Transcription
Terrifying, surreal, scary. These are some of the words that American tourist Jimbeck used on Sunday to describe the situation in Puerto Valleta, a tourist town in Mexico's Haliscoco State as it turns into a war zone. And even those words don't feel adequate enough to describe the magnitude of what's happening.
One video obtained by Fox News showed fires littering a gas station, helicopters circling over the city, and armed government forces on the backs of pickup trucks patrolling the streets. Another video posted on X allegedly showed gang members shooting from a moving vehicle as they headed for a confrontation with Mexican forces.
And the violence wasn't just limited to Puerto Valera. According to the NY Times, much of the violence happened in Guadalajara, the capital of Haliscoco State, more than 300 km from Puerto Valata. Violence was also reported in more than 10 other states.
All of this violence stemmed from one event: the killing of one of the nation's most powerful cartel bosses, Nimio Reuben Osaggua Cvantes, the founder and leader of the notorious Haliscoco New Generation Cartel. An elusive figure, Osaggua, also known by the nickname El Mencho, was widely considered the most powerful cartel boss in Mexico since the arrest of Hakeim Mal Chapo Guzman in 2016. He was also the last of the narco bosses who would capture public imagination through a combination of flashy lifestyles and brutal displays of violence inspired by El Chapo and Ismile Elmy Meers and Bada.
While his death is a major coup for America and Mexico in their war on drugs, it has also raised a lot of questions, not least of which is how the henchmen of a single gang boss were able to bring an entire nation to its knees. A country on its knees. Even in a conflict as brutal as Mexico's drug war, Sunday was on a whole other level.
Jim Vortter, an American with permanent residency in Puerto Valata, described armed men ordering people out of vehicles at gunpoint. A resident who has lived in Puerto Verta for 23 years said he'd never seen anything like it. One witness told American outlet KWTX that he had seen what appeared to be execution storms. He was on his way to the airport.
Armed gang members seized control of major roads, torching buses and trucks to create burning barriers that trapped tourists and residents in specific zones. Smoke billowed over the resort town as cartel members set mortal fires. Streets that had been bustling with tourists hours earlier were now deserted, patrolled by armed men in pickup trucks.
A Haliscoco state official, speaking anonymously to the press, said seven members of Mexico's National Guard have been killed so far.
The violence wasn't contained to Haliscoco. In Guadalajara, panic gripped the city's international airport as travelers ducked behind check-in counters and workers in high-visibility vests abandoned their posts in a desperate scramble for safety. In Guanoato, authorities reported dozens of coordinated attacks across 23 municipalities with cartel members targeting banks and convenience stores in systematic arson. In Zapan, just outside Guadalajara, six National Guard members were killed. A jail guard died when prisoners rioted in Puerto Valata. An agent from the Haliscoco State Prosecutor's Office was murdered in Guadalajara. The body count just kept climbing as the hours passed.
Airlines scrambled to respond, with Southwest, Alaska, and Delta all canceling flights to Puerto Valata and Guadalajara. Thousands of tourists found themselves stranded, unable to leave. The US Embassy issued urgent warnings for Americans to shelter in place across multiple states. All in all, Mexican authorities reported more than 250 roadblocks across 20 states, effectively paralyzing large swaths of the country.
By Monday morning, most roadblocks had been cleared, but the damage was done. Schools remained closed across multiple states. Guadalajara, a city of 5 million people that was scheduled to host four FIFA World Cup matches in June, had been turned into a war zone overnight. The message from the cartel was clear: they could bring an entire nation to its knees whenever they wanted.
It's a message that the cartel has been communicating since its 2011 formation under Elmeno, following the fracture of the millennial cartel and the leadership wrangles that followed. In September 2011, for example, cartel members dumped 35 bodies on a busy avenue in Vera Cruz during rush hour.
But while CJNG is violent, it is also sophisticated. And that sophistication may have helped the group perpetrate Sunday's attacks. Unlike other cartels, CJNG has a corporate structure that's more reminiscent of an American company than a traditional drug cartel. According to the American National Counterterrorism Center, the CJNG used a franchise model to expand beyond its strongholds in Haliscoco, Narit, and Kyma. Spanish language outlet Elpees reports that as part of this model, local criminal groups can buy the right to use the CJNG brand by paying a tribute to the cartel. As head of the outfit, Osaggua allowed regional leaders to manage day-to-day operations while maintaining centralized strategic control through a hierarchical command structure. Local commanders could pursue whatever profits they wanted in their territories, but the overall direction came from the top.
Anne Mgrim, the DEA administrator, told Congress that the CJNG and the Sinaloa cartel posed the greatest criminal drug threat the United States has ever faced. And with good reason. According to the DEA, the CJNG is now responsible for trafficking massive quantities of fentinel into the United States, where it has fueled an overdose crisis that kills tens of thousands of Americans annually.
