allegedly.ian debate 8/11/24 is God real? feat. dadddyyyyyy

steps does not mean God did it. Because again, we have no evidence that God exists. So, so we have, we have evidence for, for abiogenesis, whereas we have no evidence. I don't think that that's much evidence. Just you don't. Wait, wait, wait. So then if it's not much evidence, then give a critique of the study. I didn't read the study. Yeah, I know you didn't. So then how are you, how are you going to dismiss? So you are dismissing the evidence that you didn't even read, is that correct? Because I'm asking you about it. I'm asking you about it and you explained it pretty much. You explained it to me saying that it's about self-replicating non-living molecules, but that for the step of, of something that's non-living to become living is a pretty big step that we, both of us don't have a full, uh, full proof of how that came to be. But my, what the, the way that I think is that the most rational explanation is that life came from life. And you think that life came from not? No, because first of all, you've been incapable of proving that life comes from life. And so far as you haven't given a definition of life. And second of all, you haven't given a critique, a single critique of the evidence. Why? If so, just because we can't, um, just because we're missing like key steps of this like inera. Wait, wait, hold on, hold on, hold on. Just because we're missing a couple of steps in the innumerably large steps that would be in Evol, involved, uh, for the, for abiogenesis to occur, it doesn't mean that abiogenesis didn't happen. And it definitely doesn't mean that God did it. So we have, we have evidence for the steps by which abiogenesis happened. We have evidence for the key steps, in fact, um, whereas what's our evidence that God did it? N the key step would be life coming from non-life. Well, yeah, so life isn't just like a, it's not going to pop out of nowhere. It needs to form, uh, by giving, by gaining and acquiring a given number of criteria. It needs to gain the ability to be, be self-replicating. It needs to gain the ability to have a metabolism. These are key steps, and it needs to gain both of these at the exact same time. It needs to be, um, isolated from its outside environment as well. Now, for all three of these, we know the natural mechanisms by which these things can happen on their own. The connection step in between them, however, uh, is unclear. But the science is progressing every single day. And just because the science doesn't exist yet, does not mean that God did it. You still need to provide your evidence that God did it. Yeah. Well, the biggest key step is life being created from non-life, which we can. You summarize what I just said? Because it seems like you're not listening. Yeah, you said that just because we don't know, science doesn't know that how it happened, that doesn't mean we're not going to. That's not what I said. So do you want to take another stab at summarizing what I said, or were you just not listening? That is what you said. You said, "Just that's not what I said." It was a, it was a bit more nuanced. Can you give, like, a, because do you want to give a, do you want to give a steel man version of what I said? Part of it was just because we don't have the science for how life was created from non-life, that doesn't mean God did it. Did you pick up on anything else? Uh, no. Yeah, you weren't listening. So I'll summarize this one more time for you. Try to listen this time. So there are innumerable steps in abiogenesis, and we have the key steps figured out. We have the steps for how, um, self-replicating molecules can emerge via natural processes. We have the steps for how, um, like metabolism can form via natural processes. We have the steps for how, uh, a, um, like isolated system can form via natural processes as well. Uh, but the steps that, uh, combine these two, combine these, like three characteristics into one, these steps are unclear because the science is relatively new. But just because the science is new and it hasn't yet discovered these things, does not mean that these things do not exist. This isn't evidence that, like, the fact that science has not yet figured it out, doesn't mean that God did it. By this logic, you would be in, in ancient Greece believing in, like, Thor or Poseidon because you didn't have science yet. So you just have to assume that, like, God's doing it. Like, where's the lightning coming from? I guess it's God. How do tides happen? I guess it's God. Well, okay. Well, I see what you're saying. But I mean, the biggest key step to to proving abi, abiogenesis is that life coming from non-life. Like, yeah, we can have self-replicating molecules, you know, but that doesn't, that doesn't really mean that life can be created from non-life. Yeah. Wait, so I'm just asking, like, what's your evidence that God exists, though? Because you have so. I've already laid out pretty expressly, uh, and I responded directly to this point, but you had nothing to say to any of my response. So you just restated your conclusion. You have no response to any of what I just said. But that's fine. Because I'm interested in your claim. What's your evidence that God exists? Because you, so, because if your evidence that God exists is that God created life, then that's just circular. Well, no. My evidence is that we've never observed life being created from non-life. And you can say that, like, we have all this evidence that, you know, self-replicating molecules exist, and that's a part of abiogenesis. But I would disagree with that. So I would say that scientifically, you think that this, you think self-replicating, you think self-replication isn't a part of abiogenesis? What's the argument? I would say, no, I would say that a self-replicating non-living molecule is not evidence that life can be created from non-life. And why is that? Because we have a rep, self-replicating molecules. And how come we've never seen self-replicating molecules? Wait, that's a question I'm asking you for the ev, I'm asking for the explanation. Why is this not evidence? Do you understand the question, or do you need clarification on it? Because, because from our observations, self-replicating mole, molecules have never created life. Yes, they have. From our observation, the leading scientific theory is that they have. I mean, if you wanted to cite the leading. Earlier, earlier, earlier, you agreed that the Big Bang was the leading scientific consensus. Why did you appeal to the Big Bang Theory if you don't believe in the leading scientific consensus? The Big Bang Theory. Okay. The theory that life, or that the. But you earlier you appealed to the Big Bang Theory. You can't put the scare quotes "theory" around it, uh, if you, if earlier you were appealing to the Big Bang Theory. Because I'm trying to explain why. Yeah, go for it. So the reason why I'm appealing to the Big Bang is that we have evidence that time and space are not eternal, that there was a beginning. I'm not saying the expanding universe. Oh, cool. So the Big Bang Theory. So you believe in the Big Bang Theory? Perfect. Because we know that the universe is expanding and has been, been expanding, and most, virtually all scientists believe that time and space had a beginning and is not eternal. They don't believe that. But I'm glad, I'm glad you've now latched yourself onto this argument. So if you're going to say that the, the majority of scientists believe this, um, then I'm going to say that the majority of scientists believe in abiogenesis. That's your exact argument. Can you disprove that the majority of scientists believe in abiogenesis? That maybe they do. But what? Perfect. So then, so then by your logic, under the argument that you gave, you would accept abiogenesis. Because I would say that the expanding universe is evidence that time and space are not eternal. But I would say that a self-replicating molecule is not evidence that life came from non-life. Yeah. And why is that? Because so in both of these cases, you appealed to just scientific consensus. Now, first of all, it's not the sci. Pete, thank you so much. Appreciate that. Pete. First of all, it's not the scientific consensus, hate to break it to you, uh, that that time and space had a beginning to them. You can look that up. Well, that's not what the Big Bang Theory says. Well, you can look up. Do most S. I already know. I know a lot about the Big Bang Theory. I, I know that I know that the majority of scientists believe in the Big Bang Theory. But if you would listen, you would hear me say that's not what the Big Bang Theory is saying. The Big Bang Theory does not claim that time and space and had a beginning. It just claims that the universe used to be extremely small and then it rapidly expanded. None of that entails that there must have, must have been a beginning to time or anything like of that sort. I literally just looked it up and yeah, time and space beginning with the Big Bang is a source. Can I get a source? Just looked it up on Google. Yeah, can I get a source? Let's get the source. Keep on double tapping on that screen while we wait for the source. Let's get all the way up to 30k likes. Uh, share it with your friends. Drop a follow as well. Damn, this is a long time period. This is not the amount of time it takes. If you add the source, pulled up, dude, it literally, when I looked it up, it was the first. Yeah, yeah. What's the source? What the? It said AI overview. So it's a bunch of sources. Oh, okay. Wait, so can you just give me the one specific source? Okay, hold up. But make sure you're double tapping on that screen. If you want to join the community, go play Bingo. Uh, if you're 18 or older, there's a link to the Discord in my bio. Um, it's a great place. We have community nights every, uh, every Saturday. Yeah, every Saturday. We had one last night. We did a game night. It was fun. I enjoyed it. Um, and, uh, you should consider joining if you like hanging out. I know I certainly do. Um, I spend lots of time in my server. I'm in VC constantly. I love talking to people there. Um, I'd love to meet you. Uh, so if you're interested, consider joining the server. There's a link to the Discord in my bio. I would love to see you there. Yeah, what's up? You have for me? Let's get the source. Where is it? Let's see it. Can you hear me? Uh, not when you're off the app. What's the BBC Science Focus? What was before the big? Every, everything you need to know. But I mean, you, you could just look up. Do, do majority of scientists believe that time and space had a beginning? And it's going to say yes. Like, you could just look that up. Play out on Google. Oh, wait. So it's, so this is like a completely speculative piece, the one you're citing, because nobody actually knows what happened before the Big Bang. But all the evidence that is currently available, the new evidence, like when was this article published? Uh, I can't really find the date of this article. Uh, but evidence that's like from within, like, just a couple of months ago, seems to indicate that there was a big bounce and that there's going to be a big crunch. Okay, well, all right. Well, I would, I would just say that the evidence points to time and space having a beginning. And that's what Stephen Hawking believed. Like, I don't really care about, like, appeals to authority. I would say majority of scientists believe that. I don't really care about appeals to authority. All right, all right. Well, well, actually, no, this is like really easy because I can actually just like, this, there's, I have an argument for this anyway. Okay. Um, so I'm going to tell you that, uh, so creation requires time. Here's why. I'm going to give you five premises. You need to reject one, otherwise, time can't be created. So, um, creation is a change of states. A change of states is a change. A change requires a before and after. A before and after requires a past, present, and future. And a past, present, and future requires time. Which of these five premises do you disagree with? I don't understand. Yeah, just like reject a premise. So otherwise, time can't be created. Otherwise, yeah, wait, wait, let me, let me, let me help you understand. So otherwise, we have, um, that that creation requires time, which means time can't be created because in order to create time, would already need to exist. Oh, I actually disagree with that one because I believe that God exists outside of time. Yeah, yeah. So which premise do you reject? The, the idea, the, the one that you just said were that's, that's the conclusion. That's the conclusion. Which premise do you reject? Dexter, thank you so much for the 10 subscriptions. Welcome to the community, everyone who got it. Let's get a Big W Dexter down in the comment section. Appreciate you. So can you repeat each single one again? Yeah, so creation is a change of states. A change of states is a change. A change requires a before and after. A before and after requires a past, present, and future. A change. What do you mean a change requires a before and? Okay, yeah. So you have a before state and an after state. Okay. And then what's the next one? Um, uh, a before and after requires a past, present, and future. A past, present, and future requires time. Well, the, the one that you said before the last one. I believe that God exists outside of the dimension of time. So you think that, you think that a change does not, or that, uh, so you think before and after does not imply a past, present, and future? How can you have a before and after if you don't have past, present, and future? Well, we know that time is a dimension, right? Isn't time like the fourth dimension? How do you think that that answers my question? Well, I believe that God exists outside of the dimension of. That's different than the answer you gave. But how do you think that this answers my question? Because you're, what do you mean? Yeah, so, so I'm just asking you on what basis do you reject that before and after? If, if you have a before and after, then you have a past, present, and future. Yeah, so I believe. How can you have a before and after if you don't have a past, present, and future? Well, I believe that God exists outside of time. And he sees all of time as like, in one glance. That's not an answer to the question. The question again: How can you have a before and after if you cannot have, or if you do not have a past, present, and future? If he sees all of it in one glance, then that seems that there's no before and after. Yeah, so God is. So then this isn't a rejection of this principle. It's not the fact that you're giving me is unrelated. By your own admission. Yes, I believe that just God exists outside of time. Perfect. So then what? So we agree that what you said was unrelated to the premise. So which of these five premises do you reject? The, the one before the last one, which, yeah, so, and I, and I'll ask you again, why do you reject it? Well, I, because you're basically saying that, you know, God can't exist outside of time. Is that? That's not what I'm saying at all. Do you, wait, can you, wait, wait, can you tell me, do you even know what premise you rejected? What was the fourth premise you said? That, um, you have no idea. Well, yeah, yeah. I mean, you kind of rejecting a, rejecting a premise you don't even know. No, I just, I forgot it. You kind of put me on the spot. The premise again was just, uh, a before and after. If you have a before and after, then you also have a past, present, and future. Oh, okay. Yeah. If you have a before and after, you have a past, present. So, yeah, you're saying that time cannot be created because to have a before and after, you need a past, present, and future. No, no, no. Wait, wait. Let's just take it. Forget all the rest of the conversation. Just focus on this one premise. Why is this one premise not true? What, how is it possible to have a before and after if you don't have a past, present, and future? And, and you're talking about in terms of like time being created, right? It doesn't matter. It's just the premise itself. How can you have a before and after, anywhere, at any time, like in any way? How can you have a before and after if you don't have a past, present, and future? I believe that in terms of like, in this universe. But I believe that God exists outside of time. Yeah. And how does that? But you've already said that that explanation doesn't relate to the premise. Yeah. So, wait, wait. We are, we are presupposing that something has a before and after. So let's say that event A has occurred and it had a before and after. JoJo, thank you so much for the Corgi. Appreciate that. Appreciate you. How is it possible to have a, a before and after if you do not have a past, present, and future? Can you give me an example of something that is a before and after, but doesn't have a past, present, and future? So everything has a before and after, past, present, future, except for God. Wait, wait, wait. I'm asking you, can you give me a thing that has a, a before and after, but does not have a past, present, and future? You need to give me something that has a before and after, but does not have a past, present, or future. Otherwise, you're forced to accept. Then you would accept that if you have a before and after, then you also have a past, present, and future. [Music] Um, so I would say that God exists outside of time. That doesn't. What was the question that I just asked you? If you have a before and an after, you have a past, present, and future. Yeah, so could you provide me with a thing that does not have a before, or that has a before and after, but does not have a past, present, or future? God. Oh, so what's God's before and after? What do you mean? What's his before and after? Yeah, so what's God's before and after? I mean, he's just, he's eternal. He never changes. Yeah, so then God does not have a before and after. So this is, this is, this is another example that proves my point. You can't provide me anything that has a before and after, but does not have a past, present, and future. Okay, so does this AR, is this whole argument saying that time cannot be created? Yes, that's the conclusion. Yeah, but you need to reject a premise, otherwise this is like walking to the top of the of a staircase and then claiming that you're not on the top of the of the staircase. You need to reject a premise, otherwise you need to accept the conclusion that time, or that time cannot be created. Yeah, I mean, this is, it's kind of a tricky one. Um, H, so everything with a before and an after has a past, present. So, but, but you're saying everything with a before and an after. So if you're saying time is eternal, there is no before and after to time. Time is infinite. So it doesn't apply to something that has a before and an after. So it doesn't apply to something that there's like before and afters present in time, but time itself has always existed. Okay, all right, all right. So I guess we disagree with the fact that time, you know, we disagree with the fact that time and space were created. And we disagree with the fact that life. Wait, wait, but you can't disagree with that if you disagree with that, then reject a premise. If you can't reject a premise, then you can't disagree with it. I, I don't see how these premises point to the fact that time cannot be created. So do you, do you understand how these premises, the conclusion is that creation requires time, that time must exist in order for creation to occur? No. Okay, cool. So I'll walk you through that. So, uh, let's go through the premises. So it starts with creation is a change of states. A change of states is a change. A change requires a before and after. A before and after requires a past, present, and future. A past, present, and future requires time. So we have, via a chain of requirements, we have that creation requires time. Well, not, not if God exists outside of time. So which premise do you reject? You're saying that creation requires time, but I believe that God exists. Which premise do you reject? The, the fact that the one that you just said were for something to be created, there needs t time. I believe that God ex. That's the conclusion. That's not a premise. Well, this is like walking to the top of the staircase and then saying I'm not on top of the staircase. I reject the conclusion. Just because God is the only being. Goa. So you accept, you accept all of the premises and then you reject the conclusion. Yeah, cuz I mean, they don't apply to God. Which he exists outside. Reject a premise. Which, which of these premises don't apply to God? Yeah, all of these premises apply to like us, but they don't apply to God. Which of these? Wait, so, so, uh, in God's view, a change of states isn't a change? No, we're just talking about the ones in terms of time. Yeah, they're all in terms of time. Change requires time. But from God's perspective, does a change of states require a change? Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. That does. Perfect. So then that one's true to God. From God's perspective, is creation to change of states, is the same before and after he creates? Yeah, yeah. Yep. So, uh, is there, um, when God creates, is there a before and after? Yeah, in the creation. Yeah, yeah. Perfect. So from, from God's perspective, when he creates, uh, for, for a before and after, as we agreed earlier, there's also a past, present, and future. Yeah, yeah. Within time. Yeah, within time. Yeah, yeah. Perfect. So time, in order to create, you need time to exist, which means God can't create time because cre, because time would need to precede creation. I will, I believe that he exists outside of time. So which premise do you reject? You're all of those premises apply within our universe, within. And which doesn't apply outside of our universe? The fact that God exists outside of time and he created time. Do you think the fact that God existed outside of time and that he created time is a premise to my argument? What do you mean? I asked you to reject a premise. Which premise do you reject? Which premise doesn't apply to God? What premise? What premise would you say? Uh, so what I just said, the fact that God exists outside of time and he created time. What does that disagree with? Which, because it doesn't reject a premise. It doesn't, it doesn't disagree with any of the premises. Oh, okay. Okay. Well, I just said that God, God created time, right? Yeah. And I'm telling you that he can't do that. Which the argument that you have been incapable of refuting concludes with the fact that God cannot do that. Which premise disagrees with the fact that God exists outside of time and he created time? None of them. Well, so, so they all, wait, wait, they all disagree with the idea that he created time. None of them implicate his atemporality. He can be a temporal and also have time. He just can't have created time. Time needs to have always existed. Why? Because of the argument. Because it can't have a beginning. Why? Because if a beginning, then it's a. So a beginning is a change of states. And then the rest of the argument is the same. Because the beginning is a change of. So, yeah, for something to begin, there's there's a change in states. So, yeah, it, so it went from not existing to existing. Yeah, a change. Yeah, yeah. Okay, well, I guess I, I guess I don't, I'm not really understanding how like the premises that you state kind of disprove the fact that God exists outside of time and he created time. Because I mean, of course that's possible. Of course it is possible for God to exist outside of time and to have created time. Like, just because you're claiming these premises that exist, like that apply to us, that doesn't mean that it applies to God who exists outside of time. Yeah. Do you, well, wait, so which premises don't apply to God? Whichever. Well, I would say whichever one you said that means it's, it's whichever one that you said means that it's impossible for time to be created, or that's the conclusion. What you're referring, what you're taking issue with is the conclusion. You know, I, I agree that Socrates is a man, and I agree that all men are mortal, but I don't know, like, all this is Socrates is Mortal stuff, I'm not too sure. Like, you can't accept all of the premises and then reject the conclusion. Okay, so which premises that you stated pretty much proves that not have a begin, like a staircase. Okay, okay. Well, I mean, I would, I would disagree. And on what grounds? I believe that you're just going to reject the conclusion again. You need to reject a premise. I don't think that those premises kind of point to the fact that, you know, God can exist outside of time and that he could have created time. So they point to the fact that he couldn't create time. They don't make any statements, any mention about whether he can exist outside of time. That's not really what this argument is interested in. Okay, well, I, I guess I don't really understand the argument. I guess the argument is that he couldn't create time because time must always exist, otherwise you would have a change as time comes into existence, but change itself requires time. So you're saying that for time to come into existence, there would have to be time before time. Yes, exactly. Precisely. Which is why it can't come into existence. You can say God exists outside of time. You can just have like two eternal things. You can say time existed forever, and that God existed forever. Well, I don't. I just know that there's plenty of scientists, including Stephen Hawking, that believe that time has a beginning. I would, I would impale Stephen Hawking on this argument. Stephen Hawking couldn't find a premise to reject either, I bet. All right, well, I mean, yeah, I guess, I mean, I guess I guess that's kind of my fault for not really understanding like fully what you're saying. So could I move on to a different argument and why I believe in Christianity? Well, we've just been talking for a while, so, um, probably got to move on to the next guest really quickly. Like, give me like one minute. Yeah, go for it. Okay, so the reason why I believe in Christianity is that, well, we know for a fact that Jesus was crucified. That's a historical fact recorded by first century Roman and Jewish historians. Would you, would you say that that's right? Uh, I'm, I can say sure. I don't know. Well, it is. It is a historical fact that Jesus was crucified. All, all scholars would would agree that this is. I'll, I don't think all scholars would agree to that, but I'll take your word for it. Yeah, I mean, you can, you can look it up later. And it's also historic. I've already looked it up and I know that there's lots of scholars who even reject that Jesus existed at all. I'd say that like that's less than 1%. I heard that the statistic is 98.8% scholars believe that Jesus was crucified and he died on the cross. Uh, maybe. But they're still going to be scholars who don't think he existed at all. But that's fine. I can. Yes, let's say Jesus like died and died on the cross. Sure. Go for it. It's also a historical fact that the apostles, the original disciples, were all brutally martyred. Not over faith, but over claiming to have seen Jesus risen from the grave. Prove it. That's that's a historical fact too. That's recorded, recorded as a part of history. It's in, it's written by, it's written by Josephus. The, the, the martyrdom of the. Sure. Isn't it? Is that. Wait, so can you even name the book that Josephus wrote? Antiquities of the Jews. Yeah. So what page in Antiquities of the Jews is that going to be? I, I don't know the page, but he, he wrote about it. Most certainly does not say that it records of the martyrdom of James. Oh, it doesn't do that. So could you, could you point that out to me? It does. Yeah, could you show me? Look it up. Wait, wait. And is it, is it martyrdom on the basis that he said that Jesus resurrected? Does it specify that? Yeah, yeah. So show it. I believe so. There's three to the best of my knowledge about the historical facts. There's like three that were pretty sure were murdered. We have literally no evidence that they died because they claimed that Jesus had resurrected. Yeah, you can look it up. I've, I've already looked up. I've read books on this. I, I just looked it up. Yeah. Wait, so what's your source then? Are you asking about like the specific page number? Sure. Yeah, for Antiquities of the Jews. Yeah, so if I, if I do like, yeah, I mean, I, I'm just trying to. So if I, so if I control that. Andrew, thank you so much for the $5 on Venmo. Let's get a W Andrew in the comment section. Appreciate that. So I mean, if you could just look it up, I mean, you'll find it. Like, yeah, I'm looking it up right now. What I'm looking at, um, I, I have a PDF of the Antiquities of the Jews pulled up on my computer right now. Now I have control F with the word resurrect. Or do you want? Wait, wait, which which word do you want me to control F? That would say that the, the died, uh, uh, for to protect the lie that Jesus had resurrected. I mean, it's, it writes that he was stoned for refusing to denounce Jesus. Yeah, so where in that is there a resurrection? I mean, they all preach the resurrection. Prove