“I deliberately understaff every project” | Leadership lessons from Rippling’s $16B journey

对我来说，非常重要的是，我们觉得公司里的每一个项目我们都刻意地人手不足。如果你人手过多，就会出现政治斗争。你会让人们去做那些比必要优先级更低的事情。那是毒药。那是浪费。它会让你变慢。它会形成惰性。你在Ripling担任了很长时间的首席运营官。最近，你调任Ripling的首席产品官。你经常谈论的一件事是，非凡的成果需要非凡的努力。如果你想在成果方面达到99%的水平，那将非常困难。你必须提醒人们，如果他们在工作中发现自己处于舒适区，那他们肯定犯了错误。[音乐] 这本应是极其累人的。你非常喜欢升级问题。

>> 从根本上说，你能做的最自私的事情就是对某人隐瞒反馈。当你想到一个能帮助某人[音乐]改进的想法，但你因为这会让你不舒服而避免告诉他们时，那么，你就是在为自己的舒适优化。这从根本上说是自私的。很多人都有团队运作不佳的情况。团队总是会优先考虑局部舒适而非公司成果。商业中最纯粹的抱负和最强烈的能量来源是创始人兼首席执行官。创始人兼首席执行官之外的每一个管理层同心圆都有可能在强度上降低一个数量级。那是[脏话]危险的。作为一名高管，作为一名领导者，你的工作是将其强度保持在尽可能高的水平。你在自己的创业公司有过一些非常有趣的经历。

>> 我们在硅谷谈论永不放弃，但这完全是彻头彻尾的风险投资[脏话]。今天，我的嘉宾是Matt McInness，Ripling的首席产品官[音乐]，此前曾长期担任首席运营官。如果你对Ripling不太了解，它是一家非常成功的公司，最新估值超过160亿美元。他们拥有超过5000名员工，Matt对这一成功功不可没。他还拥有罕见的组合：残酷的诚实、构建一个非常复杂且非常成功的业务的大量经验，以及能够清晰地阐述他所学到的东西。Matt分享了许多我从未在这个播客上听其他人分享过的见解和建议，我离开这次谈话时觉得每一位领导者都需要听听他的建议。非常感谢Albert Scrashim和Sil Raman为这次对话提供了话题和问题。如果你喜欢这个播客，别忘了在你最喜欢的播客应用或YouTube上订阅和关注它。这非常有帮助。如果你成为我的时事通讯的年度订阅者，你将免费获得19款令人难以置信的产品一年使用权。整整一年可爱的reflecript、whisperflow、perplexity、warp、granola、magic patterns、raycast、chapiard、mobin和stripe atlas。前往lenniesnewsletter.com并点击“产品通行证”。接下来，在我们的赞助商简短发言后，我将为您带来Matt McGinness。

本播客由Google赞助。大家好，我是Omar，Google DeepMind的产品和设计负责人。你是否曾想为自己、朋友构建一个应用，或者最终启动你一直梦想的那个副项目？现在你可以将任何想法变为现实。在Google AI Studio中使用Gemini 3无需编码[音乐]背景。这被称为“氛围编码”，我们正在让它变得极其简单。只需描述你的应用，Gemini[音乐]就会为你连接合适的模型，这样你就可以专注于你的创意愿景。前往a.studio/build创建你的第一个应用。

本期节目由Data Dog呈现，它现在是领先的实验和功能标记平台EPO的所在地。世界上最优秀公司的产品经理使用Data Dog，他们的工程师每天也依赖这个平台，将产品洞察与产品问题（如bug、用户体验摩擦和业务影响）联系起来。

>> [音乐] >> 它始于产品分析，产品经理可以在其中观看回放、审查漏斗、深入研究留存率并探索他们的增长指标。[音乐] 在其他工具止步不前的地方，Data Dog走得更远。它能帮助你实际诊断漏斗流失、bug和用户体验摩擦的影响。一旦你知道重点在哪里，实验就能证明什么有效。我在Airbnb时亲身经历过这一点，我们的实验平台对于分析哪些有效以及哪些出错至关重要。并且，在Airbnb构建实验平台的同一团队也构建了EPO。Data Dog随后让你通过会话回放超越数字。准确观察用户如何通过热图和滚动图进行互动，以真正理解他们的行为。所有这一切都由与实时数据绑定的功能标记提供支持，这样你就可以安全发布、精准定位并持续学习。Data Dog不仅仅是工程指标。它是优秀产品团队更快学习、[音乐]更智能修复并自信发布的地方。请访问dataq.com/lenny请求演示。那是datadoghq.com/lenny。

Matt，非常感谢你来到这里，欢迎来到播客。谢谢你的邀请。我想从我知道对你来说非常重要的一件事开始，你经常谈论它，但我认为人们在这样的播客中听到的不够多，那就是非凡的成果需要非凡的努力。谈谈为什么这如此重要，你认为人们需要听到什么。我的意思是，这个短语我实际上归功于我的一个朋友，Dan Gil，他是Carvana的首席产品官，Carvana作为一家公司，其科技公司的本质也没有得到足够的认可。这非常有趣，我认为对我来说，作为一个通用框架，今天我与你说的很多内容并非专门针对产品，我们实际上应该谈谈这一点，产品职能是管理这一普遍概念的一个实例，担任首席产品官与担任任何其他首席官并没有太大区别，你必须应用相同的框架和概念来让人们共同实现目标，但有一点是绝对普遍的，我认为我们坦率地说，在硅谷，很多人并没有真正内化这一点，那就是如果你想完成一些真正非凡的事情，如果你想在成果方面达到99%的水平，那将非常困难。比如，那会非常不舒服。你必须提醒人们，如果他们在工作中发现自己处于舒适区，那他们肯定犯了错误。比如，他们肯定以某种方式搞砸了。并不是说非凡的努力足以带来非凡的成果，但百分之百确定的是，非凡的努力是必要的。因此，我确实将这个框架作为我个人领导力的一种指导原则。

>> 为了让人们更真实地感受这一点，有哪些时刻是异常艰难的例子？这无关任何宏大的单一故事。我认为真实的故事实际上是通过一千件小事讲述的。因此对我来说，这个故事是通过一千张Jira工单讲述的，而不是通过一千个宏大事件。非凡努力这件事，它是一个提醒，提醒我们这本应是极其累人的。它本就该如此。所以，就像周五晚上你遇到紧急升级，周五晚上你被工程团队的某人抛来一堆新bug，你需要进行分类处理时，这些时刻就是区分优秀选手和优秀团队与良好选手和良好团队的关键。在Ripling这样的公司说这些很容易，因为我们作为一家公司正在取得胜利，尽管我们有各种缺点，我们今天应该花时间谈谈哪些地方不完美、不好，但我们现有营收基础上的公司增长率是非凡的，非常引人注目，它作为领导者给了你支持，让你可以在团队面前说：“嘿，伙计们，我需要你们榨干最后一滴油。”如果你的公司增长不快，如果情况不那么好，如果你的增长率是30%或40%，你知道，作为那家公司的贡献者，在周五、周六或周日全身心投入并付出一切，感觉就不会那么好，因为你不知道它会带来多少回报。因此，非凡的成果需要非凡的努力，但如果没有机会获得非凡的成果，就很难付出非凡的努力。所以我喜欢提醒Ripling的人们，至少，能有机会成为一个团队的一员，你周五或任何时候付出的非凡努力实际上正在为非凡的成果做出贡献，这是非常罕见和特殊的。这是一件非常特殊和罕见的事情，它给了我作为领导者的超能力，因为当我，你知道，从那些感到无聊和疲惫的人身上榨取最后一滴油时[笑声]，我可以依靠这一点。

我在Airbnb和Brian Jesy那里也看到了同样的事情。总是感觉事情进展顺利，好像我们发布了某个大获成功的东西后就可以休息一下了。但感觉总是相反的。总是感觉我们如何才能进一步踩下油门？我们如何才能更快？我们如何才能做得更大？好像从来没有休息的时刻。我在苹果公司工作了七年，在史蒂夫·乔布斯担任首席执行官时，我学到了我们称之为“死亡行军”的东西，那就是我们对工程师所做的事情。就像你刚发布一个版本的iPhone，你就会立刻被扔进构建下一个版本的深渊，没有休息。它就是如此无情。最终谈论一个非凡的成果。呃，没有解脱。就像在竞争激烈的市场中，如果市场有价值，它就是竞争激烈的。毫无疑问。如果你在战场上留下任何东西，如果你给竞争对手留下一个裂缝，他们百分之百会去填补那个裂缝。所以你必须毫不留情。组织不能有任何松懈。这不意味着人们不能来去自由，或者不能休假，或者过自己的生活，当然。你不能，人们是人。你不能把个人磨垮，但团队作为一个集体，必须时刻保持警惕。不能有停顿。如果你留下一个，呃，你就是在乞求那些稍微更饥饿的竞争对手进来抢走你的午餐。而且你知道，这就是资本主义的美妙之处。[笑声]

此外，非常反直觉的是，嗯，也许这里更乐观的观点是，当你给你的团队空间让他们无所事事时，坏事就开始发生了。士气实际上会下降。根据我的经验，人们会分心。他们会想：“嘿，我们到底在做什么？这没意思。”我发现，让人们保持忙碌、有动力和充满激情，即使你可能认为他们会更乐意休息几周并放慢节奏，我发现他们的士气在那些时刻实际上反而会下降。

>> 这是一个我经常使用的管理框架。嗯，作为一名高管，你不知道如何做出任何一个完全正确的决定。这是不可知的。你不知道要分配多少预算。你不知道一个项目要投入多少人。你不知道如何设定一个发布产品的截止日期。但当然，你必须设定一些默认值。所以你做出最好的猜测，然后你根据这个最佳猜测进行管理，并边做边学，因为在软件开发和一般商业中，一切都是突发的。这些不是自上而下或先验可知的事情，所以你做出最好的猜测，并且知道你不会得到正确的答案。你需要决定相对于你感知的中间点，是过度转向还是转向不足更好。所以我们来谈谈人员配置。比如当你为一个项目配置人员时，明知你无法做到完美，是人手过多好还是人手不足好？嗯，人手不足更好。如果你人手过多，就会出现你刚才说的所有问题。你会遇到政治斗争。你会让人们去做，我认为最重要的是，那些比必要优先级更低的事情。比如你有一个包含20项的优先级列表，你知道你必须完成前五项，但接下来的15项有点模糊，但你却为项目配置了过多人员。所以接下来的10项工作在你甚至不知道它们是否必要之前就已经开始了。那是毒药。那是浪费。它会让你变慢。它会形成惰性。所以很明显，人手不足比人手过多危害更小。在这个特定的框架中，建议是始终刻意地人手不足。然后，智慧的元素在于知道不要过度人手不足，并了解这两者之间的区别。这就是我们在Ripling的工作方式。每个人都在不断地要求更多资源。当然，在我们负担得起且合适的地方，新的资源会到来，但对我来说，非常重要的是，我们觉得公司里的每一个项目我们都刻意地人手不足。

有一位以前的嘉宾，我忘了是谁了。他们用了一个比喻，他们希望自己的团队处于“脱水”状态，总是渴望更多的水，然后最终他们变得过于“脱水”，好吧，我们需要有人来帮忙。有趣。是的，有一句话与非凡的努力相符。我想确保我读出来，因为我觉得这真的很好。这也许是总结你所说内容的一种方式：好的团队会疲惫，而这时伟大的团队就会痛扁好的团队。是的，这实际上是Sil引用的一句话，他从一位女子篮球教练那里听来的，这正符合我之前说的观点，你必须时刻让引擎保持在红线区，因为你一旦放松警惕，一旦放慢速度，一旦放松，一旦给竞争对手留下一个裂缝，伟大的团队就会进来痛扁好的团队。而且，你知道，体育，我不是一个很喜欢运动的人，但体育类比是如此难以抗拒，因为归根结底，商业就是一场游戏，所有这些都不重要。我们不会把它带进坟墓。就像你在这里，你在这里做这些事情，因为它在你活在地球上的时候某种程度上让你感到充实。我热爱商业这项运动。我发现，尽管我很少看体育比赛，但体育和军事是领导力中非常成熟的并行概念来源。

我还发现，那些最紧张、压力最大的漫长夜晚，是你最深刻记忆的时刻，也是你最深情地回忆起你正在构建某物的时候。关键在于，正如你所说，如果一切顺利，如果你正在成功和获胜，所有这些最终都是浪漫和怀旧的。记得我们建造这个东西，熬夜工作，然后发布它的那段时光。如果它一无所成，你就不会有那种感觉。所以，我认为这其中一个非常重要的组成部分是，你需要不断获胜和成功。

