Transcription
Good morning. This morning's plenary will deal with the critical developments in geopolitics and geo-economics and deal with the questions on everyone's minds. We are going through a very special time in history, a sensitive time, and in fact, a dangerous time. We have transited from a bipolar world during the Cold War to a unipolar world, and now we are transiting to a multipolar world. But in this multipolar world, we see that many of the institutions we were familiar with for 80 years in the liberal world order are fast being undermined and dismantled, and strangely, by the country that led its establishment and development. What are we transiting through? What are we transiting to? And in this new era, are we going to see a situation where might becomes right?
Now, with me to discuss these interesting topics are five excellent, six excellent speakers. They have not been introduced. So let me very quickly tell you who they are, because I think you have not yet had a chance to look at their bios. Let me begin with Ryan first. Ryan H, director of the John Tanton China Center at Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. He was in the Obama White House, and he served in the Beijing embassy some years ago. Next to him is uh Professor Lu Yen Chun, who is a very well-known economist. I learned that he is considered the most influential economist by China Newsweek in 2022 and voted one of the 10 most influential economists in China by Sina Finance. And he heads, of course, he's president of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. And next to him is Huong Ping, Singaporean extraordinary entrepreneur, an intellectual entrepreneur who knows how to make money too. He is chairman of the Banyan Group and he sat on the board, serves, sat on the boards of GIC, Singapore Airlines, Singapore Chartered Bank, and Diego, a spirits and alcohol company. >> Yeah, alcohol. Yeah. And I'm uh pleased to introduce Ambassador Luen Ming, China's special envoy for climate change, a former UN Under Secretary and Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, China. And next to him is Gita Viran, former founder and chairman of Ankora Group and Minister of Trade of Indonesia previously, and also chairman of Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board. And last but not least, Alfred Skipe, who is the director of the East Asia Institute in NUS. He was previously IMF's senior resident representative in China for at least five years, I believe.
So here's the panel, and uh they are here to discuss this very interesting time of flux with you. The format is the following. I have 80 minutes. We'll spend about 55-60 minutes talking amongst ourselves. We encourage panelists to disagree with each other. That makes it more interesting. And then the remaining 10 minutes will be for the audience to pose questions to them. So let me begin by asking each of them to give me a five-minute take, their take on what they see. There is general recognition that this is a multipolar world today. So what is the nature of this multipolarity, and is this a good thing or a bad thing for the world in terms of prosperity, peace, and security? Ryan.
>> Well, thank you, Ambassador. It's really a pleasure to be among all these friends. Um, I come from Washington D.C. I'm a somewhat traditional American foreign policy analyst in the sense that I think that alliances add value and strength to the United States, that the existing rules-based international order strengthens America's influence in the world. President Trump is not a traditional foreign policy thinker. He's an unconventional, non-traditional foreign policy thinker. He thinks that these things drain uh America's strength and America's resources, and that the United States needs to stop taking on other people's problems, not burden-share, but burden-shift, so that other countries can tackle their own challenges, and the United States can get back in the business of putting America first. That is sort of the core of his argument, that America has so many challenges at home that it needs to focus its resources, its attention, and its energy upon itself. Now, the challenge with this is that the world does not naturally order itself. Countries do not naturally provide global public goods. And if there is not a strong country that serves as a convening power, that brings countries together in service of common goals, then things naturally fray. And at the moment, there is no other country in the world that appears willing, able, or capable of playing that role. And so this is sort of the the crux of the challenge that I see, particularly given the fact that so many of the world's challenges transcend borders. They're not just confined to one country or one region. And, you know, ultimately, I think that what we're entering is a more disordered, more chaotic world, a world where there is selfish pursuit of national interest, and where countries work very hard to try to protect themselves from external challenges entering into their country. And that's where we are at the moment, I think.
>> Thank you, Ryan. You kept to time. Professor.
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological allocation purposes because Chinese technology is a lot more efficient, a lot cheaper. People in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, they cannot afford iPhones. They can only afford Huaweis and Oppos. Singaporeans can afford iPhones because they earn $91,000 per capita per year, whereas the people in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, they earn less than $2,000 per year, whereas those in Indonesia only earn $5,000 per year. On the back of that, in addition to looking at China increasingly for technological capital allocation purposes, I think the West is a natural economic capital allocator by way of the fact that they've quantitatively eased their economies as to create about $140 trillion worth of liquidity that hasn't gotten diversified out to the global South. Why? Because of two structural attributes. The first is the lack of rule of law, which Singapore has, which most members of the global South do not have. The second is the lack of wherewithal to translate uncertainties into risks. Uncertainties are unknown unknowns, whereas risks are known unknowns, stuff that can be priced, measured, quantified, and predicted. So I do see trends which are presenting both challenges and opportunities, but I do believe that Southeast Asia has its work cut out in the next few decades on the back of this massive educational divergence.
