Transcription
I think that there is no question that China is interested in dominating East Asia. It's interested in becoming a regional hegemion. And I think it made good sense for the United States to give Taiwan 11.1 billion dollars in military aid. And I also think it made good sense for the Japanese prime minister said to say, uh, in effect, that Japan would come to the defense of Taiwan.
If Australia follows John's advice and says that it will stand up and defend Taiwan, it is committing geopolitical suicide. And you want to remember, Keshore, that the United States, it's not as powerful in relative terms as it once was, is still a remarkably powerful country, and it's armed with nuclear weapons. And that is a country, the United States, that is bent on containing China. And you never want to bet against the United States. Believe me, you know, in the scenario that John mentioned earlier of a war breaking out, let's say between the US and China, the United States would suddenly find that all kinds of spare parts that it needs for all kinds of things, you know, all kinds of machines, aircraft, and so on and so forth, you'll suddenly hit a critical shortage.
Fore speech. This is the, the Economist magazine, just in the last week. They say this shows that the administration is ready to sacrifice some of its technological edge over China in exchange for goodwill. So, is this a sign that America is buckling to China, John?
Well, the fact is that Trump got into a trade war with the Chinese, as I emphasized before, and he thought that he held the upper hand. And it turned out that he did not have the upper hand, and he's been forced to make compromises. And this is one of the compromises that he's been forced to make. The Chinese have been playing hardball with them. They started on April 4th when they made it clear that they were going to curtail the flow of rare earths, and especially rare earth magnets, into the United States. And then on October 2nd, the Chinese explicitly upped the ante. And, uh, this was a huge problem for the Trump administration. And furthermore, as you know, Trump depends heavily on support from farmers. And the Chinese said they were going to stop importing American soybeans, and this was a huge problem. So what's happening here is that Trump, on the trade front, uh, is being forced to make certain concessions. And with regard to the H200, uh, chip that, uh, he's now agreed to sell to, uh, China, you see evidence of the extent to which he's been forced to back off.
And by the way, I'll give you another example that I think is an important one. It's where he didn't really stand up and back the Japanese prime minister when she said on, uh, November 7th, that if the Chinese were to attack Taiwan, that would be seen by Japan as a threat to its survival, or it might be seen by Japan as a threat to its survival. You would have thought that the Trump administration would have immediately backed her, but they did not. But that doesn't disguise the fact, Keshaw, that many states in the region, I'm not just thinking of Japan that John just mentioned or Taiwan, but also Australia, uh, India, the Philippines, they want the United States heavily engaged in the region to deter China because they're increasingly anxious about China.
Uh, are we downplaying the China threat here, Keshaw?
Well, uh, I, by the way, you're absolutely right in your first statement that countries in the region want to see the United States stay engaged in the region. You're right. Uh, not just for the reason, uh, you mentioned of, uh, deterring China, but also there are many countries in the region that have had very, very long-standing, uh, relationships, uh, with the United States. And as you know, in, in Southeast Asia and the ASEAN region, there are huge reservoirs of goodwill towards the United States. But that said, I would say the story is much more complicated than the one you present. That, uh, the countries in the region who are looking for the United States as an insurance against China. And the reason, uh, and the reason why this, the story is much more complicated than the way you portray it, is that there are over 50 states in Asia, and you mentioned five, and you're right, you actually, you mentioned four states and one, uh, Taiwan. Uh, so, uh, if you look overall, there's no question that China's relations with the majority of states in Asia is on a very positive track. And, and all you have to do is look at the statements that are coming out from Indonesia, from Malaysia, from Thailand, uh, from Bangladesh, you know, you can get a sense of how states around the region are coming to terms with the fact that China is emerging as a new great power. And by the way, you know, this is 2,000 years of history.
Yeah. When a great power emerges in your neighborhood, okay, the wisest thing you have to do is to adjust to the fact that the new great power has arrived in your neighborhood. And, and, and this is where, frankly, the, the pragmatism of the Asian states overall, uh, is a big asset. We're not, we're not choosing sides. We're not saying we're going to be with the United States against China. We're not saying we're going to be with China against the United States. He said, no, we're going to be friends with both of you, and we're going to live, uh, with both of you. And that, that I think is the dominant strain. Now, if you, when you mention the specific cases, I frankly think that it was a huge mistake for the Japanese prime minister to make a pronouncement about Taiwan because at the end of the day, the Chinese, one of the things that China wants to do is to remove all traces of the century of humiliation. And one of the lowest points of the century of humiliation was when Japan seized Taiwan from China after losing the, after winning the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. So that being, that being such a sore point in the China-Japan relations, it was an absolute mistake for the Japanese prime minister to say things in the way that she did. So. And, and, and, and by the way, uh, John is right. President Trump didn't support Japan, uh, when she made that statement.
