Transcription
President Trump continues to drift around, trying to find desperately any way to get out of this war with Iran. He's trying to sound tough. He's trying to use military strikes. He's trying to use threats. But so far, none of it is working. And in fact, most of it seems to be backfiring.
And as we try to figure out where President Trump even can go, how can he get out of this? I think it's really instrumental and helpful to really kind of break this down, this whole war into different pieces. It's not just the war, but when you understand some of the component elements, things come into a little bit more clarity. And I think you're going to really, uh, enjoy what you're about to see. And we have back with us, uh, one of our favorite guests here, Professor John Mirshimer, international relations theorist, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, and dare I say it, sage on foreign policy stuff. And you're about to see why I say that. Uh, professor, welcome back to the show. As always.
>> I'm glad to be here, Danny, to try and figure out what's going on in the world.
>> Yeah, that's that's why we love to have you on here because you do have, you have a vision and a lens to see things that just not very many people do. And that's that's so helpful when you're trying to figure out first of all what's going on and then secondly, how we can get somewhere good. Let's, let's take a look at first of all, you, you have said in recent days, uh, you're kind of breaking this down into three different pieces, not one, but three. First was the first 40 days, then was a blockade, and then where we are now. Can you start first of all with the, what you think with the first part, which was the air war?
>> Yeah. I think the way to think about this is to focus first on the air war, then on the blockade, and then on what I would call the tit-for-tat attacks, of which there have been three. So, let me just sort of walk, uh, you through this. Uh, the war started on February 28th, and from February 28th to about April 8th, uh, this is the 40-day war. It was a bombing campaign. It was a strategic bombing campaign, uh, where the United States and Israel together hit targets in Iran, uh, and did extensive damage inside of Iran. That stopped on April 8th, in good part because it wasn't working, but also because we were, uh, running low on ammunition. Uh, then on April 13th, we transitioned to the blockade. That's when President Trump put the blockade against Iran into place. And then on June 17th, when the memorandum of agreement was signed, uh, or the memorandum of understanding was signed, uh, the blockade ended. So, just to think again about the big picture here. Um, February 28th to, uh, April 8th is the, uh, is the air war, and then, uh, what happens is from April 13th until June 17th, you have the blockade. And what happens on June 17th, when we sign the memorandum of understanding, is that the blockade ends because the blockade wasn't working. The blockade was not bringing the Iranians to their knees any more than the air war did. So, it's very important to understand that the reason President Trump signed the memorandum of understanding on June 17th is because the air war and the blockade had not worked, and we had no more cards to play. And this is why I think you could call the memorandum of understanding a surrender document.
Okay. Now we are in a phase where we have these tit-for-tat attacks, and actually, what you've seen over the past week, this is from June 7th, July 7th to July 9th, that's from Tuesday to Thursday of this week, you saw three tit-for-tat attacks, one on the 7th, one on the 8th, and one on the 9th. It's very important to understand that this is the third set of tit-for-tat attacks, right? What's happening or what has just happened over the past few days is actually nothing new. The first tit-for-tat attacks were between June 9th and June 11th, just before the memorandum of understanding was signed. And that's when the Iranians shot down an Apache helicopter. And we had two sets of tit-for-tat attacks. June, uh, 9th to June 11th. The second set of tit-for-tat attacks was Jul, was, uh, June 26th to June 28th. This is right after the memorandum of understanding was signed. And again, we had two sets of tit-for-tat attacks. And those tit-for-tat attacks, the June 26th to June 28th ones, involved the United States facilitating the movement of tankers through the Omani channel in the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians said that's unacceptable. They attacked a tanker, and that's what led to the June 26th, 28th set of attacks. What happened here is on July 6th, this is Monday, uh, the Iranians again attacked, uh, in this case, three tankers in the, uh, Omani channel in the Strait, and this led to three sets of tit-for-tat attacks. So Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, you had separate tit-for-tat attacks. So, basically, that's the big picture. We've put the air war behind us. We've given up on the, on, on the blockade, at least so far, and we've moved to a world where we have tit-for-tat attacks. And the two tit-for-tat sets of attacks that have occurred since the memorandum of understanding both involve ships going through the Omani channel in the Strait of Hormuz. And just to finish here, in both cases, the attacks stopped after a few days, and we're in a sense back to square one. And so, actually, we may not be in back to square one. We may be behind square one. Maybe square zero. Uh, because since these tit-for-tats have happened, let me see if I can pull the right one up here. Uh, where'd it go? I think this is the right one. Nope. That's not the right one. Sorry. Oh, this is right here. Uh, you see that the, uh, traceable vessels through the US corridor and the Omani lane. This is as of this morning. You see, have effectively ground to a halt. So even the tit-for-tat stuff, you talked about how the air war didn't work, the blockade didn't work. Well, now the tit-for-tat stuff is not working because Iran maintains control. So the only thing passing through is through the northern corridor that the Iranians have done through their territorial waters, and they have effectively shut down here.
Where does Trump go now?
