Transcription
Too close a position to, um, to Trump actually hurt Orban because now to be close to Trump is almost an embarrassment in many places. Because Trump has an amazing capacity to alienate all his friends and supporters. He's just doing it deliberately, you know, with MAGA movement, and with England, and then with France, and insulting the pope, and he's insulting Macron, and he's insulting Stara. He's insulting everybody, just making himself a person non grata everywhere. So, I actually heard that, uh, after, uh, Vance gave a speech, it was like catastrophic fall in, um, in in his in the ratings for Orban. It was like a death kiss.
Welcome to World Affairs and Context, everybody. Today, I'm absolutely thrilled to welcome back our good friend, Dr. of Vladimir Brovkin. Vlad is a former professor at Harvard and an author of many books on politics and history. I will link them below. He also runs a really great YouTube channel as well, and I'm sure many of you are already very well familiar with it. And, uh, for those who are not, I will link his channel in the description below, too. Vlad, welcome back to the program! It's great to see you again.
>> It's always a pleasure to be in your program. Thank you.
>> It's a pleasure to have you. Um, so there are a lot of things going on in Europe, and one of the main ones is, of course, the elections in Hungary. Over the weekend, Europe was shaken by Hungary's PM, Victor Orban's, loss in elections. He's been in power for 16 years, and he has managed to retain Hungary's sovereignty and, uh, maintain ties with both Eastern Europe and the West. What makes this Hungarian election so significant for Europe and, uh, global politics?
>> This is a great question, and especially interesting the way you framed it, because, of course, it is important, and, uh, uh, but it's not important in a sense of expecting some fundamental changes. Uh, that's what I'd like to argue against because those who say, "Oh, this is a major shift in European politics," it's not. It is a shift only in a sense that the funds blocked for Ukraine will be released. That's it. There's no other shift.
And this is important to understand because, uh, Madiar comes from the same political party. He's an insider of Orban's party. He split away two years ago, and in some issues he takes even more, um, conservative or steadfast position than Orban. So, I, deliberately preparing for this, uh, conversation, ran a search on issues, and what is amazing is that on all issues, except Ukraine and Russia, which we will speak about separately, he is actually absolute and total conservative, or more so.
So, here's, for example, the issue: uh, will he support a move that is so much proposed by Fonder and the Brussels leadership to go from, um, universal consensus in Europe to, uh, veto, to to cancel veto power of each member? In other words, majority vote. No, he's not going to abandon Hungary's or anybody else's right to have a veto. So, he's against that as a pro-Europe.
Uh, what about quotas of immigrants? No, he continues Orban's policy that he's totally against any quotas or any dictate of Brussels to Hungary or to any other country for that matter as to how many immigrants they should take. The fence that was built will continue, and, uh, in he, as he put it, is reinforced in some areas. So, there's no change on immigration, no change on the status of veto power integrationist. He's not an integrationist of European Union. He's actually steadfast for, uh, Europe as a Europe of sovereign nations. Uh, so conservative sovereignty, that's pretty much Orban's position all along.
The only reason that they're so excited about it, uh, Fondline and all the others, and Macron, and all these people in the current leadership of the European Union, is because now on the Russia-Ukraine issues, so dear to their hearts, uh, he has changed, and, um, the change basically is that I can sort of put it like this: "Hungary is more important for me," says Majar, "than, uh, money for Ukraine." So, we're not going to fight to keep it frozen. Let them have their money. That's not our money. But we want to get our money.
And that's what he's doing. He's his position is in a sense very clever. Uh, it's called to have the cake and eat it too. Uh, he pleased, he wants to please the Europeans to get the frozen money from the European Union that Hungary needs. At the same time, he, uh, you know, he's paying for it by unblocking, uh, funds for Ukraine, and in that sense, you know, this is just pragmatic policy, uh, no more than that. It's not a fundamental shift of Hungary's position.
