunification is on the horizon so that our sort sort of weaker deterrent capability doesn't then uh signal to President Xiinping that this might be a moment to take some action. So maybe the the constellation of of forces political and military are maybe not going to sort of trigger something that they might otherwise have. You know, my own sense is Liz, I I I do believe we overestimate how much that China is thinking about taking near-term immediate military action. I I actually think and I read the the visit of the KMT in a different way. I I think this is a Pinsir strategy designed to profoundly, you know, kind of erode the confidence uh of politically of um the current administration and basically place them in a deeply vulnerable position. So the first is you you welcome her, you you roll out the red carpet. Um that creates political anxiety. And now I think the hope will be the Chinese intend to play this meeting in Beijing and I I know we're going to disagree on this.
>> We are going to disagree >> because I I think they're going to play this as a G2.
>> Yeah. >> And that look, two great powers standing a stride and it's going to create a lot of anxiety in Asia and particularly in Taiwan. So I think that's the Penser movement. there's they're they are intent on weakening the confidence um in Taiwan and I don't think we tend to underestimate you know Taiwan is a remarkable achievement in every possible way you know democratically technologically culturally but much of it is grounded on the assumption of an ironclad American commitment u that is bipartisan and I I think there are now probably in the next couple of weeks going to questions about that. Now, it is possible that we'll see a kind of backlash among a still pretty timid Republican group on the hill that will say, "No, no, we've got to continue to stand by Taiwan." Much more to come. But I think what I'm trying to argue here is that the Chinese strategy really right now is to use other forces to try to constrain and to undermine Tai Taiwan's um you know sense of confidence and and I worry about that.
>> Yeah, I mean, I don't I don't disagree that that's their strategy. Perhaps we disagree on whether it's actually that effective because I do think you know the polling in Taiwan and we had a little bit of this discussion last week in Washington. Um, a little the polling in Taiwan suggests that actually the visit of the chairwoman to Beijing um was a negative for the KMT uh for the upcoming elections. Um that a majority a a vast majority of the population in Taiwan um has no interest in reunification with the mainland. So I I think that that visit didn't actually accomplish what Beijing would have wanted it to accomplish. But I think it does enable X Cinping to create a fiction that the time is moving forward in the way that he would like. I think in terms of the current um Trump and she summit, I would say so far so good. So we still have the possibility that things will go sideways in terms of what the president might say or do around Taiwan. But I think initial indications are the Chinese came out very hot at the beginning sort of giving this warning that Taiwan is the most important issue. It's central. Uh don't do anything stupid or we're going to end up in conflict. Um the response from the US side has been nothing. There hasn't been an acknowledgement of even the statement. Uh Secretary Rubio said after the first day that our policy has not changed on Taiwan. It's been one administration after another. Now, you're right. There's there's still time for things to to change on the the next day of the discussions. But um but I think that you know members of Congress, senior members of the Republican party in the leadup to this summit have come out pretty clearly and said they don't want to see any shift in US policy on Taiwan. And don't forget Taiwan just passed huge arms purchases. That's KMT and DPP aligned uh in the legislature in Taiwan. Huge arms purchases um agreement.
>> I agree that that is what Rubio said, but I think as significant is what Bessant said in an interview in which he indicated a couple of different things that President Trump acknowledged, understood, felt some of the Chinese issues um with respect to Taiwan and would have more to say in the next few days. So my sense is that signals um perhaps some subtle um adjustment in our policy. And I think what's important to keep in mind is that the dominant player in the formulation and execution of strategy on uh on China and the Indoacific is not Rubio. Secretary Rubio is is barely involved. He's much more involved in the Middle East and in Latin America. it is Bessant who is the dominant player in all issues associated with China and so let's see um but I also would say Liz there there are already plenty of indicators that would at least cause some anxiety we know that President Trump and President Xi have talked about managing or discussing issues associated with with with arm sales to Taiwan that that has been made clear in their last conversation And when you know, President Xi called President Trump to complain about um the Japanese position on Taiwan, President Trump immediately called her and warned her as opposed to speaking out supporting the Japanese position, which we've tried to get them to do substantially. And so I would just say, and I understand and I I hope what you're saying is true, but I would say at best the record is ambiguous and there are lots of indicators that suggest perhaps a different approach. And we do know from a history of things that the president has said and done that he feels like big countries should have maybe a little bit more say over their immediate neighborhoods. and and that has been how he thinks about the United States in Latin America, how he sees Russia in Ukraine. And we'll see, but I I do think there are clear indications that strains of that thinking have um affected how he thinks about China and Taiwan.
