Transcription
It's Friday, March 6, 2026, and welcome back to Goodfellows, a Hoover Institution broadcast examining history, economics, and geopolitics. I'm Bill Whan. I'm a Hoover Distinguished Policy Fellow. I'll be your moderator today. It's my great honor to be joined by three very distinguished gentlemen here at the Hoover Institution, our good fellows as we like to call them. I'm referring to the historian Sir Neil Ferguson, the economist John Cochran, and Lieutenant General HR McMaster, former presidential national security adviser. Neil, John, and HR are Hoover Senior Fellows. Gentlemen, this is the Domino's version of Goodfellows. Today, we're going to try to deliver a show in 30 minutes. So, here goes.
Uh, I want our listeners and viewers to know that Neil has written a just tremendous piece in the free press. Uh, its title is, "Could This Be the Start of World War II?" Uh, and in it, Neil details 10 questions related to the situation in Iran. I'm not going to read them all, but HR, I want to go to you and I want you to answer questions six and five, which are how how widespread will the war get and at what point does the Iranian regime alteration happen? Keeping in mind that the president today, President Trump, moved the goalpost and called for Iran's unconditional surrender.
>> Go ahead.
Sure. I >> I think it's reached its peak in terms of how wide it's gotten. I think now the capacity of Iran to widen the war to continue to attack new countries or to even sustain the attacks on you know the 10 or so countries it's attacked with ballistic missiles and and drones is going to be greatly diminished. I think also their ability uh to to affect shipping uh in in the uh in the straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf is also going to be greatly diminished. But what else can they try? What else are they going to try to get going? Well, trying to expand to other the use of their proxies. We see that with Hezbollah already and Hezbollah now promising yesterday, hey, we're going to try to attack US assets in the region with kind of the uh the franchises that that Hezbollah has in the region. So, we'll see a continued terrorist threat. You see countries in the Gulf and in Europe acting preemptively against these uh against these cells associated uh with the with the IRGC and the MOIS, the intel arm of the Iranians. But I think in terms of the the scope of this war, the geographic scope of this war, uh it's waning and what you're going to see are their capa the capacity for them to continue to strike is just going to drop off a cliff here with the sustained air campaign. Uh and now the ability to have as as what the you know the chairman of the Joint Chiefs call it Dan Kane said, hey, the stand-in attacks of having you know fourth generation fighters uh bombers you know patrolling continuously uh across the country striking now these these uh missile launch storage facilities, the underground shahed drone storage facilities. Uh so hey, I I think we're going to be okay and I think also in terms of the air defense is going to be okay. As well. I mean, I mean, estimates vary. Maybe 1,500 interceptors fired. About 1/5th of the stocks of the US, Israel, and the Gulf States against these. Maybe what is it? Uh 2,000 drones so far. Uh 600 or so ballistic missiles. But again, that's going to drop. That's going to drop off and you'll have kind of a a reopening of shipping. You know, I think we've hit like the the you know, the the nater of the of the uh the the crisis on on uh on gas and and oil supplies.
>> So, Neil, to the question, will it be the start of World War II? The answer is what, a definite maybe?
>> No, it's not World War II. Uh, though I don't think it's a stupid question, as I point out in the piece, uh World War II didn't just all begin with a bang. It was several distinct wars that coalesced in late 1941. And we already have one war raging in Eastern Europe. Uh, now we have a war that has began really in 2023, but it really escalated in the past week. But I I said in the piece, and I think this is where I stand, this is Gulf War II. Uh, and it has to be understood in the context of the Cold War. Gulf War II, I think I wholly agree with HR, is going to look a lot more like Gulf War I than Gulf War 2, i.e. It's a Desert Storm type uh scenario. It's something that takes weeks as opposed to what happened after 2003 where we ended up with 8 years of uh uh being bogged down in the Iraqi insurgency. So this is going to be much more like 1999. Uh, I think uh HR is dead right that the total dominance of the skies has now been established and it's going to be very, very hard for the various different uh armed elements of the Iranian regime to survive. Uh, and I think in short order that the there will be a steep, there already is a steep decline in the missiles that they can uh fire and I think uh the drones too will will tend to dwindle. So I agree with HR's military analysis. What is harder is to to uh say anything uh clear about the political future of Iran. Unlike Desert Storm where the goal was kick Saddam out of Kuwait and restore the Kuwaiti regime, what we're doing here is we decapitated uh the Islamic Republic. Uh, and we've not just killed Hame, we've killed a substantial part. I say we, I should say the US and Israel have killed a substantial part of the leadership elite of the regime. And more will be killed. But we have not specified what comes next. And it's very hard to get any Iranian expert to say with any degree of confidence what will come next. That's the part that's uncertain.