>> I mean, I've long argued, as you know, that Trump has no choice but to implement the memo of understanding. Uh, I, I, I don't know what the war-winning victory is, a war-winning strategy is here. As I like to say, please tell me what Trump's theory of victory is. Again, the air war didn't work, and the last thing we want to do is go back to, you know, to restarting the air war, right? I guess you could do the blockade again, but it didn't work last time. What makes you think it's going to work this time? Uh, and furthermore, the tit-for-tat attacks don't work. Danny, let me say a word about the tit-for-tat attacks. Uh, as I said, uh, there are two previous sets of tit-for-tat attacks. One before the memorandum of understanding, that was the June 9th to June 11th, and then two of them after, uh, the June 17th memorandum of understanding is signed. And the first one, of course, is June 26th to June 28th. And then we have the recent one. Uh, you get a lot of coverage of the US attacks on Iran. You'll see film footage, and Central Command will talk about all the damage that we have done to Iran and so forth and so on. But we never hear anything about what Iran does to US bases in places like Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Qatar, right? These appear to be the four targets that we, that the Iranians went after this past week. We just don't know. And as we know from other examples of, uh, Western reporting on the effectiveness of Iranian attacks, at first, hardly anything is said, and the impression is given to all of us that the Iranians have not done much damage, that all the drones, all the missiles are shut down. And then a few weeks later, reports come out that the Iranians have either destroyed or badly damaged virtually every, uh, American military installation in the Gulf. And you see a similar situation with regard to Israel, by the way. Uh, you would get the impression reading the mainstream media, uh, when these attacks are taking place, that the Israelis and the Americans together are shooting down all the ballistic missiles that are aimed, uh, at Israel. But then you later find out that those missiles have been deadly effective. All of this is to say, Danny, when we talk about these tit-for-tat attacks that are taking place, like the ones that we have seen over the past three days, my surmise is that the Iranians are doing a lot of damage. It's not just the Americans who are pounding Iran. It's the Iranians who are pounding the Americans. So these tit-for-tat attacks, I do not believe give the United States any coercive leverage. I just don't see again what the theory of victory is here. Uh, and by the way, we've played this three times now. As I said to you, there are three sets of tit-for-tat attacks, and it hasn't given us any leverage that I can see in any one of the three cases. So this is why I said we were back to square one, with, of course, your qualification added on.
>> And, and let's look at one of the context of this tit-for-tat part here too. If the intent from the United States side is to coerce Iran into submission to, I don't know what, because it's not enumerated, but it's apparently trying to force them into doing something here, that seems to have, uh, gotten more complicated because of the Supreme Leader funeral procession, because it was tremendously, uh, popular among the people in both Iran and Iraq, as millions came to each of these locations. Um, and then there was, uh, we see this here, that there has been a tremendous desire for revenge against Trump for assassinating their Supreme Leader. Now, we, uh, hopefully, we'll have later on this afternoon, if we can get this signal to work, uh, Sullean Akmed, uh, who was a Western journalist based out of the UK, was, as far as we know, the only Western journalist that was allowed to go with all of the stops that throughout this whole procession, all the way through to the final resting place. And he said he was interviewing people at each of the locations. And he said one thing that really stood out to him was the two different things. One was the, as you see there, from this hatred of President Trump for what he did, because they now recognize, and now view the Supreme Leader, who was a divisive figure among many in Iran, now is almost being synonymous with the nation of Iran, with their culture. Ergo, they did that to us, to me, is how he said they were. So there's a lot of anger on that. That has another ramification that you might not, or that some might not have thought about, is that now there's pressure from the people on the government not to have any kind of a compromise with the West. They were apparently unhappy that they signed the MOU in the first place. And the thing that really stood out to me, and I'd like your view on this, is that the Sullean told me that the thing that surprised him the most was in the first stop in Tehran, when President Poses came out to say something, he got booed, booed by the Iranian people, because he was too much on the, let's have a deal with the American side, and they don't want a deal with the American side. What do you make of that?
>> Well, the same thing happened to Archi, the foreign minister. Uh, and they had to pull both of them out before they were physically attacked. Uh, as we know full well, Danny, there were lots of people inside of Iran, and some of them were very powerful people, who were unhappy with the memorandum of understanding. They thought that Iran should have played hardball, uh, and not agreed to sign it. That Iran actually had a lot more leverage, uh, than the Iranian negotiators understood, and they were foolish to sign that agreement. And furthermore, you can't trust the United States anyway. And if you look at what's happened, Danny, I think the hardliners have been proved correct. I mean, I think this is the problem that people like Arabi, uh, and, uh, Galibbuff, and others face. Uh, they thought that the negotiations would be fruitful, uh, and that has not happened at all. You want to remember here that there are sort of three big problems from the Iranian point of view in terms of the West living up to the memorandum of understanding. What we have been talking about now is, um, the whole question of control of the Strait of Hormuz. And the issue here is that the United States thinks that some tankers or some ships can go through the Omani channel in the Strait. And the Iranians say that is absolutely unacceptable. And this is what the two tit-for-tats have been all about. The two tit-for-tats that have taken place since the memorandum of understanding was signed. It's all about the question of whether or not, uh, ships can go through the Omani channel. That's the issue. That's one big issue regarding the MOU. There are two other issues as well. One of them is that the United States has now said that it is not going to allow Iran to sell oil in world markets, and that was part of the memorandum of understanding. And you remember, as soon as the memorandum was signed, the Iranians were allowed, without penalty, to sell oil in world markets. The United States has now reneged on that element of the agreement. Furthermore, in the memorandum of understanding, this was the very first point, it was made clear that the Israelis had to cease and desist from their war against Hezbollah, and that, of course, meant getting out of southern Lebanon. And not only have the Israelis not gotten out of southern Lebanon, but they've continued their war against Hezbollah. So when you look at what's happening from an Iranian point of view, there are actually three elements in the memorandum of understanding where the Iranians believe that the United States has not lived up to its part of the bargain. And given that, coupled with the horrendous things that President Trump says about the Iranian leaders and the Iranian people, and given the fact that he's threatened to wipe them off the face of the earth, it's hard to see how you're going to get any cooperation in the near future from the Iranians that works to America's advantage. They have a powerful incentive to play hardball with us.
Uh, let's see. That is today. Looks like I had not seen that one. So that's President Trump. The Islamic Republic of Iran has asked us to continue talks. We have agreed to do so. Very, very kind of President Trump. But the United States has stated to them in no uncertain terms that the ceasefire is over. Thank you for your attention to this matter. That is one hour ago. So that, that less than an hour ago, that President Trump just said that. So, uh, we'll see how that's going to play into those hardliners that you're literally talking about right now. As we're, as we're basically speaking, Trump reinforces that the ceasefire is over, which may imply there's another tit-for-tat coming or another strike coming. Uh, what do you make of that?