So, so I would emphasize to you, the key point is, don't push things into a binary black and white choice. The story is very complex, and countries have very complex relationships with China and with the United States.
Yeah. Well, well, John, Keshaw says that China's rise and the region's reaction to its rise is more complicated than what I portrayed. Now, during the last 25 years, you've really distinguished yourself, John, by warning that western engagement with China has just made China more prosperous and more powerful. Uh, we have, in your language, just been feeding the beast. And you also say that structure is largely determinative, that there's little we can do to change the situation, which means we're con, we're consigned to waging an intense security competition with China that can be best managed on the margins to prevent disaster. That's your argument. How would you respond to Keshaw Marbani's response?
Well, I think that there is no question that China is interested in dominating East Asia. It's interested in becoming a regional hegemion. And I think it made good sense for the United States to give Taiwan 11.1 billion dollars in military aid. And I also think it made good sense for the Japanese prime minister said to say, uh, in effect, that Japan would come to the defense of Taiwan. Uh, if you're interested in containing China and preventing China from becoming a regional hegemion, which most states in East Asia are interested in doing, and the United States is certainly interested in doing, you have to create a balancing coalition, and you have to have a clear deterrence policy. And the Chinese are determined to capture Taiwan. And I studied the issue quite carefully, and I believe that if Japan and the United States, and even Australia, but Japan and the United States mainly, come to the defense of Taiwan, I think that the Chinese cannot capture Taiwan, and they will therefore not attempt to capture Taiwan, and you will avoid war. So, I think it makes good sense for the United States, and for Japan, and even for Australia, to make it clear to the Chinese, not in a provocative way, but in a clear and concise way, that they will come to the defense of Taiwan should China try to conquer it, because I think that facilitates deterrence, and I'm deeply interested in making sure that we avoid war in East Asia.
Deterrence works. Keshaw Mabani?
Well, I would say, if you want me to be very blunt, uh, if Australia follows John's advice and says that it will stand up and defend Taiwan, it is committing geopolitical suicide. Because at the end of the day, geography matters. Geopolitics is a combination of two words, geography and politics. And remember, with western power will receive more and more from Asia. Australia, as I've said before, will be left as the lonely western outpost in Asia, and is therefore in Australia's interests to see how the other Asian countries are handling China's rise, and also handling the sensitive Taiwan question. This doesn't mean they're saying that Taiwan should be handed back to China immediately. No. But they're also saying that the Taiwan issue has got to be handled very carefully, very delicately, to avoid any kind of war over the region. And remember, at the end of the day, the United States has clearly since World War II ensured that it never got into a direct military conflict against another nuclear power. You use proxies. Fair enough. But you never engage yourself directly in a war against the Soviet Union, for example. So, therefore, the, the, the, in the question of Taiwan, what the Asian countries are doing is that they understand the sensitivity of the issue, and therefore they're managing it very carefully and very delicately. And I would say it's in Australia's best interest to watch what ASEAN is doing and see what Australia can learn from ASEAN, rather than say, okay, we will join the United States and attack.
But, but John, unlike Keshaw, obviously you support a containment policy towards China, but you opposed containment of Russia. What's the difference? Or let me put things this way. Uh, China and Russia are rival great powers of the United States, and you, in your, much, much of your scholarship over the last four to five decades, you have argued that great powers will go to great lengths to defend their vital strategic interests in their spheres of influence. So the question here is, if Russia, as you've argued, will play hardball to ensure that Ukraine is not a western bulwark on its borders, shouldn't China, by your logic, a rising great power, also go to great lengths to protect its sphere of influence, whether it's the Taiwan Straits, the East and South China Seas? Um, or as your mother used to say, John, what's good for the goose is good for the gander. John, what's good for the goose is good for the gander.