This explains why Washington and Mexico have been aggressively pursuing the CJNG's leaders, including Osagera's brothers, Abraham, who is in custody in Mexico, and Antonio, who was extradited to the US in 2025, leading to fears within the cartel that if he collaborated, they could capture or kill Osaggua.
And that brings us to the 22nd of February, 2026, and the operation that brought down one of Mexico's most powerful drug kingpins. The operation. From what is publicly known, Mexican special forces launched what the defense secretariat described as a coordinated effort to capture Osaggua in Tapalpa, a small town in Haliscoco. During the raid, the special forces operators came under fire before managing to kill four cartel members and injure three, including Osaggua. He would later die while being transported to Mexico City. Two additional suspects were arrested, and authorities seized armored vehicles, rocket launchers, and other weaponry. Three Mexican soldiers were wounded in the firefight.
White House press secretary Caroline Levit, in a post on X, confirmed US involvement, stating that American intelligence agencies provided support for the operation. She emphasized that Oguera had been a top target for both governments as one of the main traffickers pumping fentinel into the United States.
The details beyond this remain sparse. Mexican authorities have not disclosed how they located Osaggua, how long they had been tracking him before the raid, or any other pertinent information. And given that they might use the same tactics to track down other gang leaders in the future, it's more than likely that they won't reveal their tactics to avoid giving the cartels insight into their operation.
As we mentioned in the previous section, what followed Oguera's death was swift and brutal: a demonstration that even after the death of their leader, the CJNG still remains one of the most dangerous cartels in the country. This reaction mirrors the responses seen after other high-profile cartel arrests and deaths, albeit at a much larger scale than we're used to. When authorities captured Hakeim El Chapo Guzman in 2016, the Sinaloa cartel erupted in violence, targeting local businesses and the authorities. Whenever such attacks happen, they are usually an attempt by a cartel to demonstrate to the government, general public, and other cartels that despite the capture or, in this case, death of its leaders, it still retains the capacity for extreme violence.
Still, despite the violence that emerged as a result of Osgua's killing, President Claudia Shinbalm is likely to consider it a success because it helps demonstrate that her government is tough on crime. Since Trump returned to office, she has faced relentless pressure to crack down harder on cartels, particularly those trafficking fentinel. In February 2025, Trump designated six Mexican cartels, including the CJNG, as foreign terrorist organizations, and he has repeatedly threatened to send US troops into Mexico to target cartels directly. Proposals Shinbal has firmly rejected as violations of Mexican sovereignty.
Now, that's not to say she refuses to play ball. Since Trump's inauguration, Mexico has extradited dozens of suspected cartel members to the United States, deployed thousands of National Guard troops to the border, and ramped up operations against trafficking networks. The killing of Elmetro represents the most dramatic demonstration yet of this intensified approach, and it allows Shinbal to show Trump that Mexico can handle these threats without American military intervention on its soil.
On the other hand, the violent response is likely to be one of the biggest headaches of President Shinbound's career. As we mentioned earlier, Guadalajara is said to host four matches during the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Heliscoco State officials expect over 1 million visitors to descend on the city for these games, including a highly anticipated clash between Mexico and South Korea on June the 18th. With the tournament just 4 months away, the images of burning vehicles, roadblocks, and armed cartel members on the streets and travel advisories from multiple governments will probably discourage a significant number of tourists from attending the games.
This would be a massive disaster for the state, as it has invested about $37 million to prepare its infrastructure for the influx of visitors. It's also possible that the violence could hurt the number of World Cup visitors coming to Mexico altogether. Some estimates indicate that the country could welcome as many as 5.5 million visitors during the tournament period, with consultancy firm Deote estimating a direct economic impact of approximately $1.24 billion, or about 14% of Mexico's GDP, from tourist spending. But this projection was made before cartel violence sent tourists already in the country scrambling for safety and forced airlines to cancel flights. If the situation in Haliscoco remains unstable, many international visitors might choose to stay away entirely or redirect their trips to games in the United States and Canada instead.
And in many ways, this may be exactly the kind of reaction that the cartel is hoping for. Sunday's meltdown was a demonstration not just of their power and reach, but of CGNG's ability to bring the nation to its knees. One that comes with an implicit warning that they could do it again at any time.
Across the border, Trump's administration, meanwhile, will likely tout the operation and fallout as vindication of its hardline approach. Trump has framed fentinel trafficking as a chemical war against America and has designated the drug and its precursors as weapons of mass destruction, expanding the federal government's authority to combat cartels. The successful elimination of one of the most wanted traffickers in the world provides political ammunition for his aggressive stance on Mexico and validates his threats of military action.
The question now becomes, what happens next? Both for the cartel and for the broader drug war.