it. Pro. What do you mean, prove it? Like, prove you not understand the question. Prove that they believed in that was literally the whole focal point of Christianity. Yeah, that that like. Wait, so which book was written by James again? Oh, he didn't. He didn't write a book. He was the brother, the half-brother of Jesus. Yeah. Perfect. So prove that James preached the the resurrection. That's literally what all Christians at the time were preaching. It. I mean, I guess, I mean, that's that's what the, the four Gospels say. Yeah, so the Gospels are going to be wildly unreliable and self-contradictory. Could you tell me, so I have a question about the, the day that, uh, Jesus was killed. Was it before Passover or after Passover? Uh, I actually, I think it was right after Passover. Oh, uh, because if it's after Passover, I'm pretty sure the, the first three would disagree with you. Maybe it's the, maybe it's the fourth one that would disagree with you. They disagree on when he was killed. Yeah, they disagree on the date of his death. Yeah. Are you sure? What's, what's? Yes, because, well, yeah, because like the Last Supper, like the Passover supper. So I think in the, the first three, it's after, or maybe it's before. No, I think it's before for the first three, and then the last one, it happens after. Don't think there's a contradiction there. I've never heard of that. Wait, so you don't think that there's a contradiction saying that this person was killed on this day, and then another person says that they were killed on this day? Can you be killed on two different days? No, I don't. I don't think that it actually states a difference. Like, where's your, where's the evidence of that? Well, yeah, so the Last Supper is like literally like the Passover supper. I, I mean, like, give me the verses where it contradicts. Yep, the, the time of death, date of Jesus' death. Um, I don't want the hour, I want the day. Um, okay, so we [Music] have. Okay, so in the, the synoptics, in Mark 14:12, Matthew 26:17, and Luke 22:15, um, uh, they have the Passover meal as the Last Supper. Um, whereas in the Gospel of John, um, uh, boop, boop, boop. Oh, so then they led Jesus from the house. It was the early morning. They themselves did not enter the governor's quarters so that they would not be defiled but could eat the Passover. So, um, the, so Passover happens, um, so it seems like, so Gos, or so John is before Passover, whereas Mark, Matthew, Luke say that it happens after Passover. So which one is it? So I just, I just looked it up and it says that, hold up. So it says that John didn't actually say it was the day of of Passover, but John says that it was the day of preparation for the Passover. So that's not like a real contradiction. Yeah, so it was before Passover, whereas these ones, the other ones are after Passover. This is like literally my exact point. That according to John, it's before, like the, the crucifixion happens before, whereas according to Mark, Matthew, and Luke, it happens after. Probably because large parts of Matthew and Luke are copied straight from John. So I just read that John, or from Mark, rather. I just, I just read that it says that John and Mark agree that it was the day before the, before the Sabbath. I mean, that's just what I read online. Yeah. Wait, wait, so, so but is it before Passover or after Passover? I just want to know the day. The day before the Sabbath. Yeah. Wait, so, so, um, on Mark 15:25, it says Jesus was crucified at 9:00 a.m. on Passover, whereas in John 19:14, Jesus is crucified on the preparation day. So which one is it? Was he crucified on Passover or the preparation day? I don't know. I haven't, I haven't really looked into. Gotcha. So why would I accept your Gospels if they're contradictory? I don't, I don't think there's a contra. Okay, after this live, I'm going to look into this supposed contradiction. I've just never heard of it. I've never done research on this, but I don't think that there's a contradiction there. But you don't think that there's, you don't think that there's a contradiction involved in dying on this day and also dying the day after? You don't think that these are contradictory accounts? No, I, no, I think that there's a misunderstanding on your part that I need to look on my. So, yeah, so what's the misunderstanding on my part? That that John and Mark both agree that he died the day before the Sabbath. Oh, yeah. Wait, okay, so why in, um, why in, so Mark, Jesus is crucified, according to Mark 15:25, the crucifixion happens on 9:00 a.m. on Passover, but according to John 19:14, Jesus is crucified on the preparation day. So which is it? Okay, I don't, I'm not sure. I'm going to look into this more. But the, the fact of the matter is that all scholars agree that the disciples were martyred based on the claim that they saw Jesus risen from the grave. Yeah, wait, so, so name the scholar who's, who believes this. Can you name, can you name like three scholars who believe this? I'll look it up right now. Wait, wait, wait. You, so you're citing all scholars, but you can't name. You can't even name one scholar. Why would I accept the claim that all scholars believe this when you can't even cite a single scholar? Cuz I, I haven't looked into the names of the scholars, but you can look it up. How do you know that all scholars think this then? Majority. I've already looked this up. Read entire books on this. This is not a settled issue. All I'm going to look. Damn, as we as we wait for bro to like Google his argument. All right, well, I'll just, I'll just leave it at that. But I do believe that the majority of scholars agree that Jesus was, or that the disciples were martyred based on what they saw, not based on faith, but over actually their claim of Jesus risen from the grave. Name, name two scholars who think that. Well, I'm trying to look it up, but then you're giving me crap for because you can't, because you can't make the claim that all scholars believe this. So what's your, what's your evidence that all scholars believe this? Majority, majority of scholars. I'm looking at. That's a, so that's a W concession from your original claim. But what's your evidence that the majority of scholars believe that they were martyred for what they saw? Make sure you're double tapping on that screen. Let's get all the way up to 50k likes. Make sure you're dropping a follow as well. I found, I found three scholars. I found Sean. Wait, wait, because now, so if you're, if you're Googling it, if you're Googling it, I don't want. Wait, wait. I don't want three scholars anymore because if you're Googling it, if you have to Google it because you did not know, then what I want now is the evidence that the majority of scholars believe that he was murdered, or that they were murdered because of the resurrection. Okay, I'll, I'll look that up now. I don't know. What are we doing? What should, what shall? Maybe I'll, maybe I'll scope out the guest request. Okay, so I actually just found a scholarly written article. It's titled, it's titled, Did the Apo, Did the Apostles Really Die as Martyrs for Their Faith? Yeah, so could you, and this article, this article demonstrates that the majority of scholars agree that he was martyred for his faith. What do you mean? Because that's the claim you're trying to prove. Is that the majority of scholars think that, uh, the the disciples died because they were murdered for their faith? That's the claim you're trying to prove. So this article that you just cited proves that claim. I, yeah. Okay, cool. So, uh, dive for their faith. Yeah, let's look at it. Um, uh, the one from Biola University by Sean McDowell. Yeah, it pretty much lists all the evidence for, I think each, I think it lists all the evidence for each of the martyrdoms. Interestingly enough, when I control F the word majority, there are zero results. So if I will there be even one result if I control F Search the word scholar, or is this just a source that you didn't actually read that you don't actually know? And also apparently Sean McDowell isn't a scholar. Good to know. Justin, appreciate that. Theologian. I didn't know this. I don't know who these people are. Oh, it literally, it's the only s. That's like really embarrassing. This person's only source is literally just the Bible. That's a circular argument. He's using the Bible to prove the Bible. Well, I mean, I know that the martyrdom is recorded in by Josephus and by the Clement of Rome and yeah, but it's, but what's not included in these accounts is the like the resurrection. That it was done for the resurrection. Done for the resurrection. Thank you so much for the $3 on Venmo. Let's get a W Lena in the comment section. Appreciate that. Well, that would be. Okay, well, that would be why they were being persecuted because they were preaching the resurrection. Prove it. All right. I mean, that's kind of, isn't that like a historical fact that, you know, the. Sure, isn't it? It's not a historical fact that the early Christians believed in the resurrection. Not these. They didn't. No evidence. All right, well, I guess I, I don't want to waste too much more of your time, but, you know, I, I appreciate, you know, you, you letting me on here and in our conversation. You know, I think that you're, that you're a cool dude, man. God bless. Thank you. Appreciate you coming on up here. Yeah, let's get a keep on double tapping on that screen, sharing it with your friends, all those good stuff, all those good things as we go to the very next guest. If you want to support the stream, the Venmo is allegedly Dash, and the Cash App is just allegedly. And what's up? True, how's it going? Hi, how are you doing? Well, how old are you? 39. Yeah. And what religion are you? I'm a Christian. Yeah. Perfect. So what's your strongest argument that does not involve personal experience for why God exists? Um, well, you see, we got morals. I'm a pretty moral man. I get them from the Bible, most and foremost. And atheists don't have no, don't have no morals. Oh, that's not true. I think that, well, so for example, like the majority of ethicists are are atheists. Like the people who literally study morality as like an academic discipline are are atheists. So that doesn't seem to be the case. Well, how do you ground your morals without? I mean, I would, I personally would ground my morals just in the objective fact of suffering as being qualitatively bad. Oh, no, you can't do that. I mean, why is it bad? Why not? Because it's qualitatively bad. It's like asking, like, well, why is the sky blue? It's qualitatively blue. Well, how do you tell it's bad? Something's. What's bad to you? Suffering. Well, yeah, suffering is qualitatively experienced as bad. Nope, that's wrong. Suffering is qualitatively experienced as blue. Well, I'm telling you that it is. It's quite literally in your brain. In your brain, it is quite literally the bad feeling. Blue is a color, correct? Whereas pain, it doesn't mean it's bad. There's nothing bad about the not pain body. Suffering feels pain. I'm not talking about pain. I'm talking about suffering. There's a specific neural pathway associated specifically with suffering. There's other ones that are associated with with pain and other senses, but that's not suffering. Agree. But suffering, simpliciter, ain't bad because bad is a subjective or, um, normative claim that this thing is bad. It is. I'm, and I'm telling you it is qualitatively bad in the same way that the sky is qualitatively blue. It's just experienced that way. So what then, what this logic leads to is a notion that anything that is suffering is always bad. Yeah. Well, so I'm just going to bottom it out in terms of, um, like actions that reduce suffering, all things considered, are going to be, uh, preferable to actions that promote suffering, all things considered. When I work out and I feel suffering in my muscles, does that mean it's bad? Feel pain. You don't feel suffering, right? Is that pain bad, even though it's helping me? I don't think. I don't think pain is bad. I think suffering is bad. Well, exactly. Suffering is subjective. What you deem is is suffering is subjective. Is the fact that an individual experiences suffering as is indicated by a biological fact about their brain? Do you think biological facts about brains are subjective or objective? There is nothing about the brain that says suffering is bad. Let's not be a Wheeling wall. Do that's not an answer to my question. Do you remember what my question was? Hold on, sir. Hold on. Do you remember what my question was? Hold on, boy. Hold on. You're not answering my question. Go back. Let's not, let's not be a a running Randall. Let's just answer the question. Okay, what's your question? You don't even remember what the question was. Do you think biological facts are objective or subjective? They're ob. Well, they're objective. Yeah. So it is a biological fact whether or not an individual is suffering. There's a biological fact that pain is there, but there's no biological fact that says that pain is bad. It's not pain, for like the seventh time, it's suffering. The bad thing isn't pain, it's suffering. How do you, how do you tell someone suffering biologically? Oh, yes. So we tell this just because of the, the specific neural pathway that's associated with it. There's are there are others that are associated with. No, not pain, suffering. Because there are others that are associated with pain, but it activates a more like dopamine-centric, uh, neural pathway. For example, if you do like BDSM, that doesn't activate the suffering neural pathway. It activates like the dopamine, uh, pain neural pathway, which is cor, is correlated to pain, which is correlated to pain. Yes, exactly. Precisely. So suffering, so suffering is not pain. Exactly. I'm glad you got it. So you're exactly, you're gauging pain, you're gauging somebody's suffering on their pain. No, on the neural pathway.

That's associated with the suffering, not the pain. Because there's multiple neural pathways that are associated with pain, there's only one neural pathway that's associated with suffering.

How do you tell someone's suffering without pain? I'm not so. Suffering involves pain, but not all. All suffering involves pain, but not all pain involves suffering. How do you tell someone suffering if they're not in pain? I'm telling you that that's not a case. All suffering, way, all suffering involves pain. Pain involving something as suffering as correlated with pain. I don't think you're understanding. So, do you, when I say, when I say, "All squares are rectangles, but not all rectangles are squares," do you know what I'm talking about there? Yeah. Okay. So, what I'm saying is that there's like subsets. This is just one type of pain, but there are others.

Pain itself is not the bad thing. Pain is not the bad feeling. Suffering is the bad feeling, right? But without the pain, you don't know someone's suffering. No, because all suffering is is the activation of the neural pathway of suffering. Yeah. So, but that's not. Wait, wait. But that's not. That's not. That's not. That's not pain. That's not pain. That's the suffering pathway, right? So, what about that suffering in the neural pathway tells that person or you that it's bad?

Okay, I'm glad we were capable of moving off of this. So, because we can objectively identify whether somebody is suffering, uh, and we know that suffering is qualitatively experienced. Objectively tell so much suffering because it is qualitatively experienced as bad. Where, where in that neural pathway does it say that that suffering is bad? Yeah. So, it's just going to be based on the overcoming continually of the specific action potential threshold via the the ratio of sodium to potassium. That's all you're describing are the the neural pathways. You're not describing the badness. There's no objective badness in suffering.

Well, that's like. That's like looking at the neural pathway that lights up when you see blue and asking, "How do you know that this is the blue neural pathway?" We know that it's the blue neural pathway because we know that it activates whenever somebody's. That's not analogous. That's because we know. We know that this is the suffering neural pathway. Know. Wait, wait. Because we know that it activates every time someone suffers. Nope. That's not analogous. You said no. Prove it. Because. Wait. Prove that this pathway activates. Because in your view, you're injecting some normative notion of badness where it's not there. All there is. It's qualitatively there. The qualitative data is the the neural pathway. Do you think that there's. But it's not the. It's not the badness of that suffering. I don't think you know what qualitative means. Because if you're just like setting the neural pathway and being like, "Well, that's just like, you know, the qualitative part of it is the neural pathway itself." No, the qualitative part of it is the experience. In the same way that looking at the sky is qualitatively blue, suffering is experienced as qualitatively bad. No, whatever. The experience alone doesn't demonstrate something's bad. But this. But suffering is qualitatively experienced bad. Badness is a subjective claim about our experiences. Badness is a subjective claim. Well, no, it's not. It is a. It is a phenomenological claim about our experiences. And then all you're doing here are tying your experience directly with bad. So, every experience of suffering is bad. Is that. This is what that. There is. That there follows. Wait, wait. That you, when you experience suffering, you are experiencing badness. That there is an innate badness present in the phenomenological experience of. Molecule. Where's the badness? Where's the badness? Molecule in your worldview. Okay, great. Wait, wait, wait. Can you. Can you point to the badness molecule in your world, sir? You. Wait, wa. Wait, wait, wait. Hold on. Wait, wait, hold on. Wait, wait, hold on. Wait, wa. Wait, wait, wait. Hold on. I'm not going to let you pivot away from this. Where's the badness molecule in your worldview? God. Oh, you think God is a molecule? And you think God is bad? God is a. God is bad. God is a non-physical substance. Gotcha. So, so God is one, not a molecule, and two, not bad. Good. One. Well, I'm sorry. Sure. But God. You can just drop the accent if you. When God is present, he's good. There is goodness. When he's not present, it's badness. Evil. Badness is the privation of good in God. Now. So, when you said. Wa. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Hold. I'm not going to. I'm not going to let you be a wheeling and dealing through about this. I'm not going to let you pivot away. You said that there is a badness particle, a badness molecule present in your world. In my worldview. Or that there's no bad molecule present in my worldview. So, I'm going to ask you again, what is the badness molecule that's present in your worldview? God. I already explained to you. God. Yeah. So, wait. In what way is God the badness molecule? What do you mean when you say badness molecule? When God is present, he. There is goodness. Can you give a definition? Badness. Can I get a definition of of badness molecule? See, I never claimed that I have a badness molecule. You asked me where mine, where the mole in my worldview was. Excuse me, sir. I have an objective standard as to what's good or bad, and that's in God. Wa. Wait. So, I'm. I'm asking you. You have. There ain't nothing about neural pathways that say it's bad. Wait. But I'm asking you because you asked me where is the badness molecule in my worldview. Can I get a definition for that term? Because clearly that's your standard. So, I just want to make sure. Wait, wait. So, so it's. If it's not your standard, then why did you ask me? I. You. How do you know that certain. Why did you ask me? Why did you ask me about a badness molecule if that's not your standard? Because your claim is that there are objective good and bad things. So, can I get a definition of badness molecule? Uh, a substance that tells you that it's bad or good independently of any other. Okay. Wait. So, so just like a moral defining substance. Do you think bless is like a substance? Yeah. Okay. Then I'd just say that badness is like a substance, right? So, where in the neural pathway is the badness? Where in the neural pathway is the bless? Well, bless is a particular pathway. Yeah. Badness is a particular pathway as well. Okay. Then if. If that's the case, then every pathway that it. That is the particular one that you deem as suffering is going to be bad. Even in the case of people who who work out and their muscles get bigger. Even though the same neural pathway is initiated. It's not the same neural pathway initiated. That one's associated. Wait. Prove it. Wait. Prove it. Wait. Prove it. Prove it. Well, when every time you exercise, sir, your muscles are in pain because they're sore. They're. They're literally being destroyed. Your muscle fibers. So, so can you. You said that. You said that it's the same neural pathway. Could you tell me what the name of the neural pathway is? No. Acceptors. Yeah. Wait. But what's the name of the neural. Are the same? That that tell you that. Wait, wait, wait. I'm not going to let you pivot away from this. You said it wasn't the same neural. What's the name of the of the pathway again? It's. It's. What's the technical. You made a technical claim. So, I just want to test to see if you're just talking out of your ass or if you actually know things. Can you tell me the. Can you tell me neural pathway? Yeah. I could. But I'm asking you right now. It's a. It's a quiz for you, big dog. Big dog. It's a quiz for you. Do you know what the name is? I don't need to know the name to know that it's still the same pain, sir. Yeah, but it's. It's not the same pain. It's pain, but it's not suffering. So, I'm asking, how do. So, then how do you know it's not the same pain? Because I know that it activates a different neural pathway. Because the one that's activated during working out is not the suffering pathway. That doesn't mean it's not. It's not the. It's not pain, sir. It's. It's not the suffering pathway. What's activated is the dopamine. Suffering pathway. Oh, wait. So, you would just reject all of neuroscience then? Well, I'm sorry, sir, but there are different types of pathways that can lead to the same. To the same pain. And that's why I. Your view doesn't make no sense. Wait. Prove it. Prove what? Prove it. The claim that you just made. Prove it. That pain happens in different regions of the brain. Oh, no. But. But just that the. The suffering pathway is activated during times when you're not suffering. Suffering. The point I'm trying to make to you is that suffering is subjective. What, what one person deems a suffering as being bad is subjective. If I work out and I feel pain, that's still good to me because I'm stronger. But that's not going to be the case though, right? Because it's the same neural pathway in both cases. Why does that matter? The point is, do. Do you think that. Do you think that a thing being the same is the same as it being different? Really? No. Under your. Under your. You can just drop the accent. No one cares. Under your view, you think that, um, pain is always bad or suffering is always bad, right? Well, I think that suffering carries a qualitative badness to it, which you're just designating as some kind of pathway, right? In the brain. Yes. That this is. It is objectively correlated to this pathway. Yeah. Right. So, the point is that there are very similar pathways in the brain that lead to pain too. And what you would have to consider those bad, where such as working. You would have to be committed to saying that working out is bad. But my. My standard isn't pain, it's suffering. And suffering is not. The suffering pathway isn't present during something like working out. So, let's say they're suffering still, right? But that person would say it's still good. But I'm telling you that there isn't suffering that, like, when you're working out. That's not active. Like the suffering. Dopamine. They're still suffering. Your muscle fibers are literally being destroyed. Wait. But that doesn't activate the neural pathway involved with suffering. There's. There's a pain response, certainly. There's certainly a pain response. Pain response. Yeah. Responses. Pain. Does pain is not the same thing as suffering. You can be in pain for a variety of reasons. So, like, let's say. Can't say that pain or indicates, uh, suffering all the time. And say that. I didn't say that pain indicates suffering. You can't say that there's some kind of independent way of verifying somebody is suffering and that suffering is bad. The. The specific suffering is going to be the neural pathway itself. Okay. It is. It is one to one directly bad. That doesn't tell us that it's bad. It's qualitatively experienced as bad. Like the sky is qualitatively experienced as blue. No, there's nothing about the experience that says it's a bad or good one. Wait. So, you think that when people suffer, you think that there's like no badness present in this experience? That they don't experience that's your claim? It's present in the experience itself. It's just going to be analytic. So, where in the experience of suffering does it tell you that it's bad, independent of anybody's opinion? Where in the experience of bless does it tell you that it's blue, independent of anybody's opinion? It's disanalogous because blue is not a moral claim. Blue is an analytical. Blue is not a moral claim. It's. It's a synthetic claim. But why would that make it? It's true every single time. Blue is the same in the brain. When it comes to suffering, there's nothing about suffering that's bad. Oh, wait. So, if you're. If you're. The distinction you're drawing here is that blue is synthetic, but my badness is analytic. Then this actually just slam dunks on you. Because if you're. If you're saying that it's. If you're saying that it's analytic, then that's just going to be definitionally true. I never claimed that morals are not analytically. Oh, yeah. Wait. So, then what's the distinction? What's the distinction between bless and and and, uh, like the badness present in suffering? Oh, there's no. There's no badness present in biologic. So, can I. Is there bless present in our brain? In our brain biologically? Yes. Bless is a particular configuration of neuro. Uh, charges. But when it comes to badness, there is no such thing. Well, I'm saying that badness is one to one analogous with the experience of suffering. Well, that can't be the case because there are. There are instances where suffering is good or bad, right? So, there's nothing about the suffering itself that is that designates it being bad or good. So, the instances where suffering is going to be considered good, um, are going to be when it reduces a long-term, like badness. So, like, we could say that, like, the, even if there's like suffering present in, like, getting a shot at the doctor's office, that's fine because it prevents, like, the suffering of getting, like, super ill. Yeah. So, now you're injecting some kind of normative, uh, theory to that, right? Yeah. You're. You're doing that subjectively. You're. Again, you're not. You're not actually addressing that the. The big question here as to why is certain. Why are. Why is suffering or experiences of suffering bad? You can't answer that. Well, yes, because it's going to be qualitatively experienced as such. But that doesn't. That experience. There's nothing about the experience itself that tells us something is bad or good. Wait. So, is there anything about the experience of seeing blue that tells you whether or not, like, bless is present? Oh, my God. Why do you keep doing this? Blue is because it's one to one analogous. No, it's not. Because what's the disanalogy? Badness is not present in biologically. Bless is. Wait, wait. So, where is bless present biologically? And I already explained this to you, right? Bless is a particular configuration of neural. Neural properties. As is badness. Nope. Where's the badness? Or where's the. Where's the goodness in a particular neural pathway? It. I don't. I don't make any claims about goodness. All I make claims. I'm still working out my theory of goodness. But right now, I just told that, like, uh, suffering is one to one equivalent to badness. And that's sufficient for grounding, like, some moral. Then you'd be committed to saying that, uh, working out is bad. No, because, uh, presumably it creates. So, first of all, I have no evidence that working out is considered suffering. It can be pain, but pain is not suffering. Okay. So, there's no amount of pain that would indicate suffering to you. Uh, if the. So, what's the only thing that's going to indicate suffering to me is just like the activation of the neural pathway associated with it. For example. Wait, wait. So, for example. Now you're being inconsistent, okay? Because you. Wa. Wait, there. So, what's the inconsistency? Well, you said before that pain indicates suffering. I never said that. In fact, I didn't say that pain is always present in suffering. But that's not the same thing as pain indicating suffering. Well, in fact, you said before that pain