Transcription
[Music] It's always a challenge to have a panel right before lunch, but I think we have about 30 minutes to do this. But this is a topic to talk about, sort of explore the the potential commonality or maybe differences in values between Chinese and Western culture because we think that this is actually very important in understanding the context of today's US-China relations. This is a subject that could take on, you know, for three days and three nights, but we only have 30 minutes. Let me set the stage first, and then I'll introduce our panelists.
So, so there is a, there is a potentially two narratives on one on the China side, the other one from the Western world. The China narrative is that the rise of China is has been, you know, there's been obviously a lot of economic success over the last thirty years, but there is a sense that the Western countries, led by the United States, is now being threatened by the rise of China as an economic power. That there's a strategy of containment, trying to contain China. From the Western perspective, there is a sense of skepticism of what this rise means to the to the rest of the global economy, whether China could really integrate into the global economy. And then there's a lot of people point to a lot of sort of exhibition of so-called sharp power by the Chinese. Some of them, they accuse of China of government-driven sort of activities trying to influence political affairs in other countries.
So, the, so we are set in this stage, and I couldn't find two more appropriate people and also distinguished people to talk about this topic. Actually, to maybe debate a little bit. It's always good to fight on an empty stomach, as Gary just said. And so I like to introduce Eric Lee, who is, he is a venture investor based in China, but he is most well known for some of his views about the Chinese model of governance. Some of you might have seen his TED talk. He's a frequent contributor to the Foreign Affairs magazine, and he has a, I think he offers a very unique perspective. And Professor Keith Richburg, a native of Detroit. We talked about the heartland of the United States, and last night we're talking about the Detroit Pistons and the Brooklyn Nets. And so Professor Richard Berg is currently director and head of the journalism school at the Hong Kong University. He is a seasoned journalist who has been with Washington Post for the last 20 years and have been bureau chief in Paris, Jakarta, Manila, and I believe Hong Kong as well. You actually lived in China from 2009 to 2012, so you've been there, you've been in came observer of Chinese affairs.
So, with that, I maybe I start with Professor Richard Berg. What do you think about this containment strategy?
Well, you know, that's, I've heard that a lot, especially being in Beijing. It's, it's usually on the pages of the Global Times or something where they're saying the US is trying to contain China's rise. That's kind of the mantra you hear. And, you know, from my perspective, nothing could be further from the truth. Because in fact, it was the US that actually promoted China's rise. The US promoted flooding, China entered the WTO, which happened 2001, 2000, 2001. So I don't ever think there was much of a containment strategy. There was more, in my view, a strategy of, let's, let's help China open up, become part of the global international system. Let's help China, let's help, let's facilitate China's rise because there was a view that once China was a part of the international global system, coming from closed economy to an open economy, basically they would become more like us. You know, let's, let's, and, you know, and opening their economy meant flooding the zone with, you know, McDonald's and KFC and all the other good things from the West. And ultimately, you know, they would become more like us and they would have more openness and more freedom and ultimately lead to a more open political system as well. That's the strategy, if you want to call it that, of, you know, you know, bringing into your so-called adversary by embracing them. So it was never, in my view, a containment strategy. And I would say up until this day, you know, you hear this as well. Even when President Obama announced the pivot to Asia, everybody talked about this as containment in China, when in fact, it's the exact opposite. I don't think the US wants to blunt China's rise. I think America knows that its own economic success depends on China's economic success. So the goal is not to contain the rise as much as it is to direct the rise in a certain direction so China becomes, you know, a friendlier, more open country that's tied in to the exact same international institutions that, you know, by WTO, etc., etc. So I think that's, that's why I push back when I hear people saying that there was some any kind of a containment strategy ever.
But, well, it seems like things have turned out sort of in a direction that people didn't expect. And you talk about sort of open political systems. And I think what defines the Western liberal democracies are some of the values of individual liberties, freedom, and election-based decision-making process. And question to Eric, what is, what is the model that China is moving on? Is there an alternative model of governance?
Well, thanks. Let me first quickly respond to what he said. I mean, I do agree with you that I think for a long time after the Cold War, the United States did not pursue a containment strategy against China. They wanted to bring China into the system, as you said. I think the US strategy was, US pursued a, a make the rest of the world in its own image strategy, by persuasion if possible, by force if necessary. That that's been the strategy post-Cold War for for 20-30 years. But I would argue that it was essentially spelled out by Anthony Lake, the National Security Adviser under Clinton, to make the rest of the world in its own image. I would argue that if China had followed that prescription, it would not actually being successful. And to answer Joe's question, I think yes, China is pursuing a different, has been pursuing a different political system, a political model, and will continue to do so precisely because it's being successful in pursuing something that's distinctly different from from the Washington Consensus.