>> 我的意思是，我从Parker那里学到了一件事，Parker是我们在Rippling的首席执行官。他，你知道，呃，他说你并不是真的从错误中学习，你是从成功中学习。我觉得，当然，你确实会，他也会承认你从错误中学习到一些。但我确实认为这是一种呃，自我感觉良好的[脏话]，你知道，就像“嗯，你知道你没有成功，但至少你学到了一些东西。”我也经历过失败，比如当我回顾从2009年第一天开始在Inkling工作，直到2018年我们将那家公司卖给一家私募股权公司，从硅谷的酷炫曲线顶端跌落到另一边的默默无闻，那九年时光。当然，在那段时间我学到了很多，也成长了很多，但现在，我认为在Rippling的六七年，我正在计算，即将满七年，我学到了更多，因为我看到了成功。比如我看到了业务的快速、疯狂、惊人、超乎寻常的成功。而且，呃，它更有启发性。就像从看到事情如何正确完成中获得的收获，比从看到事情如何错误完成中获得的收获更多。如果我告诉你你要乘坐飞机，一位维修技师见过100次正确操作，而另一位维修技师见过100次错误操作，但他从错误中吸取了教训，但自己仍然没有成功过。我的意思是，饶了我吧。甚至无法比较你会对哪架飞机感觉更舒服。所以我确实认为“从错误中学习”这种说法有点像一种自我感觉良好的老生常谈，实际上在现实中没有什么实质内容。这就是为什么作为一名早期职业产品经理，或者坦率地说，在你职业生涯的任何阶段，当你想要学习时，都应该加入一个成功的团队。比如22岁去创业很酷，祝你好运。成功的几率并不在你这边。但是，当我看到一份简历，发现有人加入过那些在超级激动人心和疯狂增长模式中的真正优秀公司时。我会立刻想面试那个候选人，因为我想听听他们从一个成功团队中学到了什么。而那，嗯，那是我在查看候选人资料时常用的启发式方法之一。我认为这是一个被低估的套路，抱歉，不是一个不为人知的套路。这是一条我认为在硅谷人们没有足够重视的建议，那就是成功孕育成功，你应该追逐成功。

谈到成功和学习，你长期担任Ripling的首席运营官，你之所以在这里，是因为你最近调任Ripling的首席产品官，这非常令人兴奋和罕见。我很少看到首席执行官转任产品职位。让我问你为什么，你为什么转任那个职位？我觉得你在首席执行官的职位上一直表现出色。也许这就是原因。小心你擅长的事情。还有就是，转任产品职位有什么惊喜之处，因为很多人都想象过它会是什么样子，然后你实际上正在做这件事。Ripling的故事很有趣，嗯，我会讲出来，因为我认为它解释了为什么，你知道，我正在进行这次转型，但这并不是真的关于我。我认为这是一种你的听众会觉得有用的模式。通常，你最优秀的管理人员是那些你可以随意投入任何挑战，他们都能将混乱变为秩序的人。他们会解决问题。我确实很欣赏Ripling的人们对我使用的称呼，你知道，谈论McInness的“受伤的鸟”，即在任何给定时刻，某个职能部门处于混乱或危险之中，然后我就会非常仔细地关注那个职能部门，使其恢复秩序。也许击球率达到800，你知道，不总是疯狂的成功，但我除了研发部门，其他地方都做到了。我会，你知道，考虑帮助销售组织的某些部分，比如我们的渠道团队，或者我花时间，你知道，几次建立招聘职能，当它需要根据我们的增长进行某种重新思考时。嗯，但从来不是研发。所以我有点，我就会把脚放在桌子上，看着远处那个冒着烟的垃圾堆火灾，想知道是否会有人去处理它。而且你知道，这种“烟雾”会以各种形式出现，当Rippling增长如此之快时，它不一定总是影响客户的事情，但它就是那种让你觉得[脏话]那个架构不对，或者他们没有正确衡量采用率的事情。从外部看，我实际上有很多可以提出的批评。而且，嗯，Ripling发生的事情是，嗯，我们犯了一些招聘错误。我想那些担任这些职位的人也会同意他们不是合适的人选。我们在工程领导层犯了一个招聘错误，当时的产品负责人不得不兼管工程。随后我们在产品招聘方面也犯了错误，我们很多人不得不介入，Parker和我在这两年里，面对这种混乱、这种无序、这种痛苦，彼此对视，却从未同时拥有对工程和产品部门的良好高层领导。而且，嗯，我记得Parker有点，Parker有点瘫坐在椅子上说：“啊，[脏话]，我又要进行一次招聘了。”我说：“不，是时候了。我要去做。”他真的从座位上跳了起来。他说：“真的吗？你愿意去做？”我说：“老兄，这就是公司需要的。”所以我就这么做了。这大概始于一年前，我意识到我要去做，并在12月向Parker表达了这一点。我实际上是在25年1月接手这项工作的。所以这已经是11个月的学习了。嗯，当我跳入产品角色时，产品职能本身虽然配备了非常有才华的人，但却严重人手不足，并且没有一个精神领袖来推动一致性和流程卓越，它已经变得局部优化但全局不连贯，如果你了解康威定律，你注定会发布你的组织结构图，因此，一个局部优化但全局不连贯的团队。你有一个局部优化、全局不连贯的产品体验，需要解决。因此，我过去11个月的努力是建立，你知道，比如我们在这里做事方式的更大清晰度，更好的流程，更好的，你知道，总体领导力，呃，招聘和解雇。我的意思是，只是做了那种“第三通道清理”的工作，尽管团队中很多人都非常有才华，并且在管理各自领域方面做得非常出色。

跳入产品角色真是令人大开眼界。嗯，我对一年前从外部看问题的天真感到有点不好意思。产品团队有一个需求层次结构，我们喜欢指责未能满足该层次结构中更高层元素的问题，并质疑该组织的失败，例如没有非常仔细地衡量采用指标，也没有密切跟踪这些指标作为推动执行的手段。当我介入时，我心想，伙计，你知道，我们需要为测试覆盖率建立一些基本标准。我们需要为产品准备好下生产线后，如何进行我所说的“工厂检验”建立一些基本标准。我们有没有一份我们称之为“产品质量”的清单？产品质量意味着什么？那些基本的东西都不存在。所以，我们应该花时间衡量采用指标的想法是绝对的疯狂。你跳过了很多中间步骤。因此我们取得了巨大的进步，我认为这正在转化为我们客户的产品质量改进。但正如我所说，在我深入了解之前，我对它的看法有点愚蠢。作为一名高管，坐在混乱之外却自以为知道答案，这是没有任何借口的。作为一名高管，这样做是不可饶恕的罪过。你需要去看看。你需要身处核心。你需要自下而上地研究系统，嗯，并提出如何修正系统的假设。这就是我一直在做的。

我喜欢听到这些，因为很多人都有团队运作不佳的情况。听到一个并非长期从事产品工作的人进来尝试解决这些问题，我认为对人们来说非常有用和有趣。再深入探讨一下。嗯，最大的教训和有点令人大开眼界的时刻是，为了实现你正在努力实现的衡量参与度和采用率这一结果，需要做很多基础性工作。那么，它是不是像跟踪、指标和数据科学？那是不是其中的教训？教训是所有事情都必须按时按序完成，而且你可以非常非常快地行动。呃，你可以在所有这些事情上紧急行动，没有任何借口不这样做，但你必须按顺序进行。而且你必须自下而上地领导。就像你必须从你观察到的具体情况出发进行领导。我认为对我来说，过去11个月发生的一件最好的事情是，我对自己的直觉有了更大的信任，即我在其他职能部门中匹配到的模式确实适用于产品。但我既有优势也有劣势，因为我以前没有领导过产品职能，因此必须从第一性原理思考每一个问题。我别无选择。我可以在网上读到[脏话]。我可以听取那些对某个话题有清晰思考的人的意见，并引入他们的想法，但我非常不愿意在不将其分解成组成部分并弄清楚它如何适用于Rippling的情况下引入一个想法。所以原则上我根本不[脏话]关心采用指标。我关心采用指标是在我关心采用指标的时候。就像我意识到这是一个同义反复的陈述，但它就像我会达到那个目标。所以在我们产品的某些部分，我确实很关心采用指标。我非常关心我们申请人追踪系统（我们的招聘产品）的采用指标，因为它在可用性方面处于非常好的状态。它被很好地工具化了。它有很多非常满意的用户。嗯，它有一个很棒的增长曲线。所以我们应该真正关注采用指标，因为我认为这将是随着时间推移降低流失率的重要因素。比如，消除实施过程中的摩擦。我们产品的其他部分，我会说我根本不关心采用率，而更关注基础性的东西，就像我之前说的测试覆盖率或其他什么，只是为了确保产品稳定良好，一旦被采用，就能准确地交付它应该交付的东西。

既然你身处产品团队内部，你认为产品外部的人，比如两年前的Matt或其他，我不知道，市场推广负责人，其他高管，呃，需要了解哪些关于产品的事情，而他们在进入内部之前并不了解？我再给你一个我喜欢用的框架。在金融界，有一个“阿尔法”的概念。阿尔法是相对于指数的超额表现。所以这就是为什么seekingalfalpha.com是一个非常受欢迎的网站。他们的意思是，你正在寻找购买一些东西，一些资产组合，它们将跑赢，比如说，如果你以标普500指数为基准的话。所以阿尔法是相对于指数的超额表现。然后你有了“贝塔”的概念。贝塔只是波动性。贝塔不好。一只高贝塔股票会无缘无故地剧烈波动。它与指数无关。它就是，你知道，贝塔值很高。如果你是期权交易员，那很棒，但除此之外，它并不是你想要在资产中拥有的东西。所以，你理想的股票是高阿尔法、低贝塔的股票。它们实际上不会以那种形式出现，因为阿尔法和贝塔往往是相关的，但那是你在购买金融资产时想要的。那么，类比是什么？我认为你有一些高阿尔法的人，他们非常有价值。我认为你也有一些低贝塔的人，他们也很有价值。嗯，丹尼斯·罗德曼，篮球运动员，疯子，非常高的阿尔法。而且你知道，每个团队都有一个这样的位置。丹尼斯·罗德曼是我的最爱。就像你可以有一个难搞的员工，但他有巨大的潜力。嗯，所以这个阿尔法贝塔的东西，我在考虑我想要什么样的人以及我想要什么样的流程时，经常使用它。所以当你从零到一构建一个产品时，你可能正在追求阿尔法。你正在寻找这个市场或这个客户问题的某个角度，产品实际上将提供相对于任何默认解决方案的超额回报。当你有一个更成熟的产品，或者你在产品运营团队或其他部门有人时，你可能想要一个更低贝塔的环境，就像它能稳定地生产出来。它做得非常可靠。我们的薪资产品，我们非常希望它具有非常低的贝塔值。我们真的不希望薪资产品有任何不可预测性或异常。所以我们[清嗓子]愿意接受更多的流程。这是一个组织设计的基本原则，即企业中的流程存在的唯一目的是降低贝塔值。流程是为了降低系统输出的波动性。流程的缺点是它会抑制阿尔法。你必须在产品团队中应用流程时非常非常小心和明智，以确保你在需要降低贝塔的地方降低了贝塔，而没有在需要阿尔法的地方抑制了阿尔法。所以，在我们过去一年改革Ripwing产品构建方式的过程中，这就像一场游戏，识别出那些我需要引入一点点流程的地方，只是一点点。其他地方我需要实施非常清晰严格的流程，在那里我不需要阿尔法，我只需要低贝塔。

这样的例子，比如说，我们的产品质量清单，我们在Ripling亲切地称之为“泡菜”（pickle）。

>> 为什么叫泡菜？是的。所以这实际上是一件非常重要的事情。我认为如果你想在一个团队中带来文化变革，你看，我们在研发组织中有1300人。这是一艘我们必须驾驶的大船。如果你想创造一个能深入人心，成为时代精神或人们抓住不放的东西，你必须创造一个实体，一个意义的载体，然后你必须用你的意义来填充这个载体。你可能会说，一个梗。