is always present in suffer. Yes. But that's not the same thing as pain indicating suffering. Wait. So, this is like. So, wait, wait. So, being a rectangle is always indicated by being a square. But that doesn't mean that being a rectangle is the same thing as being a square. What? Okay. So, I'll say that. Wait. I'll run that one. I'll run that one. I'll run that one more time. Your position. Yeah. Wait. So, so being square. Being a square is always going to entail being a rectangle. But being a rectangle does not necessarily entail being a square. Uh, pain or. So, so suffering is always going to entail some kind of pain. But pain does not always entail suffering. Okay. So, pain does not always entail suffering, right? Yep. Okay. So, so there we go again. Um, you're back to this question, how do you know suffering on its own is bad or good in any situation where there's no pain? How do we know that suffering is. Uh, there. You. I don't think that you can have. I don't think you can have suffering without pain. That would be unusual. Well, you can have suffering without pain. I think, uh, people being emotionally disturbed. Right. Emotionally. There's like emotional pain there. Yeah. Then you can call that pain. So, now again, what you're. You're falling back here is saying saying that pain is now associated or at least very linked, very closely linked to to suffering. Uh, yeah. So, no, I mean, in so far as like being a square is like closely linked to like being a rectangle, like that's not really. Look, I agree with you that pain is linked to suffering. But the problem is that there's nothing about the. The suffering or experience or even pain itself that tells us this is bad or good. And that's why I don't think objectivity can be. You can't hold this, you know, objective morality. But I've explained this to you like, like eight or nine times that there's a qualitative experience. In the same way this guy's qualitatively blue. I'm just going to hold that pain and suffering is qual. Or not pain. Not pain. That suffering is qualitatively bad. Look, I agree that suffering is a qualitative experience. But again, outside of that experience, there's nothing that is independent of our, um, stances that tells us that suffering is bad. Well, and I agree. Like bless is a qualitative experience. But there's nothing outside of our senses that tells us when things are. When something is, like, qualitatively blue. Also, there is something that tells you because there is, like, the suffering itself. Can the suffering neural pathway as objective? You can trace bless into specific configurations of neuronal patterns in the brain. You can't do that with badness. Yes, you can. You can trace it to the suffering pathway. But then there you are again, equivocating suffering with bad. You can't do that. Wait. That's that's L. Just questioning. That's the definition. It's. It's not question begging. It's analytic. That's the problem, right? You can't make analytical claims about empirical things. You can't say, "Oh, well, this, uh, biological phenomenon means it's bad by definition." Well, that's. That's question begging. Your. Your view of meta-ethics. Wait. So, so could you. Could you. Let's apply the same thing to bless then. So, do we know that the thing that we see is blue? Is blue? How do we know that the sky is blue? Look at the brain. Bluef. But how do we. How do we attach the label bless to that? Because if you say by definition, then, then [ __ ] you can't find any disanalogies between these views. You'd have to say that nobody has ever seen blue in their life. No. We can see bless. Or we can. We can see the. And why experience? We can see that the. We can see in the brain where bless is experienced. We can also do that for suffering too. And I agree with you. But there's nothing about the suffering that says it's bad or good. But I'm. I'm telling you that there's not going to be any disanalogies here that you need to identify specifically. What's not going to be present in the brain, um, or what? So, like, why is the. The qualitative experience of seeing blue? The qualitative experience of seeing blue? Why do we call that blue? Because it's a particular pattern in the brain. But I don't know why. Wait, wait, wait. But why would we attach blue to that particular pattern? Uh, because that's just how it works. And I agree. Oh, yeah. And I'm telling you that that's just how it is, right? Like, you're going to bottom out. You're going to bottom out in analytic philosophy. You're going to bottom out in definitions. You're not understanding. Like, I agree with you that we can trace suffering in instances of suffering and pain to specific pathways in the brain. But there's nothing about that. That biological phenomenon that that determines if it's good or bad outside of our stances. There's nothing about the biological. Okay. Is there something outside of our? Oh, the thing that's going to determine it is just going to be the qualitative experience. Could you say that, like, the qualitative experience, the bless present in the color blue when you look up at the sky? Is that going to be ex. Is that going to be there, like, stance dependently or stance independently? Stance independently. Yeah. So, you think that you can have a qualitative experience? You. There can be qualia without a person to experience the quality? You can have experiences without experience? What? No, I think experiences are objectively true. We experience things. That's true. Now, I agree. We experience suffering. But the problem is, how do you know suffering is bad independent of stances? And that's where the problem lies. It's going to be analytic. No, it's not going to be analytic in the same way that. The reason we call this color blue, that's just analytic. Well, the reason why this saying it's analytic is is bad is because, well, I can say, well, every instance of suffering is good, good, analytically. And there you go. And now we have no symmetry breaker between what's good or bad. Oh, yes, there is. Yeah, because this is like a very, um, non-standard usage of words. Because I'm not sure who the person is who says that, like, suffering is good. What? So, you're. It's just like a. It's like an extraordinarily. It's bad. Object. No, just that there's going to be standard and non-standard usages of terms. Specifically, I mean, you could, if you really want to, you could define red to be blue. That's fine, I guess. Um, it's just a really weird usage of words. And it seems like you're just not really describing the same phenomena. Yeah. So, that's also disanalogous. Well, when somebody says something good and bad, there's clearly a distinction between those two. Um, there's a. There's a stark distinction. So, so it's disanalogous because there's a clear distinction. What's the distinction? The distinction is the same experience that you say is good, somebody else can say is bad. Oh, but I'm going to say that nobody experiences suffering to be a good thing in the present. And the reason why this problem. Reason. Well, the reason why this is a problem is because you are claiming that there is something stance independent about that. That that experience that cannot be distinctive with another. That's why your view doesn't make sense. No, but it. But there is something stance independent. Specifically, the the fact of the neural pathways. But who. I understand there's no pathways. But the problem is that there's nothing good or bad about them independent of stances. Is there anything blue about the sky independent of stances? We're not making moral claims about bless. Saying being. Just saying that these. Saying that this isn't the thinging. You're. Wait. Give me a reason why these things are disanalogous. A relevant reason why this is disanalogous. Because we're not making moral claims about bless being good or bad. You are. But I'm asking you, why is that relevant? Why does that make it disanalogous? Because when it comes to bless, there are no claims of it being good or bad. I. I know that. That's the reason you're pointing out that these two scenarios are different. I'm asking you what the relevant distinction is. You're just question back. Do you. Do you understand? I'm asking you why is it morally relevant? Yeah. So, why is. Why is not making moral claims in one and making moral claims in the other? Why is that relevant? And your answer is that, well, in one we're making moral claims, and in the other we're not making moral claims. I understand your claim. I'm asking why is that relevant? Why does that relevantly make it to analogous? Because, uh, when you're making claims of something being blue or or green or whatever, you're short-circuited. You're just going to give the same explanation. No. Can. Can I? Give the exact same explanation. When you're making statements about something being being blue or not, that is something that we can independently verify. But you cannot independently verify something being bad or good. Well, and how. How can you independently verify something being blue or not blue? By looking at the neural activity. Just like. Yeah. And you can determine badness by looking at the neural activity. Oh, really? Okay. So, tell me, where in the neural pathways do scientists say that this is bad or good? Well, it's just going to be the. The, um, specifically the medial pathways related to the to suffering itself. You're short-circuiting, sir. I'm asking you a very. I just. I just answered the question. It's the neural pathways. Medial neural pathways related to. Where in that pathway do scientists demonstrate that it's a good or bad one? Oh, wa. So, this isn't a scientific claim. This is a philosophical claim. Okay. So, now you're making a claim philosophically that this is good or bad. So, how do you know? How do you independently know, stance independently, know that something is good or bad in terms of neural activity? How do you stance independently know that somebody is is seeing blue absent neural activity? Oh, well, again, we can see specific neural pathways. But there's no goodness. I asked you absent neural pathways. How do you know? Wait, wait. How do you know that there's no badness neural pathway, but you know that there is a bless neural pathway? What makes the bless neural pathway? The neural pathway that's what I'm asking you. How do you know that something is good? I want an answer to my question, Mike. How do you know that this neural pathway is the blue neural pathway? Because we can look at where the colors are produced in the brain and we can see. Yeah. Perfect. And we can look at where the experience of suffering, the qualitatively bad experience, is produced in the brain. Still not grasping this, right? I agree that we can look at the brain independently and see where suffering occurs. However, we cannot say that that suffering is bad or good. Why not? Because how do you know it's bad or good independent of stance? It's qualitatively experienced as such. How do you know that the sky is qualitative? How do you know that the sky is blue absent experiencing it such? How do you know that experience is good or bad? Because it is. Well, how do you know that the experience of looking at the sky is blue, like, that there's bless presence in the experience of looking at the sky? Why do I continuously answer this question? Haven't given the disanalogy. If you gave me the disanalogy very clearly, I would. I would stop. Wait. If it's a bad argument, I'd like. I'd hide it. I'd move to something else. I'd use my sneaky debate tricks to get rid of it. The reason you keep hearing about it is because you haven't answered it. I have several times. Thank you so much. Appreciate it. So, what's the disanalogy? I already answered this to you. You haven't. When it comes to bless, there is something about bless that we can independently of stances verify. You can't do that when it comes to badness or goodness. But. But there is. You can independently verify the suffering neural pathway. Okay, great. So, how do you verify that that pathway is bad or good? In the same way you verify that the blest pathway is the. How do you do that? How do you tell that that pathway is bad or good? How do you do that? Yeah, just just based on the qualitative experience of suffering over and over and over again. How do you tell that's. How do you tell that's good? Tell because it's experienced that way. Yeah. How do you tell it's bad or good though? Because it's experienced that way. No, no, no. How do you tell that experience is bad or good? Uh, it's self-evident. It's like saying, like, when I'm happy, I'm happy. It's self-evident. It's not self-evident. How do you tell? So, wait, wait. I have. I have a question for you. I have a question. When you see blue, do you see blue? When you see blue? When you see blue, do you see blue? Yeah. Thank you so much. Nine. How do you tell when you see blue? When you see blue? You're not understanding. When you see blue, do you see blue? Yeah, yeah. Perfect. And when you. When you experience badness, you experience badness. It's self-evident. Okay. So, where's the badness pathway? The badness pathway is the suffering neural pathway. Okay. And how do you know that that's a bad pathway instead of a good one? Because it's experienced that way. It is literally connected to the reward center of the brain. The reward deterrent center of the brain. I look. I agree that we have experiences that we deem as good or bad. But those are stances. Right? Oh, wait. So, so then you think bless is just a stance? Like, whether the sky is blue? Stop talking about bless. Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Because this, like, if you want, if you'd like, we can talk about red. Redness. I didn't realize that bless upset you to such a. You're not. You're not addressing your claim, right? So, in the same way we know the redness neural pathways, the redness neural pathway, we know that the. The suffering. The badness neural pathway is the badness neural. Analogous because it's disanalogous because bless isn't good or bad. When it comes to your C. It's literally. You're literally short. Have to let me explain. You have to let me explain. Yeah, go for it. You're. You're just saying that these are different cases. That's not a disanalogy. Go. Oh, my gosh. Listen. When you claim that bless has a pathway in the brain, I agree with you. And the pro. The disanalogy, however, is when you say, "Oh, well, how do you know that bless is there?" Well, we know it's there because we can view it. But I'm not claiming it's bad or good experience. You, however, in your suffering example, are claiming it's a good or bad experience. That's the disanalogy, right? That's why it's disal. Just pointing out that these cases are different. Why does that? Why does that make it disanalogous? Showing you the difference. I'm showing you the difference. Just wait, wait. Just like showing the difference between an analogy is not the same thing. Actually show disanalogy. Why is this so? Wait, wait. This would be. This. I just want to point put into perspective, like, the level of argumentation that you are at right now, Mike. This would be like if I ran, I don't know, um, like, uh, the violinist in terms of the abortion debate, where I say, "Well, would it be moral to disconnect yourself from this violinist?" Uh, and then I take this to imply that it's like also moral to to allow people to get abortions. And then you come along and say, "Well, in this scenario, you're disconnecting yourself from a. In that scenario, you're getting an abortion." That's not what I'm saying. Just pointing out that the cases are different isn't actually showing a relevant disanalogy. Yeah, the disanalogy is that you're. You're saying that in the suffering example, there is a case of being bad or good. And that's not the case at all for the bless. There can't be a claim upon bless because that's not. That's that would be a straw man of of my view, right? That's why. Run that back one. That was just word salad. Can you run that back one more time? Yeah, so, um, in terms of your claim that, uh, uh, suffering is bad, the reason why you can't say, "Oh, I know it the same way because bless is a quality of experience, just like suffering is." Well, the difference. The why is this analogous is because your claim that suffering is bad entails something. It's. It's a moral claim that is not being made in the bless claim. So, you're literally just saying again, these are disal. Disanalogous because they're different cases. Why is. Why is one being a moral claim and one not being a moral claim make them disanalogous? Because you can't. That would be like me saying, "Well, I think it's wrong to, you know, to murder." And then you're saying, "Well, why is it? Is it wrong to flip a light switch?" It's two different claims, right? No, no, because I could say in one, and under my view, I would say that murder is bad because it causes a lot of suffering, whereas there's no suffering caused by flipping a light switch. So, these are disanalogous, right? But. But there's a relev. Are a moral. Right. Light switches don't have. You can't make a moral claim about a light switch. Yeah, but I could find the relevant distinction. I could point out the relevant distinction in this situation. Look, you're not going to answer. You're just going to say, "Look," and then pivot away. Go for it. Not really showing how. How, um, suffering is bad or good. In. How did he do it? How did he know? How did he know? Just like saying, like, "Look," and then pivoting away. Big dog, I'm still waiting for the. You're not really grasping the problem here, right? You're not grasping why you can't say suffering is bad because we experience it as bad. That that's just a tautology. Yes. Perfect. So, what's the critique? Critique. Critique of tautologies. Do you think. Wait. Do you reject the law of identity? No. The point is, you can't just, you know, pretend that this is by definition bad. You're making a claim that independent of stances, it's bad. You have to have some way to verify that independent of stances, which you haven't done. Yeah, just the. The usage of words maps on to this, like, undesirable feeling. The things that shouldn't happen. The an experience of of should-ness is present in suffering. Where, where in suffering is there? Is there a badness or goodness? Do you agree that there's like a should andness present in suffering? No. What do you think the feeling of suffering is? How objectively? Wait, wait. But how would you. How would you define suffering then? Sufficient amount of harm imposed on somebody. Okay. Wait. So, do you think that there's like that like necessarily. Oh, what's this? Oh, that's an easy question. What's the sufficient amount of harm? Oh, I like how you're pivoting, right? You're not answering the question. Wait, I'm asking for clarification. What's the sufficient amount of harm? It depends on the circumstance. It depends on your theory. Wait, wait. So, you think the. You think the. The suffering, whether the neural pathway of suffering is activated, depends on your moral theory? You think a biological fact? Wait, wait. I I just want to be clear. I just want to be clear. You think you think biological. Your moral facts determine your biology? What? No, I never claimed that. You. Because you said that that suffering, whether the suffering neural pathway activates, is just a matter of your individual moral theory. What are you talking about? No, I'm not saying that. That is literally. That is bar for bar what you just said. What I'm saying is, I'm asking you. So, then I'll ask you again, by what threshold of of like harm does it become suffering? It depends on your normative theory. If something is. So, you think the objective fact of whether someone is suffering is just a matter of their moral. Of their moral theory? The objective biological fact, whether a specific neural pathway is activated, is a matter of your moral theory. Yeah. So, do you think, uh, somebody working out is suffering? Wait, let's not pivot away here. I just want to. I'm asking you because I'm showing you my point, right? Do you think somebody working out is suffering depends on if the suffering neural pathway is activated? For a lot of people, it's not. It is. Wait. Can you prove that? Oh, my God. Yes. Every time you exercise, can I. Pain occurs. Can I get. Wait. But pain is not the same thing as suffering. You're just not tracking. Well, there's a. There's a great deal amount of of pain that occurs when you're. Yeah. And pain is not the same thing as suffering. For the fifth time. Okay, great. So, then what amount of pain says something is suffering? None. That's not. Pain is not the relevant criteria for all over the place. So, there of pain. There's no. There's no. All you. Literally pivoting to a different question right now, big dog. Do you want to. Do you want to get back to the thing that you pivoted away from? I'm asking you, what's the threshold wherein harm becomes suffering? You pivoted away from that. Wait, I have it. Wait, Mike. Mike, I have. I have it written down. I have a. I have it written down on a piece of paper. We're not moving away from this question until you answer it or concede it. Yeah, go ahead. What's the question? Yeah, so, uh, what exact threshold does say harm becomes suffering? There is no such exact threshold. Oh, cool. So, then it's. It's just arbitrary. You have no definition of suffering. Is arbitrary? Yes. No, no, no. I'm asking. So, so you agree that you can't define suffering? That your definition of suffering fails? So, we default to my definition. But suffering is the. Is the bad feeling. Okay. So, where's the exact threshold in your view of suffering? Yeah. So, suffering is the bad feeling. Yeah. So, where's the exact threshold of thr something suffering? So, could you. Could you point out in my definition where the threshold language is? Well, you're claiming that there has to be a threshold, right? No, you're claiming that there has to be a threshold. So, claiming that there has to be a threshold. I'm claiming that it's the bad feeling. No, Ian. I never claimed there was a threshold. You said that there needs to be a sufficient amount of harm. And then after a sufficient amount of harm, it becomes suffering. We redeem something. You hold that there's a threshold. I just hold that an exact threshold, though. I never said there was an exact. Cool. Wait. So, then you're talking about quantities. So, the quantity of harm. What's the quantity of harm? It's the same question. We can just. We can put. We can put whatever words you want onto it. Depends on the situation. Yeah. Wait. So, so what's. Oh, perfect. So, you have no definition. Your definition isn't well-defined at all. Okay, great. So, in your view, where exactly is the exact threshold at which something is deemed suffering? Yeah, when the suffering neural pathway is activated. Okay, great. So, so when there's a circumstance where a neural pathway is activated and someone says they're not suffering, is that suffering or is it suffering? Wait. So, when somebody says that they're not suffering, but the neural pathway is activated, then they're suffering. Okay. Even though they're saying they're fine? Yes. If the neural pathway is activated. If your. If your bless. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Mike. Wait, Mike. That's fine. Mike. In the same way that if somebody said, "I'm not looking at blue," but their bless neural pathway is activated, the reasonable conclusion to come to is that they're lying, right? So, let's say somebody's working out and their neural pathways are fired. Does that mean they're not suffering or they are suffering? If the suffering neural pathway is activated, then they're suffering. Okay. So, when somebody works out, there's that's suffering. That's a form of suffering to you? If the pathway is activated, then sure. Okay. So, under your view, it is objectively wrong to work out because it's suffer. No, not the case. Because it reduces other suffering. So, then you can't. You can't say suffering. Wait. And I agree. I agree, Mike. We can declare victory after you've established absolutely nothing. But the fact of the matter is is that this is still going to be considered a good thing because it reduces suffering in other aspects of your life. And also, you still haven't proven. You still haven't proven. You still haven't proven. You still haven't proven, Mike, that suffering is a necessary and present part of working out. What? Yeah. Prove that suffering is present in all working out. My claim is, under your view, where everything, all suffering is objectively bad, then it would have to be the case that working out, if suffering, if it's suffering, is bad. Oh, yeah. So, so in the same way, like, if if drinking water causes like 8 trillion children to get tortured, then we would have to conclude that drinking water is bad. Yeah, if you just assume that, like, it causes something that it doesn't cause, then, yeah, you can arrive at you can arrive at any conclusion you want if you just presuppose something that's not true. Yeah. Let's just get this straight. Do you think that if working out causes suffering to somebody by, you know, making their muscle fibers be destroyed, is that objectively bad? So, it's going to come down to whether or not there's a greater amount of suffering that's reduced. And whether or not there's suffering at all that. Okay. So, then you can't. In so, then you've just conceded without even knowing. Unbeknownst to yourself. Oh, yeah. So, what's the concession? Show it. You've conceded that there is nothing about suffering simpliciter that shows us it's bad or good. No, wait. And how did they. In what way did we come to that conclusion? Because you had to then further inject your normative theory onto it subjectively to say it's bad. Wait. But that's not the case though. So, my claim is, and always has been, that if you could experience every single person, what every single person is going through, um, if an action happens versus if an action doesn't happen, then you can objectively determine what the right thing and wrong thing to do are. Just qualitatively, again. And that qualitative experience doesn't make it bad or good independent of stances. You have already conceded that your definition is incoherent for suffering, which means we default to my definition, which means that it is analytically bad. Your definition is. Wait. You think. Wait. Do you think definitions have have. You think definitions are propositional? I misspoke. I didn't. Do you think you think they're propositional? You think that a definition can be wrong? To listen. I. You said that def. That my definition is wrong. You think definitions can be wrong? Spoke. What I meant to say was it doesn't. It doesn't allow you to say it doesn't enable you to say that this, uh, suffering is bad or good just because you deem it bad. Well, yeah, just because you deem the color blue to be blue doesn't make it blue. That's your logic. I mean, stance independently, do you know what that means? So, do you think that blue is blue stance independently? Yes. Blue. Blue is objective. Yeah. Perfect. So, so blue is blue stance independently. I'm going to just. So, when it comes to. Yeah, because we can see the neural pathway. Now, and we can see the neural pathway associated with badness. Where, where is the bad pathway? And where's the good pathway? I don't. So, first of all, I've already expressed this before, but I don't have, like, I don't defend a specific theory of goodness. But what I do defend is a specific theory of badness. Yeah. So, the bad neural pathway is the suffering neural pathway. Yeah. Again. So, how do you know that that suffering pathway is the bad one? Because it's qualitatively experienced as such. In the same way that blue is qualitatively experienced as blue. No. How do you know that qualitative experience of suffering is bad, objectively? Because it's qu. Because objectively it's qualitatively experienced as such. And the same way blue objectively is qualitatively experienced as blue. Again, you're not understanding. I know there's an experience of suffering. But I'm asking you, how do you know, independent of stances, that that suffering is bad? Because it's qualitatively experienced as such. Oh, my God. I agree that I agree that we have experiences of suffering and badness. But that doesn't. They're objectively bad. But they're. It's qualitatively bad. And qual. Like your qualia is going to be objective. Do you know what objective means versus? Yeah, objective means. So, subjective is indexical to the the individual, whereas objective is not indexical to the individual. Exactly. Great. So, so if you know what objective means, then you should surely be able to verify independently of any stances and opinions that neural pathways in the brain are bad. Well, just that they. They carry with them the experience that's qualitatively experienced is bad. How do you know the specific qualia color? Wait, wait. Why? Wait. So, why is the specific quality? Wait, hold on, Mike. Hold on, Mike. So, where is the. The bless present in the blue qualia in the brain? Wait. You think qualia is in the brain? You think, like, the thing that you see? First of all.