>> John, um, yeah, let me try and agree. This isn't World War II. It becomes World War II if a major power comes in on the side of Iran. And no one's doing that. Not even China, who's losing access to a lot of oil here. I mean, that's World War, that's when World War II breaks out. Um, and more importantly, nobody likes China. You know, in our great fight against communism, World War II, Cold War, Cold War is different from Cold World War II. There was an ideological component. Some people like the Soviet Union's model. Nobody likes the Chinese model. It's a military confrontation. I do think though, um, the focus on what's going to happen next, I think is misplaced. So the the lesson I'm getting from this is how America operates in the absence of an ideological competition with with China is that um we are happy to let you screw up your country, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, do whatever you want in your country, no matter how horrible it is. We don't like it, but we're not going to interfere unless you start causing trouble internationally, and then we're going to come in and we're going to kick you out of power and and we don't care what happens next. I think it's pretty clear the US doesn't really care what happens next. And that's if you're going to actually interfere and say, "Look, you got to stop this international, you know, causing trouble to your neighbors." um, you if you're bound to, we can only do it if we have a plan to restore democracy, you're never going to do it. And the US has figured out that it's not in our interest. In our interest is we can come in, regime modification, regime change, whatever you want. We don't care if we leave a mess behind so long as you don't bother your your neighbors. This is not a a very moral, ideological, beautiful thing, but it is the way that the US will will now be able to fight these little things on the edges uh of um of the world scene.
>> Well, HR, John is suggesting we will essentially cut and run at some point. Um, and here's my question. Can you achieve what we want to achieve with air power alone? Uh, our experience in Iraq in 2003, we had shock and awe, but then we sent in what, a quarter of a million troops after that. What if the regime does go down and then what if Iran turns into a version of Iraq where you have sectarian violence in a civil war? Would we be compelled to go in at that point?
>> Well, you know, I I see kind of three alternatives here. You know, alternative one is that uh that there is a weakened uh Islamic Republic, right? A theocratic dictatorship uh that stays in power, you know, with the RGC running for their lives operating as they are now out of schools and hospitals, you know, for for example, because uh all of their headquarters are getting blown up, um, and they're being hunted down. Uh, the second, the second, I think alternative is that there's kind of a fissure, a fracture within within the security apparatus and then somebody emerges and says, "Okay, enough of this." You know, contacts uh the the the United States and says, "Hey, I'm your guy. You know, I've put together this group to splinter off and we're going to we're going to establish an alternative, a transitional government, something like that." And I think the the CIA, I would hope, and I'm sure they are, is working overtime to identify th those people who can use existing security force capacity to transition away from the Islamic Republic into something else. The third would be a devolution into some form of a civil war. And and I think the first and third of those are bad options, you know, and and I I what we want to make sure we don't do is set conditions for a destructive civil war, kind of like in Libya, except many orders of magnitude larger uh than than Libya. This is why I'm kind of concerned, you know, about this idea of arming the Kurds, you know, not a new idea, right? The the Brits tried it, you know, in the uh in in the early 20th century. Um, but you know, I think what that will do is create deep anxiety uh among the Persian population and and and other elements of the population uh and and take, you know, really reduce their enthusiasm, which they have now, for just ending the Islamic Republic. So anyway, I I mean, it's it's tough to do this remotely, you know, and and you can't you can't control it. You can influence it, but you've got to find really essentially uh somebody on the ground, groups on the ground who can begin to affect this transition as you continue to to weaken the repressive arms of the regime. And that's kind of the new class of targets that are coming on now are really going, as Neil alluded to already, to to weaken the security apparatus. The the challenge, it seems to me, is