>> 是的。嗯，当然。一个梗，就像一个梗在流行文化中实际上是一个很好的例子，你知道，而且，嗯，在流行文化中，我认为这就是为什么当人们带着外部的想法来讨论时，我欢迎这些外部想法，但如果我要求这个人做的第一件事是不用那些词语来告诉我他们的意思。所以当有人进来并说：“嘿，我想在战略上做这件事。”我会说：“酷，不用‘战略’这个词告诉我你的意思。”这迫使他们将其分解成组成部分。如果他们不用那个词也能清楚地表达出来，我就知道他们知道自己在说什么。如果他们又只是围绕着“战略”这个词打转，我就会觉得，好吧，你实际上还没有彻底想清楚。所以对于“泡菜”，对于产品质量清单，我本可以想出一些通用术语，但我真的希望公司的新员工能明白，这是Ripling特有的东西。这是我们独有的。你想了解这个东西。我也希望它成为产品管理和工程团队日常工作中常用术语的一部分。所以“泡菜”，尽管听起来有些滑稽或愚蠢，但它被刻意设计成一种棱角分明或突出的载体，我可以用来填充特定的意义。所以我们有一个产品质量清单。产品质量清单是轻量级的，因为它以最简单的方式阐明了我们希望你在发布产品时达到的标准。不适用于所有产品。并非每一条都适用于所有产品，但它是全面的，并为我提供了一个随着我们学习而迭代的框架。就在昨天，我们把产品发给了Parker。这是我们流程的一部分。当我们发布一个新产品时，它会交给Parker，他是Ripling在Ripling的大管理员。如果你不知道，Parker是Ripling唯一负责薪资管理的人，负责所有5200名员工。他总是亲自处理薪资。对所有5200人都没有例外。他有时确实会抱怨，但这对于软件来说，也许对他来说，都是一项了不起的成就。所以他也会安装我们为自己安装的任何新应用，因为我们对我们构建的一切都进行了彻底的内部测试。昨天他去安装这个新应用。我们即将发布一个用于反馈的新应用，允许人们就他们的公司互相提供反馈。他安装了它，然后进去，它把他扔到了一个空白屏幕上。他说：“这[脏话]是什么？这是什么？怎么回事？”就像，“嘿，哇。真是失败。”所以我，嗯，又砍掉了我的一根手指。我只剩下九根了。而且，呃，我心想，我们错过了什么？我们错过的是有一个[脏话]功能开关。[脏话]功能开关。我就是不被允许在“功能开关”前面不加[脏话]地说，因为功能开关是我的祸根，是世界上不断制造问题的最糟糕的东西。工程师暂时放一个进去然后就忘了。就像垫片。如果你正在盖房子，总承包商在某些地方放了小垫片，然后忘了它们的存在，接着在上面砌墙，最终垫片失效，突然你的门就不合适了。就像功能开关非常危险，需要仔细管理。所以[脏话]功能开关。总之，我们有一个。Parker安装了它。他们忘了禁用功能开关。他安装应用程序时看到了一个空白屏幕。我做了什么？我的反应是“呃”。回到团队。给他们直接反馈。告诉他们不要再犯那个错误。但也要问一个问题：我们如何在工厂检验过程中错过了这一点？答案是我们的“泡菜”清单中没有关于功能开关的任何条目。所以我在那个[脏话]“泡菜”清单中添加了一行，说你只允许有一个功能开关来管理你发布时的整个产品。这是一个可能无法实现但我们渴望达到的极端标准。这个框架，“泡菜”，鉴于这些轻量级的清单，根据我们不断学习到的东西持续迭代，构成了一种非常好的轻量级方式来降低系统的贝塔值，希望对我们构建产品的阿尔法值只有微乎其微的负面影响。所以，你知道，你问了我一个非常简单的问题。我给了你一个非常冗长的答案，但这些框架帮助我设计出可以扩展的系统，你知道，从一个人到2000名技术人员。

哇。好的。顺便说一句，[清嗓子]泡菜，那是一个首字母缩写词，还是仅仅因为我喜欢这个词？我们就叫它泡菜。

>> 产品质量清单。

>> 产品。好的。我明白了。所以是辅音。好的。PQL，除了“泡菜”你还能怎么发音？我想象你的所有演示文稿都有小泡菜表情符号，还有>>泡菜表情符号。Slack里的跳舞泡菜。有很多，是的，它确实带来了一些乐趣。

>> 我想到的是“泡菜耙”。

>> 是的。你明白那个典故吗？

>> 这是一个罗夏测试。

>> 好的。所以，这个高阿尔法低贝塔，我喜欢这个概念。所以，这个想法是，根据团队，根据问题，呃，我们需要一个高阿尔法、低贝塔的人，或者实际上我们对这个特定项目的大量变数也无所谓。是的，我们愿意接受这个领域的大量波动，以换取这些人或这些专业人士的创造力和冒险精神所带来的好处，或者说缺乏流程给予他们自由去做他们想做的事情。

>> 所以当你招聘时，你是在寻找，这个人是低贝塔还是不是？那肯定会是>>当然。我的意思是，这确实是一种非常有用的方式，你知道，当你遇到一个候选人时，我的我的我的操作方式，我想你知道，谈到招聘，我认为，嗯，我在Ripling花了很多时间与团队讨论我如何招聘，它源于大量的实践，如果能倒带我的人生，思考我在各种情境下见过多少候选人，那会非常有趣，几千个，你知道，也许几万个，我不知道。嗯，这就像在我大脑中进行了大量的击球练习和模型训练。所以我非常依赖我的直觉，当然人力资源部门的人会说你不应该这样做。那完全是[脏话]。如果你有好的直觉，你绝对应该依赖你的直觉。而且，嗯，当你对一个候选人有反应之后，当你考虑招聘某人时，你需要做的是解码，你需要解码你的直觉，以便能够有效地向其他人表达。所以我为此使用的一个框架是SPO。嗯，这是一个非常难看的首字母缩写词。宇宙中某位最初想到这个的人值得致敬。不是我，但我采用了它。它是指人们聪明、热情、乐观、坚韧、适应性强、善良。那五件事。六件。甚至数不清。我告诉过你，我犯错的时候正好少了一根手指。所以我少了一根。

>> 九。还有九个。SPOTTAC本身并不是一个好的自上而下的框架，但当你思考“哦，为什么我没有，为什么这个候选人就是没有点击？”时。我为什么不喜欢他们？嗯，你沿着清单往下看，你会说：“哦，是的，不，这个人，是因为他们对这个想法不感兴趣。”他们没有热情。你知道，就像他们对前任经理说[脏话]，他们是前两家公司业绩的受害者。就是这样。他们不乐观。嗯，你知道，这个框架对于评估人非常有用。我认为阿尔法贝塔框架也非常有用。当你结束谈话时，你会想：“我喜欢那个人。”我觉得他会非常非常出色。为什么我特别不认为他能在这个产品上做得好，答案是：这是一个高阿尔法产品领域，而他是一个低贝塔的人。有价值，但绝对不适合这个。所以，我认为在这种情况下它也真的很有用。

我喜欢所有这些框架。你正在对这个听众讲话。框架，框架，框架。是的。所以，高阿尔法，低贝塔，有时高贝塔也可以。SPO，嗯，在招聘方面，在我们转向不同话题之前，你还发现有什么真正有用的吗？当我刚开始在产品组织工作时，我接触到了一种面试框架或面试策略，我认为在我职业生涯中几乎没有怎么用过，那就是每个产品人员，无论资历深浅，都会得到相同的案例研究。而且这个案例研究异常困难。它要求你同时考虑许多维度，思考数据传播问题。它变得相当技术化，而且，嗯，我们用来评估该案例研究表现的评分标准，嗯，它为你提供了指导，说明对我们来说，一个入门级产品经理是什么样子，一个初级、中级、高级管理产品经理可能是什么样子。每个人从那次面试中出来都感觉糟透了，好像他们失败了。然而在我们这边，我们会说：“哇，那个人做得真好。”就像他们以一种非常令人印象深刻的方式预见到了三四个转角。有10个他们没有预见到，但他们预见到了其中最难的四个。当我们提供新信息质疑他们解决方案的有效性时，他们并没有采取防御姿态。他们也愿意打断我们提出更多问题。以及很多基本的“人际互动模式”。我，你知道，你绝不会认为给某人一个不可能完成的任务，甚至让L5级别的人和副总裁做同样的事情会是富有成效的。我们可以说，我们的招聘团队对此仍然有些顾虑，觉得我们在面试的这个阶段淘汰人过于激进。但我从中发现了智慧，并认为给每个人相同的简单而复杂的提示，然后递给他们一个钻头，给他们一面混凝土墙，看看他们能否钻进混凝土一毫米或一英寸，实际上非常有用。你知道，他们永远不会完全穿过墙壁。这不重要。你会学到很多。我发现这对我来说是一种令人大开眼界的新事物，而且很有趣。我的意思是，看，产品的乐趣，产品管理的乐趣，以及成为产品一部分的乐趣。我认为实际上有很多乐趣。如果我能给你一个清单，但其中一个巨大的乐趣是你可以和软件领域最聪明的一些人一起工作。工程师非常聪明。他们不总是最好的社交，你知道，呃，实体。销售人员是出色的社交实体。他们不总是最好的系统思考者。你可以继续列举。但产品管理的魔力在于你必须，你知道，我们谈论“迷你CEO”。我认为这有点像一个愚蠢的误称，但其中包含一些智慧。我认为智慧在于你必须是一个博学多才的人。比如你必须非常擅长与他人合作。你必须擅长沟通和表达。你必须擅长项目管理。你必须擅长科学、数学和工程。这真是[脏话]酷。所以我认为这份工作对我来说最大的乐趣之一就是与业内最聪明、最多才多艺的顶尖人才互动。

我再说一件我喜欢领导产品的事情，那就是作为首席运营官，我的工作是接受产品现状，并围绕它优化一切。我的工作是确保产品运营，在我们业务中，与保险公司、支付实体、政府监管机构的接口，所有这些东西都能正常运作。它是为了确保我们的销售引擎、营销引擎，所有市场推广的东西都围绕产品本身进行优化。呃，它是关于招聘，并确保我们招到人来开发产品。你可以看看任何不在研发部门的职能，我都有参与尝试弄清楚如何在给定产品的情况下，让该职能发挥其最大能力。而现在我领导产品，我心想：“哦，哇。这是最高位的。”并不是说我以前不理解这一点，而是现在我真正明白了产品是最高位的。如果你把产品做对了，它就能适应市场。呃，其他一切都变得更容易。财务更容易，销售更容易，营销更容易，招聘更容易，一切都变得[脏话]更容易。所以我认为领导产品职能的另一个乐趣是，呃，我可以在其中设定最高位的。