>> Well, what good is it going to do? I mean, again, there is no theory of victory here. Nobody can explain how this has an ending that works to our advantage. We signed the memorandum of understanding on, uh, on June 17th, because it was the best deal we could get. Yes, it was basically a surrender document, but that's because we lost the war. We, we have no military option here. Doing more tit-for-tat doesn't solve anything. And furthermore, this is, I think, a very important part of the story, Danny, because the Iranians have been consumed with the funeral. They have not really said much about how they are going to respond to what President Trump has just done. In other words, I said before, the war in southern Lebanon has not ended. The Israelis have not pulled out. Uh, the Iranians are no longer able to sell oil on world markets, and the United States continues to insist that ships can go through the Omani channel. Okay. So if you're the Iranians, what do you do when you hear that? They're not going to cave. We know that they're going to play hardball. Are, are they going to really limit how much comes out of the Gulf? Are they going to shut the Gulf down altogether? Are they going to mine the Omani channel? Uh, what exactly are they going to do? It's very hard to say. And then what are we going to do in response? I don't think President Trump wants a situation where the, where the Gulf gets shut down again, or the number of ships coming out is reduced to single digits. That is not in America's interest at this point in time. It's certainly not in, in President Trump's political interest. But I'm not sure what he's thinking, because it's just very hard to understand what the administration is doing here. And furthermore, just one final point on this. This point by Trump that the Iranians have asked him, uh, to go back to negotiations and that he's kindly agreed to do that, is ludicrous. Right? There's no evidence of that. If anything, the, the Iranians are hinting, and I underline the word hinting, uh, that they're not interested in going back to negotiations at this time. And it looks like, uh, the Pakistanis and the Omanis are working overtime to change their mind on that. But the idea that they called up President Trump and said, "Please, uh, let's go back to negotiations," is, is kind of a laughable argument.
>> Yeah, it, it would be laughable if the, if the stakes weren't so much, because he said that literally the other day, too, that they're, they are begging me for for a negotiator. And then obviously, that was even during the, the ceremony when the Supreme Leader was being laid to rest in his final place. And I think it's pretty, uh, ridiculous to suggest that they did. Um, want to look at, you mentioned that there was some, some additional headwinds. You mentioned one about Lebanon. I think that there's an additional one I want to talk about on top of that. But since you brought it up, let's look at Lebanon, because this is from the Jerusalem Post this morning. Uh, this was in an op-ed. First of all, it says, withdrawal cannot be a gesture of faith. US-Israel must align on Lebanon, meaning that they must pull us to their side. But then you see that subhead there, that's not an opinion piece. That's what the Israeli Defense Minister, Israel Katz, said, "We did not ask anyone's permission to enter Lebanon, and we do not need anyone's permission to stay in Lebanon." Does that sound like that President Trump is in charge and that he's going to demand that they leave, because that's what he signed in the MOU? How do you see that?
>> Well, if the Iranians insist that they will not negotiate until the Israelis are out of southern Lebanon, the question is, what does President Trump do at that point in time? Let's assume, and we're just assuming here because we don't know exactly what the Iranians are going to do, but let's assume that the Iranians effectively shut down the Strait. Uh, that the number of ships going out is very small on a daily basis. Uh, and at the same time, they say they will not go back to negotiations. There'll be no negotiations until the Israelis are out of southern Lebanon. Then the question is, what is President Trump going to do? Uh, is he just going to say, "Okay, the status quo is fine, and we'll just continue like this"? Uh, I don't think so. I don't think he can do that. And I think he will go to great lengths to put pressure on the Israelis to get out. Now, whether he succeeds at that remains to be seen, but if he doesn't succeed, the question is, where does that leave the United States? And it leaves us in deep trouble. And, and, uh, it leaves us in deep trouble is the best way to put that. Uh, we have a quote here, a minute, I'm not sure if Gary, some he's scrambled to try to find it behind the scenes. I threw a curveball at him, uh, because Professor Morandi, who, who certainly you know well, uh, has, has addressed that very issue right there. If we can find it, I'm going to pull it up in just a second here. But in the meantime, let me go to what I said is the second issue here. Uh, and that is the issue with additional problems. And I'm looking at the wrong thing. Things got moved. There we go. Uh, that is Turkey. Uh, this is again from today's Jerusalem Post. As Iran fades, Turkey emerges as Israel's biggest strategic threat, a NATO ally. And they're of course upset right now because of the F-35s, but that's hardly the biggest issue. What can you tell us about this, uh, this growing conflict? And do you have concerns that it may literally supplant the Iranian problem for Israel?
>> Well, it's, in my opinion, hard to believe that the Israelis are now picking a fight with the Turks. You would think that they have their hands full in Gaza, on the West Bank, in Syria, and in Lebanon, not to mention Iran. In my opinion, they've suffered a humiliating, the Israelis suffer, have suffered a humiliating defeat in Iran. And you want to remember here, Danny, that the most important issue from the Israeli point of view has always been, uh, Iran's nuclear capability. And, uh, if we don't get negotiations going, uh, we're never going to get a nuclear deal, a new version of the JCPOA. Uh, and who knows what the Iranians will do on the nuclear front. So the, the Israelis have lost in Iran in a really serious way. And as we were just talking about earlier in the show, there's no way to rescue the situation, right? The best that you can hope for is a revised JCPOA. But you're not, it's not clear you're even going to get that at this point in time, given where we're going. So again, Iran, Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, and here they are putting their gun sights on Turkey and alienating the Turks. And furthermore, this has consequences for the US-Israeli relation. I mean, uh, the US, uh, Israeli relationship in the sense that President Trump was just in Istanbul, making it very clear that the principal reason he was there was because Erdogan, who he considers a good friend, and he talked about giving the Turks F-35s. So what Trump is trying to do is improve relations with Turkey, and at the same time, Netanyahu is picking a fight with Turkey, uh, which is going to put Trump in a terribly awkward position. And the question is, if you're Donald Trump, do you need that? And the answer is no. The Israelis won't cooperate on southern Lebanon. Uh, they won't cooperate on Gaza. They won't cooperate on the West Bank. They won't cooperate on Iran, and so forth and so on. And now you're picking a fight with Turkey, which is going to complicate Trump's diplomacy with Turkey. This is not good from Israel's point of view, but it's where Israel is at at this point in time.