I first of all, qualia, think that we experience in the brain. Experiences in the brain? You think experiences in the brain? Yeah, that's fine. I can grant that. And I would just say that Badness is also in the brain. But what, why do we, why do we define specifically the bless neural pathway as, as being associated with blue?

Thank you so much for the $2 on Venmo. And in the comment section, there's an objectively verifiable area in the brain that says where colors are produced. That, that shows us where colors are produced. How do you know? Can't be said for bad. Wait, wait, wait. But why would we, how do we know that this is the blue one? What tells us that it's the blue one?

Depends on the neural pathway. The neural patterns. Yeah, yeah. So, so for the, for the blue neural pathway, how do we know that this is the blue neural pathway? Oh, because we, we know that that's what it correlates to when it, when you see blue. Yeah. And we know. So, so it's, it's the qualitative experience. We know that we know what the pathway is because we associate it with a specific qualitative exp. The difference is, there's, we're not, we're not saying. We're not. No, it's not perfect. We're not say because, because the same way that it's the qualitative experience that grounds bless, it's the qualitative experience of suffering that grounds. Over and over again. Listen. Yeah, you're just not listening. I'm trying to get through to you, Mike. There's nothing bad about the suffering or good about the suffering. It's qualitatively experienced. Oh my God. Listen, listen, listen. I agree that we have experiences of good and bad. But that's concession. Dep. Concession. W. Concession. Wait, wait. Oh my God. Wait. Oh, experiences. Experiences of good and bad. Wait, wait. Did you say that experiences happen in the brain? Yes. Yeah. So, so, okay. Wait. So, uh, is everything that happens in the brain an objective fact? Yes. So, okay. Wait. So, if, uh, if, uh, we have experiences of Badness and experiences are an objective fact, then that means Badness is an objective fact. Thank you, Mike. So much. Oh my God. W. Concession. Mike. Let's get a w concession for Mike in the comment section. Which premise do you reject, Mike? The fact that I said stands dependent. They are. Wa. Wait. Which, which premise do you reject? What? Wait, wait. We'll go, we'll go through. We'll go through. Me speak. If you would let me speak. Okay. Thank you. Yep. I'm writing down the three premises. I'm going to read them out to you. It's gonna be fun. You listen to. If you listen, you're going to rage quit. I'm going to love it. Reject a premise, Mike. Is it going to be one, two, or three? Or do you want the premises again? Sh. Let me speak. Wait, wait. Is it? Wait. Mike. M. You're not going to. Mike, the next words out of your mouth are going to be one, two, or three. Is it going to be one, two, or three? Which premise do you reject? Yeah. So, which premise do you reject, Mike? One, two, or three? Want Prem. Wait, wait, wait. Mike, which premise of the argument you reject? Is it one, two, or three? State the argument again so I can reject. Perfect. Yeah. You forgot. So, uh, uh, premise one, um, there were experiences of Badness. Premise two, uh, the, um, Badness is, or experiences happen in the brain. Premise three, all things that happen in the brain, um, are objective facts. So, which of these 3G rejects? How does that tell us that there's a bad? That tells us that Badness, that qualitative Badness is an objective fact. This is a non sequitur. The reason. Wait, wait, wait. So, what's the, what's the problem with the structure then? Yeah. Well, it's a non sequitur because just because we have objective experiences doesn't mean that their stance independently bad. Wait, so which, uh, what's the problem with the structure of the argument? You said it's nonse. It's a. The conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. Your concl. Okay, that's fine. I can, I can formalize it if you want. Okay. Great. So, no, no, no. So, so listen, the problem with your argument is that that, uh, those experiences of good and bad are stance dependent, not stance independent. Okay. I'll just write this out, uh, in like a modus ponens style. Um, no, dude, you don't know what. You don't even know what you're talking about. I literally have a. I think I'm, I think I'm quite capable of writing down Aon AR. Even maintain what you're doing. Wait. And I, and I agree, we can do rhetoric. But I'm just writing out the argument so that we can make it as valid as we can, and you can reject a premise. So, brain state of, uh, brain state associated, implies objective fact of the matter. Um, okay. So, uh, pre, uh, premise one is just going to be that there are experiences of Badness. Premise two, if there are experiences of Badness, then there is a brain state associated with those experiences of Badness. Three, if there is a brain state. You reject this. You reject that experiences. Yeah. So, you, you would reject that, and that experiences happen in the brain. No, I reject that there are bad experiences in the brain. Okay. But you, so that's, that's premise one, that there's an experience of Badness. Yeah. I disagree that that experience of Badness is stance independent. Oh, wait. But it's like qualitatively experienced. So, is somebody's, so, wa, wait. Is here we go again, right? I have a question for you. Wait. So, if I'm happy, is it going to be an objective fact that I'm happy? Um, again, experiences are objective. Answer: no. Question: yes. Experiences are objective. But perect. No, Mike, cuz now you're now you're like super cooked. So, because one, uh, that there are experiences of Badness, and two, experiences are objective. I disagree with that second premise. You literally just said a, that experiences are objective. No. So, everyone, every single person, every, every single individual just heard you say it. What do you mean? Yeah. So, you're, every single person. Who are you trying to, who are you trying to pull this over on? So, the second premise is wrong because are objectively, uh, good or bad, which I disagree with. I don't. You're, you're trying to smuggling that end into your argument. Well, you literally said that experiences are objective. If you would just let me explain myself, I can explain to you why you're wrong. Right. Wait, wa, wait. Did you, so, do you want to walk back the claim that you made previously that experiences are objective? Can I explain this to you real quick? Wait, do you want to do you want to walk back to your claim that you made earlier that experiences are objective? I still hold to that. So, you still hold that experiences are objective, but they're not bad or good. Badness or goodness is not, is not OB. So, Badness, uh, is is experienced. Where, where is Badness experienced? You literally said that there are experiences of bad. Where? I agree that their experiences of Badness, but they're not objective. Okay. Wait. So, so, so, there's, um, so, experiences of Badness exist. Experiences are objective. Experiences of Badness are objective. Badness is objective. Yeah. I disagree with the third premise there. I don't. Wait, wait, wait. So, you, that's not, that's not really the, that's, that's more of a conclusion. It's not really a premise. Well, that's, it's a non sequitur then because you're, you're assuming that that experiences of Badness are objective. Why? When I reject that. So, do you agree that all experiences are objective? Yeah. Okay. So, is the experience, so, and you agree that there exists experiences of Badness subjectively? Yep. Oh, but I just want to know, are there experiences of Badness? Yes or no? Yeah. People can experience bad things stance in, uh, stance dependently. But is there, like, a like a qualitative experience of Badness? No. There's no bad molecule or bad pathway in the brain. That says, why would you say that there's experiences of Badness? Oh, because that's stance dependent. So, okay. But you, you would then, so, if experiences are objective and you hold that there are experiences of Badness, then that means that objectively there are experiences of Badness. No. Um, again, because. So, which of these two premises do you reject? Do you reject that there are experiences, or do you reject that experiences are objective? I disagree with it with the, what you smuggled into your argument, that that bad experiences are objective. That's the conclusion, Mike. Which of the premises do you reject? It's a non sequitur because there. It's not a non sequitur. It's wait, wait. What's then? Where's the argument then? What's your argument that that there are objectively bad experiences? Okay, wait. So, let's, let's do it like this. So, let's say that this is the, we got the [ __ ] circle of experiences, and we're, we're going to, we're going to write Badness in here, uh, because, because people have experiences of Badness. Do you agree subjectively? Yep. And, yeah, perfect. Yeah, yeah. Within the, within the circle of experiences, we have Badness. Perfect. No, you have to put that into the argument, right? To, wa, wait, wait, wait. I just want to. We're just doing a diagram right now. We have, we have Badness within the circle of experiences. Now, is experience objective? Yeah. Perfect. So, then we'll just go ahead and and shade this with the objectivity shaving or, uh, uh, shading. So, so everything which is shaded is objective, as we just agreed. So, Badness is objective. No, that isn't. That's nonsense. Bad. Wait. It's, you're literally looking at the diagram. Are you kidding? Let me explain to you, right? So, there, I agree that there are experiences that we think are bad or good stance dependently. But are no independent. There are no stance independent Badness or good, good experiences. And that's what I maintain. And that's what you can't demonstrate. You, I don't even know how to proceed with the argument. The diagram is like right in front of you. Badness is objective. Where, where? How do you know that? What do you mean, where? Right in front of you. Look at it. No, that, that's not. You, you have smuggled in the idea that all experiences are objectively good or bad into. There's no, nothing about this is like, all experiences are objectively. Wait, I don't think. Wait, wait, because that's that's just that's just a straw man, right? Because I don't think the experience of like bless is good or bad. I think it's just blue. Some experiences are good, and or I, I'm actually agnostic to that. But some experiences are bad. Um, uh, and then, uh, some are not. So, that's not true at all. I agree. But their stance dependently bad, right? Yeah. But so, so, do you, do you disagree? Would you reject one or two? Would you reject that, um, that there are experiences of Badness, or would you reject that experiences are objective? There are, uh, there are experiences of Badness, but that bad or good experience is a stance. As to whether or not it's B. Is it going to be, is it going to be one or two? Are you rejecting one or two? Well, first of all, that's not an argument. What you present. Wa, wait, wait. Are you rejecting one or two? It is an argument. It's a premise and a premise and a conclusion. So, you rejecting one or two? Uh, I reject one. Okay. So, you reject that there are experiences of Badness. That are? Yeah. I reject that because that it assumes that they are, um, objectively bad experiences. Well, wait. So, if, if I was presupposing that they were objectively bad experiences, then why would I have premise two? I'm not. I'm not assuming that. I'm inferring that based on an additional premise. That's that's a bad inference because, there can be experiences that are subjectively bad or good. But I'm saying, so, if, so, Badness is experienced. Experiences are objective. Therefore, Badness is objective. That's a non sequitur because there, there, because there are experiences that can be subjectively bad. There are experiences which can be subjectively bad, but experiences are objective. But that doesn't mean that they are objectively bad. But they're still objective. So, Badness is an experience. Experiences are objective. Objective. Wait, no. It doesn't mean they're objectively bad. Okay, wait. So, how can we do this? So, the, is being used, I think, is is a predation. So, let's do, um, okay, okay, wait. We'll, we'll just like, do some like term substitution, just so we can understand how this argument is not an on sequitur. So, you agree a square is a rectangle, right? Yeah. Oh, wait. Okay, actually, let's do, um, okay, uh, uh, there are squares. That will be premise one. Oh, no, I'm being, I'm being stupid. Yeah. So, so, square is a rectangle. You agree with that? Um, uh, rectangles have four sides. Therefore, squares have four sides. You agree with that? Mhm. Badness is experienced. Experienced subjectively. Subjectively. That has to be Aster. There. I, I don't even know what that means because you hold that. So, then your worldview just has a contradiction where, because you're saying that, uh, experiences are objective, but then here you have this subjective experience. So, are experiences objective or subjective? Which is it? So, I agree that object, uh, experiences are objective. But when we invoke the word bad or good experiences, that's where subjectivity comes into play. Okay. But are experiences always objective? Experiences in terms of, you know, the, the equality or the, you know, neural pathways? Yes, that's objectively true that those things happen. But being bad or good experiences, that's where it's subjective. Cool. Wait. So, perfect. Awesome. Wait. So, we have that experiences are objective, and Badness is the thing which is experienced, um, subjectively. Yeah. Badness. When we say something's bad, that's just a subjective claim. I, I'm just not really sure, like, you're directly contradicting yourself and I don't understand how you don't hear you yourself direct, like, just directly contradicting. Yeah. So, where's the contradiction? Because you think experiences are both subjective, sometimes they're subjective, but also objective. No. Um, I'm saying that exper, uh, bad experiences in terms of saying something's bad, that's subjective. Are experiences indexed to the self, or are they not indexed to the self? Uh, well, that's a different. That's a deeper question. It's no, it's not, though, because that's literally just the definition of objective. Well, they're indexed to biological functions. Perfect. So, is that going to be in, or biological functions indexed to the self, or are they indexed to not the self? Well, I, this is weird because I, I kind of reject the self that the self exists. That's the dumbest thing I've ever heard. So, I'm just going to ask you the question again. Do you think it's going, do you think like biological facts are going to be indexed to the self or not indexed to the self? What's your self? The [ __ ] you like the thing that's experiencing the thing that's like embarrassing himself making the dumbest arguments anyone's ever heard. What's so, what's me? Like my molecules? So, if I take off, are you asking about the word, or like the, the thing that's referred to by the word? Yeah, like what's the self? Uh, you are a split self that includes, um, like, like an "I" related to your biology, but also to your self-image. There's like many facets of "I". But they all unify into one self. You're composed that one self. What's that one self? If I take off my eye, am I no longer a self? No, you're still yourself. You're just yourself without an eye. If I take off my brain, if I take off my legs, am I still a self? Yeah. I'd probably say if you took off your brain, the idea of you still exists, but you as an entity. Um, if you put your brain in a vat, I would say that you are the brain in the vat. You are your mind. If I were to burn and my ashes just went into the earth and the air and water, would I still be a self? Well, no, because then you would be dead. Okay, great. So, where's the, where's the cut off between self and not a self? I mean, in that scenario you outlined, probably death. That seems like a pretty good cut off. Death. So, you're, for the specific burning example, that seems like a, a pr good. So, one second, one second. Before I die, I'm a self. But, but the second I die, I'm not no longer. I'm no longer a self. Yes. Really? So, what's the distinction that, that where the self comes in? Death. Yeah. What about death says that I'm a self or not a self? Death is an end to the mind. Oh, okay. There you go. The mind. So, you think, where in the mind is the self? Your phenomenological experience. Okay. So, your experiences tell you that you're a self? Yes. Okay. So, where, when, what point do these experiences end where you say it's not a self anymore? When you're no longer having an experience. And how do you know? Probably some biological fact about the brain and whether or not you are continuing to have an experience. Well, yeah, this is where I, I would say I disagree that there is such a thing as a self outside of biological processes. Um, we, I think that our minds can produce a self. But, yeah. So, wait, what's the contradiction entailed in my view? Because it seems like you just pivoted to restating your conclusion. Well, I'm not saying there was a contradiction. I'm just saying I don't, I don't agree with your premise. What's the unintuitive premise? That that self exists. I don't think self exists. That's your conclusion. Which of my premises? This is really irrelevant, right? Wait, wait, wait, wait. Which, which of my premises is unintuitive? That there's something about the mind that says there's a self. I just, the mind is like the fet through W. The Mind, mind can think about the mind. You are identified by your mind. This tracks on to like, just an intuitive understanding. This tracks on to common usage. Um, this tracks on if like, we did, we divided my mind into U, or my brain into like little, little bits, and, um, I still have a couple thoughts or experiences in the little part of my brain. Am I still a self? If you, if it gets divided into a little bit, do you have an experience? Yeah. Let's just say my brain is a small, tiny thing, but it experiences something. There's this tiny, there's a little part of my mind that experiences. Still, am I still a self? Does it understand itself in the same way? Like, you're still a self, but are you the same self? That's a different question. If you understand yourself to be the same self, then I would say that you are. Yeah. This is where this is where it gets confusing to talk about the self because where does it, we like, where the ends and the starts of it. Um, but look, this is a, this is a point that's not even relevant. The point is that, um, there's nothing about an experience that says it's bad or good independent of of a stances to me. Okay, that's fine. I, I just disagree. Yeah. So, so, you know, if you're going to claim that morals are objectiv, objective, that suffering is objectively bad, that's a claim you're making that has to be shown. Yeah. And I, I've demonstrated it by trapping you in like contradiction after contradiction. Uh, the TikTok live clips are going to eat you alive. Yeah. Where's the contradiction? The contradiction is that you think that experiences are both subjective and also objective. No, I don't. I don't think that. Um, okay, so, are, is, um, are there, is Badness experienced, um, subjectively? Yeah, yeah. So, some experiences are subjective. Are all experiences objective? Claims of experiences are subjective, right? So, so, the claims are the experiences themselves? No. So, the claim is independent of the experience. That's the point, right? The claim is independent of the experience. Um, and the pro problem with saying that this is a bad or good experience is that there's nothing, uh, independent of her stances. The claim is a, a stance, right? Wait, so, so, which, so, what was my, what was my question? And how does that answer it? Or you have no idea. I think you, you pretended as if there was a contradiction in my view, and you feel that's not a question. That wasn't the question. Do you remember the question that I just asked you? The question that you were trying to answer? The question that you did not answer? Do you remember that question, or do you need to be reminded of it? Go ahead. What is it? I have no [ __ ] idea. Completely forgot. But I mean, you didn't answer it. That's. I know that. I don't remember there being a question. But again, you still was, um, you haven't shown my bad exp, where bad experiences are independent of stances. You haven't shown that. So, the question was, so, is related to, okay, wait. Oh, oh, sure, sure, sure. So, is, um, uh, what, what part of his objective is the experience itself, or the claim about the experience? The claim, which is that's that's subjective. So, so, the claim, the claim is the subjective part, but the experience itself is objective, right? God. Oh, okay. I understand the disconnect now. Because, so, um, gotcha. So, you would say that there exists claims that an experience is bad, right? Um, but there does not exist like a Badness within the experience itself, right? Exactly. Gotcha. Um, I think I would just disagree with this. I know, but why? That's the problem. Yeah, because it's qualitatively experienced as bad. It is literally invoking the reward, um, like, uh, deterrence centers of the brain. It is quite literally the bad feeling. Pete, thank you so much for the $666 on Cash App. W. Pete in the comment section. W. 666. W. Satan. Hail Satan. Appreciate it. But there you go again saying that you're smug. Ling in the notion of being bad, a bad feeling. How do you know something's bad or good without? We've already done this one, Mike. I've already explained this to you. Yeehaw. Thank you so much, Barnabas. So, yeah, where we've done, we've done this like 10 times, Mike. It's, it's, uh, based on the experience itself. In the same way that blue is qualitatively blue. Beyond the experience. Beyond the experience. How do you, Chevy, thank you so much for the coral. Let's get a big W. Chevy in the comment section. I appreciate that, Chevy. Look, not talking. I