将业务的成功归于一人。>> 听到这个真是太棒了。很多时候，产品之外的人不理解这些事情，而且经常看不起产品，尤其是你知道的销售人员，因为很多时候我喜欢你看到了这一点，并意识到了这一点，并且认识到这项工作是多么重要、有趣和具有挑战性，以及产品经理是多么棒，你知道的，很多人都非常反对产品经理，为什么我们需要产品经理，我们不需要他们，他们只会拖慢一切，所有这些流程。>> 我在那里有一个区分，那就是我反对糟糕的产品经理。>> 这正是我所说的，如果你讨厌产品经理，你只是还没有遇到过一个出色的产品经理。>> 这就像，看，我喜欢葡萄酒。葡萄酒是我的爱好之一，我学了很多关于葡萄酒的知识，我最喜欢的一句话是，我不喜欢霞多丽。我说，不，不，不，不，不。霞多丽是世界上最 [ __ ] 惊人的葡萄酒品种之一。你只是还没有喝过好的霞多丽，你知道的，而且有适合你的霞多丽。产品管理，就像你不喜欢产品管理，你认为产品经理很糟糕。这就像，嗯，你只是还没有喝过好的霞多丽。>> 这正是。>> 一旦你有了。一旦你有了，你知道的，你就无法忘记它。[笑声]>> 比如，让我们尽快找到那个产品经理。>> 不，让我们尽快找到那瓶霞多丽。[笑声]那个产品经理和一些霞多丽。你提到了产品市场契合点，我想在这条线上加倍下注。你曾有过几次非常有趣的经历，在创业过程中努力寻找产品市场契合点。你说你为此工作了九年，你说。>> 嗯。>> 好的。然后是 Rippling，呃，完全相反，极高的产品市场契合度，一路飙升。你从中学到了什么，你认为人们可能不理解关于产品市场契合的感觉，以及达到产品市场契合需要什么，事物是如何发展的？>> 有一句线，一位风险投资家，我不会说出他的名字，他说过，你知道，产品市场契合就是那种你看到它时绝对知道它的东西，因此如果你不绝对知道它，你就没有它。这又回到了我关于从错误中学习还是从成功中学习的观点。这就像，啊，伙计。在我在 Rippling，抱歉，Inkling 度过的许多年里，我们一次又一次地认为我们做到了。我们认为我们已经达到了产品市场契合。也许，也许吧，你知道的，事后看来，有了现在经历过稳固产品市场契合的经验，我们没有做到这一点是显而易见的。我投资了大约 60 家或 70 家公司，我不知道。这不是我主动做的。但机会，我想，由于我在 Rippling 的职位，所以出现了，我与许多企业家交谈，我喜欢它，我觉得它非常刺激，我喜欢新的想法，这只是我已经在玩的那场比赛中的一个真正的点缀。但当我收到那些已经做了三、四、你知道的，几年的人的投资者更新时，我读到的是我 2011 年和 2012 年寄给我的投资者的更新，我感到心碎。我们在硅谷谈论永不放弃，但那是完全绝对的风险投资 [ __ ]。风险投资家的动机是把钱投入你的公司，然后榨干你。他们永远拿不回他们的钱。他们没有任何办法收回这笔投资。所以他们唯一合乎逻辑的愿望就是让你继续尝试，不顾一切，因为偶尔会有这样的例子，有人从 A 转向 X，结果大相径庭，而且成功了。Slack 最初是一家游戏公司，后来变成了企业聊天。你知道，Airbnb 也许。有一些公司进行了大胆的转型并取得了成功，但伙计，这很罕见。我是说，非常非常罕见。我认为重要的是要记住，你知道的，我 45 岁了。我们将在地球上。我是说，美国男性的平均死亡年龄是 70 岁出头。就像，我还有 20、30 年，也许，如果我幸运的话，40 年留在地球上。非常清楚我所拥有的时间。而且我并不后悔我在 Inkling 所做的事情。我学到了很多。它为我现在所做的事情提供了信息。我不认为我现在所处的篇章没有之前的篇章就不可能出现。所以，我所做的事情是一件美丽而奇妙的事情。但当我读到投资者更新时，我说，你和我当时一样，而且你不会摆脱这个困境。硅谷的“坚持到死”的心态对企业家不利。它对风险投资家有利。我知道为什么会这样，但我认为大声说出来很重要，你应该 [ __ ] 放弃。你应该重置时钟。你应该重置股权表，因为相信我，当产品市场契合到来时，它是疯狂的，它是令人兴奋的，你应该去追求它，并且永远不要自欺欺人地认为你拥有它，而实际上你没有。这是危险的，也是令人遗憾的。这算是一场演讲吗？[笑声] 美丽。呃，反风险投资演讲。>> 我还有更多。顺便说一句，它不是反风险投资。它是反风险投资宣传。>> 每个人都在硅谷根据自己的利益行事。高管、创始人、风险投资家，每个人当然都在根据自己的利益行事，而风险投资家拥有非常强大而持久的利益，这些利益塑造了硅谷运作方式的动态。这没什么不对。对于那些 25 岁的企业家来说，他们对这一切一无所知，指出这一点并对他们大喊大叫非常非常重要。相信我，45 岁的企业家或 50 岁的风险投资家，他们在这个行业里已经有一段时间了，他们明白了。他们观察过。他们知道是什么样的。这个系统是为了利用那些不了解的人，或者至少是利益结构最容易捕获的猎物，而不是风险投资家作为个体，他们都是美丽而奇妙的。他们都只是非常了不起的人。这只是利益结构在某些情况下会导致真正的伤害，我认为。我发现的是，当你放弃风险投资时，我总是说，“嘿，等你开始下一份工作时告诉我。我很高兴投资。”他们很少，除非他们不是一个伟大的风险投资家，很少有人会因为“你怎么可能让这件事不起作用？”而对你生气。作为一名创始人，当你的生意该收摊时，你非常想把钱还给股权表，我总是提醒企业家，嘿，如果你在种子投资领域，你的预测是零，你对每笔投资的假设是它将归零。任何不采取这种立场的种子投资者都疯了。你知道他们是很糟糕的投资者。嗯，寻找那些玩长远游戏、希望参与你的第二家和第三家公司，并且愿意在第一家公司下注并让它归零的投资者，这样你就可以继续前进。我是说，我曾多次进行过这种对话。本期节目由 GoFundMe Giving Funds 提供，零费用捐赠者建议基金。我想告诉你 GoFundMe 最近推出的一款新的 DAFF 产品，它可以让年底的捐赠变得容易。GoFundMe Giving Funds 是由全球排名第一的捐赠平台支持的 DAFF 或捐赠者建议基金，受到超过 2 亿人的信赖。它基本上是你自己的迷你基金会，无需律师或管理费用。你贡献金钱或增值资产，如股票，立即获得税收减免，可能减少资本利得，[音乐]然后稍后决定你想捐赠到哪里。没有管理费或资产费，你可以现在锁定你的税收减免，稍后决定捐赠到哪里，这非常适合年底捐赠。加入 GoFundMe 社区，拥有超过 2 亿人，[音乐]开始节省你的税单，同时帮助你最关心的事业。今天就开始你的捐赠基金，网址是 gofundme.com/lenny。如果你转让你现有的 DAFF，他们甚至会支付 DAFF 的费用。那就是 gofundme.com/lenny 开始。这引出了一个问题，什么时候该放弃？你知道，听到这个的人可能会想，哦，天哪，就像，有什么迹象表明，好的，是时候结束了。嗯，历史为我们提供了明确的指导。当你看到公司取得巨大成功时，它们会很快取得巨大成功。迟到派对非常非常危险。早到派对也非常非常危险。绝大多数时候，问题就在于此。你知道，就像 Rippling，如果它在 2014 年开始，今天就不会是这样了。我认为 Rippling，如果它今天开始，五年后也不会是这样。所以我认为时机很重要，而且很难控制。但当你掌握了时机，市场是真实的，产品有效，产品市场契合，就像我之前说的，它是非常非常清晰的。所以，如果我随便说一个数字，仅凭我的亲身经历，我认为这非常重要。一个题外话，不要向人们寻求建议。向人们寻求相关经验。如果你向他们寻求建议，他们总是会给的。但如果你向他们寻求相关经验，他们很少有。如果他们没有，那就不要寻求他们的建议。所以向人们寻求相关经验。我试图这样做，你知道的，与我自己的企业家一起工作时。就像，让我提供我所拥有的任何相关经验。我关于何时放弃这个话题的相关经验是，我认为我们可以在第二次或第三次转型后就结束，那大约是在第四年。当然，相信你所建立的东西并坚持不懈是非常重要的。但说“看，我们已经转型了一两次，它没有成功，我得去做下一件事”绝对没有什么可耻的。我认为，如果你创业四年、五年了，而它不是一个明显轰轰烈烈的增长故事，那就非常非常困难。这非常非常罕见。所以，甚至比你从一开始就会面临的罕见分数还要高，这些分数现在将转化为疯狂的东西。所以，这可能很难听到，但当你觉得，“去他妈的。我要这么做。我有精力。我要再做一次。我将从零开始。”时，这可能非常解放。[笑声]这非常有帮助。你有一种很有趣的方式来描述产品市场契合，围绕着受体和药物。>> 哦，是的。是的。我认为这是一个根本上被误解的动态。嗯，当创始人和我发消息给我，他们说，“嘿，就像，喜欢我的 LinkedIn 帖子和我的推文来推广这次发布。”我做了。我转发了。我喜欢它。等等。没有人关注我在 Twitter 上，这无关紧要。就像，你知道的，我做了，然后我心想，这不是关于这个的。就像，这不是建立伟大公司的途径。它可以是一个成核事件，但它不是一件大事，因为没有人关心你的公司。就像，你的发布不重要。巨大的弹弓发射的量，在关于初创公司和公司的噪音的海洋中，只是微不足道的水滴。嗯，所以你必须一步一步地建立它，自下而上。而这些发布并没有真正产生多少影响。所以，你怎么看待？就像，你怎么看待你发布的无关紧要性？或者你认为你为建立一个你相信将拥有产品市场契合的产品所付出的所有努力？嗯，如果你认识到市场是不可变的，无论多少发推文、发 LinkedIn 帖子、打广告都不会改变市场是否想要你的产品。它不会。它可能会提高你产品的知名度，但它不会改变某人是否想要它。然后你采取不同的心态。你必须将你的初创公司视为在宇宙中进行实验，看看你能得到什么回报。而这种药物发现和结合受体的类比是，没有人认为他们可以通过市场营销来提高你在体内的表现。结合受体存在或不存在。当他们构建产品时，他们的目标是找出结合受体是否存在。但命运已经决定了结果。这对于你构建的每一个软件产品来说都是绝对真实的。命运已经决定了结果。市场要么会抓住你的产品并继续下去，要么不会。不要发布产品，发现缺乏成功，然后试图通过市场营销来解决这个问题，因为结合受体很可能不存在。对我来说，这是一种非常解放的心态，因为现在我只需要找到正确的药物，就可以不用再试图说服身体为我正在构建的任何东西开发结合受体了。>> 我喜欢你在这里的建议，你早期投资了 Notion，这是经典故事之一，我认为他们花了四年时间才达到某个水平。我认为他们搬到了日本，他们完成了所有工作。那么从中有什么教训吗？这是否是一个罕见的例子，它真的奏效了？这是否是一个不值得效仿的例子，因为它极其极其罕见？我们再来谈谈 Alpha Beta。好的。作为一名投资者，你可能会建立一个清单，列出你希望确保关于一家公司的真实或虚假的事情，并希望这能带来你想要的投资成功。它有这种创始人吗？它是一家特拉华州的 CC 公司吗？就像，砰，砰，砰，砰，砰，砰。而这些清单都是关于什么的？它们都是关于压制 beta 的。它们是关于避免可避免的错误。它们是关于带来稳定性。Jeff Lewis 是一位在许多事情上都有独特见解的投资者。我认为他最持久的说法之一是叙事违规。这个想法是，普通智慧必须以某种方式被每一个取得巨大成功的公司所违背。这是绝对真实的。当我给出关于硅谷模式的普遍观察时，最成功的企业不可避免地在某些非常重要的方式上违背了那个清单。所以，你无法复制 Notion 的成功，作为一名企业家。你无法复制它，因为你不是 Ivan。你无法复制它，因为你不是。你无法复制它，因为现在不是 2010 年他们开始公司的时候。或者实际上是 2011 年。这些人坚持了下来。他们经历了地狱。他们转型了。他们去了日本，坐在和服里冥想他们将要建造什么。通过各种手段，他们取得了今天的成就，成为一家非常成功的企业，在一个极其困难的市场中，建立企业几乎是不可能的。它被 Google 和 Microsoft 所主导。在这个市场中开辟自己的利基市场简直是不可想象的。所以我认为 Notion 的成功是由于坚持的叙事违规，我不认为这对很多人来说是个好主意，但它确实奏效了，而且我认为这是创始人团队及其特定怪癖的功能，Ivan 对工艺的绝对坚持。这是他的事。带走的教训不是放弃或不放弃。带走的教训肯定不是去做 Notion 所做的事情。带走的教训是，每家公司都建立在创始人怪癖的基础上。创始人的怪癖。Rippling 的成功几乎是与 Notion 成功的原因相反。但在两种情况下，公司都建立在创始人怪癖的基础上。所以拥抱这一点，认识到这些怪癖，这就是伟大的投资者所做的。他们发现了候选投资中的这种尖锐性和伟大之处，并将其转化为承诺，然后当然，投资者或好的投资者接受他们从宇宙中获得的交换。我喜欢我们朝这个方向发展。我本来没打算谈你的投资生涯。只是给人们一个收听这个节目并可能倒带的理由，我想问一个关于投资的问题。你早期还投资了哪些公司？>> 首先，好吧，所以，我，我有点，我讨厌这个问题，就像[清嗓子]你投资了哪些其他公司？这是一个公平的问题，但问题是，我将给你列出一些我投资过的公司，它们都成功了，你知道的，它们非常有名。所以，我想做的是，而不是回答这个问题，所以，我将给你一些，让我给你一些诱饵。就像，我曾是 Notion 的早期投资者之一。我可能是第一个，我不知道，问 Ivan。嗯，Clever，它有一个很好的退出。嗯，我是 Zenitz 的早期投资者之一，如果你听说过的话。嗯>> 听说过。>> 在我加入之前，我是 Rippling 的早期投资者之一，然后最近，我投资了 um，这是一个有趣的事情。我是 Deal 的早期投资者之一，如果你听说过他们的话。[笑声]嗯>> 我，你知道的，我能够退出，我能够退出那个职位，然后，你知道的，希望那家公司因为他们的犯罪行为而归零，但不管怎样。嗯，但最近，你知道的，如果你知道 um，就像 Decagon，他们在 AI 领域做了一些非常酷的事情。>> 干得好。>> 嗯，我是说 Langchain，很棒。所以，这些是你可能听说过的一些公司，但比如，我投资了 Macro，创始人是 Derek Lee。Macro 已经倒闭了。我投资了 Debrief Ned Roxson。它已经倒闭了，你知道的。我投资了 Verb Data，与 David Herz 一起，已经倒闭了。我正在从一份名单上阅读。我投资了 um，数字是多少？根据这份名单，我追踪了 70 家公司，其中大部分都归零了。而那些创始人都很棒。那些创始人都很厉害，他们投入了 [ __ ] 大量的精力来建立他们的企业，但它们都归零了。嗯，而且它们是持久的关系。因为我可以打电话给那些人中的任何一个，我想，除了 Deal 之外，也许可以打电话求个情，而且我，你知道的，我有一些后续的，事实上，很多人加入了 Rippling，相信我，所以，我不知道我投资过的公司是一个长长的名单，我喜欢列出那些已经不存在的公司，因为列出好的公司是自私的，是糟糕的幸存者偏差。我喜欢这个答案。我认为，我认为你在你的命中率方面很谦虚，这显然非常高。即使是 70 家公司中有一两家极其成功的公司，在风险投资中也是一种胜利。所以，你做得很好。但我认为这是一个非常重要的视角。当你看到人们网站上的公司 Logo，上面列出了他们投资过的所有公司时，你根本不知道他们有多少次尝试。>> 问人们提供完整名单是一个好习惯。>> 是的。[笑声]>> 你最喜欢的投资失败是什么？>> 哦，不。哦，我其实不是。好的。>> 嗯，我当时想，不，我们不花时间在这上面，但我认为这实际上是一个很好的问题。是的。就像，你最好的失败投资是什么？>> 向我展示那些不起作用的公司 Logo。>> 这是一个非常，这是一个非常诱人的问题。是的。>> 关于这个领域有一个我想花时间讨论的话题，我还没有听到有人这样想，那就是你谈到的复利加幂律加熵，以及这如何成为思考商业的有用框架。所以，你以“非凡的成果需要非凡的努力”这句话来开启这次对话。向 Dan Gil 致敬。这些都是一部分，就像，伙计，理解宇宙的本质是很好地在其中工作。所以，就像，幂律分布无处不在。它解释了为什么很少有人控制如此巨额的财富。它解释了为什么斯蒂芬·库里比篮球队里排名第二的家伙要好得多。它解释了为什么世界人口集中在相对少数的特大城市。就像，嗯，幂律分布到处都在发生，一旦你看到了，你就无法忽视它。它在许多动态中都有体现。人们倾向于认为，世界是按照更线性的关系运作的，其中 x 轴和 y 轴是，你知道的，y=x，但事实并非如此，其影响是深远的。就像，如果你构建的东西达到了 80% 或 90%，y 轴几乎没有变化。你还没有达到回报的拐点。所以，幂律更广泛的含义是，排名前 10% 的人，排名前 5% 的人，获得的不仅仅是 10% 或，你知道的，20% 的回报，而是 10 倍的回报或 100 倍的回报。这非常戏剧化。熵，热力学第二定律是一个非常简单的概念。这就是为什么你的袜子抽屉会变得凌乱。嗯，这就是为什么会出现坑洼。这就是为什么我们需要投入如此多的精力来维护我们飞行的飞机以确保它们安全，因为它们真的真的真的想散架。这就是事物的本质。如果你放弃一座城市几个月，它就会开始衰败，你知道的，所以熵只是这个概念，[ __ ] 倾向于混乱。而宇宙，我是说，生命本身就是对抗熵的暂时胜利。你和我都不应该存在。太阳向地球提供能量。它组织了我们可以吃的东西，就像我们一直在对抗熵，直到我们失败，就像我之前说的，在 70 岁或 80 岁的时候，如果我们幸运的话。这与产品有什么关系？这真的与努力有关。对抗熵的唯一方法，对抗系统中衰败的唯一方法就是能量。你必须注入能量。所以，如果你有一个代码库，你添加到该代码库中的每一行代码都会增加该系统的熵，并需要人类投入越来越多的精力去维护它，以确保它不会崩溃。如果你想取得伟大成就，如果你想获得非凡的成果，特别是如果你想在 x 轴上排名前 10%、前 5%，这样 y 轴就会飙升，那么你必须在游戏的每一步不懈地注入能量。团队会很伤心地，但因为我们都是人类。团队总是会优化局部舒适度而不是公司成果。不是因为他们聚在一起认为我们应该这样做，尽管工会确实明确地、故意地这样做。但即使是一群产品经理或工程师，随着时间的推移，熵也会悄悄地蔓延，人们会优化局部舒适度。你作为高管、领导者的工作就是每天与这种熵作斗争。这意味着，每次你看到一个 bug，每次你看到一个 bug，不是大多数时候，每次你去把它交给产品经理或工程经理，每次最好是在公开场合，这意味着每次有人来找你招聘某人并说他们跳过了背调，每次你都说，你不能雇用这个人，除非你做背调。这意味着当你进入董事会并陷入任何你作为高管的流程时，你必须要求 99% 的能量，否则熵就会蔓延，系统就会衰败。你必须这样做。我最近在我们的大型高管、大型，就像我们每 18 个月左右一次的顶级 75 名经理的离职会议上发表的一个信息是，提醒大家，如果野心的最纯粹形式和企业中最纯粹、最强烈的能量来源是创始人 CEO。那么，创始人 CEO 之外的每一个下一层管理都可能导致强度下降一个数量级，而这是 [ __ ] 危险的，因为如果你去两层，信号和强度就会下降两个数量级，这是一个非常功能失调的组织。所以，我告诉团队的是，你不需要保护人们免受 CEO 的强度影响，而是你必须绝对复制这种强度。企业周围有足够多的利益相关者会主张放松。你下面有无限多的人会为团队成员提供缓冲，让他们免受需求的强度影响。你的工作不是成为这些缓冲器之一。你的工作是保持最高水平的强度，让缓冲发生在别处。关键是，熵会悄无声息地、缓慢地随着时间的推移而悄悄地侵入系统，让你无法察觉，你必须每时每刻都保持这种强度来与之抗争，如果你想留在幂律的极端右端，这显然决定了我们所构建的一切的最终结果。如何将这种强度传递下去？就像，[清嗓子]它感觉如何？它看起来是什么样的？所以，假设 Parker 来找你。这个 bug 很糟糕。我有一个坏掉的屏幕。你割断了你的手指。也许这是个例子。>> 好的。它们还在。>> 我有十个。>> 我会给你具体的例子。嗯，实际上，我在这上面玩的一个笑话是，在我向团队展示时，我的下一张幻灯片是带有声音效果的 Slack 围栏东西，而 Parker 在 Slack 中的图标只是他使用了通用的黄色鸡蛋。>> 是的。哇。你知道，这很有趣。所以，每个人都知道黄色鸡蛋就是 Parker。所以，演示文稿中的下一张幻灯片是哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔DI哔哔A-哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔A-哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔A-哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔A-哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔哔மாகவும்