the the Venezuelan analogy doesn't fit too well because that's kind of what has uh motivated at least a part of President Trump's thinking that what worked in Caracas can work in in Tehran. Now, I I give great credit to Dan Kaine, uh the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He clearly warned the president this would not be uh like Venezuela. It would be a great deal more difficult. Uh, and it's worth just pondering as to why that is. And I think it's partly uh that there is a degree of ideological uh radicalism which is greater. The Chavista regime had its ideology, but it wasn't remotely like the the radical Shia Islam on which the Iranian revolution was based. The other difference is the neighborhood. Uh, it's the fact that chaos in Iran spills over uh into the the Gulf. And uh I hope you're right, HR, that that we'll see normal service resumed in the Strait of Hormuz pretty soon. If we don't, and I'm throwing this to John Cochran, if we don't see normal service resumed in the Strait of Hormuz pretty quickly, uh then the world is going to be on the receiving end of one of the biggest energy shocks of our lifetimes. The potential supply disruption is much greater than anything we have seen this century. It would be greater than anything that occurred at the time of Desert Storm. We're looking at the 1970s because of the sheer volume of uh oil, not to mention natural gas that goes through the Strait of Hormuz. So the reason it's not Venezuela is that the stakes are much, much higher. It's going to be hard to find DLC Rodriguez amongst the IRGC generals. Maybe at some point somebody comes out and says, "I'll sign the instrument of surrender. Where do I sign? I'll do that over getting killed." But that person is immediately going to be denounced by the surviving remnants of the theocratic regime. I think the tough thing, HR, if you agree, the tough thing here is to make it sufficiently stable that the traffic in the Strait of Hormuz can resume. And my impression is that the shipping uh and insurance interests are nervous as hell. It's not like a ton of ordinance was raining down on the Strait that many people uh were hurt or ships were damaged. There's just a fear of what can be done. And until that fear is removed, there's going to be a significant economic shock.
Actually, I want to get John's thoughts on this.
>> Yeah, John, let me add here in Palo Alto, my gasoline is already up 10%. There are dire prophecies of gasoline going to eight dollars a gallon. Yeah, this is this is like the the nightmare for the uh uh the inflation hawk that we end up getting on top of all the kind of monetary and fiscal kindling, we get the gasoline, the oil price shock of '73, '74, or '79. John, are you worried that we're about to revisit the '70s because of this?
>> Well, always, especially considering the bad fashions uh of the time. Uh, I so I do think this partly explains, I think the military objective is simply uh either that they're unwilling or unable get rid of all their military assets and then who cares if they turn into another Libya is I think the attitude. Um, but boy, it's hard to get rid of, you know, all the, it only takes one Shahed drone to keep an oil tanker out of the Strait of Hormuz. So, uh, I'm not sure if, you know, maybe we keep pumping this one around, but I'm not sure you can do it by just removing all of their military assets and then letting them rot. Yeah. So, let's do the economic fund. Neil posted a great graph that I I copied and passed on on how inflation uh in this recent period looks exactly like the 1970s. And here we are just about at the exact time when the Iranian revolution happened and set in big oil price shock. So, yeah, there's reason to worry. I think less so in the 1970s. Our economy is less dependent on oil than it was in the 1970s. We are an oil exporter. So although, you know, higher world prices hurt our economy, they they also, you know, help our balance of trade. We we make money. We weren't as uh export dependent. Uh, China is the one who, you know, they got most of their oil from uh Iran or Venezuela, also some from Russia. So, it's going to hurt them in the short run uh more than it hurts us. Uh, and uh, you know, my hope that this doesn't last as long as as the last one did. But yeah, if the Strait of Hormuz closes for a long time, uh, I think it it could be, and you're seeing the beginnings of stagflation now. The latest jobs report is weak and the latest inflation is up. So get out those bell-bottom jeans. Uh, still, I don't think that's baked in. And and I do think the resilience of the American economy, the the fact that we produce a lot, we're less dependent on oil, lots more domestic production, um means the outlook is not as severe.
