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Americans are violating the, as I said earlier, the, the MOU at multiple levels. And they, they have, I mean, they, they started this war. They waged war against the Iranian people unprovoked, illegal. So for them to talk about Iran violating the ceasefire, that's, that's a bit too much. Iran warned a ship not to travel without coordinating with Iran through the Strait of Hormuz. That is not a violation of the ceasefire. And that ship refused to abide by orders from the navy and it was hit. So, and so that Iran did not strike US, the United States, for the United States to strike Iran.
Now, the United States military is saying that they are ready to provide 30 million dollars, which to a trillion dollar albatross is a drop in the bucket. But nonetheless, they are saying that they want to provide this to the Lebanese armed forces. And I don't really know what this means because the United States ultimately, if they're going to change the calculation here, which is they, they're going to have to provide some massive support. I don't know what 30 million dollars will buy for the Lebanese armed forces. But ultimately, all of this is geared toward what they say is to disarm Hezbollah, which again, is, is, is only inciting more conflict and therefore in violation of the MOU. It's, it's the circle that goes around and around and around.
Yes, of course, this, this support for the army. They always say that we support the Lebanese army, not so that it could defend the country, but so that it could attack Hezbollah. They, they, they say it all the time. So this, this is about, uh, supporting the president and this prime minister in pushing the country towards civil war. But again, I find it difficult to imagine that it actually happens. And if it does, that it succeeds. Because, uh, Hezbollah has massive support in the armed forces and the armed forces would collapse. And, uh, Hezbollah is a very powerful and competent military force, and they have, uh, huge popular support. And most people, as I said, don't support this policy of, um, capitulation to the Israeli regime and the gifting of Lebanese territory to Israel because it's obvious that the Israeli regime is not going to back down.
So Iran is going to ignore all this. Iran is going, is says that we have an MOU. You want us to normalize trade through the Strait of Hormuz. You have to carry out, uh, Article One. It's as simple as that. And until that happens, there's not going to be an agreement and there's not going to be normalization, uh, in, in the Strait of Hormuz. So the United States has to make a decision. They can do all they want to make all the agreements what they want with the Israeli regime, but the pressure is going to continue to build. Economic pressure. More ships are, are moving through the strait than they were, uh, three, four weeks ago. But, uh, the shortages, uh, across the world continue to grow at a slower pace, but they continue to grow. And, uh, therefore, the United States is by no means out of the woods. And Iran knows that. And until Article One is implemented, that's how it's going to be.
So what Iran, and I should add this, what Iran is pushing, and what it has been pushing for the last almost four months now, is that it's trying, it's trying to drive a wedge between the United States and the Israeli regime. Trying to push the United States towards economic crisis so that it has, so that it ultimately has to prioritize its own interests over that of the Israeli regime because it's always Israel first. And now the Israelis want one thing, but, and but the Americans see that if they continue, if they follow the, uh, Israeli regime's lead, that it will be devastating for their own, uh, economy. That's why they signed the MOU in the first place. That's why they gave all those concessions to Iran. They didn't do it willingly. And the Iranians know quite well that they, even after they signed the MOU, there's no intention by the Americans to carry it out, as we've, as we discussed earlier. They've always, they've been constantly trying to undermine the, uh, MOU.
But the Iranians are going to remain steadfast and they will make sure that, uh, until all of its demands are met, some have been met. The US has lifted the siege, uh, a disproportionate amount of the oil that's been exported from the Persian Gulf during the last, uh, since the signing of the agreement of MOU has been Iranian oil. Huge amounts of Iranian oil. So, Iran has been able to make up for a lot of, uh, uh, of lo-, lost exports. But, uh, so, they've lifted the siege. They've lifted the sanctions on Iranian, the Iranian energy sector, uh, officially, at least. Well, I, I, if it's being actually implemented. Uh, they've spoken about releasing Iranian assets. I don't know how far that's gone, but they clearly have not implemented the deal. And, uh, and of course, the issue of Lebanon is the first article. And until that happens, until it happens, there won't be an agreement. And so, the, uh, trade through the Strait of Hormuz is going to continue to be, uh, much less than it should be.