>> Thank you very much, Gita. Uh, thank you for bringing in the inequalities in the uh, in the world and largely in the global South in our development when we talk of multipolarity. I think looking at inequalities within society and between countries is also a very important dimension. Uh, Alfred.
>> Thank you very much. Real pleasure to be here with the panelists. Um, I want to focus a little bit on the econ and business uh part, um, and start out with uh, um, um, a suggestion that we need to be careful not to think too uh aspirational because the world has substantially changed. And the way I think about it is the following, and I'm guilty as charged. We used to have a global governance structure, call it trade uh structure, um, driven by the WTO. And somewhat we're here, it's kind of tough to do when uh with a microphone. We're kind of moving away from what we used to know, but I think a lot of us still believe there's a rubber band between where we are and what we used to be, and I think we're hopeful that eventually we're going to come back to the world that we used to know. I I would argue that uh the likelihood that we're going to come back to that world, even in a reformed uh fashion, is very unlikely. So we have to think about what happens if we cut that uh rubber band between where we are and where we want to be. Now, that creates a lot of challenges, but it also creates opportunities, including uh for the business world. What is it that we're seeing right now? I give you two scenarios, one that we're currently seeing, and one that maybe we should move toward. I think there is a lot of, there are a lot of incentives for countries now to accelerate discussions on reducing trade barriers. It is done on a bilateral level. Uh, Europe, Indonesia, for example, is is a good example. Uh, China and ASEAN. As a matter of fact, we are experiencing countries uh that have been stuck in negotiations now making concerted efforts to reduce uh trade barriers and non-trade barriers. However, it is done more or less at a bilateral, bilateral uh uh level. Um, and so we're going to have a spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements. Um, where should we move toward? This is my preferred scenario. If you take ASEAN, uh, China, or Asia in general, and you look at another part of the world that has really benefited from globalization, which one is that? Europe. You take those two combined, um, both have high incentives to maintaining the core elements of the previous world. You have about 450 million Europeans, and if you come to this part of the world and only look at the middle class that is rising rapidly, we have about 200 million in ASEAN, we have about 400 million uh in China. That's already 600 million. That is a major block. The question is, would it be possible to foster the dialogue between these two uh groupings, whether it is in the context of RCEP or CPTPP? Of course, the key is to have China included in this. But if one were to move in that direction, even in a world that one could describe as a G minus one, so the world without the United States, you would have a critical mass with institutional backing. This is just not, um, you know, um, 200 countries trying to come to an agreement. You have the European Union on the one hand, and you have ASEAN on the other side. So you have mechanisms for for dialogue. Now, what does that mean for businesses? Again, there are a lot of opportunities right now because there will be a reduction in trade barriers. There will be an improvement of bilateral trade relationships with some parts of the world. But it's going to be a different world. First of all, if you are a global company today, what in the past was a global company? A global company is a company that is super efficient in managing supply chains globally. You go to the place that is the most efficient for you. Now, in a world where we're seeing blocks, you are losing as a global company one of your biggest advantages, managing these global supply chains. As a matter of fact, we hear a lot about, whether European or another ASEAN country or American company, it's China for China, Europe for Europe. But if you're a global company, you're not a global company anymore. You're becoming a Chinese company. You're becoming a European company. And then it's not so clear that you're that much better in competing with the local companies. So managing, um, these regional blocks for global companies will be more costly, but it will happen. So there is no, um, way that we're going to move back to a world that only focuses on efficiency. This resilience, ultimately, is becoming, I think, a word that most CEOs today have in their back of their minds. Now, what are the benefits of global companies? As we are moving in a world of blocks, you have to replicate systems. We might even talk more about the financial sector side later on, where we're going to have different standards, different technologies. Global companies can absorb these costs. There, the smaller companies have difficulties. You can do it. But what are the advantages of smaller medium companies, small medium, medium-sized companies? Well, they're very agile. They can move more quickly. They can potentially take advantage of a new agreement. So there are opportunities. And maybe the last term that I wanted to highlight is, a lot of people talk about de-risking. I think that is completely the wrong term. This is a very risky world. If you want to be successful, uh, as a company, you have to take risks, but you have to manage those risks. So de-risking means you stay at home and don't do anything at all. And I think a lot of us here right now, and this is the problem that we're having, by having policy uncertainty, investments are not being conducted because we're looking for some certainty, uh, coming out of certain parts of uh, the world. In summary, the old order will not return anytime soon. We're increasingly living in blocks. But on the positive side, there are a lot of movements for further integration, and this part of the world has all it takes, uh, to be the driver, not only for this part of the world but for other parts of the world.