But let me explain. First of all, the reason that China is a serious threat to the United States, and Russia is not, is because China is a threat to dominate all of East Asia. It is a threat to become a regional hegemion, and the United States does not tolerate regional hegemions. There were four potential regional hegemions in the, uh, 20th century: Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the United States. We played a key role in putting all four of those countries on the scrap heap of history. We do not tolerate regional hegemions. That means we will contain China. Russia is not even a threat to conquer all of Ukraine, much less dominate all of Europe. It is not a potential regional hegemion. In fact, we should have good relations with Russia. Russia should be an ally of ours in trying to contain China. The fact that it isn't is a remnant of this foolish war in Ukraine. Now, my second point is regarding what's good for the goose is good for the gander. As you know well, Tom, we have a Monroe Doctrine, and the Monroe Doctrine basically says that the Western Hemisphere is our sphere of influence, and no great...
1920s. 1823. And the basic precept of the Monroe Doctrine is that no distant great power is allowed to put military forces in the Western Hemisphere or form a military alliance with a state in the Western Hemisphere. Now, of course, the Chinese prefer to have a Monroe Doctrine of their own. They do not want the United States on their doorstep. They do not want the United States in their face. And I don't blame them one bit. As I have said on numerous occasions, if I was the national security advisor to Xi Jinping, I'd tell them we have to do everything we can to push the Americans beyond the first island. If Donald Trump was pushing them beyond the second island chain, cut them some slack. Why not cut the Chinese some slack? That's what Donald Trump would say to you, Tom. If you're a great power and you're faced with a potential regional hegemion, you don't talk about cutting them slack. At least in the realist world that I operate in, you go to great lengths to contain them. And that's what we should be doing. And that's what we are doing. As the national security document that just came out made clear, containment of China is imperative for the United States. It's imperative for Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia as well.
Well, Keshaw, I mean, what's your view here about great powers exercising a sphere of influence in their near abroad? Because many western commentators, whether they're neoconservatives or liberal interventionists, say that this is a fetish from the 19th century. But with respect to China, they, some commentators, not unreasonably, would complain about China threatening, uh, sovereign states in its hemisphere. You know, uh, remember the Hague ruling in 2016. And of course, that's not to mention China's bullying of Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines. This causes great angst. So what's your view about great powers and spheres of influence, Keshaw?
Well, I would say be careful about using analogies from the 20th century in the 21st century. So yes, the United States buried Imperial Germany, the United States buried Imperial Japan, but the whole logic of history and the way in which countries dealt with each other was very, very different. That was a, a much more, I would call it an imperialistic world. And remember that until about the middle of the 20th century, uh, most of the world was colonized by the West, right? Remember how 100,000 Englishmen could rule over 300 million Indians effortlessly, exactly 100 years ago, 1925? So you can see, therefore, that that was the tenor and chemistry of history in the early 20th century. But this is the 21st century, and countries are much more interdependent in deeper ways than they have ever been. And clearly, China has anticipated this containment strategy that John, uh, mentioned. And it has carried out a preemptive strike against any such containment strategy by making sure that most countries in the world trade more with China than they do with the United States of America. And remember that one of the things that gave the United States such amazing power at the end of World War II is that it had about 50% of the world's GMP at the time. And I suspect John can probably has the data, 60 to 70% of manufacturing capacity of the world at the end of World War II. I suspect that was the United States' position in the world. Now, I want to remind you that in, in the 21st century, when it opened, in the year 2000, China's share of global manufacturing capacity was 5%. Now it is already reaching 30%, and by 2030, it's going to hit 45%. Now, this has made China an indispensable supplier of products to every country in the world. And believe me, you know, in the scenario that John mentioned earlier of a war breaking out, let's say between the US and China, the United States would suddenly find that all kinds of spare parts that it needs for all kinds of things, you know, all kinds of machines, aircraft, and so on and so forth, you'll suddenly hit a critical shortage. So therefore, in this interdependent world, to talk of using 20th century analogies of containment and so on and so forth will not work in the 21st century. And, and, and I can also tell you that that for the vast majority of countries in the world are much more autonomous actors in the 21st century than they were in the 20th century. And therefore, they themselves are not going to join any kind of games that easily in the way that you did in the Cold War, for example. And remember, in the Cold War, the United States had allies not just in Western Europe, not just in, not just in Japan or or South Korea, it also had Indonesia, you had Pakistan, you had Egypt, it had Zia. Now, those days are gone. That kind of lining up to join a containment policy is not going to happen.