What are the key components of that model, and maybe some of the values that underlie?
Let me first stress what we have in common. Great. We can end on that. After the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping took the, the other six guys to the National Museum, and he pronounced this thing called a Chinese dream, which is essentially that Chinese Renaissance, national Renaissance. And I remember reading a lot of people, including a lot of leading intellectuals, who said that the Chinese dream is the opposite of the American dream. The American Dream is about individual individualism, individual aspirations, freedom. And the Chinese dream is spark the collective, national aspirations, and and what have you. But I would beg to differ from that. And me, as you remember, we all say the 20th century was the American Century, which is true. And the inaugural president of the American Century was Teddy Roosevelt, of course, it became president at the turn of the 19th, 20th century. And, and I remember, if you, if you go Google it, you'll find his most important speech at that time called The Strenuous Life. If you read that speech, you'll find it is so similar to Xi Jinping's speech after the 18th Party Congress about Chinese dream. And he talked about the American dream, okay? He talked about, look what the Spanish are doing, look at what the British are doing. We gotta get our act together. Let's forget our individual interests, let's forget our individual dreams. Let's all work for the great American collective to build American national strengths and give up on our own individual desires to sacrifice for the American, the collective, the American collective national, national Renaissance, not a renaissance, but bursting to greatness. So, you, it's amazing how similar these two speeches are. And if you look at from Teddy Roosevelt through FDR, through the interstate highways, through the building the welfare, labor union, all of that. So America had been the American Century for a large part, America's rise had been about the collective, about the nation as a whole, until recent decades. Somehow it gone on a tangent about it's all about the individual. I don't buy it. And I think American greatness, American Century was built on a collective dream, not, not, not about the individual. And the individual is an illusion that came about in very recent decades after America is already risen.
Richburg, what do you say to that?
I took issue a little bit with the history there. I think your presidents always called together the nation for the collective. It was John Kennedy who said that's not what you can do, you know, that's what you can do for your country, not what your country can do for you. But they never did that or promoted that idea of a collective together at the sacrifice of individual liberties, etc. I found that interesting earlier when you were talking about what Anthony Lake said, and you said China would not have been successful had they that model, because you seem to be implying, I don't to put words in your mouth, that democracy or more individual liberty is would be, it would have been incompatible with China advancing the way it has advanced. And, you know, you know, when I was here in the 1990s, living in Hong Kong and traveling around Southeast Asia, I heard a lot of this talk about Asian values. That Asians are somehow different than the US. They don't, they don't Westerners, that that they prefer a paternalistic style of leadership. They don't care about things like individual rights. They only care about, you know, the country, the family first, and then the society. The, but, you know, we put too much emphasis on individual rights. I've been hearing that Asian values thing from for four decades now, mostly by prime ministers in Malaysia and Singapore.
Well, I use, I hear this stuff. It's usually to justify one party's continued hold on power by saying our people don't care about democracy. They only care about paternalistic rule as long as it's benevolent. And when you have the Mandate of Heaven, you can rule. You know, I've always said that's bunk. Because, you know, I go back to the idea that yes, there are some values that are universal. And I think there, trying pretty nicely in the Declaration of Independence, went, you know, and just if you look at those words, you know, you know, you know, we're endowed with certain inalienable rights, including, you know, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And it's not just that these are American values. Somehow, I think somehow these are universal values that are applied everywhere. Ho Chi Minh quoted those same, you know, universal values when he was declaring independence for Vietnam. And if you look now, you know, and I'm not saying that everybody has to have a system that looks like the American system. I'm not saying that at all. So when I say democracy, I'm talking small D, can look differently in different places. But it seems to be the trend that has swept the globe. To me, the most exciting thing over the last twenty years is how democracy has taken root in places like Latin America, Central America. I think Cuba is the only one now that's not somehow having elections. In Africa, where I covered, you can't get away having coups anymore. I mean, even in Zimbabwe recently, they had to say this is not really a coup. Now, most countries are at least at least pretending to have some kind of democratic election to legitimize their rule. Even in, you know, in Asia, look around the, in Thailand, they're pushing the head up for an election this year to justify. In Cambodia, even Hun Sen, who's been in power thirty years, has to go through the motions of having some kind of popular legitimacy. So I don't buy the notion that somehow democracy and this idea of individual rights is just the Western concept that we're trying to push onto people, including China.
