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But why is it though that Israel would be the one or the only country then, uh, wanting to have this war with, uh, Iran? Because surely they're seeing the same thing we are seeing, and it would be a disaster for them if not only once back in June, they have to walk this whole war back after Iran showed that they could, well, essentially make the Israelis and the Americans back off. Uh, if, if this happens again, and even after a larger war where the Iranians are able to, to, well, dish out a lot of pain for the Americans as well, this wouldn't be great for, for Israel in, in any way. And also, it's not going to be possible for Israel to sit this one out. The Iranians, I think, have made it clear. They're not going to, uh, they're not going to pretend as if Iran, Israel is not part of this. So, given if this is a war which can't be controlled, uh, the US doesn't have this escalation dominance in terms of, you know, deciding when the war starts, when it ends, how the war should be fought, uh, why, why does Israel want this? Because surely US credibility and, uh, well, essentially Trump's ability to put maximum pressure and have countries bow to his will, all of these things are in Israel's interests. So why would they want to gamble all of this away at a loss, as a, at a war which has a, well, uncertain probability of succeeding?
Yeah, this is a great question, and I, I think this is one of the big puzzles of the day when it comes to Iran, and I've thought a lot about it. So, let me just tell you what my take on it is. Going back to the 12-day war, which you were talking about, and, uh, as you made clear, uh, the Israelis, uh, were very interested in ending the 12-day war. This is, uh, June 13th to June 25th. That's the 12-day war last year. And the Israelis were interested in ending that war because they were running out of defensive missiles, number one. And number two, the Iranians had become quite sophisticated at figuring out how to penetrate Israel's defenses, and they were really pounding Israel, which, as we all know, is a very small country and very vulnerable to ballistic missile attacks. So the Israelis pushed us, the United States, to end the war on June 25th.
Fast forward to January 14th of this year. In the morning of January 14th, I remember it very well, it looked like President Trump was going to attack, uh, Israel. Excuse me, he was going to attack Iran, uh, shortly. It looked like the, the bombers were loaded, so to speak. But what happened then was that President Trump decided not to attack. And one of the two reasons that he did not attack was Prime Minister Netanyahu asked him not to attack on January 14th because he felt, this is Prime Minister Netanyahu, that Israel was not in a position to defend itself.
Fast forward to the present. Israel today is pushing the United States to attack. This is a different approach than we saw on January 14th, and it's different from what we saw at the end of the 12-day war. So the question is, what's happened to cause the Israelis to be so enthusiastic about an attack? Now, here's my take on that question. Uh, I think first of all, we have the United States has more defensive assets in the region, uh, and we can do a somewhat better job of protecting Israel, uh, than we could have done on, uh, January 14th, and that we could have done at the end of the 12-day war. So I think we are in a better position. We, the United States, uh, and Israel, we are in a better position to protect Israel from the ballistic missiles, but it's hardly a perfect situation. A lot of ballistic missiles are going to get through.
Now, why are the Israelis willing to accept that? Israel is profoundly committed to destroying Iran. It wants regime change, but what it really wants is to break Iran apart. Uh, it wants to do to Iran what has been done to Syria. It views Iran as the principal threat or the principal potential threat in the region, and it really wants to wreck it. And the Israelis, I believe, understand that the window for doing that is closing. First of all, the Chinese and the Russians are moving in to help the Iranians in a big way. And if you study geopolitics 101, you know that over time, the Chinese especially, but the Russians also will do more and more to help Iran. Furthermore, Iran has figured out that ballistic missiles are the magic weapon for them. They're going to develop more ballistic missiles. They're going to develop hypersonic ballistic missiles that are first class. They're going to be able to really blast Israel in a future war. They can damage Israel significantly now, but it only gets worse with time. So, this is a window, right? If you're going to get Iran, if you're going to affect regime change with American military power and Israeli military power, now is your only chance.
Now, you might say, Glenn, that's true, John, but it doesn't look like this is going to work. Uh, it's a very risky strategy. My view is that states pursue very risky, if not extremely risky, military strategies if the political forces that are pushing them to contemplate war are really powerful. And I think the Israelis view Iran as an existential threat, and they believe that it is absolutely imperative that they deal with this existential threat as soon as possible because, again, the window is closing. So, I believe that the Israelis have decided, even though things have not changed that much since January 14th, they've changed enough that we have to pursue this extremely risky strategy. And that tells you, by the way, Glenn, that the Israelis will be pushing us not to launch a limited strike for Israel to get what it wants, but for Israel to get us to wreck Iran. And you understand that's what they want. They want us to wreck Iran. They want regime change plus break up the country. We have to really launch a massive attack. And that massive attack is going to have to extend out over not days, but weeks. And again, to go back to General Kaine, what he is saying is we don't have that capability. But the Israelis, I believe, think that once we get into the war and once it begins to escalate, we will have no choice but to continue the war. It'll be analogous to what you see in Ukraine. Once you get into these big fights, they're hard to get out. And the Israelis want to get us into the fight.