think, I think, I think bad is the experience. Okay. How do you know something is bad or good without a stance? Well, it's like asking, how do you know that the, that bless, that the experience of seeing blue is blue? No, because we're not saying blue is good or bad. You're just pointing out that these are different cases. That's not actually a disanalogy. Lina, thank you so much for the $3 on Venmo for Badness molecules offset. W. Lina in the comment section. I appreciate that. Suffering in. Yeah. You still don't. There's still no substance in the physical world that says this experience is bad or good. Could you tell me what the, what the bless substance is? You're just going to say brain states, and I'm going to say that that's the same substance for Badness. We're not talking about sub. We're not talking about the experience itself. We're talking about the Badness or goodness of it. Yeah. I'm saying that suffering is one to one bad. One to one bad. So, every instance of suffering is bad to you? Just that there is a, um, it, there is a Badness present in it, which is not to say that the experience overall, that if all things considered, um, like a, a specific event itself is bad, but just that the experience is bad. But if you put the event in context, for example, if working out, even if it does cause suffering, which I'm not convinced it does, but even if it does cause suffering, if it reduces suffering elsewhere, then I would take this to be, um, a, a good thing, a better thing to do than, uh, if, if you didn't do it. Certainly, I wouldn't take it to be a bad thing in so far as it actually causes a reduction in suffering. Yeah. So, here's an analogy. Do you think pizza is objectively tasty? No. Okay. But every time you eat pizza, you're stimulating the the neural pathway in the brain that says this is good tasting pizza, right? So, uh, the, okay, that talks about a specific event. I don't make claims that like this event or that event is going to be like objectively good or objectively bad. Problem. That's your problem. And then you just, because I, I make claims about events which cause suffering, I make claims about experiences, and these experiences are caused by events. So, I don't make a, a blanket statement about like, well, working out is good. Well, you know, like kicking puppies is bad, although I'd probably defend that kicking puppies is bad, but that's neither here nor there. I don't make claims about like, like a specific event. I make claims about the things that these events cause subjectively. You don't have objective. You cannot make objective claims about be something being good or bad. You can't do it. The stances. Why not? Because you're appealing to stances every single time. Well, show me how you're not. Show me how you're shifting. Wait, wait, wait. I'm not going to let you burden shift. Defend your claim. How am I not? You're unable to show how that's your, that's your claim again. How am I not? It's, well, the burden is on you because you're making. Wait, because you made the affirmative claim that I'm not demonstrating it. How am I not? Yeah, you're not demonstrating it. Yeah, that's just the claim again. How am I not? Because you made the original claim that you have objective morals. Yeah. Do you think that that answers my question? Defend that. You, wa, wait, wait, wait. Let's not. I'm not going to let you burden shift away from this. You made the claim that I didn't defend that. How am I not? Defend. Wait, wait. That thaten yet. That that this is that I didn't provide like the explanation for this. So, in what way did I not provide the explanation for this? By not doing it. Yeah. Oh, sure. And, and how do you know that that's the case? Because I actually gave the explanation like probably 10 times at this point. Yeah. So, how do you show that experiences are objectively bad or good beyond the experience? Because they are qualitatively, fundamentally, and self-evidently experienced as such. Well, I, then how do you know that those experiences are good or bad? You can't just say, well, I experiencing them as bad or good, because that's just appealing to stances. I, how do you know that the sky is blue, Mike? Here we go again. It's going to, it's going to come back to qualitative experience. That you know the sky is blue because you qualitatively experience it as such. You know suffering is bad because you qualitatively experience it as such. Understand that you have an, you, you can, you can appeal to your intuition and say, well, it feels bad to get kicked in the head. Not, not feels bad. Not feels bad is bad. That's not my claim. Exactly. So, how do you know that kicking somebody, kicking, being kicked in the head is bad objectively? Because it is qualitatively experienced as such. There you go. So, you're relying back, you're going back to the feeling. It feels. Not it's not a feeling, Mike. There's no feeling there. It's an experience. That's feeling. Oh, okay. Wait. So, do you, do you feel blue? Do you feel blue when you look at the sky? Bless is, uh, do you feel blue? Experience. What does blue, what does blue feel like? It's not a feeling. It's a perfect. It's an experience. Yes. Exactly. Badness is an experience. It's not a feeling. Bless is a, what? Bless is an experience. It's not a feeling, right? It's an experience. Yeah. Perfect. Awesome. Agree. How do you know something is bad, bad? Because you experience it as bad. What about, you know something is blue because you experience it as blue? You know something is bad because the experience it is bad. What about the experience says it is objectively a bad experience? What about, what about the experience of looking at the sky says that it is objectively blue? The fact that pathways light up in the brain. But that's the fact that pathways light up in the brain. The fact that pathways light up in the brain. But that doesn't tell you that they're are good. But the, and the pathways don't tell you that it's blue or not blue. The experience does. Yes, they do. Okay, wait, wait. So, so, if I, if I pulled up neural pathways right now, could you tell me what color they correspond to? Yes. We know what color [ __ ] [ __ ]. Yeah, let's run it. Oh my God. We know. We know where colors are experienced in the brain. Yeah. Oh my God. Yeah, Mike. We are, we are going to run this one. Yeah. The problem is Badness is not experienced in the brain objectively. It is. You're, you're just to claiming your, just your stance is that it's a bad experience or a good one. I'm pulling up some brain scans of, uh, various colors, and we're going to see, uh, whether or not in fact your claim is correct that you can identify, uh, what, what color is is being viewed based on the neural pathway. I don't know why you would make like such an obviously stupid claim, but that's fine. [Music] Wait, I think you actually might be like completely cooked, cuz there's actually no neural pathway it seems that's associated with colors. It is. It's called the ventral stream. The ventral stream. Mhm. It's a pathway that processes color vision. It's in the temporal lobe. Ventral stream. Um, it doesn't mention anything about colors. It talks about objects, shapes. Yeah, it also processes colors too. Um, when there's so many fMRI studies showing that, um, stimulating certain, um, areas of the brain and produce color. The V4 area responsible for color perception. Human. Um, um, okay, cool. Wait, so ventral stream, V4. [Music] Mhm. Um, V, uh, uh. [Music] Sh. So, it doesn't seem like there's any studies that that have made this distinction. So, how do you know that this is the area of the brain that's responsible for differentiation between colors? Yeah, so there's an NIH study on this. Yeah. Let's see it. What is it? Yeah, just look up NIH. I'm sorry. NIH. Yeah. National I Institute. Yeah. Um, let me see. Yeah, uh, activity patterns in the brain are specific to the color you see. Pathway one. The articles on the paper are specific to the colors you see. That's just one of the articles. But the study is called Color Space Geometry Uncovered with Magneto-Incel, uh, Incelography. Uh, okay, wait. Um, the geometry that describes the relationship among colors and the neurom mechanism is that support color vision or so here we use, uh, oh, that's just the abstract. But, um, yeah, there's different neural correlates for color appearance. So, if I gave you a brain scan right now, what would you look at to determine whether or not, uh, it was looking at like something that's blue, something that's red, or like whatever color? How would you determine that? By looking at the part of the brain that lights up when you see those colors. But how do you know that these parts correspond to, if not, if not based on the experience of seeing these colors, how do you know that it is these colors and their correspondence that's creates this neural pathway? We can trace them back to like your photo receptors and your eyes. Yeah. But how do you know that it is these colors specifically that create these colors to light up? Well, or these pathways to light up? Well, when we say color, we're talking about a particular, uh, neural experience. Right now. Experience. Qualitative experience. Perfect. So, you ground, so, you ground bless and qualitative experience. You ground redness and qualitative experience. The reason we know the pathway is associated with this thing is because of qualitative experience. Similarly. Similarly. No, not similarly. We would say that Badness is grounded in qualitative experience. So, where's your study on Badness being, uh, found in the? Well, that's that's a philosophical claim. It's just going to be analytically true. It's just going to be it's just going to be analytically true that Badness one to one corresponds with suffering. Look, you can't just say. Are analytically true? I mean, a theist can do that. Say, oh, God is analytically true. Any. Well, yeah, I would just ask them what they mean by God. Your job is to defend. Wait, wait. Yeah. Wait, wait. No. Well, no, they can't because then I would just ask them to define God. The claim that they make is either is either untrue or uninteresting. Define the fact that the idea that Badness is, uh, objective. Show me how that's. Wait, so, define the fact. Do you think facts are defined? Typically, definitions are defined. Words are defined. You think facts are defined? Is that correct? Support. You know what I mean? Support the idea that, uh, bad. Wait, wait. So, so, but I'm going to reject the analogy that you just gave. I'm, I'm rejecting the analogy that you put forward just now. Okay, about about about like a theist coming forward and saying, well, God exists because analytically, because I would just to ask them, well, what's your definition of God? And sometimes they say, well, I think God's the universe. In which case I say, I don't really care about that. If you want to say that God is the universe, I mean, you can. That's not really the God that I'm talking about when I make the statement, God isn't real. Yeah, I'd say God is a being that, uh, subjectively instills experiences that are that we subjectively think are bad or good. So, God is the being that sub, that subjectively instills experiences that are bad or good. Yeah. So, warrant the existence of the being. Yep. That's the, that's analytically. Well, no, no, but but warrants the exist. Wait, wait, because you make a claim. So, an analytic truth is just going to be a truth, a definition, even if it's like the same ways. Let's say that, like the way that phones work, um, if, if I defended the position that the way that phones work or because there's like little fairies running really quickly between your phone and my phone, that would technically fit with the phenomena. But that doesn't actually prove that there are little fairies that are running between our phones. It wouldn't be an analytic truth to say that there are fairies running between our phones. In the same way, it wouldn't be analytically true to say that God gives us the experiences. You would still need to prove the existence of the god in the first place, just like you haven't proved the existence of objective facts morally. Oh, oh, perfect. Wait. So, so, you'll concede that fact and go back to just restating your conclusion. Awesome. So, so, you, you'll get, you'll get folded on that argument and then just go back to your conclusion. I'm glad. Talk about what are you talking about? Wait. So, that's, that's perfect. So, you couldn't defend the argument. You couldn't defend the position. So, instead of defending the position, you just restated your conclusion. What are you talking about? You, everyone heard it just right now. No, so, so, so, I, I told you that the, to in for it to be analytically true, they still need to defend the existence of that thing in reality. If they don't defend the existence, it's not analytically true. And then you pivoted to say, well, you haven't done that. This is just a pivot back to your conclusion. You, you're just restating. You're just restating your conclusion. No, um, I'm saying that you haven't supported the idea of moral facts yet. But I, but I have so many times. How, how do you know that something is morally good or bad without appealing to stances about it? Yeah, just like in the same way the sky is qualitatively blue, suffering is qualitatively bad. Oh, so where's the bad pathway in the brain? It's the, the pathway related to suffering. Okay. And how? Well, no, you can't, you can't equivocate Badness with suffering again. How do you know that suffering pathway is bad? Because it's qualitatively experienced as bad. How? No, again, how do you know independent of stances that that's a bad experience? It's qualitatively experienced as such. How do you know that looking at the sky is qualitatively blue? How do you know outside of how do you know that the sky is qualitatively blue? How do you know outside of how do you know? I'm not going to move on from this. How do you know that the sky is qualitatively blue? Answer the question. First of all, the sky isn't blue. It's the brain that perceives it as blue. Oh, so why, how is the exp of looking at the sky qualitatively blue? Again, we, I showed you research on that. That we can look at the patterns of the brain. Yeah. Per. So, so, it comes back to a brain scan. But how do you know that this neural pathway is the one that is associated with colors? Because, because every time we can independently verify this by having a patient look at the sky and that part of the brain activates, right? And that, that would be an evidence that that's objectively blue. But when it comes to Badness, there is no such experiment we can do. Oh, yeah, that's going to be because lots of different things cause suffering. Not just like specific objects. It's not suffering. Like, like you're not showing how suffering, um, correlates to Badness or goodness objectively. How do you know an experience is bad or good beyond somebody's experience of it? How do you know that an experience is bad or good beyond the experience? How do you, how do you know facts about an experience, putting aside the experience? Well, again, that's, we have other, we have people who can verify things, and we can verify things beyond our experiences. So, you can verify this based on what's going on in the brain. Yeah. We have. That's why there's research on the brain. We can verify. Concession. Now, how do you verify that an experience is good or bad beyond, uh, your stance about it? Yeah, well, that's just going to come down to the suffering neural pathway, as I've said, like, at least 20 times. Yeah. So, you've been, you've been. Can you, can you point out the contradiction? If somebody said, wait, wait, Mike, Mike, you, we've been debating this for like two hours at this point. Do you have the contradiction in my worldview? When did I ever claim there's a contradiction? I'm saying, so, there's, if there's no contradiction in my worldview, then I'm just going to accept it. Well, then that would be the case for anything you want, you want to believe. Oh, I just believe in fairies. There's no contradiction. I believe it. That's not. No, but there is a contradiction because, uh, the, there is a strong evidentiary case that naturalism is true. Superal. But it, but it is because we arrive at our beliefs based. Wait, wait, wait. Okay, wait. Mike, you just said no, it's not. Can you summarize the argument I was about to give? Or do you want? Wait, do you want? If you already know, if you already know the argument, then fine. But otherwise, can I, can I, can I give the argument? Or do you already know it? I'm, I'm just saying there's no contradiction. Wait, do you, wait, wait. And I, I know, I agree that that's your conclusion. But do you want, can I give the argument, or already know? You get the argument. Go. Perfect, perfect. And are you going to interrupt this time? Or good? Yeah, perfect. So, we arrive at our beliefs based on evidence. We gather evidence towards the ends of our beliefs, um, and, and based on these beliefs, based on the evidence, all the evidence points towards naturalism. Um, this leads to the belief in naturalism, which would actually disprove the existence of fairies. No, it wouldn't. If that's an epistemic contradiction, I asked for a logical contradiction. You couldn't find it. Epistemology is involved in logic. Wait, so, can you find the epistemic contradiction in my worldview? Yeah. Uh, the, the, the problem with your view is that if somebody were to say that this, um, experience is good, even though it's, it's a, it's, uh, correlated with the same pathway that you deem is bad, that's a contradiction. That's an epic contradiction that would be inail about your view. Yeah. Could you find me the person who says that, uh, suffering, uh, is is good? And doesn't, or in case it like unnecessary suffering is good? For example, could you find me the person who would affirm that unnecessary suffering is good? Who experiences unnecessary suffering and experiences that suffering as being a good thing? Could you find me that person? Yeah. What's his name? David Higgins, or Higgins, whatever. He thinks that suffering is good. Like, you know, going out there, suffering in like cold waters and [ __ ]. So, he would say that those are good experiences. Say they're bad. Who's right? Well, wait. So, first of all, this doesn't involve suffering. This involves like the dopamine neural pathway. Yeah. So, how do you know that certain actions are bad or good objectively beyond stances? So, you're just pivoting away. How did I pivot? Wait, wait. Do you, can you even summarize the last thing that I just said? You're saying that there's dopamine involved and there's pain involved, and that's fine. I'm, that's not, that's not what I said at all. I said, uh, that the specific neural pathway that's activated in these scenarios is the the dopamine pain neural pathway as opposed to the suffering pain neural pathway. This is the same pathway. It's invoked in like BDSM, for example. The suffering pathway doesn't happen when someone gets like spanked or whatever. Um, it's like the dopamine, uh, pain neural pathway. Yeah. So, let's just say that same suffering pathway, somebody says is a good experience. How do you know that they're wrong objectively? If they say that it's a good experience? Because it's just quality. It's in the same way that if somebody's like, red pathway activated, but they were staring at [Music] blue. Well, that could be independently verified to be wrong because of, uh, the, uh, the fact that we can test that experience and we can see that certain pathways light up or don't. I'm asking you how do you know that that's a bad or good experience objectively? You can't do it. You can't. Wait, wait, wa, wait. But, but you couldn't do that. So, you just like hand-waved away that question. Let's say that you have, so, let's, let's put the experiment like this. Let's say that you have like goggles on your face, and there's like a color that's like being viewed, and there's like a cat scan being, or like a, like a brain, not a CAT scan, like a brain scan being done of your brain, and it shows it sees the, um, like blue pathway lighting up, going [ __ ] nuts. How do you know, or, uh, but they say that the color they're looking at is red. How can you say that they're that they're wrong? Like, what, then, how do you, are, what, what are they looking at? Well, well, again, um, if somebody says they're seeing red, well, that's just a label they put on the thing, right? And that's perfectly fine. But the object being referred to is still blue. So, even if somebody labels, even if somebody labels it as good, as suffering is good, that's just putting a label on Badness. The color isn't indexed to Badness or goodness. That's why it's analogous, right? Wait, but that's just pointing out that it's a different case, Mike. No. Why? Wait, wait, wait. I'm okay. That's fine. I guess I guess we'll just have to run you down on this one. That's fine. Such a boring debate. Whatever. Wait, wait, wait. Mike, I'm going to be, I'm going to be unbelievably linear and aggressive with you for the next, like, however long this takes, and you're going to answer, and I'm not going to move on until you do answer. Why are these things disanalogous? Because in one circumstance, um, they are indexed to goodness and Badness. In the other circumstance, they're not. Yeah. And why does that make these disanalogous? Because that's a distinction. Oh, just your conclusion again. So, why does being a distinction make them disanalogous? It's a distinction relative to your claim. So, so, okay, but why does that make it disanalogous? Because you can't say that bless is good or bad. You can't say that there's something objective. I'm not trying to say that bless is good or bad. Nobody's saying that bless is good or bad. Nobody is saying that bless is good or bad. Wait, wait. Nobody, nobody's saying that. Why are these things disanalogous? Because you're trying to equivocate an an experience of blue or red as something. And why does that make it disanalogous? Because when you're saying something is good or bad, that's different from saying something.