>> Thank you, Alfred. Now, you've heard six different versions of the, you know, post-last order, the emergence, the search for the, what is emerging as a new multipolar order. It's not firm yet, you know, but, uh, we've had discussions of moving away from Western values. The non-West is asserting itself. I think that is true. They want to be part of the conversation, a central part of the conversation. And I think Western countries should bear that in mind. And who was it who said that the creation of the order? I think it was Ambassador Leu, that there are few countries that uh, really matter. They are the biggest players, and actually, they are the small ones who want to be heard too. But they should be there to help determine and set the next new order because we've heard so much from global South countries and BRICS countries that they were not there at the beginning, and the order you have, you know, laid out in the last 80 years, countries did not participate in writing that order. So time to remake it. Gita has brought out inequality. That's good. You know, and, uh, I think Alfred has highlighted the economics of things. Now, we've been talking at a 30,000-foot level, and we have an audience of business people who are interested in doing business, and business between China, Southeast Asia, the rest of the world. So we bear this in mind. And I know Alfred started talking about how business is configuring in the world. Let me come down to something much more concrete, and I think most of you would be interested in. I have a question which I'll take through with the others. But Ryan, do you think a US-China trade deal will be concluded? What will this trade deal look like? And, but, you know, it's not just a trade deal. What happens after the trade deal? I think that's far more important. Does a trade deal, if it is concluded, open new doors and create a new dynamic in US-China relationship? I'll ask, um, Ryan to start, but I'll ask the others to respond.
>> Well, thank, thank you for the question. I think that if the United States and China conclude a trade deal, many people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. They will exhale and feel comforted by the fact that the United States and China are still capable of sitting down together, negotiating, and resolving issues, as opposed to being on an inexorable path towards confrontation or worse. So that's the the first reaction I think that we will feel, particularly here in Singapore. And it would be a good thing if, uh, if the two leaders were able to come together and reach a deal. My expectation is that it would probably not solve many of the challenges, the core fundamental challenges that exist in the United States' relationship with China. Nor would it necessarily affect the way that China perceives wearily America's intentions towards China, and vice versa. So, while I understand that there would be a sigh of relief, I would caution against uncorking champagne bottles because I think there will be a lot of work left to do after, uh, any deal is announced. And where this goes, just to try to address the second half of your question, I think what we're watching is, on the surface, the United States and China are interacting very regularly, intensively. Underneath the surface is where the real action is taking place. China is much more explicit than the United States has been about it, but there is a campaign in both countries towards self-strengthening, hardening, self-reliance, and really trying to insulate and protect against dependence and vulnerability to the other. And I expect that that trend will continue into the foreseeable future.
>> Thank you. Now, Professor Leu, you know, you're an economist. I want to ask you, uh, do you think this deal will be concluded from the Chinese point of view? And, um, you know, it has been said by observed by, uh, in fact, American scholars that China enters into negotiations very quickly, but it concludes a deal very slowly, you know, and you really want to keep the United States in the negotiating process because that is stabilizing. Uh, do you agree with that? Do you think that'll be a deal? And are you positive about the trends of US-China relations?