What's next? Let's start with the CJNG, the organization that El Mano founded and led until his death. The group faces an uncertain future, as its top leadership has been systematically dismantled over the past few years, which led Al Jazer's John Hullman to note that there is no obvious successor who could quickly take over. As we mentioned in the last chapter, Osguera's brothers are currently in prison. His son, Ruben Osguera Gonzalez, known as Elmanito, was sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years in March 2025.
Without an obvious successor, the cartel faces two likely scenarios. The first is fragmentation. Regional commanders who have been running semi-autonomous operations under Osaggua's oversight may decide to strike out on their own or pledge loyalty to rival organizations. Several candidates could emerge to claim leadership, including Juan Carlos Gonzalez Valencia, Osaggua's stepson, known as L3 (which I assume is the Spanish way, but I don't know how to say that: Unos Tres El Tres, maybe?), who has long been considered the operational boss of the cartel. Osguer's daughter, Jessica Yahana Osaggua Gonzalez, who goes by the nickname Lanagra, could also vie for the group's leadership. Other potential successors include Audius Flores Silva, a senior regional commander who controls large portions of CJNG territory along the Pacific coast, and Gonzalez Mendoza Gaiton, who controls operations in Puerto Valata. But none of these figures command the same respect or fear that Osaguera did. And infighting between these factions could tear the cartel apart from within. We've seen this happen multiple times before, including during the formation of CJNG after the collapse of the Millennios Cartel.
The second scenario involves a new leader, most likely one of the individuals we just mentioned, consolidating power quickly enough with the support of the other leaders to maintain the organization's cohesion. This would require someone with both operational experience and the ability to command loyalty from the various regional cells. But even if a new leader emerges, they will face immediate challenges from rival cartels looking to exploit the CJNG's moment of weakness. This might create a situation where the CJNG or splinter groups of the organization are absorbed into other groups.
The groups that stand to benefit most from a weakened or fractured CJNG are its long-standing rivals, who have been locked in territorial battles across Mexico. Chief among them is the Sinaloa cartel, which has been competing with the CJNG for control of key trafficking routes in several states across Mexico. Although the Salur cartel has been weakened by its own internal conflicts following the arrests of its leaders, it remains a formidable organization with established networks and experience. If CJNG fractures or as regional commanders become distracted by succession battles, Sinaloa could move aggressively to reclaim territories it lost to the CJNG over the past decade.
Other groups poised to capitalize include the Santa Rosa de Lima cartel in Guana, Lefamilia Mikana and Los Viagraas in Mikauan and Guerrero, and various factions fighting for control in Zakatus. These smaller organizations have been pushed back by the CJNG's aggressive expansion, but could now see opportunities to reassert control over lucrative smuggling routes, extortion rackets, and drug production facilities. The death of Osguera essentially opens a window for these rivals to strike while the CJNG is vulnerable, potentially reshaping Mexico's criminal landscape in ways that could make violence even worse in contested territories.
The most unlikely scenario in this case is the complete destruction of the CJNG as a drug cartel in Mexico. From past experience, it's clear that gangs in the country don't really die; they evolve.
And that leads us to our final question: How much of an impact is this going to have on the drug trade? To be blunt, not very much. The fentinol supply chain doesn't depend on any single individual. Mexican cartels import precursor chemicals from China, manufacture the drug in clandestine labs scattered across multiple states, and smuggle it across the border through hundreds of different routes. Even with Osguera gone, the CJNG still controls ports, production facilities, and distribution networks. Someone else will step into his role, or multiple someone's will carve up his territory and continue operations independently.
The economics of the drug trade also work against any lasting success from kingpin removals. Fentinel is cheap to produce, highly profitable, and there's massive demand in the United States. As long as those fundamentals remain unchanged, traffickers will continue supplying the market regardless of who leads them. Removing one supplier just creates space for another to expand operations. Mike Vigil, former chief of international operations of the DEA, told Alazer that killing or capturing cartel heads doesn't have a major impact on the drug trade. He argued that authorities need to go after the infrastructure, logistics, money laundering operations, and armed wings of these organizations if they want to see real change.
Perhaps the most significant impact of Osaggua's death won't be on drug trafficking, but on Mexico's security situation. If the CJNG fractures, Mexico could see a surge in violence beyond even that witnessed on Sunday, as factions fight for control and rival cartels like the Sinaloa organization move into contested territories. For now, at least, Mexico's authorities claim to have cleared most of the roadblocks. And while it seems that the immediate violence has subsided, there are fears that the region could quickly descend into violence again.
What remains to be seen is whether Osguera's death represents a meaningful blow in the fight against Mexico's cartels or simply the prelude to another chapter of cartel violence. What is certain is that Mexico's war against the cartels is far from over, and the battle for control of the CJNG's empire is just beginning.
Thank you for watching.