>> Well, and let me, let me show you, let me complicate things a little bit more, or rather, illuminate the complications a little bit more, because this, this whole issue of, of primarily US, Israel, Iran, and the nuclear issue, and, and you have to include Lebanon in that, which you just did a second ago. All of those things are just a Gordian knot that it's just nearly impossible to undo. Let me show you how it's even more difficult than some may think. Uh, is that you said the issue with Lebanon is, is one of the primary issues. Well, here's how it is. The Iranian studies. This is Professor Morandi, uh, here, just a few days ago, explaining how important Lebanon is to even getting what President Trump wants. His whole thing has always been, it's the, the nuclear deal. They can't have nuclear weapons. That's his mantra, his, his objective here. Here's how complicated it is now. The Iranians have told the Omani government that they would like to work with them. They've had negotiations, but the Iranians have also said if Oman pulls back under duress from the United States, uh, Iran will do it alone. So Iran is not going to wait for Oman. The decision has been made in Iran that they will, for now on, control the Strait. They will take, uh, fees. The Iranians have been very clear to the Americans. There will be no nuclear deal if Lebanon is evacuated. If, if it is not evacuated, if the war does not end, there will be no nuclear negotiations if this does not take place. So that's really up to the Americans. And in addition to that, the Iranians can make life for the Americans much more difficult in the Strait of Hormuz. If the Americans refrain from carrying out their obligations elsewhere, then the Iranians will feel that they are not obliged to allow all that many ships to pass through. So there it is. That's the leverage that you talked about there at the end, but also the situation that, hey, there won't, we won't even talk to you about what you want, Mr. President, unless this issue with Lebanon gets done. Um, do you think that that's just bluster on the Iranian side?
>> I don't think it's just bluster. Uh, and there's all sorts of evidence that the Iranians have said that, uh, on the internet. And as you know, Danny, one of the big problems that we face is evaluating what's true and what's not true. And when you see reports that the Iranians have said what Professor Morandi said is their position, you're never completely sure whether it's true or not. My sense is that it is true that the Iranians have reached a point where they will not cut a deal on the nuclear issue. In fact, I think the Iranians will not continue to negotiate, period, until the Israelis are out of southern Lebanon. Uh, and there has to be some sort of agreement. Also, just to go back to the clip you played on the whole question of the Omani channel, uh, in, in the Gulf, I actually thought it was, uh, basically solved after the, uh, uh, the last tit-for-tat, not the one that just took place, the one that took place between June 26th and June 28th. Uh, I, I thought after that one was over with, we understood that the memorandum of understanding made it clear that Iraq controls the Strait and we can't ships that Iran, excuse me, controls the Strait and we can't send ships, uh, through.
>> That's what we signed.
>> That's what we signed. Yeah. If you look at Article 5, it seems clear to me that that's what we signed. And after the previous tit-for-tat, this is the June 26th to June 28th one, which was over this issue. It looked like once that tit-for-tat stopped, that we had resolved this issue, but then it started again because we sent more ships via the Omani channel, and they, of course, attacked the ships, and then we started the tit-for-tat. Uh, so you say to yourself, where are we now? Are we going to, in a week's time, send more ships or encourage more ships to go through the Omani channel, and then we're back to square one? Uh, and I think again, what's going to happen here, and maybe it has happened here, if Professor Morandi is correct, is that the Iranians have decided that you either respect, uh, the, uh, memorandum of understanding in all its dimensions, or if you don't, we don't agree to negotiate.
Now, here's, here's kind of where we are now, because you've laid out very clearly the, the three phases where we're at. And now, then the question is, where do we go from here? Because so far, I think it's pretty arguable that we definitely lost the air war. We definitely lost the, the blockade war, and we're losing the tit-for-tat war. I guess you, you can't say lost past tense yet, because that's kind of still where we are. But there are others who recognize that and they're saying, "Hey, you know, how about this? How's about we go back to war?" I know that sounds like a great idea. It didn't work the first time, but maybe this time it is. And that is led by General Keith Kellogg. There's a big rule in war about simplicity, and I'll make it really simple for you. I think what they ought to do right now, what I'd recommend to the president is, you take that 14-point and you throw it away, and you start to make the Iranians understand that we are not equals in this fight at all. Because what you just said, we've decimated their military forces. We are able to penetrate at will and say there's three demands we have. One is we're going to send the IAEA to get the enriched uranium and the centrifuges with American support, with no restrictions at all. Number two, we're going to open up the Strait of Hormuz. And if you attack it, we'll attack back. And if you damage any ships, we're going to take the fungible reserves that you have in place, which are in the billions, and pay those shipping companies the cost of either losing a ship or getting damage to a ship. And the third, you're going to lay off your neighbors.
>> Yeah. So, basically, uh, you lost, and we're going to do, you're going to do what we tell you, and we're just going to pretend like the first 40 days didn't happen, I guess. Now, I'll tell you, John, you may say, "Well, that's just this lunatic guy. He's been saying non-stop nonsense from the beginning, and no one's going to actually listen to him." But then, just before we came on the air here, Gary passed this on to me. It's like, "Oh, snap. The USS Abraham Lincoln is reentering the Gulf of Oman, just 250 kilometers off Iran's, uh, Chabahar coast and within, oddly, within missile range." Uh, what do you make of, of what, uh, he said, what the general said, and what this, uh, news shows?