And the last thing on domestic issues: uh, you know, abortion and woke agenda, and, um, you know, rights of, um, sexual minority authorities. He's totally conservative. Absolutely conservative as can be. Uh, on the contrary, he wants to strengthen the family. He wants to strengthen aid to mothers and to increase the fertility and the and the children and all the rest of it. So, uh, it it's really culturally and politically, it's one could say it's the strengthening of the conservative movement in Europe, which is unfolding, and the attempt to represent it as some kind of a Europe integrationists, you know, now strengthening Europe, strengthening NATO. No, that's not the case. It's actually, um, you know, "urbanism without urban," as one observer put it, or conservative, uh, Hungarian politics one step further, except for Ukraine and Russia, which we can come back to, um, and discuss.
Given the similarities, what do you feel were the key issues driving voters away from Orban, uh, from Orban and from his party? Was it, um, economic conditions, other concerns, or democratic backsliding?
>> It's a very interesting question, and I guess I'm not, you know, too close to Hungary to comment on that. You have to be really a specialist on Hungarian society. But my impression is that, um, uh, my impression is that the too close a position to, um, to Trump actually hurt Orban because now to be close to Trump is almost an embarrassment in many places because Trump has an amazing capacity to alienate all his friends and supporters. He's just doing it deliberately, you know, with MAGA movement, and with England, and then with France, and insulting the pope, and he's insulting Macron, and he's insulting Starharma, he's insulting everybody, just making himself a person non grata everywhere. So, I actually heard that, uh, after Vance gave a speech, it was like catastrophic fall in, um, in in his in the ratings for Orban. It was like a death kiss.
Uh, it probably would have been better if, uh, Vance didn't come, uh, and and, um, you know, gave the speech. But the speech is actually very remarkable because it speech actually, uh, repeats the same things as before. Uh, it's more important for Vance and the US relations with Europe than for Urban and Hungary because it reiterates, uh, that, um, Vance, if he's ever going to be president, is inherently hostile to current European Union, which he calls Brussels bureaucracy and centralizes, and that that they want immigration, they want to dilute national cultures, they want to subvert sovereignty. So, on all these issues, um, in his speech, uh, Vance was even more anti-western than Orbin was, or he, Vance himself, was when he spoke at security conference in Munich. So, this is why this speech was important.
But speaking of Orbin, uh, it seems to me that, uh, the change, uh, was was a normal thing. I mean, it's not that they changed the voters from conservative to socialist or anything like that. It's like from one conservative to another super conservative, a student of the previous generation. This guy is younger, and maybe what played a fact a role is that, uh, Hungary does need those funds. Uh, they feel they're entitled to them. Uh, and, um, you know, blocking funds that for for Ukraine is not a major thing for them, or let them have it.
But what's interesting is that about Hungary and Ukraine, you know, the first impression, the western media plays it, "Oh, now is going to be good relations between Hungary and Ukraine." No, it won't because the two fundamental issues remain, and they cannot be resolved simply by, you know, shaking hands or saying today we're going to have good relations. The two fundamental issues with with between Hungary and Ukraine have nothing to do with Putin. Zero. It has to do with oil number one and Hungarian minority in Ukraine number two. And these issues will not go away.
Hungary does need Russian oil. It's not that Orban invented it. They do need it because it's cheap, just like everybody else in Europe needs it. Except that these are, you know, the Fond Lions and others are so, you know, stuck on their anti-Russian agenda that they they don't want to buy cheap fuel. They'd rather buy expensive one. Oh, fine. Let them do it as long they can afford it and as long as Americans have it, but they don't. The Americans import oil themselves. So, they're going to have to get it somewhere. Uh, and we'll see how the things will turn out in the Middle East. So, in that sense, the oil issue is simply pragmatic. We will continue to buy Russian oil.
On that, I should note it's not clear the Russians are going to sell them this oil because Putin had always said, "We need long-term predictable stable partners." And if he says for now we're going to buy Russian oil and later we're going to phase it out, where the Russians may say, "Well, why don't we phase it out now because we have plenty of climates clients in current world situation that we don't need those for one, two years?"