>> Well, um, Heni, since you invited us to disagree with each other, could I start by saying I somewhat disagree with the whole proposition. Um, I think the idea of moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world is rooted in Cold War typologies. It presupposes that there is a single power which is still very wholesome and powerful and giving way to others. I think the world is actually far different from that today. I think we are seeing, and particularly since the topic is future China, even though it's organized by Business China, I think the future is not just a multipolar world. I think it's an entire paradigm shift to a very fundamental civilizational reset, where the Western civilization, which has been dominant for the last 300 years, is being challenged internally to its core. I do not think Western civilization, including both Europe and America, has had as serious an internal crisis as it has today in the last 100 years, since the 1930s. And the parallels between America today and the 1930s is tremendous. You talk to any of your intellectual friends in America today, the the whole idea that within one year, all the civil institutions that make up civil society, and you look at even the entire ideology of democratic liberalism, is being challenged to its core. So I think there's a paradigm shift because on one hand, you're seeing, I wouldn't call it decline, but I would certainly say there is a massive civilizational crisis in the West today, from its fundamental political values to its economic and military power. I think very uh very honest intellectuals in the West would acknowledge it itself. That is on one hand. So it's not a unipolar powerful America confronting a morally bankrupt Soviet Union that only happened to have military power. It's not that scenario. It's not a Cold War scenario. So you have one civilization that is in crisis. You have the rise of East Asian civilization, particularly in China. That is again, I don't want to use the word multipolar because that is playing to the idea that China's military is going to confront America's military. China's economy is going to confront America. This whole trap of win-lose, which I think is a is a mindset we should get ourselves out of. I think the civilizational challenge of China today is entirely not just economic or military, but in all its values. The values of political governance and responsibility for people. Every value that the Chinese civilization has had is rising up. So there's a complete paradigm shift. And I think this means that we need to look at it. If it's going to be a civilizational reset, we cannot look at it from the Western point of view that China is challenging America. China is clearly becoming ascendant, but it's not necessarily a challenge. I think one best way to look at this issue about a civilizational reset was when I read recently about a Chinese academic talking about AI in China and the challenge that the Chinese will have with AI. And again, it gave me an insight because it was not so much about Chinese deep going to beat you know, OpenAI and so on. It was the idea that if China's civilization is going to rise and be and come into its own, the knowledge feed that goes into AI has been predominantly Western. Not good or bad, it's just that all knowledge creation has been Western because AI trains from the internet. So the whole thesis was, if there's going to be a civilizational reset, and we look at AI in terms of its analysis of politics, what about Chinese sources of knowledge? What about all the Chinese philosophers of political science? You would not get that on the internet today. What about if you look at AI's probing into medicine? It's all Western medicine. What about the need for Chinese traditional medicine to actually be a knowledge feed for AI? So that gave me an insight that what we're talking about today as a civilizational reset is much more than about business, military, and this whole Cold War scenario that, oh, China is going to overtake America, or America will not allow China to overtake it. That is playing to a mindset that I think is outmoded, and we need to think of a new paradigm shift of civilizational change and very importantly, a civilizational reset. We can no longer think like we do in Singapore. Although we're bilingual, uh, we are very much part of a Western civilizational mindset. And if we're going to, and if if Singapore is going to play a a bridging role, we have to understand that it's more than just about business, tariffs, and all of that.
>> Thank you. Actually, I would like to expand on it, uh, but I would let the other speakers go first. You know, frankly, what you say, civilizational uh change of the paradigm with this civilization, civilizational new focus, is not contrary to this multipolarity that is being shaped because you have just described the nature of the multipolarity you see. And by the way, it's not just one civilization, there are several civilizations in the global South, yeah. But let's carry on first. Uh, uh, Ambassador Leu.
>> Thank you. Thank you, Mr. T, and and the dear fellow uh panelists. I'm very well honored to join you for this very interesting discussion. I think on the question to be raised by our moderator, Mr. T, be to be very simple, be I think that we are living in an evolving multipolar world. But let me explain, I'll clarify a few points in this respect. First, until from the Westphalia in 1648 until the end of the Second World War, the finally of the United Nations, during that 297 years, the world, there was no real world out there. The audience, European out there, the world were dominated by Europeans, European civilization. So the US supported the creation of the League of Nations, but they did not join. So the US started to, for a long time, the US followed the so-called Monroe Doctrine. So the US started to engage in the Second World War after in December, uh, 1941. And the US led, led the creation of the United Nations and the creation of the contemporary international order, together with other people, be China, France, former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. And now we are living, still living in that intention out there. But I think the fundamental change be with decolonization. This world be not enjoyed by 193 members of the UN. It's a universal international audience. But over the past 80 years, we have experienced three periods. So until the end of the Cold War in 1990 or 1992, one, the world were divided into two pillars, two two poles, bipolar world, bipolar world, the Cold War period, led by the US and former Soviet Union. Then, end of the Second World War, the world get a period of, I don't, I I don't agree with unipolar world, there was no, no, never no unipolar. Getting