Well, Professor Ramin, I think it's a good time now to ask you about some narratives I've noticed as the strikes have, the strikes have re-emerged and as the MOU, uh, builds on days and now weeks of, uh, its signing. There's many more people, the commentariat all over social media, those reporting news, maybe exploiting some news, uh, all talking about Iran losing its leverage even by, uh, mildly opening the Strait of Hormuz and engaging in these talks. And now with all the evidence, of course, that the United States is not going to be a part, a good faith party to it, as well as of course Israel's transgressions, that staying in this and allowing it to go on in the same way it is going is tantamount to losing this leverage. What do you make of that? It's an argument I'm hearing and I'm seeing come up as the days and weeks go by of the United States and Iran, I guess, sort of negotiating, but not really. But at the same time, this is a big statement and I'm curious on your thoughts about it.
Well, in Iran also, there's this ongoing debate between those who support the MOU as it is and those who say that Iran has been too lenient. And the leader, he made a comment on the MOU, which has broadened that debate. Even though his comment is not exactly, I mean, if he doesn't explain, he does point out that he's critical of the deal, but he, he, he says he'll, he gave the Supreme National Security Council and the government a mandate to carry it out. But he was, he, he was obviously he was critical of it. But he doesn't explain how he's critical. And that, of course, is discussed, has been discussed behind closed doors. And I'm not, uh, privy to that sort of knowledge of what exactly what he, what did he want that was not in the agreement. Uh, but he was critical. But some people in the country have taken this as like, uh, the, the state is, is capitulated and this is a completely against what he wants. That is not necessarily the case. Uh, although there, I, I agree that there are criticisms of the deal. I, I, both who, those who support the deal, they have good arguments to make, and those who, uh, uh, uh, uh, are critical of the deal have good arguments to make. Uh, but I don't agree with either side completely. And that, that's, uh, usually how it is for me because I'm not on any political side. And I've been accused by different factions of always being being affiliated to the other side. With the, the JCPOA, some people have called me a staunch supporter of the nuclear deal. I never supported the nuclear deal. And, uh, they would say I'm allied to the those groups. And then, um, and then supporters of the nuclear deal, those hardcore supporters, would say I'm a, one of the hardcore opponents of the nuclear deal. I was never a hardcore opponent of the nuclear deal. I just would say there are problems with it, you know, there, there shortcomings. But, uh, but, you know, I'm not in either any of these political camps.
What I think is fair to say is that, uh, those who, there are those who, who, uh, would like to see Iran launch fire missiles and to keep the Strait of Hormuz shut. And, uh, that is, it's not the, the world is not as simple as that. I mean, uh, first of all, Iran never closed the Strait of Hormuz. It was never fully closed. And, uh, there are countries that are friendly to Iran and Axis of Resistance that use the Strait of Hormuz. And if we shut them out and shut them down, then maybe their politics would change. So, um, that's one issue. The second is that Iran is, uh, itself it was being targeted through the siege, uh, and its own exports and imports, imports were being blocked. And, uh, the Iranian people, the, the, you know, right now inflation is, uh, very high. It's roughly, I think something like 68% or 70%. That's very high. Of course, inflation in Iran has always been high because of the maximum pressure sanctions. Uh, and the, the, the government constantly adjusts the, uh, uh, people's wages, government employee wages, the minimum wage, and all that, but it's, it's not easy. And now it's, it's more difficult. So, for people to expect, uh, for anyone to expect, the state not to take into consideration the reality of the economic life of ordinary people, I think that's, um, they're being, that's being too naive. Uh, that, or, or they're being too simplistic. Uh, the government has, you know, the government, um, has to function, people have to have jobs, they have to have, you know, food, they, every supplies have to exist. And so Iran uses the Strait of Hormuz too. Uh, Iran was tough. They outlasted the Americans in siege warfare. They compensated to a large degree by using, uh, their neighboring countries to import goods, to export what they could, but it was, it was, it made life much more difficult. So, Iran has been using this deal to export. Um, but also the Iranians continue to enforce, uh, to put pressure on the United States through limiting, uh, the, uh, the number of ships that can pass through the Strait of Hormuz. And that's how the Iranian, if it wasn't, if it, if the Iranians didn't have that sort of leverage, the Americans wouldn't have lifted the siege. If Iran didn't have that leverage, the Americans wouldn't have conceded, uh, to accepting the sovereignty of Lebanon. Uh, and so on. And, and to ending the war across the region.