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**The business's success to one.**

>> This is uh really great to hear. Uh a lot of times people outside product don'a understand these sorts of things and uh look down on product a lot of times especially you know sales folks cos a lot of times I love that you're seeing this and realizing this and uh recognizing just how uh important and interesting and uh and challenging this work is and just how awesome PMs are you know as you know a lot of people are very anti- product manager why do we need product managers we don't need them just slow everything down all this process.

>> I have a distinction there which is I'm anti- shitty product managers.

>> That's exactly how I put it. If you hate product managers, you just haven't worked with a great product manager.

>> It's like, look, I I love wine. Wine's one of my things, and I've learned a lot about wine, and one of the my favorite lines like, I don't like Chardonnay. And I'm like, no, no, no, no, no. Chardonnay is the most [ __ ] amazing varieties of of wine in the world. You just haven't had good Chardonnay, you know, and uh there's a Chardonnay out there for you. Product management, like you don't like product management, you think product managers suck. It's like, well, you just you just haven't had a good Chardonnay yet.

>> That's exactly.

>> Once you have one. Once you have one, you know, you can't unlearn it. [laughter]

>> Like, let's find that PM ASAP.

>> No, let's find that Chardonnay ASAP. [laughter] that PM with with some Chardonnay. You met you touched on this product market fit point and I want to double down on this thread. You had a you've had a couple really interesting experiences of struggling to find product market fit with your own startup. You said you worked on it for nine years, you said.

>> Mhm.

>> Okay. And then with Ripling, uh, complete opposite, extreme product market fit up and to the right. What's something you've learned about just that that you think people maybe don't understand about what it feels like, what it takes to get to product market fit, how things.

>> There's a line that um this venture capitalist whose name I will not mention said which was, you know, that that um product market fit is a sort of thing where you you absolutely know it when you see it and therefore if you don't absolutely know it, you don't have it. And this kind of gets back to my point about learning from mistakes versus successes. It's like, ah, man. Over and over again over the course of the many years that that I spent at Ripling, sorry, Inkling, we thought we had it. We thought we had product market fit. Maybe, maybe, you know, and um in hindsight, with the benefit of now having experienced solid product market fit, it was so so obvious that we didn't. And I've invested in like 60 companies or 70 companies. I don't know. It's not something I actively do. Um, but but opportunities by virtue I think of my my role at Ripling sort of show up and I talk to lots of entrepreneurs and I love it and I find it super stimulating and I love the fresh ideas and it's just something I do as a real cherry on top of the sport that I play already. Um, but when I get the investor updates for the guys who've been at it for like three, four, you know, years, and I read the updates from them that I sent to my investors in 2011 and 2012, I'm kind of heartbroken. We talk in Silicon Valley about never quit, but that is complete absolute venture capital [ __ ] The incentive of a venture capitalist is to put money into your company and milk you dry. They never get their money back. There is no way for them to take that investment back. And so the only logical desire that they would have is for you to keep trying against all odds because there is the occasional example where someone pivoted from A to X and it was wildly different and it worked. Slack was originally some sort of a gaming company and became corporate chat. You know, Airbnb maybe. It's like there's some examples of companies having made wild pivots and succeeded, but man is that rare. I mean, just so exceedingly rare. And I think it's important to remember like, you know, I'm 45 years old. I we're going to be on the planet. I mean, the average age of a man in the United States when he dies is something in the mid-70s. Like, I've got 20, 30, maybe, if I'm lucky, 40 years left on the planet. Very conscious of the time that I have. And like I don't regret what I did at Inkling. I learned a lot. It informed what I do now. I don't think the chapter uh I'm in right now could have come without the chapters before it. And so it's a it's a beautiful wonderful thing that I did what I did. But when I read the investor update and I'm like, you're where I was and you are not getting out of this. The Silicon Valley try until you die mindset is not pro entrepreneur. It's pro venture capitalist. And I know why that is, but I think it's important to say out loud that you should [ __ ] quit. You should reset the clock. You should reset the cap table because trust me, product market fit when it arrives is insane and it's exciting and you should pursue it and never delude yourself into believing you have it when you don't. It is dangerous and regrettable. How's that for a speech? [laughter] Beautiful. The the uh the anti the anti-VC speech.

>> I got more where that came from. By the way, it's not it's not anti-VC. It's anti- VC propaganda.

>> It's the incent everybody's acting in accordance with their incentives in Silicon Valley. The executives, the founders, the the venture cap, everybody's of course acting behaving in you know in accordance with their incentives and the venture capitalists have very strong enduring incentives that have shaped the dynamic of how Silicon Valley works. There's nothing wrong with that. It's just really, really important to point them out and scream at them for the 25-year-old entrepreneur who has no [ __ ] clue how this stuff works. Trust me, the 45-year-old entrepreneur or the 50-year-old venture capitalist who have been in the game for a while, they get it. They've observed it. They know what it's like. The system is there to take advantage of the people who who don't, or at least it is the easiest prey for the incentive structures, not for venture capitalists as individual people who are beautiful and wonder all of them. are just really wonderful people. It's it's just that the incentive structures lead to some real harm, I think, in certain cases. And the thing I find is when you do quit VCs, like I'm always just like, "Hey, let me know when you're starting your next day. I'm excited to invest." They're never they're rarely, unless they're not a great VC, rarely are they just pissed at you for like, "How could you possibly not make this work?" That's the thing like as a as a founder when it's time to throw in the towel on your business and you're so obsessed with giving money back to the cap table I always remind the entrepreneur like hey if you're in the seed investing game your forecast is zero your assumption on every investment is that it's going to go to zero. Any seed investor who doesn't take that stance is is off their rocker anyway. You know they're a very bad investor. Um, seek investors who play the long game, who want to be in your second and third company and are willing to take a bet on the first one and let it go to zero so that you can get on with stuff. I mean, this is like I've had that conversation many times.