>> Well, the, what people like the general, General Kellogg, never spell out is how things have changed since the 40-day air war in ways that are going to allow us to achieve victory now when we were unable to achieve victory then. I mean, again, you always want to ask yourself, and I don't have to tell you this, but you always have to ask yourself, what's your theory of victory? You know, how do you produce the objectives that you care about? How do you bring this war to an end on favorable terms? And how does air power alone do that for you? You know, we tried it for 40 days, and it didn't work. And he doesn't say anything about that. I mean, there are all sorts of dimensions that have to be addressed here. It's very clear that we ran down our inventory of critically important weapons, uh, things like Tomahawks, things like Patriots, and so forth and so on. Uh, and, uh, uh, and one of the reasons we stopped after 40 days is that we didn't have an endless inventory of weapons. Uh, and, you know, we just told the Japanese that we're not going to be able to deliver all the Tomahawks we promised them on time, uh, because we're really hurting when it comes to Tomahawk cruise missiles. This tells you something. So he, he's talking about, you know, going back at it again. Do we have the weaponry to do that? And how does this affect the overall inventory? Second question is, you know, he talks about the fact that we've decimated Iran's, uh, capabilities, their military capabilities, but almost everybody knows that that's not true. And,
>> Yes, I mean, hasn't he noticed that we've been engaged in tit-for-tat?
>> Right? Tit-for-tat in my head means you hit, they hit. And if they hit, that means they have missiles to hit us with. And I think everybody understands that if we go after critical infrastructure, uh, inside of Iran, which is consistent with what General Kellogg is advocating, they're going to strike at critical infrastructure in the Gulf. And that is going to have devastating consequences not only for the Gulf but for the world economy, and probably the Red Sea will get shut down as well as the Gulf. Uh, the fact is that the Iranians have a second-strike capability, and if you go up the escalation ladder, it looks to me like the Iranians win, not us. And again, that's one of the reasons, just one of the reasons, that we quit the air war after 40 days. And, you know, just to go to the blockade and marry the blockade to the air war, both of those campaigns, the air campaign and the naval campaign, were predicated on the assumption that you could punish Iran, and the Iranians would throw up their hands. It should be manifestally clear to General Kellogg at this point in time that Iran can absorb enormous amounts of punishment, and, uh, we do not have the capability to bring them to their knees. It's just not going to happen. If they have to eat grass, they'll eat grass. Uh, they're not going to surrender. And, uh, uh, so I, I just find it hard to believe that people like him are making those kinds of arguments, but I don't find it hard to believe that they do it in a very superficial way because they can't unpack their, uh, their favorite strategy. They can't unpack how it works because they have no story to tell. They're, you know, basically purveying poppycock here.
>> Yeah, yeah, they are. Uh, but those words are landing in Tehran, and they, they don't, they don't have a neutral impact. You mentioned something about the, the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb, that is more poignant than some may realize. This was, uh, this was on July 8th. So this was two, two days ago. Uh, they said that in, if this was in response to one of the threats of President Trump had renewed about hitting infrastructure and desalination plans, oil infrastructure, which he called out by name. And they said, in future confrontations, this meaning potentially, and I like your interpretation of this, in future, if there is another tit-for-tat or some kind of bigger strike, that options such as withdrawing from the NPT, changing the nuclear doctrine, and closing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait along with the Strait of Hormuz will be under consideration. Do you think that that is just again rhetoric, or do you think they may actually do that, and will we risk it to find out?
>> No, I don't think, I think first of all, first of all, I think there is a possibility they would do that. I, I think it's, I think it's absolutely clear that if we were to really attack Iran full force with air power, they would do it. Uh, if we escalate the tit-for-tats, they might do it. Who knows for sure? I would bet that they won't, but, you know, you can't be sure. Uh, but the question is, is President Trump going to unleash the dogs and, uh, and, uh, assume that once he does that, uh, he's going to win in ways that he was unable to win in the 40-day war or with the blockade. I find it hard to believe that Trump will do that. I mean, sometimes I think Trump is irrational when I listen to him talk. And if you believe he's irrational, then he may do something as foolish as to attack Iran, uh, with air power again, like we did in the 40-day war. But I think in the final analysis, he will not do that. I think he and his advisors understand we have no war-winning strategy here. Um, and, uh, so I find it hard to,
>> Although, although I would, I would push back a little bit, because if they knew there was no war-winning strategy, I think if they were rational actors, they would already have taken the course off. And the fact that they haven't and are still talking about this stuff leads me to conclude or to fear they may not be rational actors and may do something serious like that. You think that's overblown?
>> No, I understand where you're coming from, but let me just push back a bit. You want to remember, there was an air war for 40 days, and that ended, right? Then there was a, uh, blockade, uh, that went from April 13th to June 17th, and that did not work either, and we signed the memorandum of understanding, right? And that was a surrender document. I think that the Iranians clearly won, uh, and they won on almost every point. They won on every point in that document. Uh, and the question is, what's happened since then? Trump has had a very difficult time swallowing the memorandum of understanding. And that's why you've had these two tit-for-tat operations. He's tried to test the memorandum of understanding. He's tried to, uh, see if he could get away with, uh, sending ships through the Omani channel in a strait, but he backed off on both occasions. He, he backed off after the June 26th, June 28th tit-for-tat, and he's backed off now. And he's saying that, in effect, that he wants to go back to negotiations. That's what he's in effect saying when he says the Iranians called them up and said it's time to restart, uh, negotiations again. Why is he saying that? He's saying that because he understands he has no military option. So I think Trump and the Americans, and a lot of this has to do with Israeli pressure, are just having a devil of a time accepting the memorandum of understanding which has signed.
>> And, and if I can, let me give you some graphic evidence of that pressure from the Israeli side. It's one thing if it's Jack Keane, if it's, uh, if it's General Kellogg, Mike Pompeo, who all in just the last couple of days have just been begging for to go back to war. It's one thing if it's those guys, but when it's Benjamin Netanyahu, and he's going to say how cool it is to join with the US military, but he says the job isn't finished. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hexith said the following: "The combination of the world's two strongest air forces is unprecedented and unbeatable. When the Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian regime look up, they see only two things on the sides of the aircraft: the Stars and Stripes of the United States and the Star of David of Israel. The Iranian axis is weaker than ever, while Israel is stronger than ever. That said, I must stress that the war has not yet ended. Alongside the old challenges, new ones are emerging. Some axes are collapsing while others are taking shape. We are mindful of this. We are prepared for every scenario."