>> Okay. So, we'll we'll we'll call that, you know, we'll see in the next 24 hours. Um I mean, I might just play longer than that. I mean I I do think I do think that you know there was this understanding at the outset of this administration or that you know President Trump was consumed with this notion of spheres of influence but I think if you look at the national security strategy if you look at what we've been doing since that time it is clear that we are still deeply engaged in the Indoacific.
>> Do you think do you think he read or had anything to do with the national security? I I think I think what's surprising about this administration to some extent is is that they are actually doing a little bit of what the first Trump administration did. Even though I think they're much weaker in terms of experience and capabilities and and knowledge um certainly of Asia than the first Trump administration, they're doing a little bit of what that administration did, which is to run their own play in Asia kind of irrespective of whatever the president is saying or doing.
>> That's interesting. I think they have a much more aggressive um policy, >> one that's much more in line with Biden administration, strengthening strengthening relations with our Indepacific partners. I mean, restarting uh miltomill with uh Cambodia and new exercises with Cambodia.
>> Yeah, that that'll really >> ah okay. Well, anyway, let's let's go back. I want to go back. No, no, I want to go back.
>> I have to say one thing last I'll give you the last word and then I want to go back. I want my podcast but you are my guest right so look I I don't think you can argue that the allies and partners are being nurtured and supported our most important partner Japan is quite anxious right now um I think it is also the case that a country that we had really worked to pull into the fabric of our engagement India that has fallen on very hard times so I don't think you can argue that this has been woven together effectively um as a strategy. The the second thing I will say that I've seen now in the Middle East, in Europe, and now in Asia is a general lack of interest in what experts have to say. They really are not interested in that. And I remember asking a very senior person about like who do you listen to on the Iran stuff? Like who do you and he said, well, you know, um you know, the the the people that really are on the ground, Mr. Whitov and the the president's son-in-law um Jared are the ones. Now look, they have a lot of experience in real estate and stuff, but they don't probably they're not imbued in some of the history and the like. And so I I I actually think we are both falling into a trap that I always warn Asians about, which is the constant search for an overriding strategy or logic when a lot of these things are really guided by personal impetuousness, lack of coordination, longheld biases and beliefs, and that there isn't a kind of a convening overarching principle. And I I try to remind myself of that because my my instinct is to constantly look for um what's the you know kind of the larger strategy in place.
>> Okay. I'm going to say I agree with you. I don't think that there's a coherent strategy. What I do think is that this administration is intensely competitive with China in technology economy and national security.
>> Yeah. So I and I think those are the things that are driving the type of actions that I'm talking about. So you're right. It's not an overarching strategy, but it nonetheless can get us to a place that I think is better than the one that you are envisioning. But
>> I just want all of our Liz's good listeners and watchers, she has the last word on this. I'm going to be very gracious and just we'll move on now.
>> Okay. So let's let's backtrack just a little bit. um because one of the things that you have I think really um architected is not a word. So let us just say that you have created um over the past couple of decades is this approach to the region of focusing on our allies and partners um as opposed to the G2 notion um and just thinking that the the country that we need to deal with first and foremost is China. Right? You have been very much about working with our allies and partners first. That's most important. So did that come out of your first Pentagon experience as you were describing it? you know, you were looking and working with Indonesia, you were seeing all the Vietnam, all these other countries in addition to China or how did you come to that sort of thought about working with allies and partners, creating this kind of network um not even just hug hub and spoke beyond that I think in certainly in the Biden administration um but encouraging our allies and partners then to form their own um sort of a lattice as somebody I think maybe it was >> Ram, right? um lattice uh sort of effect. How did you come to that? Where where did that come from that idea?