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This begs the question of just when is it time to quit? You know, people hearing this might be like, oh man, like what are some signs that okay, it's time to it's time to wrap it up. Uh here, look, history provides us with a clear guide. When you look at companies having hit it big, they hit big pretty quick. It's very, very dangerous to be late to the party. It's very, very dangerous to be early to the party. And the vast majority of the time, that's the problem. You know, like rippling had it been started in 2014 would not be what it is today. I think Rippling had it been started today would not be what it is five years from now today. And so I think like timing is a lot and it's very hard to control for. But when you get the timing right and the market is real and the product works, product market fit, like I said earlier, it's it's super clear. And so if I were to pick a number out of a hat, just from my lived experience, I think it's very important. One one aside, don't ask people for advice. Ask people for relevant experience. If you ask them for advice, they will always give it. But if you ask them for relevant experience, they rarely have any to offer. And if they don't have any to offer, then don't ask for their advice. So ask people for relevant experience. And I try to do this, you know, with with my own entrepreneurs when I work with them. It's like, let me offer you whatever relevant experience I have. And my relevant experience on this topic of when to quit is like I think we could have called it after the second or third pivot which was somewhere around year four. It is all is of course very important to believe in what you're building and to be you know like to be persistent. Um, but there is definitely no shame in saying look we've pivoted once or twice it's not catching I got to go do the next thing. And I think like if you're year four, year five in your entrepreneurship journey and it's not just obviously a screaming rip roaring growth story, it's extraordinarily difficult. This is so extremely rare. So beyond even already the rare scores you're going to, you know, uh face uh from the outset that that that that that now is is going to convert to something crazy. So that's hard to hear, I guess, but man, it can be really liberating when you're like, "Fuck it. I'm going to do this. I have the energy. I'm going to do it again. I'm just going to do it with a clean sheet."

>> That is really helpful. You have this really fun way of describing product market fit around uh receptors and drugs.

>> Oh, yeah. Yeah. I think this is like a really fundamentally misunderstood dynamic. Um when I when when founders message me and they're like, "Hey, like like my LinkedIn post and my tweet for this launch." I do it. I retweet it. I like it. Whatever. Nobody follows me on Twitter anyways. Doesn't matter. Like I, you know, I do that and then um but I think to myself like this is not what this is about. Like this is not this is not how great companies are built. It can be a nucleating a nucleating event, but it's not a major thing because nobody cares about your company. Like your launch doesn't matter. Big fat pull the pull the slingshot back launches uh amount to the teeniest thimble of water in the ocean of noise about startups and companies. Um, and so you just got to build it brick by brick, bottom up. And and these launches don't really amount to much. And so you how do you think about that? Like how do you think about the insignificance of your launch? Or you think about all the effort you're putting into building a product that you believe is going to have product market fit. Well, if if you recognize that the market is immutable, no amount of tweeting, LinkedIn posting, advertising is going to change whether the market wants your product. It's not. It might raise awareness about your product, but it's not going to change whether somebody wants it. Then you take a different mindset. You have to view your startup as running an experiment in the universe to see what you get in return for that. And this analogy of like drug discovery and binding receptors is like nobody at Genentech thinks they can market their way to better performance inside your body. The binding receptors for that drug, they exist or they don't. And when they build their product, their goal is to find out whether the binding receptors exist. But fate already has decided the outcome. This is absolutely true of every software product you build. Fate has already decided the outcome. The market's either going to latch onto your product and run with it or it's not. Do not ship the product, find a lack of success, and then try to market your way through that because the binding receptors likely don't exist. And I I for me it was a very liberating mindset because now I just have to find the right drug and I can forget trying to convince the body to develop the binding receptors for whatever it is that I'm building.

>> What I love about your advice here is you were an early investor in notion which is one of the classic stories of it took them I think it was four years to get to something. I think they moved to Japan, they worked on the whole thing. And so is there a lesson from there? Like is that a rare example where it actually worked? And that's not an example to be inspired by because it's extremely extremely rare. Let's talk about Alpha Beta again. Okay. As an investor, you might build a checklist of things you want to make sure are true or false about a company and hope that that's going to yield the kind of like investment success you're looking for. Does it have this kind of founder? Does it have, you know, is it a CC corp in Delaware? like, you know, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. And these checklists are all about what? They're all about suppressing beta. They're about avoiding avoidable mistakes. They're about bringing stability. Jeff Lewis is an investor who has many angular views on things. And I think one of his most enduring phrases is narrative violations. This idea that like the common wisdom must be violated in some way by every company that has an outsized success. It is absolutely true. And when I give these general observations on the patterns in Silicon Valley, the most successful businesses inevitably violate something on that list in some really important way. And so Notion, you can't replicate Notion's success as an entrepreneur. You can't replicate it because you're not Ivan. You can't replicate it because you're not. You can't replicate it because it's not 2010 when they started the company. Do the math on that. Or 2011, actually. These guys stuck with it. They went through hell. They pivoted. They went to Japan and sat in kimonos and meditated on what they were going to build. And by hook/crook, they got to where they are today as a really wildly successful business in an extraordinarily difficult market where building businesses is virtually impossible in productivity. It is dominated by Google and Microsoft. Carving out your own niche in that market is just unthinkable. And so I look at notion as having succeeded by virtue of the narrative violation of persistence I don't think is a good idea for very many people that happened to work for them and I look at it as being a function of the founding team and their specific idiosyncrasies the the absolute insistence on craftsmanship from Ivan. This is him that's his thing. The takeaway lesson is not give up or don't give up. The takeaway lesson is certainly not go do what notion did. The takeaway lesson is that every company succeeds on the foundations of the idiosyncrasies of the founder. The idiosyncrasies of the founder. Ripling succeeds for almost the polar opposite reasons that notion succeeds. But in both cases, the companies succeed on the idiosyncrasies of the founder. And so embracing that, recognizing those idiosyncrasies, that's what great investors do. They spot that element of spikiness and greatness in a candidate investment and they convert that to a commitment and then of course the investor or the good ones accept what they get in exchange from that for the universe from the universe. I love that we went in this direction. I wasn't planning to talk about your investing career. Uh just to give people a reason to listen to this and maybe rewind and I want to ask another question around investing. What are some other companies you invested in early?

>> First of all, okay, so I I I sort of I hate the question like [laughter] what are [clears throat] some other companies you've invested in? It's a fair question, but the problem is like I'm going to give you a bunch of companies I've invested in that that won, you know, that are like really notable. So, what I would like to do instead of answering that question, so I'm going to give here let me let me give you some some like some bait. Like I I was one of the first investors in notion. I was perhaps the first I don't know ask Ivan um Clever, which you know had a great exit. Uh I was one of the first investors in Zenitz if you've heard of it. Um

>> Heard of it.

>> I um was before I joined one of the first investors in Rippling and then more recently like invested in um here's a funny one. I was one of the first investors in deal if you've heard of them. [laughter] Um

>> I you know I I was able to exit I was able to exit that position and then you know hopefully that company's going to zero with their criminal behavior but whatever. Um I was but more recently like you know if you' know um like Decagon which is doing some really cool stuff on the AI front

>> Killing it.

>> Um I mean Langchain like great. So those are some companies you maybe you've heard of but like how about like I invested in macro founder was Derek Lee. Macro's out of business. I invested in debrief Ned Roxson. It's it's out of business you know. I invested in verb data with David Herz out of business. I'm reading from a list. I invested in um what's the number? 70 companies according to this list where I track things and like most of them went to zero. And all those founders were awesome. All those founders were kickass and all those founders put a [ __ ] ton of energy into building their businesses and they went to zero. Um and they're enduring relationships. cuz I can call in any of those people I think maybe with the exception of deal and you know call in a favor and and and have and I've you know I've got a few subsequent actually a lot of them joined Ripling believe it or not so I don't know companies I've invested in is a long list and I love to give you names of companies that don't exist anymore because it's self-serving and a horrible survivorship bias to just list the good ones.

I love that answer. I think uh I think you're being modest in the context of your hit rate is clearly very high. Uh even one or two incredibly successful companies out of 70 is is a win in VC. And so uh you're doing very well. But I I think that's a really important perspective. When you see people's logos on their websites of all the companies they've invested in, you have no idea how many they've how many at bats they've had.

>> It's good practice to ask people to give you the full list.

>> Yeah. [laughter]

>> What are your favorite failures that you've invested in?

>> Oh, no. Oh, I'm not I'm not actually Okay.

>> Well, I was like, no, we don't spend time on it, but I think it's actually really a good question. Yeah. Like, what are some of your f your best failed investments?

>> Show me the logos of the companies that didn't work out.

>> It's a really it's a juicy question. Yeah.

>> There's a topic around this area that I wanted to spend time on and uh I haven't heard anyone uh think of things this way, which is this idea you talk about of compounding plus power law plus entropy and how that's a really useful frame to think about business. So you you you kick this conversation off sort of invoking the extraordinary outcomes demand extraordinary efforts line. Hat tip to Dan Gil. And these are part and parcel like man understanding the nature of the universe is a pretty good way to work within it. And so like power law distributions happen everywhere. It explains why so few people control so much wealth. It it explains why Steph Curry is just so vastly better than the next guy down on the list on the basketball team. It explains why populations are concentrated into a really relatively small number of mega cities in the world. It's like um power law distribution just plays out everywhere and like once you see it, you can't unsee it. It's it sort of plays out in many dynamics. People tend to think that like the world plays on a more linear relationship where the x and y axis are sort of you know y equals x but that is absolutely not the case and the implications are profound. It's like if you build something to 80 or 90% the y- axis is barely budged yet. You haven't like hit the inflection point in terms of reward. And so the implication of the power law more broadly is that people who are in the top 10% the top 5% don't just get 10 or you know 20% more reward they get 10x the reward or 100x the reward. It's really dramatic. Entropy the second law of thermodynamics is a very simple concept. It's the reason your sock drawer becomes messy. Um it's the reason that potholes form. It's the reason we have to put so much energy into maintaining the aircraft we fly to keep them safe because they really really really want to fall apart. And that's the nature of things. If you if you abandon a city for a few months, it starts to go, you know, and so entropy is just this concept that [ __ ] tends toward disorder. And the the universe, I mean, life itself is a temporary victory against entropy. You and I should not exist. The sun gives energy to the planet. it organizes stuff that we can eat and like we fight entropy until we lose the battle somewhere as I said earlier at the age of 70 or 80 um if we're lucky. What does this have to do with with product? Uh this is really about effort. The only antidote to entropy, the only antidote to decay in a system is energy. You got to inject energy. So if you have a codebase, every line of code that you add to that codebase increases the entropy of that system and demands ever more energy from human beings to go in and tend to it to make sure it doesn't break. And if you want to achieve greatness, if you want an extraordinary outcome, and in particular, if you want to be in the top 10%, top 5% on the x-axis so that the y-axis is through the roof, then you have to relentlessly inject energy at every single step of the game. Teams will sadly but because we are all human. Teams will always optimize for local comfort over company outcomes. Not because they get together and think we should do that although unions do do that unequivocally deliberately. But even in a collection of product managers or engineers what's going to happen over time is entropy is going to creep in and people are going to optimize for local comfort. Your job as an executive, as a leader, is to fight that entropy tooth and nail every single day. It means that every time you see a bug, every time you see a bug, not most of the time, every time you go and you drop it at the feet of the product manager or the engineering manager, every time in public preferably, it means that every time someone comes to you to hire someone and says that they have skipped the back channel, every time you're like, you can't hire this person unless you do the back channel. It means that when you get into the board and tired zone on any process that you as the executive have got to demand the 99th percentile of energy because otherwise entropy creeps in and the system decays. You have to do this. One of the messages that I delivered recently at our big executive big, like our top 75 manager off-site that we do roughly every 18 months, um, was a reminder that like if the if the purest form of ambition and the purest and most intense source of energy in the business is the founder CEO. that every next concentric circle of management beyond the founder CEO has the potential to be an order of magnitude drop off in intensity and that is [ __ ] dangerous because if you go to two layers and it's two orders of magnitude drop off in signal and intensity that is a very dysfunctional organization so what I said to the team was it's not that you need to buffer people from the intensity of the CEO it's that you need to absolutely mirror that intensity. There are plenty of constituents in the business around you who will advocate for relaxing. There is an infinite supply of people under you who will buffer other team members from the intensity of the demands. Your job is not to be one of those buffers. Your job is to preserve that intensity at its highest possible level and let the buffering happen somewhere else. And that's the point is that entropy creeps into the system insidiously and slowly over time off your radar and you have to maintain that intensity every minute of every day to try and fight it if you want to stay at the extreme right end of the power law that obviously governs the outcome of everything that we build.

