Transcription
What if the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is not Iran's final act? But the opening move in a much larger strategy. What if the missiles, the attacks on Gulf states, and the renewed American bombing campaign are not separate events, but pieces of one carefully developing end game? And what if Washington's greatest mistake is believing that military superiority automatically produces political control?
Today, we are not simply asking whether the United States and Iran are at war again. We are asking a more dangerous question. What comes next? And who benefits from the chaos that may follow? I am Professor Jiang Xueqin, and in this video, I will explain why the latest escalation around Iran, the Gulf states, and the Strait of Hormuz could reshape the Middle East, global energy markets, and American politics. More importantly, I will make a prediction based on the structure of events unfolding today.
The headlines are showing us explosions, but the real story is about leverage. The real story is about who controls escalation. And the real story may not end where Washington expects.
According to the reports we are examining, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed after another round of American strikes. While Iranian forces claimed attacks on United States-linked military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman, the United States, meanwhile, said it had struck hundreds of Iranian military targets, including missile sites, drone infrastructure, naval capabilities, communication networks, ammunition facilities, and coastal surveillance systems.
At first glance, this looks like a familiar cycle. Iran attacks, America responds, Iran retaliates. Washington increases the pressure. But that explanation is too simple. The key question is not who fired first in the latest round. The key question is why the confrontation has moved toward the Strait of Hormuz. Why Gulf countries are becoming direct targets, and why both sides are now behaving as if the earlier memorandum of understanding has lost all political meaning.
Let us begin with the Strait of Hormuz, because this is where the military confrontation becomes a global economic confrontation. The strait is narrow, strategically vital, and central to the movement of oil, gas, and commercial shipping from the Gulf. Iran has reportedly said that the waterway will remain closed until American interference in the region ends. Tehran has also insisted that ships use routes approved by Iran, while the United States and Gulf governments reject Iran's claim to control transit or charge fees.
This is not merely a disagreement over maritime rules. It is a struggle over authority. Iran is attempting to transform geography into political power. Washington is attempting to transform naval power into freedom of movement. Both sides understand that the strait is more than a shipping lane. It is a pressure point where military action can immediately affect insurance costs, energy prices, financial markets, public confidence, and political stability far beyond the Middle East.
For viewers in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, this matters because energy crises do not remain local. Higher shipping risks can affect fuel prices, transportation costs, inflation, manufacturing, food prices, and Central Bank decisions. Even countries that import limited quantities of Gulf oil are exposed to global pricing. This means that a missile fired near Hormuz can eventually appear in the cost of groceries, airline tickets, heating, and industrial production thousands of miles away.
My first prediction is this. Iran will continue treating the Strait of Hormuz not as a permanently closed gate, but as a controlled pressure valve. Total closure for a long period would damage Iran and its remaining commercial partners, as well as its enemies. But uncertainty is extremely useful. Iran does not need to stop every ship. It only needs to convince insurers, shipping companies, energy traders, and governments that no route is completely safe. That uncertainty creates leverage. It forces Washington to spend military resources protecting maritime traffic, and pressures Gulf governments to distance themselves from American operations. And it keeps global markets focused on Iranian decisions.
This is why the language of closure may be more important than the physical reality of closure. Control is not always demonstrated by stopping everything. Sometimes control is demonstrated by deciding who feels safe, who pays more, and who must ask permission.
Now, let us examine Iran's attacks across the Gulf. Iranian forces claim strikes against facilities connected to the United States in Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan. Qatar said it intercepted incoming fire and reported injuries caused by falling shrapnel. Kuwait said its defense systems responded to hostile aerial targets. Bahrain activated sirens. Oman and Qatar condemned the attacks and warned that the escalation threatened regional security.
This is a major strategic development. Iran is no longer communicating only with Washington. It is communicating with every government that hosts American forces, provides logistical support, allows access to airspace, or participates in the regional military architecture. The message is simple. American protection may also create Iranian exposure.
This places Gulf governments in an extremely difficult position. They rely on the United States for defense, intelligence, military equipment, and strategic reassurance. But they also live geographically close to Iran. Washington can project power into the region and leave. Gulf countries cannot leave. They must survive the aftermath. This creates a growing gap between American strategy and Gulf risk. From Washington's perspective, military bases provide reach. From Tehran's perspective, those same bases create a network of targets. From the perspective of Gulf governments, the bases are simultaneously shields and magnets.
My second prediction is that Gulf states will publicly condemn Iran while privately increasing diplomatic pressure on Washington to limit further escalation. They may not abandon the United States, but they will try to reduce the probability that their territory becomes the permanent battlefield between Washington and Tehran. Oman will remain especially important because it has experience as an intermediary. Qatar may also use its diplomatic relationships to push for de-escalation. Other Gulf governments will quietly review air defense readiness, base access, energy security, and civil defense planning. The public language may remain firm. The private conversations will be much more nervous.