But a more serious, uh, rift is between, uh, Hungary and Ukraine on the issue of Hungarian minorities because many of them don't want to go and fight, and and each time somebody is is a Hungarian, um, citizen of Ukraine of Hungarian nationality, each time he's beaten up by the draft agency, uh, then all of Hungary sees those pictures, and they have marches and protests and and diplomatic, you know, summoning of ambassadors and so forth. So, this is a big issue. Uh, Hungarian minority, uh, wants to have their rights, which are, you know, enshrined in EU documents of having the language rights and the, uh, all kinds of other, um, self-rule rights. Well, they don't have it because the Hungarians suppress not only Russian language, they suppress any language that's not Ukrainian. And Hungarians, uh, want to have their language and their schools and and the rest of it, and they don't. And this is why this is not going to go away. This issue will remain a major problem in relations between Hungary and Ukraine.
>> It's so interesting you mentioned energy because right now, with the war in the Middle East, it seems that Russia, of course, is in a very good position in terms of having the energy and the supplies that everybody needs. And Putin has not used that as leverage to the extent that he could have yet. For example, for Europe, he, it wasn't Russia that cut off energy flows to Europe. It was Europe itself that shoot itself, shoots itself in the foot every single time it gets an opportunity, and then it has to buy much more expensive LG and and crude oil from other sources.
Um, so it's interesting because Russia is undergoing a new sort of transformation, and, of course, you know about this much better than I do, um, where it looks towards developing partnerships with the east, right? It's cyberization, uh, idea where it's it's it views itself now not so much maybe as a European nation but sort of the the the point where the east and the west sort of collide. And so that's a very interesting point because it does appear that that's one of the cards that, uh, Russian President Putin has yet to play if he deems necessary, and to to cut off oil or even the prospect of supplying oil to to Europe if he chooses to do so, if he chooses to use it as leverage against those countries that are unfriendly, um, towards Russia.
>> You see, what's interesting in that regard also is like long-term historical trends and the immediate policy changes. And what's what's so important is that regardless of what EU does or what Putin does, the long-term historical process that we see now unfolding in front of our very eyes is a shift of economic activity from west to east. And, um, that's one thing, and the second thing is, of course, is like from maritime, uh, so so maritime to continental trade. Um, and and, of course, the biggest partners in continental trade is Russia and China.
China's economy needs a lot of oil. Now, maybe 100 years from now they would, you know, totally transition to wind and solar and what other source of energy they need. The foreseeable future, decades to come, they will need Russian oil. And so the Russians are now building Siberia too. And these are the pipelines that cannot be obstructed by anyone, uh, unless United States decides to bomb them, which is unlikely because then the US can Russia can bomb theirs. So, this is the trade.
Just now, Indonesian prime minister came to Putin, and they also had all kinds of economic agreements, and that's a huge country of 200 million people that's like England, France and Italy put together, one country. So, in other words, uh, and and they're developing really fast, and they're good relations with with Malaysia and with Singapore and with Laos and all the Asian countries. Putin has established very, very good relations, and the economic flows go on. Even India, you know, trying to please Trump, still is buying Russian oil because they make good money on it.
So, in other words, that's the historical process. Uh, and it makes perfect sense because Russia is both Asian and European. And if they can do business in Europe, moreover, the oil physically is in Asia. It's in Siberia. Most of Siberia is in Asia. So, it's really closer to, um, you know, built all these, um, pipelines going to Asian ports and other transition issues. So, that's one thing.
But another thing is that the European Union took the position to phase out Russian oil. Fine. Okay. Russia is not going to lose anything. In fact, it's the Germans who are losing, and they're saying it. And the political party that says, "We need Russian oil," af is growing and growing and growing with each elections. Uh, and that's undeniable. This is usually, it's very likely that in the next elections they may win. The only way they haven't won now is because SPD, uh, and Christian Democrats have always had a grand coalition, which means, uh, they were they were pulling their resources, but even together each one of them was losing and losing and losing to a point where now SPD is at the level of 15%, which is lowest in its history, and the SPD people are saying, "Well, this coalition is is killing us," uh, and yet they are so afraid of changing course, uh, that if that I AFD will win, that they hold on, they just kind of they they hold on to the course that is self-destructive, but they're afraid to change it because if they change it they're going to, uh, lose it, and in any case they're going to lose, it's just they prefer to wait a few more years, uh, and then maybe something will happen, and then, uh, you know, they hope to survive.