>> Well, look, a lot of it evolved over time. Um the if you work at the Pentagon on Asia, then you spend most of your time nurturing allies and partners. And that is hard work. It's often very narrow work on like what altitude do helicopters fly. And so it's very practical and very operational and you develop deep ties with your counterparts. I I was able to see I think in the 90s a very different quality of interaction between our allies and partners and the kinds of interactions I had with my Chinese friends. And I I I have always been struck that even during periods when we were working more closely together, we had almost no habits of cooperation. And at the very core of almost all of my Chinese interlocators approaches was just a deep abiding profound suspicion of the United States. And it was hard to break through with that. And I think part of that was ideological and part of it was systemic. But I think I realized pretty early on certainly after what happened in the Taiwan Straits crisis when China launched this massive military modernization program which has reached heights that no one imagined in the early to mid 1990s. But I would say I believed that we would be facing a country that did not share our values and our interests and that would be more competitive with us. And I think I probably like many underestimated how quickly and how rapid and how sustained that uh effort would be. But the the truth it really coalesced around the leadership of Xiinping in which most of those approaches were no longer um uh shadowed. They were very much out in the open. I I also observed um in both of our administrations an approach to policym in Asia in Asia that I think undermined or did not pay heed to the interests of other nations in the region and some of that was almost on the verge of disrespectful and the idea was the only thing that really mattered was sitting in the stuffed chairs next to the Chinese and talking about the French Revolution and that other diplomacy and engagement was secondary and not in our interest perhaps. And so I I thought it was you know both a misreading of China's interests but also misunderstanding of the import of working more closely with allies and partners. And I would say the people that originally formed that school, it was a very small school of, you know, kind of strategic thinkers and many of them were more operational than they were strategic. Rich Armitage is is often thought of as one of the fathers of this school. But at the same time, I will just say we were in a very small minority and looked down upon by those that would say, look, you know, what's important is, you know, functioning and getting things right between Washington and Beijing. I I tried not to diminish that because I think it's very important and I did a lot of Chinese diplomacy, but I wanted it in a larger context. I also think it became increasingly clear, Liz, unlike previous challenges that we have faced in the Second World War and First World War, Vietnam, we had the wherewithal technologically and military to stand up to any potential challenger. We were the giant on the sidelines that, you know, would enter the fight. That is no longer the case. And and I would argue that over the course of the last 10 years, it becomes increasingly clear that if we want to have an effective global strategy, we have to do it with allies and partners. And that means with respect to technology, procurement, you know, planning and the like. And here I would say that every administration, including the one I served in, has not gone nearly far enough in terms of the kinds of relationships that we will need. There is still a substantial amount of paternalism and you know kind of imbalance in roles and responsibilities, dialogue, consultation even with our closest allies and partners. It will it will take a sea changed of sustained bipartisan effort to really build the kind of integrated coalition of allies and partners all of whom also should be seeking to build ties and engagements with Beijing. My own view and I realize that this is controversial is that the best way to have a good relationship with China is to engage them from a perspective of strength. Now I the reason why I'm probably more wary of this summit than you are is I think the Chinese have sized this up right now. Um they see that when we made the clarion call for support from our allies and partners uh in uh Iran in the Persian Gulf just just you know kind of echoing silence. They know that we're largely alone and have alienated and many of those countries are trying to carefully rebuild relations with Beijing. And so it is for me inescapable that the Chinese read that. And so that concerns me and my hope will be that over time we will realize that some of these partnerships like India like Vietnam that are really struggling right now again are reintegrated into a international global strategy that is multifaceted. But I will say it will not be easy. It will require a major shift in our own perspectives. uh and it will take a bipartisan com commitment that you know to date we've shown some evidence of but it turns out that under just a little bit of pressure it can evaporate pretty quickly.
>> Yeah. I mean, I I don't disagree with you on the importance of working with allies and partners and that we're going to need to rebuild um the very fabric of our relations certainly with our European partners and allies and even with our Asian partners and allies who I think are have a greater forbearance for the Trump administration than our European uh partners and allies do. I I'll just offer again, maybe I'm the glass half full in this sense and you're the glass half empty, that I I think it's one thing to say that Washington is losing credibility or has lost some credibility. It's another thing to say that China can effectively capitalize on that. And I'm not yet convinced that China has managed to step into the vacuum that's been left by some of the retreat that we've seen from the this administration in terms of leadership on the global stage.