Well, I mean, I think it's more basic than values. I mean, I think it's about what works. So let's take a look at last 30 years. Me, I call it the great conversion. Since 1990, I think in the in the 80s, according to Freedom House, there were about 70, 84, 750 democracies. Today there are about 150. Okay, who had electronic democracy, elections and what-have-you. And according to The Wall Street Journal, Heritage Foundation, the number of countries that went from not free market to free market has quadrupled. Okay. So never before in human history, never has so many countries abandoned whatever political and economic system they had and adopted something completely new. Never before. Okay. So I call it the great conversion. And now thirty years have passed. Now let's take a look at the track record of the great conversion. Okay. I grew from two, three groups. The first group was the luckiest one. That's the former Soviet states in Eastern Europe. Okay. Those were the most Western, especially Eastern Europe, that got quickly integrated into Europe, got access to big market. Okay. There are about 29 countries in that group, including Russia itself. If you're examining the luckiest group, okay, with a few exceptions, Czech Republic, maybe Poland, maybe Hungary, who are now regretting. About two-thirds of those countries are in horrible shape. The form, for most of it, the Ukraine being the worst. Okay. Not livable, fail state, okay, ever. Look at the stance, look, most of the Eastern Europe not in good shape. And that's the luckiest group. The second group that converting to electoral democracy and market capitalism were places like Taiwan, South Korea. Those are places that achieved developed world status dictatorships or authoritarian regimes. So they got rich before they democratized. Right? So they didn't rise under in a democracy. They rose under dictatorial or authoritarian regimes and they achieved developed country status and then it democratized out of that group, 50/50 at best. Okay. South Korea continues to thrive, but Taiwan has deteriorated in the last 20-30 years. The economy, medium incomes been dropping, as completely stagnant. Politics is poison, people are not happy. So it's 50/50. And then you look at the largest group, the devout, so-called developing world from Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America. All those countries you mentioned, none of them has been successful. Yeah, you'll be hard for us to find one shining example of success. And the biggest success of course is China. We didn't do it. Okay. So, so I think it's, it's, you know, it's more basic than values and coaches. Maybe I think Chinese people are very pragmatic. And, you know, if so, it's, I would predict it's less likely that China would would follow the Washington Consensus path because they can't find a good example. I mean, you know, if you produce a good example, maybe you will consider. We're just getting started.
So, alright, well, but okay, so now we've established that Professor Richburg is the idealist and Eric is the practicalist. But what about maybe, you know, you talk about universal values. Are there, in the end state, are there some values that are commonly held at a universal, maybe at the idealistic state? Because today in China, the GDP per capita in China is about eight thousand US dollars. The United States is about 56 thousand US dollars. So it's 1/7, up close to ten thousand. Okay, all right, whatever, one sixth of the United States. So China, in that context, is still developing, even though a lot of people said it's already developed. So maybe if you're the leadership of China, maybe China is should be run more like a corporation as opposed to a political system. Because in a corporation, when you're trying to improve, grow revenues, improve profits, whatever it is, you can really only have one CEO, not co-CEOs. We're not an investment bank, co-head of everything. So maybe, maybe at the correct, maybe the practicality of this is that in the current state, this model is more suitable in China. But is there an end state?
Eric, I, I don't, I mean, I'm not sure. I think end states are dangerous, yeah, tell you the truth. I'm worried about America because it's because it really convinced if there's an end state to human development, which is essential religious concept with us. What the Soviet Union did, that's why they collapsed. They believe there is some kind of inevitable end to human society. There is some kind of paradise on earth that that we must, you're a Hegelian, essentially Marxism, to the all societies must drive towards. I mean, I think that's a very dangerous concept. I mean, I think we should be practical and we should be tolerant of different trajectories and be open to them.