So let's look at, uh, with the, the pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu too, because he's got his own domestic pressures to not acknowledge the MOU, to not get out of Lebanon, etc. Uh, and, and you see he's pushing back on President Trump. I mean, that's publicly, you can only imagine behind the scenes, and we've seen the results of that. How do you see that factor playing into what may happen next?
>> I think that he is a brilliant snake oil salesman. Uh, they just don't come any better than him. He's really terrific. Uh, you have to admire his ability, uh, to manipulate facts and logic, uh, to spin a story that, uh, looks favorable from Israel's point of view. Look, there's no pressure. There's no, no question that, um, that Netanyahu and, you know, the Israel lobby here in the United States are putting enormous pressure on President Trump to back away from the memorandum of understanding. There's no question about that. Uh, self is whether you think, you think Trump can afford to back away. Do you think Trump can allow the Strait to be shut down again? Um, and if you do away with the negotiations, can Trump and Netanyahu live with a situation where there's no nuclear deal? I mean, we haven't talked much about this, but what about the nuclear issue? If you don't have negotiations, right? If this MOU is not put in place and the negotiation process doesn't start, how do you deal with the nuclear issue? And don't the Iranians now have very powerful incentive to get nuclear weapons? I certainly think they do. I'm not saying they will, but there's certainly pressure there. That's why we want to get a revised JCPOA. But, uh, Trump is, you know, he's between a rock and a hard place here. Uh, if you look at the international economy, you look at the nuclear issue, and you look at our military capability, uh, to win this war, uh, he really has no choice but to operationalize the MOU and reach a deal. But of course, the Israelis don't want to do that. And the question is, who's going to win? You know, which side is going to prevail? And, uh, I think that in the end, Trump will have to, uh, lean on Netanyahu and the Israelis really hard to get them out of southern Lebanon. Uh, I don't think he's going to have much choice. And if he doesn't succeed at that, the damage that will be done to the international economy and that will be done to President Trump's political situation here in the United States will be great.
>> Well, uh, who, who can argue that? And yeah, I, I mean, the, the evidence is that he's not going to succeed, President Trump, to get Israel out of Lebanon. We'll see how that's going to play out. Uh, in the last bit of time we have with you here, I want to shift gears real quick to the other work, because lots going on there too. And I want to kind of get some of your views on this. First one here is Sergey Lavrov was talking about ending the war with, uh, in Ukraine. Now, as a brief setup here, President Trump, uh, just a couple of days ago, reiterated that he called Zelensky, got on the phone with Putin, and said they want to make a deal after speaking with both leaders. So he said, "Yeah, I think we're going to make this happen." Is what he said on one of the clips. But then here is what Sergey Lavrov is saying. Now, resolution, completely exhausted. He said, not fraying, not we're losing confidence, but completely exhausted. In that environment, what can be done with this, this situation?
>> Well, as you and I have said many times, this one's going to be settled on the battlefield. There's not going to be any negotiated settlement. I think that at some point, the, uh, uh, Ukrainians will quit the fight. Uh, the Russians will win on the battlefield. It will not be a decisive victory, and you'll get an armistice, and there'll be negotiations that underpin this armistice that takes place, or frozen conflict. Call it what you want, but you're not going to get a meaningful peace agreement, and you're going to have poisonous relations between the Russians on one side, and the Ukrainians and the West, probably to include the United States, on the other side, for as far as the eye can see. But, uh, the idea that you're going to get some sort of negotiated settlement where both sides live happily ever after is not going to happen. I find it hard to believe that Lavrov is now saying these things. Why the Russians ever trusted the Americans is beside me. They should have learned a long time ago that you can't trust the United States. Same thing is true with the Iranians. The Iranians don't trust the United States. Just look at what's happened with the memorandum of understanding. Uh, do you think that the United States, in its present state, is capable of, uh, negotiating and signing a deal and sticking to that deal? I don't think so. Uh, remember, it was President Trump who pulled out of the JCPOA, not the Iranians. U and, uh, with regard to the memorandum of understanding, it's the United States who's not lived up to its side of the deal. The Iranians, as we were talking about before, have lived up to their side of the deal. And if you look at Article 5, it makes it very clear that they control the Strait. And the Strait includes the, uh, Omani channel. Uh, so it's the Americans here who are playing games. And the West has played games with the Russians for a long, long time now. You and I know that very well. So this is hardly surprising to hear Lavrov saying it, although, as I said, uh, I'm surprised Lavrov waited this long.
>> Yeah.
>> You know, one of the things that that may have finally, because he's the consummate diplomat, and maybe that's the reason why he wanted to keep, you know, a door cracked open for, I don't know, a return to sanity.
Perhaps. But maybe one of the things that's pushing him in this direction is some developments inside of Ukraine. Now, I think that the last time you were on our show, we talked about this, but there is this new uh public relations campaign in Europe especially that the tide is turning, that actually uh the Russians have been stopped. Their forward momentum has been stopped and they're no longer advancing uh and the Ukraine side is doing more and better and things are going good. But if that was the case, then one would imagine that the recruiting capability is not going to be as much of a problem. And Gary's been showing you for a year when you've been on here about people being grabbed from the streets and thrown into vans and all this kind of stuff.
Well, in Lviv just a couple of days ago, that has advanced into now riots. Hundreds clashed. This is this is Ukrainian media now. This is not propaganda. Hundreds clash with military recruiters as Ukraine draft backlash grows. Violent mobilization clash in Lviv sparks official backlash. You can see huge numbers of people, not just the the family members or the girlfriend or the wife of the guy being tried to track, but now then they're coming out in mass and there was violence and you can see in that lefthand corner picture there that they were destroying some of the vehicles. I think a bus also got hit. Uh and then this this is what happened this morning. Let me see if I can show you this one here. Uh this was a uh an apology that some of the people who were riding were forced uh by the police to to make this video. Watch this. I don't know.