>> Hey, I'm going to defend the '70s. It gave us the birth of funk. So it wasn't a child, but u I have a question for you, General McMaster. Um, Roaring Lion, the Israeli operation, the first wave of Roaring Lion takes out the Supreme Leader and 40 of his friends who for reasons historians one day tell us decided it was a good idea to have a meeting above ground at Tehran. Not a good idea, fellas. Um, but this is a departure. We are used to shanghaiing foreign leaders we don't like. We take Maduro out of Venezuela. We take Noriega out of Panama. We put them on trial. Now, we've been part of an operation that dropped a missile and killed a leader. So, two questions. As Neil would say, is this cricket? And secondly, HR, there probably people out there thinking, well, if we did this, the Supreme Leader, but a lot of other bad actors in the world should probably go, so why aren't we doing it to Putin? Why aren't we doing it to Kim Jong-un?
>> Yeah. I think what changed the calculus for probably President Trump and those around him, although it was an Israeli Israeli strike that took out that large group of leaders, was that hey, they they had just murdered over 30,000 of their own people in a 48-hour period. I mean, I think that really changed the perspective, you know, from the period of the 12-day war when President Trump was like, hey, let's get a ceasefire after the the strikes against Fordo and and really a lot of Iranians were you know, up in arms about that because they're like, why did you guys stop? You know, I mean, and so I I think um, I I think that the the biggest difference was the degree to which the regime had inflicted so much, you know, suffering, death, you know, uh on their own people.
>> You don't assassinate foreign leaders in two circumstances. One is when they could assassinate yours, and this is sort of an agreement, we don't go this way, or when you can't do it. I think we would have happily dropped a bomb on Hitler's bunker in World War II if we had any, you know, if we had precision munitions and would have saved an enormous number of lives in doing so.
>> And they did try to kill President Trump also. I mean, you know,
>> Right? And he did say, "I got him before he got me."
>> Zelensky, Putin. It's just the the lack of means rather than the lack then politeness that's stopping that one. Let's bring it back to the Cold War frame because China's situation in uh in many ways is is the thing that people aren't talking enough about. I do believe that part of what we have seen this year has been a conscious flexing of American military might uh in Venezuela now uh in Iran. Uh, both in effect client states of of Beijing. Uh, both suppliers of uh contraband sanctioned oil to China. Uh, and it it seems to me that a part of the goal here is to communicate to the Chinese Communist Party, do not mess with America. And I think that message has got through. Uh, but there there is a kind of another side to this which I think HR will have thoughts on. Uh, we are conducting extraordinarily uh fast-paced uh naval and air operations as we dismantle the military capabilities of the Iranian regime. We do not have an infinite supply of the precision weapons that are being used. John's right. This is a kind of precision that didn't exist in the first age of air power. Didn't really come into existence until quite recently. The problem is these are beautifully and extremely expensively made weapons and there's a finite stock of them. The Chinese are sitting thinking to themselves, do we rely on the United States to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and our flows uh of oil and gas coming? You know, what does that mean? Are we simply uh going to accept that position? Are we going to be next? And this is an important question that I am sure they're asking themselves in Beijing. Is the United States now so unbound, so unrestrained that it may contemplate preemptive action against us too? If that's their thinking, and it wouldn't surprise me given what we know about Xi Jinping and communism generally, then they will say to themselves, we should not hang around and wait for that preemptive strike. On the contrary, we should be acting when the United States has depleted its capabilities before they've been replaced and while it is entangled uh not only uh in uh Iran but entangled uh in its Western Hemisphere strategy and still playing some role in the war in Ukraine. So, I worry about how this is going over in Beijing. And you know what's really, really kind of eerie? They've said so little by the by comparison with the wolf warrior diplomacy we got accustomed to. They have been very quiet indeed. All of the flights that they have been doing in in recent uh months in in the vicinity of Taiwan have stopped. Now, there are a bunch of explanations for this. None of them wholly compelling. Are they just making nice because there's a summit coming up at the end of this month between Xi and Trump? Maybe. Or is something else going on here? And I think it's the unintended consequences of military action that you need to worry about. Uh, the consequences of a war between the United States and Iran were entirely predictable. Uh, Iran was going to lose. I think we underestimated the impact on the energy markets. The insurance plan I thought John was cobbled together and wasn't convincing. I think we underestimated the Shaheds, which we did not have defenses against, nor did the Gulf states. So the unintended consequences in Asia are the thing that I'm thinking a lot about. Xi Jinping's very quiet. What's he thinking? Nobody knows.