Is blue or red? I understand. I've heard this claim. Wait, wait, wait. But why? Wait, wait. Okay, so I'll just say your words back to you so you don't get confused, because I think you're a little bit lost right now. There's nothing about the experience, the reason why. Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. My daddy. Okay, Mike. Uh, so the question is just going to be again, um, why is is one thing talking about morals and one thing not talking about morals? Why does that make it disanalogous if the if the point is just that some things are qualitatively experienced? That's not the point of contention. That is the point. In because you don't experience badness, you don't experience goodness, you don't experience those things like you can experience red or blue. Well, yeah, but I'm I'm saying that you experience the the way you know you experience red and blue is just by the fact that you experience them. The way that you know you experience badness is just by the fact that you experience it. Well, that's just an intuitive claim, and I agree. But the problem is, you double, you concession that you just conceded the entire debate, Mike. You agree with the point. You agree that badness is experienced. Huge double, Mike, in the comment section. We got an objective moral realist up here. Double concession. No, so if you missed what I said, right? I said it's subjectively, it's only subjectively good or bad, not objectively. Oh, but I disagree. That's not my point at all. You said you agreed with my point. That's not my. Where is the objective badness experience? Where's the objective badness experience? It's present in the experience of suffering. But where? Wait, wait, Mike. We're not pivoting off of this, Mike. We're on the, we're on a [ __ ]. Wait, wait. We're on a, we're on a railroad, Mike. We're going until until there's an end to this, until we find the disanalogy. So you would need to point out the thing, um, for for for the sake of this, to to prove why they're disanalogous, why I can't invoke bless as an argument. You need to tell me what the relevant, what the relevant distinction is, because buness wouldn't be a stance. Badness would be a stance. Wait, so oh, but I disagree. That's I I don't accept that. Well, then that's why this is disanalogous, right? Because wait, wait, but wait. I don't, I don't accept that. Well, that I don't care, right? Like, perfect. Wait, so so well, wait, so if you don't care, then I don't care. No, you should care because we're. Well, I'll just turn it back on you. You you should care. You can be wrong about it if you want. You should care. You're you're you're being ridiculous right now, right? Well, you're you're getting, you you have no idea what you're even talking. You can't give me the relevant distinction. All you can say is that these like case A and case B are different cases. I agree they're different cases. Why does that matter to the relevant principle being to you're not. Let me try to explain it again. In the case of bless, you're just going to say that that it's talking about that bless is not experienced as bad, and I'm going to say, no, [ __ ]. Right? That's why you can't. That's not disal. Wait, do you know what? Can you can you do you know what a disanalogy is? Yeah. Now, can you show me? Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. Can you can you give me? Wait, wait. Can you show me? Good. Can you define disanalogy? Can I define analogy? Disanalogy. Disanalogy. It's when something, when two propositions are, uh, incompatible with each other. That's a contradiction. So let's try again. So you got it wrong the first time. What's a disanalogy? It's when two propositions, um, are the argumentation behind those two propositions are different. What? Absolutely not. That's just like having two different arguments. That's like literally just two arguments are different. That's not disanalogy. So let's try a third time. Can you tell us what a disanalogy is, Mike? It's when two arguments are, um, two scenarios are are not compatible with each other in terms of explaining, uh, another, a previous argument. Yeah, I mean, that's a, yeah, just like that. The relevant principle that's being appealed to. The relevant principle being appealed to is not. Now, can you now explain to me where badness is? Where's the experience of bad? Wait, wait, wait, Mike, Mike, I'm not, I'm not getting off of this, Mike. We're going to stay on this until you can see that these things are anal. Mike, I don't. Daddy, daddy, daddy. We're going to keep on going until we find the disanalogy. I'm not getting off of this. Yeah, so in one, yeah, you're just going to say that one is experienced as bad and one isn't. Or can, can I, can I, can I [ __ ] explain myself? Let's calm down there. I'm so. Wait, I'm sorry. Did, did calling you Daddy upset? I can totally not call you that. I didn't realize that struck a nerve with. Can I explain? Yeah, please go for it. Yeah, so in the scenario of the bless, there is no, it's not going to be indexed to exp to, uh, badness or goodness. But in the exp, but in the experience of suffering, you are claiming that it is indexed to something objectively bad or good. So that's why they're not compatible. That's why they're not analogous. Now, that's your conclusion. But I'm asking, why does that mean that they're disanalogous? So can you show to me, can you show me where is the objective verification? Wait, wait. I just asked you a question. Wait, wait, wait. But why, why does that make it, why does the fact that one, uh, is is an experience of moral facts, whereas one is an experience of like colors, why does that mean that they're disanalogous for the purpose of this argument? Colors are synthetic facts, and and morals are not. They're not. They're not at all. Um, okay, wait. And what do you mean by that? Well, do you know what a synthetic fact is? Yeah, so a synthetic fact is just going to be related like an objective fact about the world where it's just going to be true based on definitions, right? Moral, moral claims are not synthetic. So moral claims are not synthetic. True. That's why it's disanalogous. Now, can you provide? Yeah, so I would say that they are synthetic in so far as they correspond directly one to one, just to the fact of suffering. That's the problem. Now you have to go. What's? Wait, wait. What's the contradiction? I'm not saying there's a contradiction. I'm saying there's prediction. I don't really care. That doesn't matter. I'm telling you there's a problem. You can't justify your objective claim of morality. So, but I can, because it's objectively rooted in brain states. Yeah, so what? Where in the brain is badness or goodness located? Well, so so the objective, so the objectivity, the objective part of this is the brain state. The brain state corresponds to the qualitative experience of badness. Let me try again. Where in the brain is badness or goodness located? Where in the brain is badness or goodness located? Yeah. Well, it's that's just a qualitative experience. That's like asking like, where the bless quality is located. It's it's not located in the brain. It's located in experience. Okay, so where outside of experience is it located? In experience, Mike. Okay, where's? Wait, can you, where's blus qualia in the brain? Oh, sure. Wait, so can you say, so the qualitative like experience of bless? So you think an experience is a physical thing? Yes. A like a physical object? Like experience is a physical object that you can like somebody else could like touch or feel? Yeah, so experience is to me physical in the sense that it's neuronal. It's, um, electrochemical. No, but I'm I'm not talking about like what produces the experience. I'm talking about the experience itself. Where does the experience itself exist? I don't think there's atin. Oh, but I, but I do. Wait, so you think that, um, actually relevant too. So if we took like a brain and we just like up. Why you pivoting? Wait, wait. Because you. Well, this isn't a pivot. This is a reductio to the position that you just said. You're crashing out right now, Mike. Mike, let's take a deep breath and out. Mike, that's not a pivot. That's just a a reductio to the absurd silly thing that you just said. So if I took a brain. Well, no, but it's not because it's a redu. Do you know what a redo ad absurdum is? We're learning so much about philosophy today, Mike, aren't we? Yeehaw. Thank you so much, Barnabas. Appreciate that. You know what redo is? Would you need me to explain that too? Yeah, I know what it is. Yeah, cool. So if I took a brain and I lit up the relevant pathways, would there be an experience associated with that? Yeah, but that experience. Does it mean you think so if I took a dead brain and lit up like the the pathway associated like suffering, you think that that would cause an experience of suffering? If you caused electrochemistry to to be inputted into a brain? Yes, there would be experience. So even with like a dead brain with that's connected to nothing else? Brain? Yes. Life is just electrochemical process right now. Wait, can you, wait, could you, could you prove that perhaps? Could you show me the experiment? Well, maybe you don't know the philosophy much, but philosophy of science. But I'm sorry, we don't prove synthetic clean. Could you show me the evidence for it then? Yeah, the evidence is in biology. Yeah, but could you show me like the study or like the paper? Could you, could you show me the evidence? Yeah. Do you know what abiogenesis is? Yeah, I do. It's it's the process of of life coming from non-life. Exactly. So in the process of life coming from non-life, what has to happen? Electri. We do. We're doing a little little, uh, process. So so there's three steps that need to happen for a biogenesis, uh, um, in no particular order: like segregation from the external environment, formation of a metabolism, and the formation of a self-replicating like molecule. These are the three key steps. Yeah. Those are all electrochemical processes. W. Can you show me the electrochemical process that's present, uh, within the formation of self-replicating molecules? Yeah, so do you know how, um, you understand what DNA is? It's a. Wait, wait, we're not talking about DNA. We're not talking about DNA. Well, we're talking, we're talking about. We're not talking about DNA. We're talking about. Yeah, we can talk about of self-replicating molecules, which entail nucleic acids. Uh, do they? That could be yes, true. Let's look, um, yes, they do. That could be the case. Let's just check really quick. Um, are nucleobases the same thing as what you're talking about? Nuclear bases make up nucleic acids. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Nucleic acids are indeed involved. But so you're saying that there's, uh, and nucleic acids create like self-replicating processes? Yes. Right? And we can take a look at the electrochemical processes entailed by that, and we can see how they exchange electrons, they exchange ions within one another. That's what causes life to occur, right? It's a process. So, but this is a pivot on your end, right? No, because wait, wait, because you're the who brought up abiogenesis, pivoted all the way to abiogenesis. I had to bring. Because you asked me what was the process, right? Yeah, well, I'm just asking you, could you, could you show me the evidence of abiogenesis? There's tons of studies. No, not of abiogenesis. I I agree with abiogenesis, obviously. Okay, then you would agree that it would, you could just easily infer that these processes are electrochemical in nature that bring about life? Why? Wait, wait. Just that just that there's that experience. That experience necessarily, if the pathway is lit up, then the experience is happening. Yeah, that's that's what electrochemistry. So if you took like a, so so you're saying that if I took just this one, literally, if I if I dissected this brain, took this one pathway out of the brain, out of all of the brain, and just lit up this one pathway, that there would be an experience of suffering? Yeah, you can simulate experiences of suffering with, uh, yeah, with that. Oh, so let's say, let's say I I take from this, just all of the neurons involved in this one pathway, take them completely out of the brain, all the entirely out of the brain, take the entire suffering neural pathway out of the brain, and I light up the suffering neural pathway. Well, it wouldn't be there. So you wouldn't feel pain. There are people that don't feel pain. Wait, wait. There, no, no, but just like the the pathway itself, if I lit up just the pathway itself, would that create suffering? If it's not functional? No, you couldn't create suffer. But I took the entire pathway out and I'm I'm letting up. If you took it out, then you couldn't feel pain. Or or or is it the case that perhaps there's more to it? That there's I'm not asking about the rest of the brain. I'm asking about the pathway itself. If the pathway is gone, you don't feel pain. I'm not asking about the the rest of the brain, Mike. You're not listening. I didn't say that. Truly, thank you so much for the subscription. I appreciate it. Appreciate you in the community. Yeah, but I'm asking you, so the the pathway, you dissect it, you take the pathway out. If you lit up just the pathway, is there an experience of suffering? That's yeah. Prove it. Would be there. Would be some kind of experience. It would have be processed higher in high neuron. Prove it. Prove what? That thing that you just agreed to. Prove it. Do you know how the brain works? And prove it. I don't. I I don't. I think it's unimaginable to me that if you just took like a single neural pathway out of the brain and lit up just that single neural pathway, if you dissected it and removed it from the brain, and you you lit up just that one pathway, I find it deeply unlikely to say that there's an experience that's had here. Well, there obviously there have to be neurons that process that, and that neuron, if you destroy the entire neural pathway, you wouldn't be able to feel the pain. But if you lit that pathway up, I think you would be able to feel pain. Um, no, just by. You're you are not listening. The pathway is outside of the brain, and the pathway is the thing that's being lit up. Oh, yeah. If it's outside the brain, then yeah, you would still be able to. There still be some kind of experience there, just like life can experience things like, uh, flies, bugs, they all have experiences still. But is there an experience of suffering just for the portion of your brain that got dissected? There probably would be, and I'm not, I'm not 100% sure, but I think there would be. Prove it. Like when you say prove it, do you understand that scientific claims aren't like based on proofs? Provide the evidence for it. Here you go. Right. Evidence. Yeah. And the evidence, the overwhelming evidence is found in tons of biological studies. Yeah. So, okay, but that's that's actually deeply unintuitive because typically when people die, um, they like lots of their brain is like completely intact. However, presumably, if you took out, I don't know, some like random part of their brain, like the part of their brain associated with experiencing bless, if you took this dead person's brain and took out, dissected just the pathway, um, associated with bless, and you lit up that pathway, you just applied electricity to it, I I guess I'm just not really bought in the idea that there would be an experience had of bless. Okay, and how's this relevant to your argument? Because this is the thing that we've been arguing about for the last 20 minutes, Mike. No, it hasn't. All I asked you is how do you know that there's badness or goodness in experiences objectively? You haven't. Mike, this is literally what we were just arguing about for like, like 15 minutes now. You're pivoting back to your original question. No, so I'm sorry, Mike. I've already. What we just talked about is irrelevant. I've I've already I've already answered this question like eight or nine times. Yes, so let me let me explain to you why I. You've already explained your position, and I've already dunked on your position like eight or nine times. M. You. I didn't even. I didn't even posit a position here. Well, yeah, you you tried to give objections to my position. Exactly. And all of them failed. You provided zero. You provided zero contradictions. Well, just because they don't provide a contradiction doesn't mean that you didn't provide any epistemic contradictions. Do you know? Yes, I did. You didn't list. You were you about to ask me what epistemology is? Wait, if we, if you want to play the pop quiz game, I I don't think you want to play the pop quiz game. Let's just put it that way. No, I wasn't going to ask you that, dude. Anyway, what I was going what I was going to ask you is, how do you know that badness is something that is true or factual outside of our experience? You've already asked me this and how do you know like like 10 times. And how do you know that I'm tired, Mike. I'm not answering this a 10th time. You can just rewatch the VOD. It'll be on YouTube. Yeah, what you're gonna say is, oh, it's our experience. But that doesn't tell me that the experience is bad or good. I agree that we have experiences, but that doesn't tell us that it's a bad or good one. If I experience blue, did I experience blue? Yes. So if I if I experience bad, did I experience bad? I don't think you can experience bad. So then so then the claim that if I experience bad, then I experience bad, just becomes a vacuous truth. Do you know what a vacuous truth is, Mike? Yeah, so let me elaborate. Wait, wait, wait, Mike, Mike, is it, do you agree or disagree that it's a vac, that that the statement, if I experience bad, then I experience bad, that that's vacuous? I reject that you can experience bad. Okay, but but you would agree that rejecting it just makes the statement true. How do you know what a vacuous truth is, Mike? Because you're applying an operator over the empty set. Yeah, so can you demonstrate that bad is experienced? Wait, wait, wait. So do you, you agree that if you experience bad, then you experience bad? If if that's if it's definitionally true, of course it's true. But not definitionally true. But you haven't shown that you can experience bad. I have. I've shown this like eight or nine times, Mike. You can just rewatch the V. Yeah, so how do you experience bad? I've explained it eight or nine times, Mike. You can just rewatch the VOD. No, see, what you're going to say is, you experience suffering, but that doesn't mean you're experiencing bad. Yeah, and I've answered this objection eight or nine times, Mike. You can just rewatch the V. Do you have, wait, wait, do you have, Mike, do you have Mike, do you have anything new for me or do you? So can you actually answer the question, Mike? Do you have, Mike, do you have anything new for me? Because I've already answered all of these. If you're interested in my answer, you can just rewatch. You can just rewatch the VOD, Mike. Rewatch the replay. How do you like distinguish between something good and bad being experienced outside of? I don't take. Well, you've already asked me this, but I don't, I don't, I don't take a stance on what goodness is. Well, so then you don't hold to objective morals? Well, I I do hold to an objective moral fact because I can say that, so I hold the moral realism just based on the fact that there exists subjective moral facts. That there is some stance of morality to that, there is some stance independent morals, right? So, um, kicking my grandma, is that objectively bad? It's going to come down to how much suffering is caused. If your grandma likes to be kicked, and I don't think that's bad. I think that's kind of kinky. Oh, so there's nothing about the pathways that would tell you that they're objectively bad? No, because the pathways are related to suffering. So if if your grandma suffers, then I'm going to say that that's probably bad. But if your grandma does not suffer, then I'm probably not going to say that that's bad. But you just said that the grandma might be suffering, but she says it's okay. Uh, no, because if it, if she does not suffer, then I'd say that it's not bad. Okay, but if your grandma suffers and says it's okay, would that be still bad? Yes. Objectively? Okay, really? Okay, you really want to commit to this? Yes. So so you're saying if I cause somebody suffering, but they like it, like for example, kinks or whatever? No, because kinks don't cause suffering. That's the difference. Kinks should be objectively bad. Kinks don't cause suffering. They activate a different neural pathway. They would cause. If you listen to my example, you would know that I said it caused suffering. If it causes suffering, then it's not a kink. It's a. Wait, if, yeah, if it causes suffering, if it activates the, if it activates the suffering neural pathway, as opposed, wait, wait, wait, big dog, big dog, if it, if it activates the, um, the the suffering neural pathway instead of the dopamine pain neural pathway, then that's not like that's not like kinky. That's like this person is not having a good time. But again, that doesn't mean that's a bad experience. It could be still a good experience, even if they're feeling pain. It could still. Okay, well, yeah, but pain isn't my criteria, as you failed the track earlier. Okay, great. So pain has no relevance to suffering? That's not what I said either, Mike. You got, you got to stop strawmanning and got to put on your listening ears. So then pain indicates suffering? No, you got to put on your listening ears. So so how, how is pain relevant to suffering? So because suffering is going to include some level of pain within it, but which is not to say that pain necessarily necessitates suffering. So suffering necessarily includes some level of pain? Yeah, I'd say so. Okay, great. So then you agree with me before that pain is always involved in some in suffering in some? Never disagreed that pain is. You just did. But anyway, I didn't. Didn't happen. So my claim, my claim from earlier, wait, wait, wait. I'm gonna. Wait, wait, Mike, Mike, you're trying to pivot away because you know exactly what I'm about to say. My my claim from earlier, which has always been the same, is that suffering always involves pain, but not all pain is suffering. Okay, so, but you're saying that there is a certain amount of pain that would indicate somebody's suffering? Correct. No. So then how do you tell somebody suffering? The neural pathway. Okay, so if the neural pathway is being, uh, enlightened up, um, and that person enjoys it, would that mean that they're suffering? Would that mean it's bad? They enjoy it? Would that mean that it's bad if the pathway is that? So I would say that there's a, there's some level of like qualitative badness to the experience if the if what is being lit up. Because if, if it's word salad, I'll just explain it to you a bit easier, and I've already explained this like 10 times. That's fine. I'll go for an 11th. Why not? Um, just that there is a, there is a suffering neural pathway, um, and there is a like a pathway that's associated with pain, but it's it's more of like a like a like a fun enjoyable pain type, uh, neural pathway. That's the pathway that's associated with things like BDSM, um, or like like combat sports, for example. That's you're probably activating your like pain dopamine neural pathway, uh, as opposed to just your like like agony neural pathway, right? But let's say that, um, that same pathway that you say is suffering is lightened up, but also at the same time dopamine is being released in the brain, so that person kind of enjoys it. Would that be? That's not what I said. No, I'm I'm just raising an example to you. Would that be a bad thing? Okay, wait. I'm not talking about like, so the the pain dopamine neural. Oh, my. It's like it's okay. It's okay. Some people are stupid, and it's okay. So what I'm saying is is not that, uh, some like there's this just one neural pathway, but sometimes this one neural pathway is on, and also there's dopamine present, so it's fine. There are two neural pathways. One is the suffering neural pathway. The other saying if they're both in pain, that causes like dopamine, like pain, that it causes like excitement feral pathways. Yeah, right. So I'm saying if they're both, um, being lightened at the same time, right? For example, it happens all the time. If this is the case, then would that be a bad thing, even though that person is suffering, yet enjoys it? Would that be a bad thing? Because no, suffering is not enjoyable. It is literally unenjoyable. Nobody enjoys suffering, like definitionally. How about bodybuilders who are suffering? So, uh, if they, they're not suffering. They're like, uh, they're reducing their suffering because they would suffer more, like losing in competition. Yeah, so and also also I have no reason to think suffering to get. I have no reason to think that working out causes suffering. The only thing that I have have reason to think, uh, is that it causes probably like some level of like excitement. Yeah, let's just say hypothetically that if somebody was bodybuilding, they the same, uh, suffering pathways were lightened. Would that be an objectively bad thing for that person to bodybuild? Yeah, I've already answered this question five times, but I understand that you can't like handle not getting the answer that you like, so I'll answer it again. That's fine. Um, so in this scenario, which is not reality, as you just said, scenario which is not reality, that's going to come down to an analysis, um, of the entire picture of whether as a whole, this reduces suffering or increases suffering. All things considered, right? So then you've just conceded here that there's nothing. I agree. You can say it conceded. So what's the concession? Oh, so you're not going to let me speak. Okay, so what's the concession? Yeah, so you just conceded that there's nothing about the P suffering pathway that alone, simpliciter, tells you that's a bad or not or good. You have to. There's a. There's a badness present in it. But in order to say that, so events themselves are not bad. It is the experiences that they cause, which we evaluate the level of badness or goodness. Need we need to holistically evaluate. Daddy, daddy, daddy. So we need to evaluate the entire scenario, um, as as a whole, as an entirety, to determine whether, uh, it's going to be good or bad, just based on, um, what it causes. Yeah, that's a normative claim, right? It's a debate about normativity. You know the difference between meta-ethics and normativity, right? Yeah, so normativity is probably going to fall into the like, you should do this, you shouldn't do this, whereas meta-ethics is going to be a discussion about how we ground these specific facts, yeah, right, exactly. So when it comes to your neural suffering pathway that's lightened up when you're bodybuilding, you would have to be committed to saying that that bodybuilder is objectively wrong and bad. Wait, you're like, literally doing the thing that you're like, what, what, what a crazy, what a wild battle projection this was. Wait, you you like literally just projected this thing onto me. That's like the critique that you gave of me is like literally bar for bar what you just did. No, there is. So if, if indeed the bodybuilder suffers, there is some level of badness there. That is not the same