Same things are everywhere in Europe. Uh, Italy is so increasingly, um, assertive in its national defense and sovereignty and against Iranian war and, um, some some statements about, uh, Russia and Russian oil that are much more accommodating, and Spain. You know, in other words, if if your question was about the future of Europe, what is obvious right now is Europe is splitting into two. The north Europe, uh, which is very, very anti-Russian and Europe centralist and kind of war-mongering, you know, building the army and unifying, centralizing, blah blah blah, and the southern Europe, which is much more relaxed and much more, um, friendly to Russia, uh, critical of Trump, uh, uh, and really not interested in NATO so much. You know, when the Trump threatens Spain, "We're going to expel you from NATO." Okay, who cares? It's not that somebody is going to attack Spain. And the same thing for Italy. They're saying, "Well, you're going to have to pay for your bases or else, you know, if if you expel us, that's okay with us. We don't in any hurry." That's a very interesting new phenomenon. This Trump attack on NATO that really revealed that, you know, it's not like everybody's dying to be in NATO and to have those bases which are really outposts of American power rather than, uh, mechanisms for defense of Europe. That's a separate issue. But anyway, it sort of came up in the Hungarian debates as to what the, uh, what the future of NATO is.
>> Useran, who many argue represents the globalists, praised the outcome of the elections in Hungary, and she says it is easier for her to breathe after Orbin's defeat. Zalinski, too. He didn't hide his excitement since Orbin's defeat is likely to lead to more funding for Zalinski's corrupt regime. Who are the winners and who are the losers now that Orban has been defeated and replaced by Maguar?
>> Well, in a short term, of course, one could say that this is a loss for Russia. In in a short term political constellation, because when there was Orban, there was the kind of a outward, um, friendly handshakes between Orban and Putin. But I don't think it went very far and very deep because everybody knows who everybody is. And, you know, Orbin, uh, tried to position himself with his unique relationship that he could go to Putin and shake hands, to go to Trump and shake hands, and be a kind of a anfant, uh, inside European Union. But, you know, on a on a more profound level, as I said, the geopolitical realities did not change with this election.
Short term, what has changed is that the, um, Ukrainians are going to probably get their 90 billion. However, as I mentioned in my previous, um, treatment of the subject, the Europeans don't have that money. I mean, they voted it, but to actually come up with it will be extremely difficult, especially if the war in the Middle East continues, uh, because the prices of oil, we see it on TV here in Europe every day, you know, the governments even in France are forced to give all kinds of subsidies to, uh, farmers, to all kinds of people who consume a lot of, uh, gasoline and diesel, uh, and and that's all over Europe, they really need to, uh, as of now, it's the crunch hasn't come yet because, you know, with this roller coaster, the Trump one day price is up, one day price is down. Uh, some people probably make a lot of money on all these speculations of peace and war, war and peace, peace and war. But, um, if the war continues, then prices are going to rise, and that means that, uh, they just simply won't have any extra money. It is with great difficulties that for land managed to raise this theoretical 90 billion.
Um, but, um, in practical terms, you know, Hungary, by the way, won't for itself, uh, opt out of this. So, they're not participating, and Slovakia that isn't doesn't either. So, uh, you know, it would be interesting to see whether they will be able to come up with this money. But even if they do, I also discussed it recently. Even if they do, Ukraine needs about 40 billion in addition to what they have themselves, which is not much a year. That's bare minimum just to hold on things. Uh, and that means that if they get what they get, they will have enough money till November, and maybe somehow they'll stretch it out for the end of this year. But if they get less, then there won't be enough for anything.
This is one thing. And the second thing is that money is not weapons. Uh, the Europeans are beginning to produce, uh, drones and things that they give to Ukraine, but not in the quantities that that they need, uh, to sustain this. The Russians produce ever more sophisticated and more and more and more of artillery shells and drones, and the Europeans maybe eventually will catch up. This is what the Russian generals fear. I discussed it in my previous video. They fear that eventually the Europeans will, uh, will be able to, but I doubt, I don't know, maybe we'll be able, maybe not because they don't have they don't have the money, they don't have the will, they don't have the factories that are working, they don't have the energy, and they don't have the unity, and elections in Hungary are not going to change any one of those ingredients. It would still be lack of money, lack of unity, lack of will, and lack of weapons that they just they wish they would have it. They keep talking about building European army, building this, building that. But one thing is build is talking, another thing is building, and they're not building very much.