If President Trump says the last thing I want is a forever war, this is clear that President Trump does not want a forever war. That's not the Israeli view. The Israeli view is if you don't defeat them decisively in the early stages of the war and it turns into a forever war for the United States, that's ideal from Israel's point of view as an alternative to a quick and decisive victory because the United States remains committed in that forever war to destroying Iran, and eventually the United States will do that. So I think the Israelis, right, have become very enthusiastic about a war, even though they understand Israel will be slammed, because there's a window of opportunity here, number one, and number two, you'll get the United States to do the heavy lifting, and the United States will ultimately prevail.
Well, let me ask a last question. Um, 'cause I'm glad you brought up China and Russia, as you and Steven Walt, you wrote, you've written about, um, the US being an offshore balancer, and, uh, I was thinking along these lines, that there is an interest for the United States to maintain a balance of power on the Eurasian continent, that is, uh, for the Eurasian powers to balance each other. And a key concern is often if the US establishes a very heavy presence on the Eurasian continent, that this will then incentivize the Eurasian powers to balance the US and any hegemonic ambitions, as opposed to balancing each other. This would exhaust the United States while having this collective balancing. Now, from this perspective, it would be the interest of the US to have a, to reduce its role, presence a bit more so it can pull back, you know, lick its wounds, restore its strength, deal with the debt issue, build up its military capabilities. Uh, and this kind of the idea why the US shouldn't push Russia into the arms of China. Removes this key balance. But now, all of this is also pushing Iran into this, uh, China-Russia informal alliance, which must be, well, strategically a nightmare for, for the United States. Do you see any indications that the US wants to, well, that it recognizes or, or wants to avoid such a Eurasian, uh, I guess alliance, or, or does the US think it can knock out Iran, and this is how it prevents the balancing?
Well, the United States is in a position today where it's basically interested in taking on the world. Uh, I mean, let's just talk about Russia, China, and the United States. As I've said on countless occasions, it's in America's interest to have good relations with the Russians. Uh, it's in America's interest to shut down the Ukraine war. In fact, it was in America's interest to never start the Ukraine war. But once it was started, the United States has a vested interest in putting an end to it. Why is that the case? Uh, because the Ukraine war has resulted in, number one, the Americans being pinned down in Eastern Europe and giving huge numbers of armaments to the Ukrainians that it should keep in its inventory for dealing with China and other, uh, contingencies. Uh, and then second, we've driven the Russians into the arms of the Chinese, which is a violation of balance of power politics 101. The United States and Russia should have friendly relations because the United States is mainly interested in containing China and East Asia. China is the peer competitor, not Russia. So if you look at how we have behaved, uh, on the world stage since we moved into multipolarity, um, it's quite clear that our, uh, behavior visa v the Chinese and the Russians just makes no sense.
Now you take it down another level and you bring the Iranians in, uh, and I think what you say is exactly right. Not only are we pinned down in Ukraine now, but because of the Middle East and because of Israel, we're pinned down in, uh, the Middle East. Can you imagine what's going to happen if we get involved in a forever war against Iran? Uh, what that means for our ability to pivot to East Asia? Just think about all those naval and air assets that we have dedicated to the Middle East today, as we speak. It's truly amazing. And those assets cannot be used in East Asia. Uh, it's just not in our interest. And, and then, as you point out, we've driven the Iranians, the Chinese, and the Russians together. Uh, and you can add the North Koreans to the mix, right? You see the North Koreans fighting with the Russians, uh, against Ukraine. Uh, you see, uh, North Korea having good relations with Russia and China, and not at all with the United States. We can't get to first base with the North Koreans. So you have this situation, u, going back to the Middle East, where as we move forward, the Chinese and the Russians are going to have a vested interest in keeping us, uh, pinned down in the Middle East so that we can't pivot to Asia, and furthermore, working with the Iranians to make sure that Iran remains, uh, a bow war against the United States and against Israel. This is not in our interest. We should have good relations with Iran. As you said earlier in the program, Iran is basically not a threat to the United States. That's correct. We should have good relations with the Iranians. We should be working, uh, hard to have some sort of reproach bomb with them, and at the same time, making sure they don't get nuclear weapons, which I think is doable. Uh, but we have exactly the opposite approach, and the end result is that the United States is in deep trouble on the foreign policy front, whether you look just at the three great powers, China, Russia, and the United States, or whether you go down another level and bring in countries like Iran and North Korea and Israel, uh, and other countries in the Gulf as well.
Can extend on this logic, I guess, if you also look towards how the United States is encouraging India to reduce its ties and economic connectivity with Iran, be it energy or this transportation corridor. All this does would make makes Iran Iran more dependent on China, which strengthens China, and it weakens India, which makes it less capable of balancing China. So a lot of these policies, it doesn't seem to make much sense if it would seem through the prism of, um, adjusting to a multipolar distribution of power. But, uh, I, I guess, yeah, that's another big box to open. And I, I know you have a flight to catch this morning. So, I thank you as always for being so generous with your time and, uh, yeah, sharing your ideas and thoughts on, um, this possible war coming up with Iran.