>> And Liz, that is one of your most important strategic contributions. I would completely agree with that and I would go further actually. First of all, it's not clear that she they want to step into that vacuum. in some areas they um they may be more hesitant. We'll see how that plays out in the Middle East. Secondly, I agree with you. I'm not sure they know how to exactly. It's hard for them to appeal to countries that have very different systems of government. But the third, you know, reason is also important. We have both talked at length. There's no country we, you know, we have all these beliefs and things that we talk about with China, longterm patience and like the truth is I've rarely dealt with a country that is more impatient and takes steps often um you know that oversteps in a in strategic circumstances and I fully expect that they will do that in the next couple of years. I think it will be hard for them to avoid stepping uh to take advantage of what they see are targets of opportunity.
>> Right. But when they do that, those steps may be missteps as well.
>> Totally. And and they and they tend to motivate and and catalyze >> um engagement between allies and partners. And so my own sense is that this strategy that we're talking about that grew in the '90s >> and then really found um re really became more dominant once Xiinping came to power and he stated so clearly ambitions and technology and pressed his advantages in the South China Sea and a variety of other places. I think that is when this, you know, grouping became more dominant.
>> So, let's let's just sort of wrap up a little bit by talking about the next administration and what needs to happen. You said a little bit about rebuilding relationships and changing the dynamic between the United States and our partners and allies. What does that look like? What does a a a different dynamic look like? what is the role of US leadership um both with our partners and our allies but I think more just on the global stage who are we um do you think
>> well Liz like you got a lot of questions there and it's really hard look I I am going to say that I don't think people fully uh appreciate how difficult it's going to be in you know three or four years I if a Democrat would happen to win or a more internationalist republic Repan the the drama of rebuilding those partnerships is going to be real and and I I wouldn't even say rebuilding because it does suggest a kind of going back when in fact we're just going to have to go forward and it's very it's going to be very different. I think some of the unique leadership roles that the United United States plays in certain leadership in certain international organizations won't have that same proclivity to give the United States, you know, kind of pride of place. I think you're going to see in other areas countries taking initiative without coordinating as much with the United States. I think those things can be healthy. I don't think they're necessarily bad. I I think the harder question is what is the global system going to look like in three or four years and there are a number of theories. One theory is that it will be more like spheres of influence. Um another would be that the world will just slink more towards disorder and disunityity. A third it it a world in which China is more dominant. Um, but I I think all of those world worlds carry with it some very substantial downsides. And the interesting thing about this period is the countries that have the most sway unlike during the cold war are the medium powers and they have the ability to maneuver on the global stage and they do they create their own connections there.
>> And who are you defining as medium power? Because I know Japan does not like to be called a medium power.
>> I'm sorry. a middle power maybe. Um I I don't I don't want to get into a >> leading um countries Japan, >> Germany.
>> Okay. Okay.
>> Um other countries in Europe, Australia, >> okay, >> uh Canada, these are countries that are kind of global swing states. I think it's going to turn out that most of those countries are going to look at the world and realize that the best option among other bad options is try to rebuild a certain kind of relationship with the United States. But that relationship is going to be very different than the kinds of relations that we had in the past which were built on a deep reservoir of trust and confidence. And I don't believe we will be able to resurrect that anytime soon. And so I hate like like not very good metaphors, but it will be a little bit like a loveless marriage. Like we will have a house, we'll figure out who mows the lawn, who does. No, but but but it would be better than that than just be thrust out on the street with no place to stay. We we are going to have to start from that, Liz. And like I I am struck. You don't live in Washington, but this is what it's like. Don't >> when when you when when visiting leaders come or groups, they spend much of their time initially figuring out what gift they're going to bring, what you know, like at Pacific Islanders with thatched, you know, with with fruit that they lay before the volcano. So they consult about that and you know we talk about that but then after those meetings they come and they are very pointed and critical about how they feel about the United States and that's how they're going to talk to the next administration because they're not going to be as fearful of retribution as they are now. like like if you're chancellor of Germany and you say one thing about the Iranians humiliated the United
States and that causes 5,000 troops to be pulled out. It's not a lesson that's lost on folks. But what will also happen is that these very well-meaning folks that really want to rebuild relations with Europe are going to have to sit through hours, weeks, months, years of reminders about how unreliable and difficult it is. And that will be in some ways counterproductive and difficult for well-meaning folks trying to rebuild.