This brings us to the American bombing campaign. United States Central Command reportedly said that more than 300 targets were struck over three waves, including radar systems, missile and drone locations, naval assets, communications, logistics, and coastal surveillance facilities. Iranian authorities also reported attacks in several provinces, including areas around Bandar Abbas, Kashan, Jask, Bushehr, Chabahar, and inland transport infrastructure.
Militarily, the logic is understandable. If Iran threatens shipping, Washington attempts to destroy the systems that allow Iran to monitor, target, and attack vessels. If Iran launches missiles and drones, the United States attacks launch sites, storage areas, command networks, and radar facilities. But military destruction does not automatically solve the political problem. In fact, it can deepen it.
Every American strike creates two possible outcomes. The first is deterrence. Iran concludes that further attacks are too costly. The second is escalation. Iran concludes that restraint will only invite greater pressure, and therefore responds more aggressively. The central danger is that both Washington and Tehran believe the other side will eventually retreat. The United States believes sustained military pressure can reduce Iran's capacity and force it to accept American terms. Iran believes that regional disruption, Gulf vulnerability, and global economic pain can reduce Washington's political willingness to continue. Both strategies are based on endurance.
This is why the confrontation can continue even if neither side wants a full-scale ground war. They do not need to invade each other to produce enormous damage. Air attacks, missile launches, drone operations, shipping disruption, cyber attacks, infrastructure strikes, and proxy confrontations can continue for months. This is the modern form of prolonged war, geographically dispersed, politically deniable in some areas, economically destructive, and extremely difficult to end.
There is another detail we must examine. Reports from inside Iran describe attacks not only on military infrastructure, but also damage near ports, fishing areas, transport corridors, electricity systems, and civilian facilities. Iranian authorities said strikes had affected energy generation and transport links, while American forces have stated that their targets are military. In every modern conflict, the definition of a military target expands. A radar station is military. A port serving naval and commercial functions becomes dual-use. A railway carrying civilian passengers and strategic supplies becomes dual use. A communications network becomes dual use. An energy installation supporting cities and military facilities becomes dual use. This means the dividing line between military pressure and economic warfare gradually disappears.
My third prediction is that the next phase of the conflict will focus increasingly on systems rather than symbols. The most important targets will not necessarily be palaces or famous military headquarters. They will be ports, power grids, communication networks, railways, fuel storage, maritime surveillance systems, satellite links, and financial channels. Why? Because modern states depend on systems. Destroying one aircraft has a limited effect. Disrupting the network that fuels, guides, repairs, and coordinates many aircraft has a much larger effect. Iran will think the same way. It may target airbases, logistic centers, command facilities, radar sites, and energy infrastructure supporting American operations. This is why the attacks on Gulf installations are strategically significant. Iran is attempting to raise the logistical cost of American power projection.
Now we must return to the failed diplomatic framework. The earlier memorandum of understanding was presented as a step away from escalation. But reports suggested that it contained major unresolved issues, including the management of the Strait of Hormuz and the obligations of each side. Iran accused Washington of violating the arrangement, while American officials accused Iran of attacking commercial shipping.
This demonstrates a basic principle of diplomacy. An agreement without a shared enforcement mechanism is often only a pause. If one side believes it has complied and the other believes it has been deceived, the agreement becomes evidence of betrayal rather than a foundation for trust. This may be exactly what has happened here. Iran now says one-sided deals are over. Washington says freedom of navigation must be protected. Each side presents itself as enforcing the agreement and the other side is violating it.
This makes negotiation more difficult because the dispute is no longer only about missiles, shipping routes, sanctions, or nuclear policy. It is about whether promises have any value. My fourth prediction is that future negotiations will not begin with a grand peace agreement. They will begin with narrow operational arrangements. Possible topics could include specific shipping corridors, temporary pauses in attacks, notification systems, prisoner exchanges, humanitarian access, rules around Gulf bases, or limits on strikes near energy infrastructure. A comprehensive settlement is unlikely while both sides still believe they can improve their position through force. But limited technical agreements may become necessary because neither side can control every consequence of escalation.
The greatest risk is not always a deliberate decision to begin a larger war. The greatest risk is an accident that creates political pressure for retaliation. A missile could strike a crowded civilian area. A damaged tanker could cause a major environmental disaster. A drone could hit the wrong facility. An American service member could be killed in large numbers. An Iranian strike could be interpreted as preparation for a broader attack. Once public anger rises, leaders may become prisoners of their own rhetoric. This is why the current crisis is so dangerous. Both sides are operating in an environment where speed is rewarded and hesitation can be portrayed as weakness.
Now, let us examine the death of Senator Lindsey Graham and why this seemingly separate political story matters. Al Jazeera reported that Graham, a prominent Republican senator and strong supporter of Israel and military pressure on Iran, died after what his office described as a brief and sudden illness. Republicans temporarily held 52 seats in the Senate. And South Carolina's governor has the authority to appoint a replacement. President Trump indicated that he had someone in mind, but did not name the person.