Okay. So therefore, I would say, deal with the 21st century and the interdependent world we're living in, because that's, that's, that's the reality for most states in the world.
So John, Keshaw's line is that these countries in the region have a lot of economic intercourse with China. We all know that they're becoming more autonomous. To the extent that China's rise continues, that's going to make it very difficult for the United States to form a coalition of balancing states against China. Isn't it, John?
No, because the more powerful China gets, the more other countries fear it, and the more interested they are in balancing with the United States against China. First of all, the Chinese think much more the way I think than Keshore thinks. The Chinese believe in balance of power politics. They're realists to the core. As he pointed out before, they suffered the century of national humiliation that taught them that you don't want to be weak. The Chinese also fully recognize that the United States is one of the most ruthless great powers in recorded history, and they want to do everything they can to make sure that the balance of power favors them and not the United States. They're realists, and they understand, uh, that the best thing they can do is to achieve regional hegemony in East Asia, which means driving the Americans out beyond the first island chain and the second island chain. They want their Monroe Doctrine. They should have a Monroe Doctrine from their own point of view. But you want to remember that the United States doesn't want them to dominate Asia, and most countries in East Asia don't want them to dominate, uh, East Asia. So it will not be that difficult for the United States to put together a balancing coalition. And you want to remember, Keshore, that the United States, it's not as powerful in relative terms as it once was, is still a remarkably powerful country, and it's armed with nuclear weapons. And that is a country, the United States, that is bent on containing China. And you never want to bet against the United States.
Well, in Keshaw, in 2020, you wrote a book called Has China Won? And at the time of the launch, the three of us, you, me, and John, uh, we had a lively exchange on YouTube and that attracted nearly 700,000 views. Six years later, what do you think now, given everything that John just said there, is China's path to victory looking looking more likely?
Well, there's no question that since I wrote the book, Has China Won?, in relative terms, China's position has become much stronger, not just economically, but as I mentioned, in terms of its manufacturing, uh, capacity in the world. And also, frankly, as you know, uh, the allies of the United States are questioning their relations with the United States. I mean, this is, this is, this is not me saying anything new. I mean, look, look, look at how terrified, uh, Europe is today. And if you look, for example, another country, take India, for example, you know, for 27 years, the United States has been courting India since Bill Clinton's famous visit to India, you know, discovery of India trip, and then you had, uh, George W. Bush courting India. You had Barack Obama courting India. But you can see how all this courtship of India has come to a halt over the last few months. And I'm sure the Indians are asking themselves this simple question: Isn't it better for India to be an independent, autonomous player in this new geopolitical game rather than to be an ally of the United States or an enemy of China? Why not be an independent force on this stage? And, and, and so therefore, the geopolitical picture of the world is, I, I want to emphasize this point, is very complicated because countries are recalculating their national interest very carefully. And the sort of coalition that John is speaking about of, of a kind of a global or even a regional coalition against China isn't going to emerge.
Shana, well, I think, uh, when you talk about who won, uh, there's no way you can give an answer to that question at this point in time. What you have taking place here is a security competition between two great powers, between the United States and China. And neither side has won. There's no question that China has gotten increasingly powerful to be seen since the early 1990s. And it may even get more powerful relative to the United States over the next decade. But that certainly doesn't mean that China has won. With regard to India, I think there's no question that the Trump administration has blown it. Right? We had worked for about 27 years, as Keshore said, to greatly improve relations with India. And when Trump first took over, Modi was one of the first people to come visit him in the White House. And it looked like we were going to continue to have good relations. And as both of you know, it was in our strategic interest, America's strategic interest, to have good relations with India. And then, in large part because of the Ukraine war, Trump turned on the Indians. And he has, in good part, poisoned relations with India, which is not in America's strategic interest. But this is just another example of how Trump has mishandled American foreign policy. But this doesn't mean that we're not going to try to contain, uh, China. And it does also not mean that we will not work with India more and more over time, once we get the Ukraine war behind us, because it's in our strategic interest, and it's also in India's strategic interest to work with us, because China is a threat to India, despite what Keshaw thinks. Fore speech. Fore speech. Forech. Fore is forch. Fore! Fore!chch! Fore speech.