And so, on the one hand, you have to keep this in mind that Iran has friends, countries like China and other countries that import from and and export to the region, but import from the region. They can't just ignore them. They're friends of Iran. And, um, and as I said, the Iranians themselves have to, uh, continue to keep the running the, the, uh, economy afloat, uh, in order to be able to resist, in order to help the resistance in Lebanon, in order to help the staff, you know, this, they get support from Iran, with, we all know that, in order to help Yemen protect itself, in order to help Gaza. It's not as if the resistance in Gaza does not receive, you know, support from Iran. Comes, comes from somewhere. So developing those tunnels and put defense capabilities against further Israeli aggression, all of this costs money. So at the negotiating table, the United States conceded a lot. Is this an ideal situation? Definitely not. Am I a fan of this agreement? No. But in general, you know, I, what I, what I try to do is not to take sides because when I'm speaking to yourself and others, I'm trying to defend what I think is the people on the right side of history, those who are doing the right thing. And I believe that Iran and the axis of, of resistance has been doing that. And so if I don't agree with a particular thing that the president said or position taken by the chief negotiator or a critic of the president or a critic of the chief negotiator, if I don't take a position on that, I think it's because it's not my responsibility. I don't think people outside of Iran really care too much about the, the details to that degree. If, as a, you know, further, uh, you know, what the, what is important is the fundamental differences that are taking place that exist between Iran and the United States, the Israeli regime. And then, then once that, what, once that is established, we can go into the details about, uh, what's going on in Iran, why is one, one set of, what, one set of people opposed to the deal, I mean, and why are some supporting the deal.
But let, let me give you a personal example on campus. This was not so long ago. I was speaking with two of, two of my students or two students, they're not my students, but two students who came to my office. And then a colleague came and said that, um, uh, you, you know, you need to do a deal, as if I'm a negotiator. You need to do a deal, the economic situation is difficult, and you have to, you know, don't be so, uh, don't be so harsh and try to, you know, find some solution with Americans. I, I, I said, "Look, I, I'm not a negotiator. I'm, I'm not a decision maker." And he, he left. And then literally 40 minutes later, I don't know, an hour later, 30 minutes later, uh, another colleague, and those, those two students were still in the room talking about something completely different, just university stuff. And then, uh, this professor was saying, "Why are you conceding so much? Why are you, the Americans, if, if you keep going down this path, the Americans are going to give nothing and then we're going to, they're going to come back for more war." And again, I said that look, I'm not a negotiator. I'm not a decision maker. So, uh, both, you know, different sides make these, uh, critiques, uh, and assume that I'm involved.
But I think that on the whole, while there are problems with this, uh, uh, with this agreement, no doubt, uh, that, uh, the, there are calculations behind it. And Iran's most important, um, leverage against the Israeli regime and its occupation in Lebanon, because that's what a lot of people are worried about, obviously, is its ability to put pressure on the US economy. I mean, Iran can lob a few missiles here and there and do damage, but the real pressure is when Iran keeps the Strait of Hormuz, uh, half closed. That is what worries Trump, and that's what he said explicitly.