>> So, yeah. So, he's like, "No, no, they're fighting for us." You see all these guys. I mean, it looks like a lineup. You can imagine they're probably machine guns behind the the uh the screen there. But uh I I I'm thinking that's not going to be very effective to convince the population inside of Ukraine that no, this is fine. This is going on. You see even more of those.
But uh let me ask you that if if you're getting rights in the western part of Ukraine uh and and from my information here, they they were uh there the Ukraine side wasn't doing this kind of stuff in Western Europe because or Western Ukraine because they that was where they had the very pro Ukraine people that weren't there. They were getting a lot of this out of the eastern side on their side of the line of contact, but now it's going to the western side. What does that tell you?
>> I think your point about the fact that it is taking place in western Ukraine, not in central or eastern Ukraine, is a very important one. You would not expect this in western Ukraine because it's filled with ethnic Ukrainians who you would expect to be very nationalistic and very patriotic and therefore willing uh to commit to the fight. But look, Danny, you and I have been arguing for a long time that from uh from Ukraine's point of view, continuing this war makes absolutely no sense. You and I have argued for a long time that it would be in Ukraine's interest to shut this war down. And what the West is doing is it's using Ukraine as a battering ram to weaken Russia. And the West is not suffering any casualties. They're not Americans dying or Europeans dying, but it's Ukrainians who are dying in massive numbers and is in what is effectively not only a lost cause, right? But it's a situation where it's in their interest or it has been in their interest for a long time now to just shut this thing down and get the best possible deal. And of course, the longer it goes on, the deal that they're ultimately going to get looks worse and worse. This is Danny Davis and John Mir Sharmmer's argument for God knows how long.
>> Right? I think I think what's happening here is that a number a good number of Ukrainians have begun to figure this out that you know that peop you know a lot of people like to say that people with your views or my views are anti-Ukrainian right that we're pro-Russian and of course as we've talked about this is ludicrous right.
>> Uh this war from a Ukrainian point of view would have been never started. And certainly once it started they should have shut it down. This is what the Istanbul agreements were. The fact the Ukrainians walked away was crazy. And it should have been shut down after that. Certainly after the offensive uh the big of 2023 failed. But you know it's very hard to make that argument in the west and I think until recently it was very hard to make that argument in Ukraine. Um, but you know, just I I always like to talk about the Vietnam War, but if you go back to the Vietnam War, um, it starts in March 65, that's when we send the first combat troops. And on March 31st, 1968, March 31st, 1968, that's when LBJ says he's not going to run for another term. He's going to stop the bombing. And it's at that point quite clear that Johnson recognizes that we have lost. Okay. And then Nixon wins in the fall, November of ' 68. He comes into office in January 69. And he said he had a secret plan to end the war, which he did not have.
>> A secret not even known to himself.
>> Yes. And and not not only that, Danny, but Nixon and company were very slow to withdraw American forces at first because they actually wanted to win the war. They thought that maybe they could find a magic formula. Okay. Now what happens in terms of the American soldiers who were waging the war is that you see between 65 and 68 maybe early 69 people are willing soldiers are willing to fight and die in large numbers and they are not putting up any resistance at all. They're committed to the cause. But then after Johnson's famous speech March 31st, 1968, and then after Nixon comes into power and it's clear we have lost the war. Okay. Getting the American soldier to fight is a very difficult task. And we have all sorts of problems with fragging where enlisted men who think that officers who are too audacious are risking their lives for a lost cause are willing to throw hand grenades into their tents when they're sleeping at night. So what I'm saying to you is when you go into a war and you think there's a good chance you can win, you'll get a lot of support from the soldiers on the battlefield. They'll fight like wild dogs and you'll get people who are willing to serve. But once they see it's a lost cause and this is not working out, they don't want to be the last person to die in a lost cause.
>> Right?
>> That mentality really kicks in. And I think there's no question there's a huge propaganda campaign that's taking place here which is trying to cut against the view that Ukraine is going to lose this war. But I think more and more Ukrainians understand that that's not the case. That this is a lost war. And if this is a lost war, and you're the average Ukrainian citizen who's 21 or 25 years old, whatever, and they come around to put you in a uniform and send you to the front lines, you're not going to want to go. It's a very different situation between the June 4, 2023 offensive against the Russians where the Ukrainians are full of piss and vinegar and they think they're going to drive through Russian lines, cut to the Sea of Azop and so forth and so on. Then you can get people to volunteer. But if you look at what's been happening, right, it's analogous to what happened in Vietnam in 1969, certainly 197071. We had huge problems with our soldiers. Huge problems. Most people know nothing about this.
>> The relation >> you served during that time. So you you do have some knowledge.
>> Yeah. I mean I was not in Vietnam, but I knew exactly what was happening. Everybody who was in the American military was cognizant of the problems uh that we were having uh because people thought that we were in a war that was a lost cause and many Americans were dying. There are 58,000 names I think on the Vietnam wall in Washington DC and you didn't want to be one of those names.
>> Uh if you >> not the last one.
>> Yes, that's exactly right. So I I actually think what's happening here in Ukraine u is that people uh uh are beginning to understand. And by the way, Danny, just on this point, General Zillusi wrote an important op-ed in the Telegraph, the British newspaper, uh that basically said, "Don't believe these arguments that Russia is losing the war and we're going to win." I don't know if you've seen it.