Graham's death will not determine the war, but it reveals the domestic political structure surrounding the conflict. Foreign policy is never created only by generals and diplomats. It is shaped by elections, party coalitions, congressional votes, defense funding, media pressure, public opinion, and relationships between political leaders. Graham was one of the most vocal advocates of a hard-line toward Iran. His replacement may hold similar views, especially because South Carolina remains strongly Republican. But the political moment matters. The United States is approaching midterm elections. If the war raises fuel prices, produces American casualties, or appears to lack a clear objective, support may weaken. If the administration presents the campaign as successful protection of global shipping, support may remain strong. Therefore, the battle over the narrative will become almost as important as the battle over the Strait.
Washington will say it is defending freedom of navigation and regional allies. Tehran will say it is resisting foreign interference and enforcing sovereignty. Gulf governments will say they are victims of escalation. Israel will frame Iran as an existential military threat. Each actor will attempt to define the meaning of the same events.
My fifth prediction is that the American political debate will increasingly move from the question, should Iran be punished, to the question, what is the achievable end state? This is the question that military campaigns often postpone. Is the goal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, destroy Iran's missile capacity, force a new agreement, change Iran's leadership, protect Gulf bases, defend Israel, prevent nuclear development? These goals are not identical. Some may even conflict. A limited maritime operation requires one strategy. Regime change pressure requires another. Long-term containment requires patience. Total military defeat would require costs that the American public may not accept. When goals remain unclear, tactical victories can produce strategic confusion. The United States may destroy hundreds of targets and still fail to produce a stable political outcome. Iran may be weakened, but a weakened Iran can still be dangerous. The Gulf may be defended, but defended territory can still become economically unstable. The Strait of Hormuz may be reopened, but reopened shipping lanes can remain vulnerable to the next crisis. This is the paradox of the present moment. Every action designed to restore deterrence may also prepare the next escalation. Every strike intended to create security may create new reasons for retaliation. Every agreement reached under pressure may contain the seeds of its own collapse. And that is why the real end game is not visible yet. We are watching the contest that will determine it.
So, what is the real end game? I believe there are three possible scenarios.
Scenario one is controlled escalation. The United States continues striking Iranian military infrastructure. Iran continues limited attacks on shipping and American-linked facilities. Gulf governments push for mediation. Neither side crosses the threshold that would trigger total war. This is dangerous, but manageable. And in the short term, it may be the most likely scenario.
Scenario two is regional expansion. A major strike causes large casualties. The United States attacks deeper inside Iran. Iran launches larger waves against Gulf bases, shipping, energy facilities, or Israel. Maritime traffic collapses. Oil prices surge. Regional governments activate emergency measures. This scenario becomes more likely if communication channels fail.
Scenario three is coercive negotiation. After both sides demonstrate their ability to inflict pain, Oman or another intermediary develops a narrow ceasefire. The strait partially reopens under a temporary monitoring arrangement. Attacks on Gulf bases stop. American strikes pause. The deeper issues remain unresolved, but the immediate crisis is contained. This would not be peace. It would be strategic exhaustion disguised as diplomacy.
My final prediction is this. The Strait of Hormuz crisis will not end with a clear winner. It will end, temporarily, when the economic and political costs become more dangerous to both sides than compromise. Iran cannot permanently close the strait without harming itself and alienating important partners. The United States cannot permanently bomb its way to predictable control without risking a wider regional war. Gulf states cannot indefinitely host military operations while absorbing retaliation. Therefore, the system will eventually search for an emergency exit. But before that exit appears, the conflict may become more intense.
The next days are especially important. Watch for changes in shipping patterns. Watch for insurance restrictions. Watch whether Oman increases diplomatic activity. Watch whether Gulf governments place limits on American operations from their territory. Watch whether Iran attacks energy infrastructure or continues focusing on military facilities. Watch whether the United States moves from coastal targets toward command, electricity, and transport systems. And watch the language coming from Washington. If officials begin emphasizing limited objectives and freedom of navigation, they may be preparing the public for containment rather than total victory. If the language shifts toward leadership removal or national surrender, the risk of uncontrolled escalation will rise dramatically.
The most important lesson is that power is not the same as control. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities. Iran has geography, missiles, drones, regional networks, and the ability to create economic uncertainty. Gulf states have wealth and strategic locations, but also vulnerability. Israel has military power, but faces the danger of a multi-front conflict. Russia and China may not need to intervene directly to benefit. They can observe the United States spending resources, facing higher energy prices, and managing pressure across several theaters. Their silence should not be confused with irrelevance. Sometimes the most strategic actor is the one that allows its rivals to exhaust themselves.
This is why I do not believe the central question is whether America can strike Iran. It clearly can. The central question is whether military force can create the political order Washington wants. History suggests that destroying targets is easier than constructing stable outcomes.
If you found this analysis valuable, subscribe to Jung Shanghai Chin Explainer, turn on notifications, and share this video with someone who wants to understand not only what happened but what may happen next. In the comments, tell me which scenario you believe is most likely. Controlled escalation, regional expansion, or coercive negotiation. I read your responses and your questions often help shape the next analysis. I am Professor Jiang Xueqin. Thank you for watching. Stay informed and remember the most important development is often not the explosion everyone can see but the strategic decision being made quietly behind it.