thing as the event itself of working out being bad. Oh, so how do you know that working out is bad or good? That's going to be a holistic discussion, like a, like an all things considered. Does this cause like more suffering than it offsets? Thank you so much. Appreciate it. Okay, great. So there's nothing about the suffering. So you, this goes back to your original claim where you said that the suffering pathway tells you that something is bad or good, right? Yep. But now it doesn't. There's a contradiction in your view. Well, it tells us if there's a goodness or badness present. Ian, I know. Wait, wait, because because that's a, that's like a. I understand that your misunderstanding. Wait, wait, wait, because I need to clarify. Have to let me. Wait, wait, wait. I need to clarify, though. So the pathway activating means that there is some level of, or of a badness present within the experience, which is not the same thing as like the event itself being bad. Okay, so you said before that the suffering pathway being lightened up means it's bad. Now you're saying not necessarily, that there's a, that there is badness present. That suffering, as an experience, is bad, and that the pathway of the experience. You're not addressing this, right? So your your claim before was that suffering pathway lightened always bad. Now it's that's never. That has never been my claim. Never. Okay, so then suffering pathways can be lightened, but the event of the pathway, so the The Experience itself, the bad. My daddy, the exper, the event of of like badness is just going to be present in the experience itself. But now, um, the the extent to which this experience happens or what other experiences happen based on the event, that's a different. Yeehaw. Thank you so much. So the experience would not be, you would not be able to tell if it's bad or good until you evaluate what happens next, until you evaluate, um, how much like suffering is caused by all individuals involved if the action happens versus if the action does not happen. Yes. Really? Okay, great. So under your view, if somebody gets murdered and or somebody gets abused, and it causes suffering, and the suffering pathway is lightened up tremendously, that wouldn't be objectively bad until you go, hmm, maybe this person, you know, maybe it's good for that person to be abused later on, and the sufferings less because it prevented a war or something. You say that that's not objectively bad? Can you, can you run that scenario back one more time? Yeah, so let's say somebody was being abused, and their suffering pathways were lightened up, they experienced suffering. However, you would have to be committed to saying that it's not objectively bad because it might cause less suffering in the future, right? As so, uh, when we're evaluating events, that's correct. Yes. That the, there's that there's that there's a level of badness present in the experience, which means that there's a level of badness present in the event. But if that offsets like a huge amount of suffering later, then yeah, yeah. And this is just circular, right? Because now you're now you're going back to, hey, is that suffering? What's my, what's my conclusion, and how am I presupposing it? Yeah, so your conclusion that is actions are objectively good or bad, correct? That that they're objective moral facts that, yeah, they're way. So and actually, no, not that actions are objectively good or bad. That's not my claim at all. So so so some, so a person is raped, is that objectively bad or good? Uh, well, that's going to be, um, uh, in all scenarios that I could think of, that would be bad. Wow. Okay, so it's not a moral fact about rape being wrong? Well, yeah, Ian. Wait, to be clear, like you don't hold any moral facts. Oh, so now you're going to pivot, daddy. Think is daddy. So because what you're going for is like the optical rhetorical win. You're just saying you don't think you don't think rape is is is is is objectively morally bad. Big dog. So that's not the level. The it is, um, I can't think of a scenario that would not cause a great deal of suffering. I understand that, but this is what a subjectivist would say. I'm asking you as an objectivist, what, um, is raping objectively wrong as a moral fact? Is it objectively wrong? So the suffering caused by it is objectively bad. Um, I can't, I don't, I don't prescribe morality at the level of the individual action. I prescribe morality at the the level of, uh, the action all things considered. That's just the standard consequentialist position, right? So then you, you don't actually have access to moral facts. All you have is because all you're saying is, well, it depends on the situation, depends on the context. Yeah, wait, so is it, is it going to be an objective moral fact under my view? It depends on the, it depends. Wait, wait, wait. That that situations. Wait, oh, oh, you already know the question. So what question was I about to ask you? If you already know the question? No, I didn't say that. Yeah, perfect. Awesome. So, uh, yeah, that's fine. You'll pipe down. Um, so the, there is an objective moral fact that you can make under my view, which is just that the the thing that is bad, um, is going to be the thing that all things considered causes the most suffering. Is that, is that an objective fact under my view? No, it can't be by definition because there are circumstances where it wouldn't be good, and then there are circumstances where it could be good. Wait, could you, what statement did I just say? Uh, well, you're implying that there's some circumstance. You have to take a look look at all things considered to know that if it's good or bad. Yeah, so so is it an objective moral fact that the the good action to do is going to be the one all things considered that reduces suffering? Well, that's a blanketed statement, but it all, all the the facts depend on the circumstances and the context. So wait, wait, wait, and wait, under under my view, is that correct? Is that true? Is what true? The, do you remember the statement that I just said? You need it a third time. You to listen this time. I'm asking. Yeah, say it, say it again. Yeah, yeah, let's, let's hear it for a third time because you couldn't listen the first time or the second time, but that's fine. So is it going to be objectively true under my view that, uh, the things that cause more suffering all things considered are going to be bad, if there are things that cause less suffering? Is that going to be an objective fact? That's not a moral claim though. It's not a moral claim, but yeah, well, it is a moral claim that for for any for any event, any action X, um, it's going to be bad if and only if, uh, doing X causes more suffering than not doing X. Is that true or untrue under my worldview? Um, well, yeah, it could be true to you. Um, but again, that's not. Wait, wait, but wait, but under under my worldview, under my worldview, is that true or not true? It it wouldn't be. You wouldn't have access to to moral facts. Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. I'm not. Is it true or untrue? Mike, it's neither. It's is it true or untrue under my view? The way that I've laid it out, is that true or untrue? I'm I'm asking you. I'm asking you, is it true or untrue? Mike, answer the question. I'm showing you that you can't say it's true or untrue because have access to moral facts. You're just making a claim again, right? Well, but I'm asking, under under my view, is it going to be true or untrue? I don't know your position because so the reductive that you ran wasal. Wait, because wait, no, because you wait, wait, because you just ran an internal critique. Did you not? Wait, wait, so wait, wait, when when you were running all, when you were running like the consequentialist, when you were running the consequentialist critiques, was that, was that, wait, was that, were those critiques of your view or were those critics of? No, I'm just showing you that you have to continuously. You made the claim, Mike, that there were. You're still not grasping, right? So let me. Did you just say that I'm harassing you? No, wait. I did. Did I mishar you? Yeah, okay, that's, um, what I'm saying is, you're still, it's circular what you're doing, because you're still. What's the conclusion? How am I presupposing it? Oh, you're, you're concluding that there's objective facts about your normative claims. How am I presupposing? Which may be the case, but you haven't shown. Wait, so so which, uh, under which premise am I presupposing that? Which, which premise that I, I say, am I presupposing this? What premise are you presupposing this? You're, you're simply claiming that every, all things considered, there has to be subjective. There has to be suffering, and you have to assess that to all things considered. There has to be suffering. Do you want to to take another stab at that one, Mike? Yeah, all things considered, there has to be an assessment of things being good or bad. And the problem is that's true. You want to say the entire sentence again instead of just. Can I talk? I you're you're saying nothing right now. I have no idea what you even mean. I'm telling you why you're being circular, and that you're still appealing to subjectivity. You're still appealing to your stance here. You're not showing why it's subjectively true. No, say so saying that 2 + 2 might be a or that 2 + 2 equals 4 might be a stance, but it is stance independently true. What? No, it's that's wait, wait, so so saying that saying that that suffering is qualitatively bad might be a stance, but it is stance independent true. How, how do you know that that suff? Because it is literally hardwired into our neurology. No, what's hardwired are experiences. But how do you know those experiences are bad? Because it's it's connected to the reward center of the brain. How do you know that's good? Because it is quite literally the the bad feeling. It is the shouldn't feeling. How do you know that's good? How do you, how do you know that should andness is good? Really? Where's the shitness in your in your brain? In the in the reward center of the brain? Mike, no, wait. So do you think the reward center? Wait, wait, Mike, Mike, do you, Mike, do you, Daddy, do you think the reward center of the brain like, uh, helps influence like should or should andness? It might influence you to do things, but the should andness, that is a stance. But you think that there's an experience of should or should inness? No, there's no such thing. Oh, so then what does the reward center of the brain do? The reward center just simply determines you to do certain actions. But it doesn't tell you. And how does it do that? How does it? Does it perhaps say, you should do this, you shouldn't do this? Just the point is that there's. Wait, wait, wait, wa. No, Mike, Mike, how does it do that? Does it perhaps say, you should do this, you shouldn't do this? Is that perhaps how it works? There is no pathway that does that. Wait, wait, but I'm asking, so so then, so then how, how does it do that? It doesn't. That's why I'm saying it's a. Oh, wait, wait. So no, so I'm not asking you about like the should or should inness. I'm just asking you, how does it incentivize you or disincentivize you from doing specific things? Well, dopamine is is a force that, uh, tell, you know, tells you to do certain actions, and other things like do, you know, stumbling over yourself right now, Mike. You're not listening to me. You're stumbling. I can't listen to you to you because you keep on stumbling over yourself. Let me, let me say it again. Dopamine tells you to your body to do certain actions, and adrenaline tells your body to do other actions. But you subjectively deem them as you shouldn't be or should be doing these things. And that's the problem. When you're Ste, that's why you're being circular. You can't show me where in the biological brain is the should inness or the badness. It doesn't exist. Oh, but Mike, I already have shown you this. The should inness and should exist in the reward center of the brain. You're just not tra. Okay, so can you provide a scientific study that says certain actions shouldn't be done because of the brain? That the brain interprets certain actions as shouldn't be? Exact. The brain interprets things, and you your stance says, oh, we shouldn't do this, but there's no fact of the matter. So no, no, no, because this is all precognition. This all, every part of the neural pathway happens precognition. It's not subjective, Mike. It's objective because it's precognition. How, how can it be subjective, Mike? How can it be subjective if it's precognition? Because actions, uh, don't have embedded in them some kind of badness or goodness. Actions are just actions. You are the one stance dependently deeming them as bad or good or shouldn't or should not do. All right, Mike, do you know what the question I just asked you is? Because that didn't answer it at all. Or did you forget? Did you say word salad because you're a dishonest individual? It actually did answer it, but yeah, so so what was the question that you answered? The question was the question was, um, the reward system, the brain, uh, why doesn't it tell you shouldn't do something? And I. That's not. No, that wasn't the question. Do you want to take another stab at it? Wait, wait. That was not the question. Wait, how much, how much money do you want to bet that that was the question that I just asked you? Just say the question again. Wait, wait, wait. So you answered a question that you didn't even listen to, Mike, because you're a dishonest, bad faith deb. Well, I was answering the question, right? The question. Just say I don't remember. Don't know what the question was because you're a dishonest debater and you're still lying about it. I'm not dishonest. If you're not dishonest, then say that you don't know what the question was. I did. Oh, perfect. So you concede that you were answering a question that you didn't even know. Perfect. It's because you're a bad faith liar. The question, the question again. How can it be subjective if it's precognition? How can what be subjective? How can suffering be subjective if it's precognition? That's not what I'm saying. That's that's a straw man. I'm not saying that suffering is subjective. I'm saying that you calling it bad or good is subjective. So is saying that 2 + 2 equals 4 is that subjective? No, that's an analytical statement. Perfect. And this is also an analytical statement. No, it's not. Why not? No moral claims are not analytical claims. Prove it. This is a this is what most philosophers agree to. Appeal to authority. Prove it. Prove it. Do you understand how proofs work in philosophy? Yeah, I do. It's goes premise, premise, conclusion. So what's your premise? Moral claims, moral claims, especially in your view, are not analytical because they entail some kind of physical or biological phenomenon. Do you know what a do you know what an analytic truth is? Because Mike, the definition, the definition of badness that I'm appealing to is just going to be related to this feeling. Yeah, so that's not how facts work. You don't just, you don't just get to say that, oh, um, the chair, uh, chairs. You're stumbling over your words, Mike. You don't just get to say Earth is flat because it's an analytical truth. But what would the analytic, what would be the definitions in these scenarios? What would you define flat as? That's not, that's not an analytical truth. That's a synthetic truth, Mike. I think you're confused. You can just say Earth is flat. And how would you be defining flat if it's an analytic truth? Flat's just like a plane that's has no curve to it. Oh, perfect. Then this wouldn't be an analytic truth because the Earth is in fact not a plane that has no curvature to it. Exactly. And that's why you can't do that with moral. So so then it's not an anal. Wait, but you're just giving me an example of something that's not an analytic truth. I'm telling you that morality is analytically true. You have to. You're just, Mike, you're getting frustrated. Take a deep breath. Calm down, Mike. You have to let me speak. Okay, yeah. So how would how would it be an analytic truth to say that the Earth is flat? Oh, because that's just definitional, right? That's why I'm saying it can't be that. In what way does the Earth satisfy the definition of flat? You have to let me. In what way does the Earth satisfy the definition of flat? You have to. Oh, I just to find it as flat. Oh, okay. Wait, but it doesn't fit the definition of flat because Earth, presumably, exactly, just presumably, is the spherical substance that we exist on, whereas flatness is just.

Going to be a thing that has no curvature to it. So, what way is the thing that we live on have no curvature to it? Can I speak? It comes back to a synthetic. Some time to speak. You need better rhetoric. You're getting frustrated. Okay, can I speak now? Go for it. Thank you. You're claiming that you know certain actions are bad because of a biological phenomenon. That's a synthetic claim. Now, when it comes to the Earth being flat, I agree with you that you can't make an analytical statement about Earth being flat because it's also a synthetic claim. That's why you can't say that certain actions are bad. Why is morality a synthetic claim? Because in your view, it's attached to some biological phenomenon. And why does that make it a synthetic claim? Because synthetics are based on empirical data. No, not necessarily. So, analytics. Analytics are based on definition. So, if I just define "badness" to be the feeling, the experience, suffering, then that's going to be an analytic truth. Where it's going to be a synthetic truth as to whether or not the actual experience itself is occurring. The fact that this experience is bad is just going to be analytically true. Don't mean that that experience is bad, it's analytically true. Show me how it's bad. It's analytically true by definition. You can't say that by definition. You know what an analytic truth is, Mike? Show me that 2 + 2 = 4. Mike, show me that 2 + 2 = 4. Mike, what is, what is a synthetic claim? A synthetic claim is one that's going to be true based on the facts of reality, external empirical facts. Where invoked analytically, this feeling of suffering. What would be your critique of defining it that way? And that feeling of suffering is empirical. Yes, but, uh, so the, the claim as to whether or not one individual, anal, Michael, calm down. So the fact of whether or not one individual is suffering, that's going to be synthetic. But the fact that suffering itself is bad, that's analytic. How do you know suffering is bad? It's analytic. You, you can't. Ian, you can't just say it's analytic because I can say God is real because it's analytically true, right? Okay, but that's not going to be the case because you would need to give a definition of God that is in line with reality. Yeah, God is just a square circle. Oh, and does a square circle exist? God is a square. How about that? God is a square. Well, so, so if all you mean say God exists is that squares exist, I would reject that because I also reject abstract objects. So God doesn't exist because squares, real squares don't actually exist. I'll make a claim that is that you can't, it can't be falsified. Right? Let's say unicorns exist. What are we defining unicorns as? Uh, flying, uh, horses. Uh, and do flying horses exist? No. It's definitionally true. But do, but do they exist? Is the question. Anal, it's analytic. It's not analytically true because flying, because you, by, by unicorns, you mean flying horses. This is only going to be true if there are flying. Exist. Mike, which means it's not analytic. It's by definition true. No, but it's not true because it doesn't conform to reality. Oh, yes, it is. So, could you find me the flying horses? Oh, so, can you find me the badness in the brain? It's analytic. It's defined that way. Oh, so is a unicorn analytic? No, but it's not because you've defined unicorn to be a flying horse. Wait, Mike, Mike, and I, and I agree. Mike, you've been cornered. You have nothing. You've been outflanked philosophically. Folded like a lawn chair at every corner. Can you show me the exper? Mike, and I, and I agree. Mike, and I agree. Mike, you're getting very angry, but let's just take a deep breath, okay? Calm down. You're flying off the handles. So, it's, so the, the claim that unicorns exist, the claim, the claim that unicorns exist, that is not going to be analytically true because it's not true because the simple fact is that the way, the way that you've defined unicorns, these unicorns don't actually exist in so far as you and I both agree there aren't flying horses. Which means that it will not be an analytic truth that unicorns exist. Whereas some people do suffer, which means that it will be analytically true that badness exists, that objective moral facts exist. So show me where badness exists in reality. It's analytic. Oh, the experience of suffering. It's analytic. Where in the reality is badness? It's analytic with suffering. So again, you're, isn't it, didn't you say badness is tethered to suffering? Yes, that is, it's defined. And suffering is an empirical, physical. Suffering is going to be defined as the bad feeling, right? Which is empirical, right? Which is syn. So, so, so let's, let's draw the distinction one more time. You're still not getting it. So, it's going to be analytically true that suffering is bad. But whether or not an individual is suffering, how do you, by definition? Well, I can say suffering is good by definition. So, what definition of good are you using? Oh, so, so there you go. You, that's why you can't say it's analytically true. Wait, wait, wait, wait. That was a question. Mike, typically questions require answers. Mike, so what definition of good would you be invoking in this sense? The same definition of suffering you use. I, well, I'm not asking for a definition of suffering. I'm asking for a definition of good. And if, if you're using my definition, my definition of suffering is the bad feeling. So you're, you would just be asserting that the bad feeling is good. So I guess if you define bad to be good, then this statement works. Makes sense. Obviously, that's just [ __ ] nonsense. Yeah. What's your definition of bad? Bad is going to be the set of things that shouldn't happen. Mor. Okay, so then to me, suffering is things that should happen. Oh, okay. Wait, so you think that suffering is a thing that should happen? Yeah, that's just analytical. Oh, wait, so that seems to be more of a taste preference. So you're just saying that that this should happen. So is bad then? No, because bad, wait, because so in, so far as bad as like the, the things that shouldn't happen morally, and that there is a should andness present with the experience of. Why you can't say badness. And wait, Mike, and I agree. We can grandstand as much as you want, but there's no contradiction here. That doesn't make you correct. There's no epistemic contradiction. That doesn't make you correct. Correct. And I agree. Correct. You're mad as [ __ ] Mike. It's okay. You lost. It happens. Oh, it's okay. So, so, can you demonstrate that suffering is bad without appealing to your stance? It's analytic. Well, I can say suffering is good analytically. Yeah. So, let's just go through the terms. You actually, right? Which of us is wrong? Well, yeah, yeah. So, let's, so, let's go through this just based on reasonability. So, let's go through it. So, let's go through your terms, Mike. How are you defining suffering? Uh, the same way you do. So, suffering is the bad feeling. Well, that's just your opinion. I can say, well, but that's, that's my, that's not my opinion, that's my definition, Mike. So, how do you def? My definition of suffering is the good feeling. Okay, wait. So, so suffering is, is the good feeling. Um, well, that's just going to be a different claim than the claim that I'm making because that just refers to a different feeling because that, so, so, uh, in the sense that I use the term, I would be correct because, um, I, when I say suffering, I'm referring to the, the bad feeling, which means that this, you're actually just talking about a completely different. You can't do that again because you're making an OB. I'm, I'm the one who refers to suffering, the suffering that everybody else understands as suffering, the qualitative experience of suffering as is caused by the neural chemical pathway. Um, whereas you're referring to suffering as the good feeling. Right? But the problem is, you're appealing to objectivity. So there has to be the fact of the matter. Yeah, the fact of the matter is the, the neural pathway. Yeah. So, which one of us is correct about being bad or good? About being bad or good? In terms of, in terms of definitionally, if you just define, uh, suffering to be the good feeling, could you identify for me, actually, which one is the good feeling? Uh, whatever you deem is the bad feeling. So, so suffer, you think suffering, Mike. So, you would, okay, because then you're just reduced to absurdity. Oh, why is it absurd? When I can just say, you're, to say that suffering is good, to say that suffering is, that the people suffer, experience it, is good, because the people, yeah, the reason why it's objectively wrong is just going to be because the people who suffer do not experience it as good. Well, that's just, uh, your claim. That's just your opinion. Would you mind gouging your eyes out right now? If that's just my opinion, how do you know? Wait, wait, wait, wait. Mike, Mike, prove, Mike, prove, prove that it's just my opinion by gouging your eyes out right now. The problem is, wait, Mike, Mike, Mike, Mike, I'm not going. Mike, you're not. Mike, Mike, you will not. Daddy, you're not gonna get away from this, Mike. Gouge your eyes out right now to prove that that it's not the bad feeling. Well, how do you know it's bad feeling and not a good one? Gouge your eyes out right now, Mike. If it's the good feeling, if suffering is the good feeling, gouge your eyes out right now. I, I agree that there's a feeling. Prove it. Prove it. Wait, you can prove this super easily. Let me, let me explain it to you again. I agree that there's a feeling that we, that we'll all have if we guard your eyes out. But the problem is, you don't know if it's a good or objectively bad feeling. You don't know. Wait, you're, you're making the claim that I don't know whether the feeling of gouging my eyes out is good or bad. Yeah. You reduce to absurdity, Mike. That's a ridiculous thing to say. No, Ian, listen. I agree that it's, it's intuitively bad. But the problem is, you're claiming that it's objectively bad. To G. Intuitions are all we know. That's all we. So, then you cannot make an objective claim about this being bad or good because intuitions. Intuitions often actually grasp objective things. The only way we know logic is real is via intuitions. Uh, okay, perfect. So, then intuitions get us to. Intuition get us to objective fact. That's not true. Yeah. Wait, wait. So, so, how do you? We don't intuitions for logic necessarily. We rely on certain brain processing. We, we. No, no, we derive logic from from intuitions. No, no. Because certain things can be intuitive but unlogical, illogical. No, but the, the, the fundamental rules and laws of logic themselves are grasped intuitively. Um, well, that's just the same thing as saying that they're