What does that look like to pass along that intensity? Like what [clears throat] does that feel like? What does that look like? So, say Parker comes to you. This bug sucks. I got this a broken screen. You cut like you you cut off your finger. Maybe that's the example.

>> Okay. Still got them.

>> I got all 10.

>> I'll give you concrete examples. Um, actually the joke that I sort of played on this one when I presented to the to the team was that the next sort of slide in my presentation was with the sound effect the Slack huddle thing and Parker's icon in Slack is just he uses the generic yellow the egg.

>> Yeah. Wow.

>> Which, you know, it's like it's funny. And so everybody knows the yellow egg is like is Parker. And so the next slide in the presentation was boop boop boop boop boop boop boop boop which is the sound that Slack makes when someone calls you. And it was Parker Conrad is inviting you to a huddle. And then the next slide was Parker Conrad is modeling personal intensity. And the idea is like if you know you know like if you've ever been dragged into an like I want to talk about this [ __ ] problem right now and whatever you're doing unless it's an interview like I want you to come and have a conversation with me. That intensity is one place where it plays out. Every product team at Ripling and we have a lot of them now have public feedback channels. I am in there upside down on everything I find when I use those products and I just model for everybody. But this is how it's this is how at least I want to do it, which is I don't like this. I don't understand this. Tell me why this is this way. You know, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. And people jump in and respond. the factory inspection process that I mentioned, which is where at the end of the assembly line, I jump out with the pickle and we talk about all of the elements. You have to record a loom of every major flow through the product. I personally review every one of those flows. I got a backlog I got to catch up on today and and provide feedback to people always in a public channel so that every other product manager and engineering manager can jump in and see, you know, how the process has worked for other teams. It's about modeling the intensity publicly so that other people can say, "Okay, this is how we do things around here." And it gives the reaction the reaction from the team that received the message that that you have to you have to inject that energy every minute of every day and that there are no exceptions was not like that's exhausting. The reaction is h that is so invigorating. So in it's like so wonderful to hear that we're going to achieve these great outcomes or at least we have a shot at doing so and that you're empowering me to follow my instinct which is to really like push for the best result. Um the reaction universally is is like uh what a relief that I get to go be intense because nobody in a position of leadership wants to be chill, you know? And like what's worse than a chill boss? No, don't work for a chill boss. Don't be a chill boss. It's the most porative label I could give you. Chill boss or chill PM. Don't be chill. Chill doesn't accomplish [ __ ] Be intense. Be good. Be respectful. Be intense. Don't be chill. And again, this advice comes from where we started, which is this is what success looks like because somebody that is less chill than you is going to find that crack and come after your your market. Is that is that the gist?

>> Or sure. I mean, again, if you're chill and you move the X axis down 10 or 20 points, the Y-axis collapses. It doesn't just drop 10 or 20%. The Y-axis collapses. And this is just kind of true in everything we we do. Um, so yeah, if you want to win, you should probably should probably try. This is what I always say to people trying to build lifestyle businesses. There's always this idea, I'm going to build a side business. I'm going to make recurring income. It's going to be amazing. And I in my experience, anytime there's a market or something shows up that's juicy and there's ways to make money, somebody's going to come at you and work harder, raise more money, and there's only so long you can maintain that. Well, man, there's a whole other podcast episode on the concept of leverage.

>> If you sell your time, you've only got 24 hours a day to give. But if you can create a product that that scales, you know, the the the marginal cost of a unit of that product is zero like software, it's going to be competitive, man. Sell your time. It's not going to be super competitive, but like sell that you achieve that level of leverage and it's just going to there's it's a pretty efficient market to close out this uh threat of intensity and adding energy to everything. Something I've heard about you is you're big on uh escalating. You're a big fan of escalating issues and also you always tell people to never not give you negative feedback, to always share feedback, to not hide anything. Tell me about those two. Fundamentally, the most selfish thing you can do is withhold feedback from someone. Who are you optimizing for when you do that? What are you optimizing for when you think a thought that would help someone improve and you avoid giving it to them because it would make you uncomfortable? Well, you're optimizing for your own comfort. And it's fundamentally selfish. It's the most selfish thing you could possibly do is withhold feedback that would otherwise be useful to someone because you don't want to be uncomfortable. Well, that's not how high performance teams operate. So, I demand feedback and I give it. And doesn't mean that when I give feedback, it's not open to being questioned or discussed. I mean, of course, it is, but like when I observe something, I try to say it. That's the feedback topic. The the part of this that that has been interesting to me is that people withhold escalate the customers withhold. Customers don't want to escalate to me as an executive even like the the founders in whose businesses I've invested who use Rippling are reluctant to hit me up when something goes wrong because they don't want to bother me. But is literally my job literally my job to find things problems and make them better. And by virtue of making those specific things better to iterate on the processes so that the system that builds the system can get better. There's no greater gift to me as a product executive than receiving an escalation from a customer. We have an escalations team at Ripling, which sounds weird, but it's people who are just particularly skilled at pistol whipping other people in the company to get to real root causes. Real root causes. not like throw away the word root cause like oh we fixed the data error and shut the ticket down like no you went and you found the software that created the data error and then you found the system that created the software that created the data error and you solved all of that back to the to the to the top escalation seems like extremely good at that at rippling so we have sort of a dedicated little team that does this for us escalations are a gift and I and it's like if you're a listener right now on this podcast and you are a rippling customer and you have [ __ ] that you think we should know the fact that I might already know it is not a reason for you to withhold the gift of your feedback. So, it's an attitude that I take to this every day. I've got a little cue of some stuff that I've, you know, minor things that are um from the last couple of days from people who who had some nits and issues that I'm just like I've got them queued up on my to-do list today and I'm going to take them to the product teams directly like I'd like to understand what happened here. Not in a negative way. I just think we'll all get better if we study this one. And so, yeah, uh escalations are a gift. Feedback like that is a gift and nobody is ever inconveniencing me when they do it. For people that are listening to this and feeling like, man, this is so stressful and intense and just like I I don't know if I want to work this way. Give them a sense of just how successful Ripling is. I think a lot of people may not even heard have heard of Rippling. A lot of people are like, "Yeah, it's doing great." What are some things you can share that are public or not public that give people a sense of just how massive this business has become? People look at Ripley from the outside. I think they think of us as like payroll and HR or whatever which is cool like it's it's a bit like saying Microsoft is a desktop operating system company or you know it's like every every company starts from somewhere and grows out from there. Um we see ourselves as building the most successful business software platform in history. In fact that's the mission statement of our product organization under the umbrella of the mission statement of the company which is to free smart people to work on hard problems. And like when you translate that from where we are today data, where we think we're taking things, it's like we really do believe that like the the core of every workflow and everything that a company has to do, be it AI or manual traditional guey based software is like is who's doing stuff, who owns it, who's accountable. And so the people record is a really important component of that. You can argue that the customer record is also very important. And of course, some big businesses have been built on that primitive as well, but we think the people primitive is actually much more important. And the only thing that hasn't been done here is like somebody hasn't been ambitious enough to build a good business on top of that primitive. Workday is terrible software. Everybody agrees on that. I think Workday agrees on that. Good luck to them. But like they have failed actually despite their success to build a really broad general purpose software platform for business software on the foundation of the people primitive. So we're going to do that. And um we're successful because we deliver on that promise at the scale we're at today. like the fact that you can do and this is not this is not a sales pitch or sort of like an advertisement for rippling. I just think it's important to sort of contemplate that when you bring together a bunch of disparate business processes into one system on a common business data graph an object graph a data lake with a consistent interface you can do some pretty magical things. So we do payroll, we do HCM, we do it, we do spend, we are about to launch a new product in the category of business intelligence and data management and there's a whole bunch of other stuff coming beyond that. And then then you layer in AI on top of this where we alone where we alone have all of your business data organized into this nice neat package with a beautiful semantic layer on top of it. the AI can work magic and we have shipped nothing nothing yet in this category that I would say gets anywhere near what we're going to show next year and it is going to set the standard. It is going to be the most like the back flips that the AI is doing reading and writing data for the user just on our internal use cases at Ripling is jaw-dropping. So I'm super excited about the tailwind this is going to create for us. you ask about like sort of what can I share about the success of the company what I can say there are tens of thousands of companies that now run on rippling we're less than 1% of the market and so the you know and like the market cap at 16 billion I think now undervalues where we are from a revenue perspective by a long shot um there there is just so much upside to to do what we're doing SAS might be deadish in terms of point solutions but long live SAS in terms of what we're building let me follow that thread and and AI I there's been a lot of talk about AI is going to replace SAS [laughter] as you maybe just said.

>> Yeah. People are going to vibe code their way to their payroll system which I you know good luck to the employees of those companies.

>> And so what I'm hearing here is the the that you actually do believe a lot of SAS companies that are selling individual solutions are in big trouble. The answer is implied here is this kind of compound startup idea of you need to do a lot of things for people for them to continue to pay for your software. Is that is that the gist?

>> No, I think the gist is is a really good quote. I forget who it's attributable to, but it's uh you know, there's two ways to make money in software. Bundling and unbundling. And um you just got to get the timing right. So, this is a this is a period of bundling. Point. So, here's the problem. Point solutions don't have enough data in the age of AI to be useful. You got to be able to provide the AI with a lot of context about a lot of data so it can do things. It can do joins. it can do correlations. And so if you're a point solution, you're in you're in hard you're in hard water because you've got to now rely on data from other sources. You've got to integrate to third party systems. And when you integrate to a third party system, even the best ones are still sort of drinking their data through a straw, which is a real problem. I mean I you know there are the the biggest HCM software company you can think of integrates to the other biggest payroll software company you can think of through flat files via ST SFTP [snorts]

>> Like what are they going to do? What are they going to do? It's just never going to work. It's just no way. And so I like literally have no idea what they're going to do. They're just not going to build AI software. I guess like point SAS is is sort of in a in a rough sol in a rough spot especially when you cleave two really important systems apart and say they have to integrate it's very very hard. The other thing that I would say about the world of even just like not SAS but AI software is that point solutions in the AI world are also in a rough spot for the same reason. It's like if you're selling the shovels like OpenAI and and Google with Gemini, you can make money. And if you own the mine like Rippling with the data, you can make money. If you're somewhere in the middle building SA, sorry, building AI software that then tries to use the shovels from the shovel provider, but then also needs to rent out the mine or get the ore out of somebody else's mine and start refining it. like you are in you're in a very difficult place from an economic standpoint because you're not going to be permitted by either of those parties to build a big business on their backs. That's just not how it's going to work. They're going to demand value capture that crushes your unit economics. So I look at the the like landscape of AI companies that I've seen and I think you have to have a really durable interesting insight that gives you a shot at viable unit economics to be an interesting business and that is going to kill off 80 or 90% of the stuff that I I see right now as standalone AI businesses.

So what I'm hearing here I love that you correct me when I get these things wrong and that's exactly what I want. Uh, what I'm hearing is it's less about how difficult it is to build the SAS product. It's about do you have first-party data that allows you to build an incredible AI product on top of what you've got.

>> Yep. Because look, SAS software is a bit flipping SAS all SAS software applications are bit flippers. Like it's a it's an interface changing Yeah. changing values in a database. What it does,

>> It's really hard pro like Rippling. One of Rippling's superpowers is we're a coin sorter. You dump like you know $20,000 for an employee in the top of the coin sorder and it figures out what goes to the government, what goes to health insurance, what goes to your 401k, what goes to you and it has to move all that money very very reliably and seamlessly. Very challenging software to build and manage what's it doing even that is just flipping bits in a database. And so AI is a new way to flip bits. AI is just a new way to flip. Hopefully a way that like abstracts us a little bit further from having to think because our future is Wall-E. It's gonna be great. Uh, speaking of Wall-E, actually, I I have this Madic robot. You have one of these?

>> Uh, it's a it's like a it's a like a human. It's like a self-driving car robot. Basically, self-driving car people build this robot that cleans your your house. It's maybe I didn't mention that. It's like a a house cleaning robot that just like goes around. It's like a Roomba.

>> You should get one. They're they're expensive but incredibly cool. And actually in Wall-E, if there's a scene where they actually have what basically what these things look like. So it's not so it's not so far.

>> That movie was actually quite preient perhaps with the exception of the gravity defying day beds. [laughter]

>> Yeah. I don't know. But that's not good news. You've seen that movie.