>> I add to that, you said the word preemptive, and that's right. You know, people talk about why now. I think it was very clear that Iran was arming itself quickly and it was making ballistic missiles, not drones, ballistic missiles, faster than we could make interceptors, and it was kind of now or never. And you're right, that points to a now or never moment for for China. On the other hand, um, two, two thoughts on this. Uh, what about where are the Europeans? This sort of seems to signal the end of NATO. That they are busily getting together to have a meeting to talk about a joint declaration, maybe some couple of weeks from now. But we certainly have cleaved a big one between us and NATO here. And a final thought I've got, you know, in the last decades, so many institutions of America government have shown themselves completely incompetent. But >> but the amazing job our military has done just worth calling out, and and their Israelis uh on top of it. HR, I don't know how your buddies stay so amazingly good at what they do, but hats off to them.
>> Well, you know, it's it's uh it's it's cultural, you know, in our organization, you know, in our military to to just be at a high level of readiness and we train really hard, you know, uh and realistically uh in our training centers and so forth. And and you know, in this case, you know, we've had, you know, decades of preparation in terms of planning against this uh against this particular enemy. You know, I'll just say for Neil's point about like capacity, uh we are rushing to triple the annual manufacturing capacity of some of the key weapon systems. So the big ones here are, you know, the Patriot missiles, uh the um uh which are like the PAC 3 or the the interceptors from those, the THAAD systems, you know, the the SM3s, SM6s, you know, so so that we're we're racing to do it. But back to the envelope math here, and this may not be accurate, but but we might have fired about 1/5th of our interceptor stockpile in three days, you know, and so that gives you an idea of of how much you have to build up now for for stockpiles to recover from. But I think China would make a mistake if it would think to miss to to act now because we still have, you know, pretty significant amount, especially with this about 90% reduction in the launch rate, which is probably going to fall off the cliff even further here in the next couple of days. Um, yeah, so I I I think that, you know, it does highlight though the lack of depth in our industrial base. The the uh the degree to which we, yeah, we need to make our supply chains more resilient. You know, stockpile some of the components and and precursors for some of these weapon systems. Um, and all that is underway under the Trump administration right now. You know, it's just, hey, will will it be too late? We don't know. So we got to keep uh rushing to to build up this capacity. But also I think overall the capacity of our armed forces is too small. We ant we, you know, we assumed for way too long that we could just do like one thing at a time and and what you're seeing now is how interconnected these theaters are. Okay, you know, hey, Venezuela was, you know, was China and Russia's main platform and Iran's actually too, in the in the Western Hemisphere. Now we're seeing, you know, this is this is of import as as as uh Neil has mentioned to China because, you know, China doesn't want us to have the keys to its gas station. And I think from a geopolitical perspective, these two actions have been very beneficial. I hope we can capitalize on that diplomatically. I would like to see a lot less of, you know, the chest beating, you know, in in briefings and a lot more of just a clear-headed articulation about why this this was necessary. Hey, well, expose facto, you know, they just fired 2 million drones and 600 ballistic missiles at 10 different countries. So, was that a threat? Hell yeah, I guess it was. So, maybe it was smart to do something about this. But then also now what you've seen is because of the attacks on the Gulf States that the US is seen as really the only reliable partner for security in in in the region. You know, China, one of its big entre in the Middle East was, hey, I've got influence over the Iranians. You need me, you know, in in the Middle East. That that's that's gone now or potentially gone. So I I just think that, you know, what has happened is under the Biden administration, the axis of aggressors coalesced. They were the protagonists. They were setting the terms. Go back to April 23rd when when Xi Jinping turns to Putin. He goes, "Ah, Vladimir, we're seeing changes like we haven't seen in a hundred years." And you and I, we're driving those changes. And and Putin smiles and goes, "Oh, yeah. You're right. You're right." Hey, man. They're not in the driver's seat anymore, you know? And and I think, you know, what Trump deserves probably the most credit for is regaining the initiative over this axis of aggressors who thought they were conditioned to think that they could act against us with impunity, that we were weak, decadent, divided, feckless, you know. So, um, there's a huge opportunity here. I I would like us to be, you know, a little more diplomatic, you know, and and and understand our audiences and on Europe. Hey, Europe better get a wake-up call here because, you know what? Those Iranian missiles, they could reach Europe. What is the state of of European missile defense? Not as good as it needs to be, right? The drone threat Neil mentioned. You know, this is this goes back, there's continuity here. This is the V1, V2 threat to London in many ways, but now it's coming home to everybody. And so, we have to be ready for this kind of emerging uh and and new threat, you know, to to all of our security.