I I I still at the base though I have confidence in the alliance and partnership structures and I think there are a variety of reasons why they sustain and that the momentum goes forward. The most important of which are that these mechanisms that you described that are taking place beneath the surface, military engagements and the like continue on. They're not as affected by some of the stuff from on high and that gives that should give us confidence. The true deep state is the military stuff which which we have seen and so I'm hopeful of that.
But I will tell you the task of marshalling and building that is going to be unbelievably difficult. It will be unlike anything that the United States has seen ever. Some people will say well it'll be like at the end of the Second World War. No, it will it will be much more difficult and the circumstances internationally much more challenging. No, we were the good guys at the end of the Second World War. Now we're not sure what we are.
But it sounds to me like we're going to be looking for someone like you to come back into the next administration to help forge uh that. But but can I also say Liz, one of the things that's most important and that I I take very seriously is that the most important that thing that you and I have done is help train, recruit and prepare um the next generation of people to be in foreign policy and national security. And I grew up in the Democratic Party and I watched a series of senior people that were reluctant to yield and wanted to continue on in leadership roles long into their successful lives. And you have to know when it's time. And I will do everything I can to support, you know, if I I do believe we need an internationalist president that can recapture elements of what America has stood for. And I will do everything to support that. But the most important thing from my perspective is to train, inspire, identify, and support a group of people that are prepared to serve in the next wave.
And so for me, um, one of the hardest things about how I felt, you were asking about my earlier career, I don't mind saying there were periods where I felt very much alone in even in my own administrations. I felt like I had to kind of be careful about my real world views. I was probably harderheaded, probably a little bit more skeptical of certain things and more focused on this allied stuff. And when you engage with your partners, you know, in other parts of government that were really focused on let's let's have a good meeting with the Chinese, it it could be complicated. And so I've always tried to figure out and identify who are the people that are up and coming that really understand like some of the challenges and opportunities and and are well-versed in the various things that are important for grasping how to think about Asia.
Just if I just two last things I so what I'm a little older than you and so most of the people that I worked with in foreign policy national security were touched by Vietnam and it really affected and it and it drove a wedge through our party and it and it had real consequences for our confidence as Democrats and for issues associated with with use of force and and and and that is challenging. Um I I think a new group of Democrats coming up share fewer of those kind of um historical scars. And I'm excited by that. I think that's a real possibility. Um I I I also would say that what is striking is that a lot of the people that now work on the Indopacific Asia are recent recruits, right? Because they understand like it's the Bonnie and Clyde, you rob the bank because that's where the money is. So they they they've often come to the Indoacific mostly with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I would just simply say and you know I welcome you know it's great that we've got more strategic thinkers and people who focus nothing prepares you less well for the nuances the subtlety the challenges of the Indoacific than the brutality and the very different set of capacities associated with 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Well, K, I think you've just made my case, which is that we still need you at the helm. Um, because really you have actually trained the next generation. But I think we're going to need some very strong leadership at the top even as we have young people ready to to take on important new roles in the next administration. But I think we're going to need somebody with your experience and your deft hand and your long relations throughout uh the Asia Pacific, throughout the Indoacific uh to to create whatever is going to come next. Um, because that is what you are so great at, right? Which is seeing the new vision and seeing the new future and and making it happen.
So, let me thank you uh for all your service uh to our country and let me thank you for taking the time uh to spend with me and and talk about your views and your thoughts about where we are today and where we're going to need to go in the future. Really a pleasure. It No, it's my pleasure, Liz. It's great to be with you. And let me just say um back at you. We want your role as well. It's great to see what you've done here at Stanford, the program and the work that you've done. I can't tell you how much I appreciate both our friendship and your scholarship, all the work that you've done. This has been a tremendous I just got off an airplane, but it's been a tremendous morning here at Stanford. Thank you very much. Thanks, Kurt.