>> Oh man. So on this AI stuff, which is which I'm hearing is you're probably we're going to see a lot more consolidation where these point solution companies realize they need this data. This is existential and they're going to combine and merge and

正如你所描述的捆绑包。

这有可能。我不是这方面的调查员。我认为有一些非常有趣的投资者，他们对此思考得相当深入，特别是，呃，比如我所坚信的，像迈克·弗纳尔和莎拉·瓜。

我认为那两位投资者对人工智能极度专注，当他们决定采取那种方法时，我当时觉得那有点狭隘。呃，现在我感觉不不不不，那是正确的举动，而且他们，这只是意味着他们对，他们有一套非常非常深入的假设，这些假设是他们在看到了硅谷的每一笔人工智能交易后形成的。而且，你知道，有比我更适合回答这个问题的人，而且，呃，我认为如果你是一名创业者，我向你推荐他们，因为我觉得他们非常聪明。太棒了。我喜欢，我喜欢那些人。莎拉和还有一档播客叫《无先验》，我也推荐。我们会在节目笔记中指出并查看。

所以，关于人工智能这一点，我想，对于在这个领域工作、正在建立人工智能初创公司的创始人来说，你认为还有什么会非常有帮助的吗？他们认为你看到的，比如，你需要如何做，你需要做什么才能在一家人工智能公司中获胜？

[笑声]

所以，我实际上认为，如果我现在要给你这个问题的答案，那会是[难以启齿]。

是的。回到我之前说的观点。我没有，我没有足够的抽象相关经验，无法在播客上就这个话题大谈特谈。但是，你知道，我祝他们好运。

我喜欢你回到你的建议，不要寻求建议，而是寻求相关经验。我喜欢你的想法立刻就转向了那里。我将带我们进入“人工智能季度”，这是本播客的一个常设环节。问题是，你发现人工智能在你的日常工作中有什么用处？你发现它在哪些方面有所突破？

我的意思是，这不是一个超级令人兴奋的事情，但我想说我使用它的地方，我作为一名高管最重要的职能之一是思想的综合以及将这些思想非常清晰地传达给他人的能力。所以，当我谈到像产品质量清单和“泡菜”这样我们内部想出的东西时，我确实会求助于，嗯，人工智能聊天机器人ChatGPT和Gemini。在那里，我采取一种，嗯，可以说是一个主题的“尖锐”观点，然后我真的为人工智能写一篇短文，我就会说：“看，这是我想要传达的清晰想法，帮我想出一些巧妙的方式来表达这些事情。”它输出的80%都是垃圾。它就像是那种平庸的、低质量的垃圾，但它是一个思想伙伴，一个不带偏见、不加评判的思想伙伴。它输出的20%的东西，我会觉得：“这相当不错。”那是一个我没想到的新词，它确实击中了这个概念的要害。所以，如果我相信我的工作是引导人们踏上我试图带来的某种变革之旅，那么最重要的工具就是语言。我确实发现ChatGPT和Gemini在帮助我完善如何表达我想要表达的概念方面做得非常出色。它们在提出想法本身方面并没有用。

那真是个很棒的建议。我不知道你是否经常使用Claude，但我实际上发现Claude在写作、用词和语言方面更出色。

我没有花很多时间在Claude上。我确实用过它。嗯，但由于这次谈话，我可能会去试试它。

就是这样。它们都很棒，但是，呃，Claude在写作方面特别出色。嗯，但它们都在不断进步。总是有，总是有，呃，新的东西。

马特，我们已经谈了很多了。我们触及了我希望触及的所有内容。在我们进入非常激动人心的闪电问答环节之前，你还有什么希望分享的吗？还有什么你想谈谈或者留给听众的吗？我们花了很多时间谈论强度、磨砺以及始终保持在99%的顶尖水平的需求。而且，嗯，我认为如果你孤立地听这些，很容易相信那种强度是令人心力交瘁的，它是负面的，嗯，也许不是你想要的东西。我认为对我来说有一个我今天没有谈到的后盾，我认为分享它很重要，那就是生活是美好的。就像我们都存在于这个漂浮在时空中的蓝色弹珠上，我们每个人都是某种奇特的意识具象。而且你在这里的时间如此短暂，削着你的木棍，做着一些事情，如果你记住我们是多么微不足道，所有这一切是多么微不足道，它就会给我们的所作所为以及我们为建设这一切所付出的努力带来这种轻松感，因为这就像，就像2025年的硅谷就是文艺复兴时期的佛罗伦萨。这太疯狂了。就像现在这个地方为我们物种发生的创造力、疯狂的发明和进步的数量，在整个人类历史上是绝对无与伦比的。你必须放眼全局，欣赏那种魔力。然后你转过身来，你会说：“靠，我周五晚上还得工作，对吧？我必须全力以赴。我必须去商业竞技场竞争。”你必须，你永远，你永远不能忘记第一，所有这一切都无关紧要；第二，我们现在能够活着做这些事情，这是一个绝对美丽而惊人的现象。所以，就像玩这项运动一样，尽你所能去玩，但永远不要忘记这只是一项运动，所有这一切都无关紧要，这作为我们所谈论的强度的对立面，是极其重要的。

那真是太美了。我想起了卡尔·萨根的《暗淡蓝点》，整个事情。

那张令人惊叹的照片，当我看到它时，它确实改变了我对自己作为一个人身份的看法。是的。

好吧，马特，我们朝着一个完全不同的方向前进，我们进入了非常激动人心的闪电问答环节。我们为你准备了五个问题。你准备好了吗？

好的，我们开始吧。你最常向其他人推荐的两三本书是什么？

呃，好的。两三本书。你，你提前告诉过我这个。所以，其中一本书是《自觉商业》。我手边没有《自觉商业》，因为它实际上在办公室里，因为我们在Rippling有一个自觉商业读书俱乐部，我目前的产品领导团队的每个成员都在读这本书。弗雷德·考夫曼的《自觉商业》已经被许多企业使用，其中领英最为著名，它是一个思考框架，实际上是人类的用户手册。所以，如果你是一名领导者、经理、高管，无论是什么，特别是年轻的，比如二三十岁的人，他们刚刚开始适应作为CEO或产品领导者的角色，这本书绝对是无价之宝。它是由红杉资本的布莱恩·施赖尔在我上一家公司担任董事时推荐给我的。我花了太长时间才采纳他的建议。真希望我早点读它。强烈推荐《自觉商业》。它会改变你的生活。

第二本是《思考与系统》。唐娜·梅多斯，我总是读错她的名字。多内拉·梅多斯。她在写这本手稿的过程中去世了。她的同事教授们接手并为她完成了它。它是思考系统如何运作的最佳通用框架。读完这本书后，你会将它推广到你生活的方方面面。

嗯，然后第三本是经典的1960年代的《卓有成效的管理者》。它有点时代错误。它对秘书和高管使用了奇怪的代词。我让你猜是哪些，但这本书本身充满了关于如何有效领导团队的简单而持久的建议。而且，呃，好的东西是那些已经出版了70年的东西，这就是其中之一。

太棒了。我喜欢第一本书，你没有它是因为你一直在和你的团队一起使用它。你提到过一次，呃，在我们开始录音之前，你有大约八本那本书，你只是分发给每个人。

是的。我们像发糖果一样分发它。

好的。你最近有没有特别喜欢的一部电影或电视剧？

嗯，是的。所以，我对这个答案有点不好意思，但我会诚实地说，请。嗯，有一部新剧叫《激烈竞争》，它是关于，我是加拿大人，我是同性恋。所以，它是关于两名冰球运动员，嗯，在加拿大，波士顿棕熊队和多伦多枫叶队之间的对手，尽管他们没有使用这些名字，他们在冰上是激烈的对手，这是全世界都在关注的大事，但实际上他们秘密地相爱了，并开始交往。媒体将其标记为“淫秽但令人愉悦”。而且，呃，我认为这很准确。所以它可能不适合所有人，但它现在是一个热门。它在HBO Max和Crave上播出，只有六集，但是，呃，就像我说的，有点不好意思，因为它非常，呃，它有点俗气，但它很有趣。看到媒体中同性恋者被描绘成正常人也真的很有趣。

如果收购成功，很快就会在Netflix上播出。哦，这太疯狂了。

太棒了。好的。你最近有没有发现什么你真正喜欢的产品？我的Fellow咖啡机。

我喜欢我的Fellow咖啡机。它有一个界面，可以让你设置浅烘、中烘、深烘。它会改变温度。它会让咖啡“绽放”。它会告诉你应该在滤篮里放多少克咖啡。嗯，光滑的界面，高品质的咖啡。它，它绝对很棒。所以我实际上在办公室里有一个，家里有一个，车库里还有一个。

哇。那真是你最喜欢的产品。你在同一个地方有三个。

哦，不。在办公室里。好的。Fellow也是Rippling的客户，那就像一个很好的副作用，当我们能接触到。

他们有没有向你反映过什么问题？没有。如果你正在听，而且你来自Fellow，我想听听你所有的抱怨。

完美。还有两个问题。

你有没有一句你经常在工作或生活中回味的人生格言？

这是一个有点黑暗的格言，我分享它，呃，部分是为了它的幽默感，但它实际上有时至少能立即派上用场。它发生时，会让人会心一笑。这个格言来自我爸爸，他说：“马特，生活中没有什么事情会糟糕到不能更糟。”就像我们昨天在工作中遇到了一些麻烦，我们当时想：“靠，现在又发生了这事。”我看着首席技术官，我说：“老兄，没有什么事情会糟糕到不能更糟。”我们大笑了一场，然后继续为接下来可能发生的一切做准备。所以，它不完全是振奋人心的，但很有趣。

不，它确实是振奋人心的。我是一个乐观主义者，我发现自己经常和妻子这样想，就像“情况可能会更糟。可能会比这更糟。”

确实有用。

而且它可能会变得更糟。

[笑声]

所以让我们享受这个没那么糟糕的版本吧。

呃，最后一个问题，你和我分享过，你年轻的时候是一名DJ。呃，你能给我们来一点，呃，DJ的DJ嗓音，让大家感受一下吗？

所以首先，我们，它不是DJ莱尼。它是电台主持人。

是的，我以前做过“史上最热门歌曲”，有60年代、70年代、80年代的歌曲，还有一点90年代的。1015，老鹰电台。是的，这个，你可以打开它。它非常不真实，但在电台里听起来不错。呃，这很酷。我在高中时做的。我最终在，呃，上大学之前做了午间，呃，午间节目。那真是个礼物。在我最重要的成长岁月里，能够自在地站在麦克风前，这真是个巨大的礼物，你知道，因为我们现在就在这里。

我喜欢那些没有看YouTube的人，你真的会把头凑近麦克风，发出那种，呃，电台主持人的声音。

是的，你得能听到嘴里的唾液声。

[笑声]

不可思议。就像同一个人在说话。如果你没看这个，你会想：“那家伙是从哪儿冒出来的？”呃，那太棒了。你做到了，马特。呃，这太不可思议了。我真的很感谢你来到这里。我真的很感谢你分享了所有这些我没有听过其他人分享的建议。

最后两个问题。你有什么想推荐给人们的吗？听众如何能帮助你？

看，我的生活就是Rippling。我把人们引向那里。这就是我毕生的事业。它会，呃，它会非常成功。所以请继续关注。而且，嗯，你们能帮助我的方式是，如果你是客户，你必须告诉我你有什么问题，因为那样我们才能变得更好。

他们怎么联系你？你有没有想让人们去的地方？

在Twitter上私信我，我的用户名是easy9。你可以给我发邮件，我的姓氏@rippling.com。嗯，而且，呃，我就说到这里，不给出我的电话号码了。怎么样？

完美。

完美的界限。

是的。

马特，非常感谢你来到这里。

这是我的荣幸。谢谢你邀请我，莱尼。而且，呃，祝贺你的播客取得的所有成功。它一直都很棒。

你也一样。在谈话结束时，这总是一个好兆头。我们就像：“哦，我得买点那只股票，我得进入那个Rippling。”呃，所以。

这是一个值得推荐的好买卖。我，是的，但你，你知道，很难接触到。

[笑声]

好的，伙计。非常感谢。

谢谢。

非常感谢您的收听。如果您觉得这有价值，您可以在Apple Podcasts、Spotify或您最喜欢的播客应用上订阅本节目。另外，请考虑给我们评分或留下评论，因为那真的[音乐]有助于其他听众找到本播客。您可以在lennispodcast.com找到所有过往节目或了解更多关于本节目的信息。下期节目再见。