>> As you mentioned earlier in this conversation, um, Peter Mong Magar, I'm not sure how to pronounce his last name still, Magar, um, the new incoming prime minister of Hungary. He said that he expects Victor Orbin to lift his veto on that 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine. Then Mertz, the chancellor of Germany, followed up very quickly, and he said, "Well, Europe should disperse the money as quickly as possible. It should disperse the money now," said Mertz.
Zalinski's main goal is, of course, to stay in power, and he can do so by continuing the war that everybody understands Ukraine has already lost and cannot win. How do you expect the dynamic between Hungary and Ukraine to, um, to change with the new prime minister in power and Zalinski desperately clinging to power in Ukraine and wanting to secure more funding, secure more loans because it's understandable that the $90 billion loan that's not going to really make it or break it for Ukraine, is just enough to sort of, you know, as a lifeline?
But, but either way, Ukraine is going to need more money after the $90 billion euro loan runs out. So, Zilinski is going to come back and ask for more, um, while at the same time abusing the rights of Hungarian nationals in western Ukraine, while at the same time continuing the, uh, really extreme nationalist policies that, um, he and the far right that are in power in Kiev are pushing. So, how is that dynamic between Hungary and Ukraine going to change now that there are so many conflicting interests between the two states? And then, of course, there is pressure from the EU as well to push their agenda and to promote their interests.
>> Well, it all depends on Madiar's next moves and how Zilinski is going to, uh, respond to those. Now, I, it's hard to predict, but if you if you will look at the record of Zilinsk's actions, he is, um, he's very much like Trump. He he wants to, he has insulted everybody one could insult, including merits and including Hungarians. So, he's very, uh, non-diplomatic, to put it mildly, uh, or rude, to put it in blunt terms, uh, and, uh, so so in terms of actions, what would be important to see which way things are going is whether Silinski is going to allow to repair the DUBA pipeline because, uh, the Ukrainians deliberately sabotaged it. The Hungarians under Orban wanted to send a delegation to see what is wrong, and the Ukrainians wouldn't even let them see it. They just wouldn't let them see it.
So, okay, now that we are friends, now that Orban is bad, now that we have good relations, okay, will he let them go and see it and repair it so that the flow of oil can resume? Now, if that happens, there may be indeed some positive, uh, you know, change between the two. We shall see. That would be an important indicator.
It's quite obvious that Madiar doesn't mind if the money goes, if the 90 billion are unfrozen, but he wants to get his money from European Union. So, it will be a quit proquo. He could say, "Okay, we will not block it, but you have to give us our money that that is frozen." I think something like 20 billion. That's what he's after. He wants, uh, the European Union funds for Hungary to be forthcoming. That's why he is unfreezing the funds for Ukraine. As we have just discussed, this will be a temporary, uh, help.
Uh, but given that now I don't know what they can do with this money. There's not enough weaponry available on the world markets. None of the American weapons are available. None. I mean, even Trump has even asked Poland for Patriot missiles for Israel. So, the Americans don't have themselves enough stocks of weapons to sustain the war in the Middle East, let alone for Ukraine.
Now, as I said, the Europeans are beginning to turn out the, uh, uh, there's a program about France that they're beginning to build a thousand drones. It's nothing. A thousand drones is for a day's use. Like in one day, the Russians send a thousand drones to to Ke and other targets. So, it still is a long way away before the Europeans will be able to match the Russians in the production of, uh, of drones.
But even then, as we know from the, um, from the Iran war, the the, uh, the ability to bomb is not the same as the ability to move your troops on the ground, uh, and, uh, and win territory. And so far, uh, you know, this is another issue that bothers me, and I've been discussing it lately in my videos. The Russians are moving but moving slowly, and a lot will depend and as to what will happen in Russian offensive of summer, uh, 2026. If it is successful, then there won't be any Zilinski in 2027. Uh, if they are successful, you know, they're they're moving on Sumi, and then they want to take Kiev, and that will be the end of the war, uh, in one way or another, or they will take all of Danbas, and then the the agenda is focusing on Kharkov and Adessa. So, yeah, it's it's, uh, it's not like we're going to see the same st same thing 27, 28, 29. No. Uh, things will come to some kind of resolution. Maybe this year, maybe next year, but again, with every movement of Russian troops, Ukraine is losing industrial areas. Donbas is the is what Ukraine industry is all about. Without it, it's just an agricultural territory with beautiful fields and nice white churches. One of the towns is called White Church. Uh, but it's not, um, it's not a an industrial giant that Soviet Ukraine used to be.