tethered to their brain processing. But that's, that's besides the point. Just that. No, it's just that they're self-evident and obvious that things can't both exist and not exist at the same time. That a pen is a pen. No, no, it's, it's exactly the point. Just that there are objective moral facts which you can grasp with your intuitions. Objective facts means stance independent. So how are you gaining access to these, uh, objective moral facts beyond your stance of of it? Do you think intuitions are stances? Yeah. If I intuit that something is, uh, that the Earth is flat, that's that's a stance. All right, all right, Mike. So, uh, let's, let's think about this one. So, um, for, there's a specific bubble chamber that you can use in physics. Uh, and if you like, load up the bubble chamber, you can see, um, various subatomic particles like whizzing on by, zooming on through that bubble chamber. If you're an experienced physicist who's worked with bubble chambers a lot, you can intuitively identify based on the path and the traveling, uh, whether a particle is a, a muon, whether it's like a proton, what specific, whatever the specific particle is, you are capable of of identifying it based strictly on your intuitions. Now, is it an objective fact whether a specific particle is a muon or a positron or any other subatomic particle? Is that an objective fact, Mike? Yep. But you, so it's an objective fact that is grasped via intuitions. Nope. You didn't get there from intuition alone. But you did. No, it, you literally did. So, what is the, what's the specific thing that's being identified? What is the objective fact that makes something a, a, a path, a muon path in a bubble chamber? Well, you can verify that with like, like particles. No, no, but I'm asking you because, because they know what it is just based on the path. So, what's the objective feature of the path? I'm not, what's the objective feature of the path, Mike? Yeah, I'm not disputing that you can't come to truth with intuition. However, the problem is, intuition does not necessarily equate to objective facts. Uh, that's, that's true. However, the claim that I'm making, wait, wait, wait. The claim, the claim that, that's not the claim I'm making. Let's not, let's don't strawman me, Mike. The claim that I'm making is that intuitions can get you to, uh, objective moral facts, not that intuitions necessarily get you to objective. I can say the same about, I can say the same about subjective moral claims. Right? But the problem is, you're making an objective claim that there are stance independent facts which ought to be derived without our stances, without our intuition. Do you have that ability? No, because there's going to be an objective fact as to whether the particle, like what particle it is. But the, the talking morality, we're talking about, and I agree, you can just point out that it's a different case, but the principle being appealed to is just that our intuitions can tell us objective facts about the world. All right, do you think science is dictated by our intuition only? What part of science do you think scientific facts are dictated by your intuition? No, they're dictated by evidence. Great. So you think there's other evidence outside of our intuition that muons are certain particles and other particles are other particles? Yes. So there's a couple of ways of arriving at it. So you can arrive at these, these conclusions by, by doing the objective test of the particles, or you can arrive at it by, by your intuitions. Right? So in your example, we can objectively verify those particles. You can't objectively verify good or bad actions. Oh, oh, no, but this is going to be disanalogous because there's like lots of objective features about the world, for example, logic or mathematics, which is only arrived at via intuition. If somebody doesn't accept that 2 + 2 = 4, and there's nothing unintuitive to them about that, there is literally nothing that you can do to to, uh, convince them otherwise. Just because, so intuitions lead you to objective facts about the world. No, so we don't use only intuition to come to logical truths, right? We use processes, uh, such as linguistic processes, right? Sy, we use such up premises, modus ponens, all these inference rules. Wait, wait, wait, wait. You, you're getting circular, Mike. You're getting circular. No, because you said that we arrive at logic, uh, or you're citing modus ponens, a thing that is a rule of logic, which I am claiming we arrive at via our intuitions as disproof for our intuitions. This is literally a circular argument. Well, I would say that, um, logic is not something we just intuit in terms of like, oh, I feel like doing logic today, but it is something that is integral to our brains. And I think that's why other animals have, uh, you agree that other animals can do logic? Yeah. So, what's the, what do we call the things? So, so you can come to logical conclusions without actually like consciously reasoning. You agree, right? So, I would say that it's not just, wait, so what's the, what's the name of the, what's the name of the process that that comes to conclusions without reasoning? What, what's the name of the process that comes to conclusions immediately without reasoning? It's called Christianity. It's called, it's called intuitions, Mike. No, no, it's intuition. That is funny. It's, it's not just intuitions. Um, that's the definition of intuition, Mike. Look, I would just say it has to do with the brain processes which are not merely intuitive, but intuition obviously has a lot to do with it, but it's not just intuition. But look, the point is, you can't come to moral facts just on intuition. Why not? Because people could intuit different claim moral claims, right? Jeffrey Dahmer get into it that it's great to eat people. It doesn't make it objectively good. Well, first of all, I don't think Jeffrey Dahmer thought that what he was doing was like good in a moral sense. But, uh, second of all, um, just because somebody's intuition differs doesn't mean that they're correct or that you're incorrect or so it doesn't mean that, um, it's subjective. There can still be a person who is like correct and incorrect based on your intuition. Someone's intuitions can be whack as [ __ ]. Let's go back to the bubble chamber. Um, if, if I intuit that all of the particles are protons, but somebody with a more developed intuition than me can intuit that this one's a muon, this one's a proton, this one's an electron, then there's a difference in intuitions, but one of these intuitions is correct, whereas one isn't. And it's correct based on just a more refined intuition, not based on like a stance. No, it's based. It's, it's true or false based on how we can independently verify it. Um, you can't do that with L with moral claims. But that's going to be true of things like mathematics as well. Even if you don't like that example, that's going to be true of. No, mathematical facts are analytical in nature. So there's no, there's no, um, okay, so what do you do if somebody rejects that 2 + 2 = 4? I say, what do they mean by two and four? It's just, I mean the same thing as you. Yeah, well, then they're just, uh, analytically wrong. Oh, perfect. Then I would just say that if you disagree with me, then you're just an analytically wrong. Well, Pro, the problem with saying that is that moral claims are not analytical. Also, I've said multiple times that they are. What's the argument for why they're not? Oh, because you're tethering them to some physical process, empirical process. Yeah, I'm defining the process to be this way. Yes. Yeah, and that's not how facts work. You don't just get to define facts into into existence. You have to them, you have to show them and verify that they are true. So that's going to be true of synthetic facts. But for analytic truths, that will necessarily be the case. Yeah. So you're, when you, when you invoke your moral claims, they're not analytical, they're synthetic. Oh, because they, they, they include empirical claims. It depends which one. So for the claim that suffering is bad, that is analytical. But, uh, for the, um, to make the claim that Johnny is suffering, that's synthetic. Oh, so then all you're doing there is you're just, you're all you're doing is subjectively saying, oh, this is my definition of what good or bad is. You think analytic truths are subjective? You're not getting to. Wait, do you think, do you think analytic truths are subjective? Uh, no, they're objective. Oh, oh, perfect. So then my analytic truth can't be subjective because it's objective. Yeah, because you're not making an analytical claim. I am making an analytical claim that suffering is bad. It's an analytical claim. No, because you're talking about like the real world, right? You're talking about what the suffering being a bad thing because of a particular pathway that lights up that is empir. Yeah. So the, whether Johnny suffers, that's that's a synthetic claim. Whether suffering is bad, that's an analytic claim. You can, you need to go out into the world and actually investigate things to determine whether or not Johnny is suffering. You do not need to go out into the world to determine that suffering is bad analytically. Yeah, I mean, I agree that you can define suffering as bad. But the problem comes when I just define it otherwise and say, oh, suffering is good. And now the problem is, you're making the claim objectively that there's something stance independent, like beyond what I think or feel or what I define to be good, that I'm wrong. I must be in under your view. I must be wrong. But, but you would say I'm not. No, no, because, so, under just intuition generally, you would have to jump through crazy hoops to disagree with this, to to come up with a scenario where this is wrong. And who cares? Yeah, because intuitions can very often grasp with objective facts about the world. No, you still, do you agree that if I say suffering is good, would I be objectively wrong? It would be a deeply unintuitive thing to say. If what you mean by suffering is what I mean by suffering. If you say, if you say that that suffering is good, that's going to be unintuitive, like not just like based on like societal. This will be a, a cross-cultural, cross-species unintuitive thing to say. Yeah, but that's irrelevant because it's my definition of what good is. So, and that's just going to be a definition that is like strictly unintuitive to everyone, which is fine. Which makes you objectively wrong in so as there's like specific facts of the matter that are just going to be like objective facts of the matter that are going to be grasped via l or via intuition. Yeah. So give an example of a fact that I'm wrong about. If I say suffering is good, it's unintuitive. Deeply unintuitive. It's not a fact that I'm wrong about though. But it's deeply unintuitive. That doesn't make me wrong. It's deeply unintuitive. No, I have no reason to accept this. Wait, so it's this is the same thing that happens when people disagree with your intuitions. If somebody rejects modus ponens, uh, because they have differing intuitions about it. I'm actually fine. If my arguments aren't convincing to you, similarly, if you think suffering is a good thing, that the experience of suffering is strictly qualitatively good, I'm actually fine if my arguments aren't convincing to you. Oh, okay. So, so then it is, and is not the case that moral claims could be both wrong and, uh, correct at the same time? No, you would still be wrong. It's just, okay, like you can just be wrong. Wait, so how am I wrong if I say suffering is good? How am I objectively wrong? Well, you would, it would just be like a deeply unintuitive claim. I have no idea what you're talking about at that point. Okay, does something being deeply unintuitive mean it is necessarily wrong? Often our intuition, in so far as often our intuitions grasp at truth, yes. Are our, our intuition in many scenarios. I could be correct. So I could be correct in my statement? Right. I could be correct. Yeah, I mean, but how would you prove that? Okay, so then you agree that I could be correct that rape is okay, that rape is good? You would say that rape is good under your view. I could be correct. I wouldn't say that rape is good, but wait, you would say that rape is good. That's my intuition. Wait, but you would say that rape is good. That would be my position under my, under my view, hypothetically. Hypothetically. Okay, hypothetically. Yeah, that's not actually my position, obviously. Yeah, I assumed I was confused. Okay, that's fine. Are you Lo, are you stuck? Yeah, a bit. Because I, I got, I was a little bit bewildered by you saying rape is good in it, that rape is okay. How would I be objectively wrong if you intuit that rape is okay? I'm actually fine if my arguments aren't convincing to you. If your intuitions tell you that rape is okay, I'm actually totally fine if my arguments actually don't connect with you. I, I think that there's just such a big divide between our intuitions that it's actually okay. So there's a, so did you see the problem I raised to you? Like, you can't, there's no symmetry breaker between something good or bad under your view because I can just say, oh, I define the symmetry breaker is intuitions. Intuitions reliably bring us like true conclusions. But you just conceded that intuition does not necessarily lead to objective fact. But they, so, so, um, the only epistemic method that is going to be good are the the ones that we should accept, um, in so far as we accept that like knowledge is a true belief arrived at via reliable mechanisms. Intuition is a reliable mechanism, um, which is going to lead me to the true objective conclusion that rape is bad. Actually. And it's going to do this just based on intuitions. I understand that. But so in so far as intuitions are reliable, and this is deeply unintuitive, I can reject this claim. Um, and in so far, uh, if, if rape is in fact bad, then I have a belief that satisfies the definition of knowledge, which is how I know that rape is bad. You can't objectively reject it though. Yes, I can. Which, wait, wait, which step of, wait, which step of what I just said do you disagree with? Can, can you prove to me that grape is objectively wrong? Well, yeah, just because any definition that includes, uh, uh, rape as being good or not wrong, all things considered, is is necessarily, uh, going to be deeply unintuitive. Which means that I'm going to reject it. I have, I have the belief that it isn't true, which I arrived at. Wait, wait, wait. Hold on. I have the belief that it isn't true, which I arrived via my reliable truth gathering mechanisms, my intuition, for example, in this case. And because of this, um, I come to the conclusion that actually rape is bad. I believe this. And if it is, if it turns out to be the case that rape is bad, then that's knowledge. I know that. You don't because you're just claiming that you know it and you can't. You did not prove me wrong. You can't. Well, I just did. Wait, can you summarize my argument? You're just saying it's not intuitive to me, therefore I. That's not the argument at all. Okay, that's like one, that's like probably like 10% of the argument. You want to try? Besides, you even, I, so I've said my definition of knowledge twice now. Can you tell me what my definition of knowledge is? Things that correlate or correspond to reality. No, what is it? That's your, that's probably your definition of truth, which is funny because it's a bad definition of truth, which tracks for you, but, um, that's fine. So my definition of knowledge, uh, is a true belief which is arrived at, uh, via a reliable process. There's many reliable processes that we have access to. One of process, one of these reliable processes is intuition. It is unintuitive to me that rape is going to be good, which means in so far as if rape is in fact bad and I arrived at that via my reliable truth gathering mechanisms, my intuition, then that means that I know that rape is bad. So your, so your intuition gives you knowledge? Yep. It can. Oh, it can. Okay, so again, so do you concede that it's not necessarily the case that your intuition leads to objective facts? So in this case, and so far, so if it is, if it is the case that rape is bad, and my intuition led me to the belief that rape is bad, then it is an objective fact that I know that rape is bad. I didn't say it's an objective fact that you know. I'm saying beyond your stance, how do you know it's bad to grape? And how do you know I'm wrong that grape is good? Well, so, so, uh, if, if rape is in fact bad, and it's not good, and I arrived at this conclusion, I, I'm not, I've said this like four or five times. I'm not sure where the disconnect is. Maybe I just need to dumb this down for you a little bit. Um, okay, so let's take it one. I, I explained it, but let's, do you remember what my definition of knowledge was, or do you need me to restate it again? Reliable pathway that leads you to, uh, truth claims that can be intuitive. That's like part of it, I guess. Like just like a true belief that is arrived at via reliable mechanisms. Intuition is like one of them. Senses are like another one of them. Logic is like a different one of them. But yeah, I agree that you can come to, I agree that you can come to facts with your intuition, but that doesn't make them objectively be the case that you're correct. You could be wrong. So your claim, your claim is that you're objectively correct that grape is wrong. You have not shown that. If the, if the question that you're asking me is, how do I know that rape is bad? I start with my definition of No, and then I use a reliable mechanism to arrive at this conclusion, which said that's satisfying my definition. What's the mechanism that shows you that grape is wrong? My intuition. Okay, could your intuition be wrong? It could, but overwhelmingly it's reliable. Okay, so your senses could be wrong. Your senses could be wrong, but that's not any reason to think that the external reality doesn't actually exist. That's not. I'm saying under your view, it could be the case that grape is is good. It could be. Well, that's true of your view as well. That's true of all views. No, it's not. It's actually not true. Wait, wait, wait. So is it possible? Is there literally any chance at all that like a God exists? No, there's no chance at all that a God exists. Oh, well, it depends on what you mean by God. Well, just like a, like a deist conception of God. Oh, I'm not talking about God claim it because, so, so in your, in everybody's view, there's a possibility that there's just like some like evil [ __ ] deist God who who set the universe up such that like like rape is good, actually. Like that's certainly possible. I just have no reason to think that that's the case. It's possible, but I don't believe that. Right? Yeah, yeah, same. It's, it's possible. It's possible that like the deist God said it to be the case that, but I'm not, I just don't believe that to be the case. Right? But I don't claim I don't hold to moral facts. You do. That's the difference. And you're claiming that this, it's a fact that rape is wrong. Okay, so it's, it's possible under under your view too that in so far if there was like an evil deist God, then you you would just be wrong about this. No, it's, it wouldn't because when it comes to morality, in particular, it's my stance that it is always wrong to grape. Period. Under your view, it might be the case that grape is okay. But presumably, if this like God existed. No, it doesn't matter if God existed. Wait, because wait, wait, but it does, because he could objectively said it to be the case. Oh, it doesn't matter. This thing is wrong, which means that your morality would morality would actually be objective in this instance, which means that it's always possible. This is a possibility under literally every single worldview. Actually, no, it's not, because it would be my stance that it's always wrong to grape. Period. Yeah, and that that could be your stance. Sure. But it's possible that there's an objective fact of the matter. It's possible that there's an fact about the matter. Sure. But that doesn't mean that you have access to it. Yeah, no, that's fine. That's fine. That's all I want. Just that you agree that it's possible that there's an objective fact of the matter. Yeah, but can you demonstrate that? Could I demonstrate that there's an objective? Well, yeah, I'm just arriving at this conclusion based on intuition. There we go again. Intuition doesn't always lead you to objective facts. Yeah, neither do your senses. But that doesn't mean the sky is blue. That, but you're making a claim that something is stance independently true, and you can't do it. Is it stance independently true that the sky is blue? Uh, yeah. And do you know this via your senses? Uh, we know this by, well, saying blue is colors are really are really just part of experiences. Um, but yeah, I would say that there are objective facts about reality that we come, come to from our senses. There are objective parts of reality that you can come to via your senses. Yeah, perfect. And there are objective parts of reality that you can come to about morality. Reliable truth, truth gathering mechanism, which just means that it would be analytically true, given, given the satisfaction of those conditions, it would just be analytically true that that I know that rape is wrong. What I'm trying to highlight here is that your intuition doesn't equate to objectivity, uh, at all. Um, but it often gets us to objective facts. Ah, sure. I can, I can grant you that. But the, the problem remains that you haven't been able to verify a specific moral facts that you're claiming, such as grape being wrong. You haven't independently shown that to be true, just like we independently showed that, you know, the sun exists. You can't do that for a grape being bad. Well, no, but it can just based on the fact that it's unintuitive. Well, that doesn't make it correct. Oh, but okay, wait, but that's not the claim. The claim is that I don't know it, but I do know it because I'm saying that it's unintuitive. How do you know? How do you know that grape is wrong objectively beyond our stances? Yeah, because so if we, um, if, if rape is in fact wrong, and like objective morality is true, so it is objectively wrong, and I arrive at the conclusion based on my own intuitions, a reliable process, if I arrive at this true belief via a reliable process, then it is just analytically the case that rape is wrong. No, what, so which, which step of that do you reject? I reject that you can make analytical statements about morality because I can do the same for, you know, saying grape is good. I can say that's definitionally true, and then you would have to commit to that being the case. Wait, it's not, it's not about that statement wasn't analytic about morality, it was analytic about epistemology, okay? About knowledge. Yeah. So that I, that I know something, that it is analytically the case that I know that rape is wrong, in so far as, uh, if, if it is also the case that moral realism is true, and rape is wrong, then it would be objectively the case that rape is wrong. So we have a true belief, and I arrived at this true belief via what? What did I arrive to the belief via? A reliable truth gathering mechanism, my intuition. So I arrived at a true belief via my reliable truth gathering mechanism. Yeah, but the statement grape is wrong is, um, not an analytical, it's synthetic. In your view, but so we're not talking about the belief itself, that you cannot verify this statement to be true. You can believe it. I agree. You can believe it to be true, but you don't know it's true sufficiently enough. So we're not, we're not talking in this instance, but we're discussing is not whether it is wrong, we're talking about whether you know or like how how you know it's wrong. Yeah, and I'm telling you how I, how I have the knowledge of that fact. Yeah, and I'm saying that it's not sufficient enough to come to a conclusion. Does it not fit my definition of knowledge? Well, if you're going to say intuition is a, is a reliable weighted truth, then if I intuit that grape is good in the same way, in the same degree that you think grape is wrong, well, then you would have to think that I'm correct. Well, so in, in a world where it actually is objectively the case that like grape is good, in some like weird backwards world, and you intuit it that grape is good, you actually would know that grape is good in that instance. Yeah, but what if it's this world? And I intuit, I'm, I'm, you know, Jeffrey Dahmer, and I intuit that grape is good. What? We don't know if it's this world. What if it is hypothetically this world? So, so, okay, wait. So hypothetically, what if what if the actual world was a possible world? What a nonsense claim. Yeah, it's, wait, do you want it to be this world, or do you want it to be a possible world? Because it can't be both. Is it possible that somebody can intuit that grape is good? It's, it's certainly possible that somebody could intuit that grape is good in this world, right? Yeah, okay. So in this world where it's possible, then it's the case that you could be wrong and I could be right about grape being good. So if it turns out to be the case necessarily an object objectively that grape is good in some weird backwards opposite world, then no, it's, we're talking about this world. We're talking about this world, right? Wait, wait, so I, I guess I just need the argument for why grape is good. Do you want to provide the argument for why grape is good? It's, uh, intuitive to me. Oh, and it's unintuitive to everybody else. And in so far as our intuitions are very much an alignment on this, to know who's right. Ian, how do you know who's right and who's wrong? Oh, that's a, that's an epistemic question. Yeah, you answer it. Wait, wait, so are you interested in the morals or the epistemology behind the morals? Which one are you interested in? Both. How do you know that? Wait, wait, because I can, we can only focus on one, one or another one at a time. Mike, do you want the, do you want the epistemology or do you want the morals? Which is it going to be? Well, I think your epistemology is going to include intuition, right? Yeah, okay, great. So that's, I already know that. I'm asking you now to show me that if I intuit that grape is good, why am I wrong? Oh, because that would just come down to the, the fact of the morality itself. What? So, so you would be, you would be, so if you intuit, I know you're stuck. But and Mike, and I agree. I agree, Dad, and I agree. We can like posture about whatever, um, but the fact of the matter is is that you've been unable to find the contradiction in my worldview. Yeah. So my, let's hear. Wait, wait. Can you, can you just give me the, because we've been debating for like three [ __ ] hours now. This is you. Wait, wait. So Mike, Mike, Mike, you grilled me on my worldview. You should have absolutely no problem. What is the P and the not P contradiction in my worldview? You've, you should have no problem doing this because you've been talking to me about it for literal hours. What's the contradiction? When did I claim that there was? There was a contradiction. Perfect concession. Um, all right, I'm ending stream because we just got the concession. But I love all of you. I actually hate all of you. This was [ __ ].