>> Oh, well, no, I didn't see that one. You should you should make a point of looking at Zulus's uh uh oped and for the viewers who don't remember this Zulusi was previously the commanding Ukrainian general before General Sirki and uh they sent him to Britain uh Zilinski sent him to Britain to be Ukraine's ambassador to Britain but he is first and foremost a general and a former commander and he is not buying this argument. argument that uh uh that's being propagandized in the west and in Ukraine itself that the tide has turned and uh Ukraine is got the Russians on their back feet. And by the way, I I've got some some news from an insider source inside of Ukraine that says that Zulusi definitely does want to run for president and has was asked by the current uh regime, government, whatever, not to run. And he refused to to take their offer and apparently is going to run whenever that whenever that does happen. So, um we'll see what that happens, too.
Uh listen, I I know we're already at the end of the time. Do you have time for one more question or do you need to go?
>> Sure. No.
>> Okay. I do have time for one more question.
>> Okay, one more because and I think this is really important. You just talked about the the analogous to to the decline in the end of the Vietnam War and how the political leadership finally came to the recognition on the political side whereas clearly the soldiers and the people have come to that point. The political side still hasn't. We just had in the NATO summit in Ankura, you had uh Velimir Zalinski come back and you had President Trump sitting right there next to him and says, "Hey, how's about this? How's about we get this uh contract where we can make missiles and we'll build it right here in Ukraine and that will solve a lot of our problem. But as you know better than nearly anyone that if you sign that this morning, it's going to be like two to five years before the thing is even able to produce anything in the event that Russia doesn't blow it up in the meantime. But the fact that they're thinking about, hey, let's do something that's going to be years into the future here. Uh what does that tell you?
Look, it's very clear, Danny. When a country in the modern world gets into a war, it is very difficult, maybe I should say extremely difficult to get out. Just to go back to Vietnam, very important to understand what happened here. Kissinger and Nixon wanted to win the war. They wanted to stay in as long as we could and find a clever strategy that would allow us to defeat the North Vietnamese. Nixon gave the impression that he was going to get us out of there quickly, put an end to the war. But that did not happen. Think about Afghanistan. 20 years. And there were many people, especially in the American military, who did not want to get out, right? we'd still be there if uh if if Trump then Biden hadn't made the had not made the decision to get out, right? Uh, as you know, I if you're in the American military and you're at the top level, you don't want to be responsible for losing a war and you want to stay in for as long as you can and hope some sort of uh miracle happens and you win the war and you're constantly searching for ways to to win. And and by the way, this is exactly what you see happening with regard to Ukraine. You remember last year we were talking about the fact that it looked like Trump was withdrawing American support for uh for the Ukrainians and that the burden of supporting Ukraine was going to be shifted onto the shoulders of the Europeans and Trump was out of it and so forth and so on. But if you look at what happened at the G7 conference in France, this was in June, mid June, and you look at what just happened at the NATO summit, it's quite clear that Trump is back working with the Europeans and working with the Ukrainians to accelerate the drone war against Russia. It's really quite amazing. The if you look at the June 17th declaration after the G7 meeting, uh it was said explicitly that the G7 countries are going to continue to support and accelerate their efforts to help Ukraine wage the long range drone war. Accelerate, right? And if you look at what happened in the NATO meeting, it's basically the same thing. Trump is showing enthusiasm about what uh what the Ukrainians are doing, what Zilinski is doing, and saying we should help them. And of course, the CIA has been involved in this forever and ever. I mean, whatever Trump is doing, whichever direction he's blowing from day to day matters little because down below the deep state, and here we're talking about the CIA is up to its eyeballs in terms of helping uh Ukraine wage this drone war against Russia. And of course, this gets back to Lavrov. Why is Lavrov now saying you can't trust the Americans? It's because they now seem to fully realize maybe after the G7 meeting and the NATO meeting that the Americans and the Europeans, not just the Europeans, but the Americans and the Europeans and the Ukrainians uh are at war with Russia. You know, we're basically at war with Russia here. If you really think about it, we are helping to plan the drone attacks. That's quite clear. The CIA is deeply involved. And furthermore, we give them weaponry. Uh we're helping them develop their drone capability, their intelligence capabilities. And uh question you have to ask yourself, of course, and this is a subject for another day, is where all this leads. Because again, to get back to your original question, what you're basically saying is we don't seem to be giving up here. uh whether you're talking about Iran or whether you're talking about uh uh Russia, you know.
>> So, so in 30 seconds or less, do you think that eventually if we don't change, Russia will make good on its threat and attack military facilities and drone factories, etc. in Western Europe?
>> It depends on two things, Danny. How well suited the Russians are for developing the capability to uh limit the drone attacks. Can can they develop defenses uh that minimize the effect of the drone attacks? That's one thing. Uh and second, what happens on the battlefield? If the Ukrainian military were to collapse next month, uh that would have a significant effect uh on events. So, I think it's it's impossible to say. if Danny uh they are unable to uh keep the drones uh from doing great damage. They're unable to limit the damage uh because we're accelerating their efforts to help the Ukrainians and that works. If that happens, uh, and they don't win a quick victory on the battlefield, uh, I think that they will go after targets in, uh, in Europe.
>> Yeah. Oh, yeah. We'll have to pick that back up next time you're with us here because, uh, that leads to a lot of potential ramifications. Uh, but just follow Professor Mir Shimemer on mirshimer.substack.com and you can keep up with all of the latest stuff that he's got to say on all these topics as we do as well. Thank you a lot, Professor. We appreciate everything and we'll look forward to seeing you next time.
>> It was a pleasure talking to you, Danny.
>> As is our always our pleasure as well. We'll be back with you in about 20 minutes from now with Nema Alcheid uh coming to us live from Iran and he's going to be telling us, you know, what is going on over on there, especially in the aftermath of this uh of this funeral. What is going to be the next steps here? What do we think is going to come from the Iranian side? Are they going to give up or are they going to do something more difficult? We're going to talk about that at theaters. We'll see you then at 12:30 on the Daniel Davis deep dive. You know, we don't have sponsors because we hate to hit you over the head with ads. I don't like them. So, show a little love back. Subscribe, like, and send this to somebody you care about.