>> Absolutely. And what's interesting is that the incoming PM in Hungary does have a very interesting history. His, uh, my understanding is that, as you mentioned, his center right, his ex-wife was a minister of justice in Orbin's government, and he himself is no stranger to Victor Orbin, as you mentioned. So, Magguar has already sort of he he has a good, um, understanding of of kind of his policies moving forward. So, it is he's not a sort of a new kid on the block that, you know, will be sort of pushed from one side to another side by the EU, uh, officials. It seems that he he he knows sort of he already has a good idea how he will handle, uh, the east versus west dilemma.
Um, he already said that Ukraine shouldn't count on being an EU member in the next decade. So, so it is really interesting to see how that will transpire once he does become a PM, and if we'll see any changes, any major changes in his stance toward Ukraine and toward Russia.
But do you feel that, um, with sort of that Orbin now leaving, um, the idea that as many refer to Orbin as, you know, "Putin's lap dog" or whatever, as a puddle, and I' I've seen this in many many different articles that that that's actually not true because, you know, Mongar is going to very much follow the same key points that Orbin did? But do you feel that Russia will manage to develop a relationship with Hungary with Magar being the PM, or do you think that will actually cause a major sort of rift between the two states?
>> Yes. Yes. Very good question. Um, again, it's hard to predict, but the first indications are that, uh, the Russian government and Putin and Piskov were not very happy, uh, with Majar, and it's not so much that he replaced Orban, it is the statements, uh, that he himself made, uh, and let me explain those because they're quite revealing about attitudes of a Hungarian nationalist that he is, uh, what Putin and Piskov didn't like because they said, "We don't want to congratulate unfriendly, um, unfriendly leaders."
Now, in in some of these rallies, what was particularly offensive to the Russians was that there were slogans, uh, with these chants in these huge crowds for Majiar: "Russians out!" Now, the Russians are not in Hungary. What is that supposed to mean, uh, "out"? It's not like they're occupying it like in 1956. So, uh, the speeches of Madya could be interpreted as anti-Russian as such.
He made references to 1848 revolution that was suppressed by, uh, Russian troops, um, at the request of Austrian emperor. Uh, then he made references to, uh, obviously 1956 revolution that was suppressed by, uh, Soviet troops. Uh, which is okay. I mean, that these are fair. Uh, that's history, and that's what happened.
But, uh, what he also made references, and that's particularly painful for, uh, Piskov and for and for Putin, is that he made references to the Russians in 1944-45. Uh, now, and this is what, uh, American audience probably doesn't understand as well as as they should, is that, uh, in 1944-45, Hungary was an official ally of Hitler. It was a allied power. They were they were they were occupied only in April 45, and this is when the slaughter of Hungarian Jews took place. But as a country, in 1944, the Russians came to a country that was officially at war with the Soviet Union on the side of Germany. Hungarian troops were in Stalenrad. Hungarian troops were in in in Ukraine. They were fighting side by side with Vermacht. So, when the Russians came to Budapest, they were to be expected as normal to treat that country as a defeated enemy, just as they did in Berlin.
Uh, now Austria was divided up into four zones of occupation, but Hungary wasn't. They just kind of let them go, uh, as if they were, you know, less guilty than Austria, which was simply, uh, uh, an which is simply added to Germany, but in many many ways the Hungarians in World War II their record is, excuse me, you can't escape it, you were allies of Hitler, and when the Red Army came, they had absolute right to treat them just as they behaved themselves in Stalenrad, which is acting as conquerors. So, when the Soviets ex installed their, you know, puppet regime, yeah, that sounds terrible. But Americans did the same thing everywhere they came. I mean, that's just rough. Uh, you lose the war and you suffer the consequences of occupation.