the word, but in Chinese, we call it, is the superpower plus another major power, and other major powers, including China, Russia, uh, European Union, and other major powers, including Japan, India, and other major powers. So this is the period. But since 2008, the the international financial crisis happened in the United States from Wall Street. The US government started to realize that this is a world they cannot resolve by themselves. The many issues, international financial crisis, they cannot resolve by themselves. So they decided, okay, they need to extend this club to others, go beyond the G7, go beyond the G7. That's what they created this G20 summit. So for the past years, I have characterized that be maybe the evolution started with the creation of the G20 summit, but we have not really achieved so-called multipolar world, but we are evolving. But now, challenging the world, challenging the the leader, founder of the this international order, the United States started to destroy this order itself. Of course, I I don't think it is supported by all American citizens. I think by a group of people, in any way. But I think that be, we, the world need to be patient. Give our US CS time to realize that be destroying this current order is not in their own interest. They remain as a major power. US remains a major power, but they need to start to respect and live together in peace with other powers. I think be in this multipolar world, evolving, evolving, or growing multipolar world, of course, US, China, Russia, and the European Union, uh, will be the four major major players. So the interrelationship among these four major players will determine the future of the world. But I come frankly to see there be no better structure can be created without agreement of these major powers. So we need to that be I'm encouraging that be these major major powers, especially European Union, United States, and European Union, need to learn that be changing their traditional mentality that be they can no longer dominate the world, but they need to learn from others to, you know, be President Xi Jinping really initiated the three principles with the with President Trump and with President Biden that be between us, China, that be China prefers that be we need to follow principle, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Three principles. I think the three principles also applies to the all the major power relationship. So I'm confident that be that be this world will continue remain in a in a multipolar world, but we need to be patient. Be can help the major powers build up their confidence, most important to avoid conflict. Avoid conflict. The world cannot suffer another Ukrainian war. The world cannot suffer another Middle East conflict. World needs peace. Needs peace. I think that be I'm confident for the future. Thank you.
>> Thank you very much. [Applause]
>> Uh, Gita.
>> Sure. Ever since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, I think it's almost a given that the United States and to some extent other members of the West have been on this general trend of having embarked on an ill campaign to spread liberal values all across the world, most particularly members of the global South. And this would have been filled with distortions and to some extent hypocrisy, as if they're in this perennial state of being able to write and rewrite history. And this does not resonate well to most members of the global South, to the extent that revisionism has been inevitable, coming from members of BRICS, ostensibly pioneered by China and other members of the global South. The appeal of this revisionism is ever increasing to members of the global South. I speak for a global South member called Indonesia, and I also speak for most members of Southeast Asia, which earn less than $13,250 per capita per year. That's the threshold for modernity. On the back of all this, I'm in a camp that believes that in spite of the revisionism, I think China and the West, particularly the US, are likely to become indispensable inevitabilities for the next 50 to 100 years. And that is good for Southeast Asia because those are well-needed countervailing forces as to provide the well-needed peace and stability for Southeast Asia, as opposed to what we experienced in the 17th century on the back of that absence of countervailing force from China, which resulted in the three and a half centuries of humiliation in most parts of Southeast Asia. Going forward, I think there are structural challenges with respect to Southeast Asia. If you take a look at the longitudinal poles of Southeast Asia, from Nanwei to Moro, Nmong to Boa, longitudinally 5,000 kilometers, latitudinally, latitudinally 4,000 kilometers. Those are equivalent to the distances of Los Angeles to Boston, Tianjin to London. Despite the immensity and diversity of Southeast Asia, we're often times identified as not great storytellers. We don't tell stories as well as we should. And this is empirically evidenced in that there is only about 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia in the context of about 140 million books. That's 0.26%. 26% of all publications available for a region that represents about 700 million, equivalent to about 9% of the global population. So the challenge going forward is how does Southeast Asia improve upon its pre-existing cognitive capacity? I think the structural reason as to why there is a widening economic divergence in Southeast Asia is largely and structurally because of the educational divergence within Southeast Asia. You just take a look at the PISA scores of Southeast Asian countries. Singapore is the top of the world, top Southeast Asia. Vietnam is number two in Southeast Asia, has surpassed the global average, whereas the other eight countries in Southeast Asia are still below the global average. You take a look at the tertiary education. There is 8,000 universities in Southeast Asia with 19 million students, whereas 2,600 universities in China with 39 million students. Only one university in Southeast Asia places in the top 20. So from a non-tertiary and tertiary standpoint, there is ostensible divergence. This is correlated with the economic divergence that's staring at us. Now, this is a structural challenge, particularly in the context of evolutionary processes as they relate to geopolitics, economics, technology, and climate. To the extent that the evolution is and likely to become more exponential, the more Southeast Asia needs to be more cohesive and collective, the more Southeast Asia needs to work on reducing the educational divergence as to reduce the economic divergence. The future for Southeast Asia, in my view, is to look at China, in spite of the massive economic relations, more for technological