Couple of points that I just just want to make which are important. I I don't think John's right about NATO uh because actually Friedrich Merz, who is the Chancellor of Germany, and therefore in many ways the most important NATO leader, has made it clear that he's supportive uh of what the the US and Israel have done. Uh, the the the leader who's most out of line is the British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who has had a disastrous week in diplomatic terms because he's playing to a domestic audience that is largely opposed to the war. But this is going to really hurt relations between the US and the UK. Uh, the second point that's important is the law of unintended consequences. Uh, once again, uh one of the main beneficiaries of the events of the past six days is Russia. First of all, uh because uh we don't have uh a ton of uh spare crude oil to take the place of that which is no longer flowing through the Strait of Hormuz. We've had to ease sanctions on the Russians, make it possible for the Indians to buy uh Russian oil. Russia's already reaping a benefit in the higher oil prices. There's a dual benefit in the sanctions being eased. Secondly, Ukraine is a loser because Ukraine's access to air defense systems was already compromised. They need them desperately because they're attacked nightly by Russian missiles and drones. Uh, Ukraine can say goodbye uh to uh any sophisticated air defenses like the Patriots because those are going to the Gulf if they're going anywhere. So although I I agree with you HR, the axis of authoritarians has had a terrible 12 months and President Trump has changed the game. He sees the initiative. He's undone much of the damage of the previous administration. But there are ways in which uh the big players in that axis, Russia and above all China, not are not necessarily beaten here. Venezuela beaten, certainly Iran beaten. Russia not so much. China, watch very carefully what comes in the next weeks. I think it'll be a relatively harmonious summit because I think the Chinese are still biting their time and they have absolutely no military leadership at this point. So I think we can probably rule out a Taiwan crisis this year. Next year, I'm not so sure.
>> And then Taiwan election again being a huge turning point for that decision.
>> Maybe 2028's the year.
>> Running out of time here, guys. Let me ask you one quick exit question before we go. We're doing another Good Fellows in five days. So tell me one thing you're looking for between now and the next five days. HR.
>> Well, I'm I'm looking at some sort of a a a diplomatic outreach from some element within the Iranian government >> or or or you know, or reach out to one of our to our intelligence agencies um to you know, to to sort of negotiate some kind of an end to this because I'll tell you, I mean, the the uh the strikes are going to go up by orders of magnitude, you know, um until they just run out of targets, you know, so um, and they're going to be relentlessly hunting down the RGC.
>> Mhm.
>> John.
>> Yeah. Um, some sense of what the endgame is. I I was I was cynical about we're going in and we don't care what the endgame was, which I think we went in not caring, but it matters tremendously. So, does this turn into, you know, the Kurdistan gets established in the north, ethnic dismemberment of the country, civil war, um, some horrible part of the IRGC manages to stay in in place. Um, I think we'll learn a lot more about that in the next five days. I hope it's good.
>> I'm counting tankers. I'm just counting tankers in the Strait of Hormuz that there's a reason for them to start risking sailing again, and that is the depletion of the uh regime's destructive capability and the gradual emergence of some kind of solution to the insurers' problem. If that volume starts to really pick up and it turns out that you can get through the Strait safely, then I think this is all going to turn out pretty well. If not, then we go back to John's nightmare of flares and kipper ties returning.
>> Right, gentlemen. Great conversation. We'll leave it there. As I mentioned, we're doing another Good Fellows. I will record on March the 11th and our guest will be the Hoover Institution's Director, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. So, you don't want to miss that. On behalf of the Good Fellows, Sir Neil Ferguson, John Cochran, Lieutenant General Atron McMaster. Hope you enjoyed the show. Till next time, take care. Thanks again for watching. If you enjoyed this show and are interested in watching more content featuring HR McMaster, watch Battlegrounds, also available at hoover.org.