Um, other countries didn't go to war. Um, but many of them did. Italians supported Hitler and Romania supported Hitler. Even Bulgaria sent troops. So, they were all allies of Hitler. Poland was not. It was, you know, speaking about all these East European countries, Poland was officially allied to the Allied powers with the government in London. They were anti-Russian, but they were still allied powers, and Stalin treated them as such. This is why Poland got about a third of its territory thanks to Stalin who gave them lands of of, um, of Germany.
So, in other words, my point is that Hungarians have no right to complain the way the Russians behaved in 1944-45. And if Madiar defends that government, this Nazi government ally of Hitler, that means he cannot win any good attitude on behalf of any Russian, including, uh, Putin and Piskov. So, so this was a big mistake on his part. If you wanted to, this is good enough an insult for Putin to say, "No, we're not going to give you any oil even if you ask." This is a serious rift because it's an insult, uh, an insult to to Putin. The World War II is sacred. It's something you can't touch. And if you have any insult to the way the Russians behaved in 1944, that's about the worst thing you could say to Putin because he's totally against any what he says reconsideration of the war. And the heroes of the Red Army are like sacred for Putin.
And and I think that means that there is a chance of a real rift because, uh, Madia as a real nationalist for him, you know, you he says to the Russians, "You abused us in 1848 and in 1944 and in 1956." So, that kind of attitude means, uh, "we have a grudge against you. We will never forgive and forget." Well, if that's the case, you know, go your own way, and, um, if you refuse to turn the page and have normal relations, well, let's have bad relations. So, from that kind of historical references, um, is very, very, um, upsetting to Russian leaders, and I think that could mean that there is a shift, uh, to a cooler relationship, not necessarily hostile but much more distanced, uh, than it was, um, uh, in in, um, Orban's times.
And one more thing about Orbin, it seems to me that what I heard recently is that, um, he he hasn't really given up or anything. He's got 37%, which is respectable. Uh, it translated in fewer seats in the parliament, but it's 51 versus 37, which is respectable victory, but not a crushing defeat for Orbin. And what I've heard is that he's going to put his efforts into the European Parliament where, uh, he's go he wants to be the leader of the sovereignty, um, Euro skeptics block. Orbin is very active now in the European Parliament, and he has created himself this kind of reputation, uh, of a worldwide leader, uh, which is amazing for a small country like this, and he's going to continue on his agenda of sovereign Europe as a as a union of sovereign nations rather than a kind of a, uh, super structure of centralization run by Fondonder and others. So, that that seems his career is not over. He's going to continue and has all good chances of success.
>> Dr. Broken, maybe the last question for today. What are the biggest challenges facing a new Hungarian government, let's say, in the first 100 days?
>> Well, his biggest problems is to, um, have the cake and eat it too. In other words, if he manages to, uh, keep all the privileges that that Orban want for Hungary, such as a right to buy Russian oil, uh, such as to, uh, be exempt from the quotas of immigrants, um, uh, to continue to have a veto power over decisions of EU leaders. Uh, if he continues to have all of this and get the money that was frozen from Hungary, well then that's great.
Uh, you know, it would be a skill on his part to try to play this, um, you know, ride this wave of congratulatory positive attitude towards Hungary, uh, in order to get what he wants to get from the European Union, at the same time to continue on his national conservative agenda. Uh, he might be successful. We shall see.
As I said with Ukraine, he will have to resolve the issue of oil and would have to get some assurances of, uh, decent treatment of Hungarian minority. Uh, with Putin, it all depends if he has the courage to go for a meeting, whether they would be able to overcome this initial hostility or not. He he says he he has no plans. Fine. Uh, we shall see whether his foreign minister will go.
In other words, it would be the actions that would count, not the rhetoric during elections. What we do know of him now is who he is and where he comes from, uh, and, uh, from that point of view, one should expect conservative nationalist policies, uh, defending Hungary from European bureaucracy just as Orban did, and a shift in Russian relations, uh, and probably the same course as it was with Ukraine. That's what I can expect.
>> Dr. Brovkin, it's always great to get your thoughts and expertise. Thank you so much for joining, and as always, I look forward to having you on again. Thank you so much.