Well, thank you for the concern. I'm actually a little bit worried about China, worried about each other, you know, because when you have a government, US political system that's built its entire legitimacy on the idea that we're helping the economy grow and we're helping you get rich. And so leave at least stay out of politics. We're gonna suppress some of your individual freedoms and your right to read what you want and control the internet, but we're letting you get rich. That's their entire claim to legitimacy. And so what happens when the economy starts to slow? What happens if when they can't keep pumping up the economy 26.9? What happens when it slows to 2 or 3 or 4%? That's what I've seen happen in other countries around. When the economy slows, if that's the only claim the legitimacy you have. On the flip side of that, and I would agree with you that a lot of people probably in China believe that this is a stable system that's allowed them to get rich and grow, especially if they live on the coastal areas. And, you know, I always would ask the question when I was in China to officials who didn't like me very much, saying, well, yeah, if you think that everybody thinks that this is the best system, I have, why don't you prove it? Just have an election. You'll win. You know, just to have the Singapore model. You know, they go to the polls every four years and they get reelected because people think that's the best model to have. So, you know, and I, you know, I would just have to push back a little bit on this idea that there are no examples of success anywhere in the West. Exchanges the only example of success. I mean, yes, China, we managed to grow at 10% a year for a long time, but they were starting at a low base because of the because of the wars and then the Cultural Revolution and the travesty of Mao's era. You know, China, China was way behind where it should have been. So it was not actually miraculous that they were growing. They were just catching up to where they should have been. Now, the trick is going to come if they now that they're entering this higher income status, if they can continue that kind of growth rate going. I mean, I wanted, I didn't say, I mean, I think what I said was the new democracies, they're being very few success stories and probably the close to none. I was look at Latin America. They're quite a few. Who, who? Brazil. Brazil. Well, yeah, look at preserving. If you look, I did an analysis, the so-called BRICS country, er, I see, yes, right. And the last 20 years, I've changed the name, I caught a C-rest, China and the rest. If you look at the other four countries in BRICS, if you separate their numbers, China is the only one that carried water. Okay. China contributed 90% of the collective growth of the of BRICS. I mean, every other country was either near average or below average. And all four are electoral democracies. Only China was not.
What, what metrics are you using though for success? Just GDP growth?
Well, living standards, yes. I mean, I, I'm, what, well, let me tell you what measure I do use. And it's not about getting rich. It's not about getting rich. We lifted 700 million people out of Egypt poverty in 40 years. This is not a term getting rich could capture all right. I mean, if we look at poverty alleviation, if we take out China's MA, China's numbers, the rest of the world had gone backwards in poverty alleviation. So we lifted all of the people out of poverty in the last 30, 40 years. And this is not about getting rich. It's about people living with basic dignity.
Agree with that. That's been its tremendous accomplishment of the Deng Xiaoping. But as I mentioned before, a lot of that was just a corrective for where China should have been had it not been for the first 30 years. That's not the case. Let me, let me correct that. So in 1949, when Mao took over China, our average life expectancy was 41 years old. Okay. I don't know about two of you, you look young. I had already lived past you're the youngest looking dude in this on the stage. 41 years old. Okay. And, and literacy rate 15 percent. Immunization rate zero. By 1976, when Mao died, average life expectancy was 68. All right. Literacy rate was 80 percent. Close to 100 percent of young people. Immunization rate 100 percent. There is no way the Deng Xiaoping were being able to launch the reforms successfully without those enormous amazing accomplishments. In fact, if you look at the numbers, by 1978, at a very low income per capita, still poor country on that basis, China was already within striking distance to developed countries in terms that you and Human Development Index. Okay. Amazing accomplishment in the first 30 years. A lot of problems, Cultural Revolution, greatly for disasters, catastrophes. But to characterize somehow China, I mean, no, China was where it should be in 1978. I would disagree with that. I would think China should have been a lot further along than they were. And then they Deng Xiaoping reforms were a corrective to that. But we'll disagree on that point. Okay. But, but there's just one measure. I think just living in, you know, working in China and and seeing how the economy has developed. If you ask a young person in their 20s today, whether they're better off than their parents, whether they believe that their children will be better off in the future, there's a lot of hope there. It's that on that positive trajectory. If you go to the US and interview college graduates, whether they're better off than their parents and whether they think their children aren't gonna be better off, there is a little bit of a mixed response. So by that measure, I think things are a little bit different. But I'm sorry, we're a little bit out of time. But what I, maybe Eric, you, what do you want to cut? Let's not even compare with the US. Let's compare with all the new democracies. I mean, if you go to Brazil, go to Chile, go to Taiwan, the numbers are dismal. I mean, people were miserable. If you look at the numbers, I mean, there's only one way to characterize it. I mean, well, I'd like to leave it to Professor Richburg to respond to respond to that.
First of all, I would just take a little bit of issue saying that, you know, because I talked to, I talked to mainland students all the time. Were my students when I lived in Beijing, I had friends there. I would not say that every one of them are saying, oh, my life is better than. They'll say my life is better than my parents, but they're not necessarily so much more hopeful about the future. The things I heard were, boy, I can't afford a house anywhere near the center of the city. I can't even afford an apartment. They're college graduates who can't get jobs. So I think they have some of the same fears and frustrations as young people everywhere about the future. They don't think that they've benefited from the economic reforms as much in recent years. The one common refrain I used to hear from people, and I still hear it from my students here, is yeah, we have two trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserve. The country is rich, but the people are still poor. And I've heard that over and over again. So I would not necessarily equate this great economic growth and boy, look on paper, they're better than Brazil was saying, while the people are so much better off and so much happier. I'm sure you can find anecdotal evidence. I mean, everybody could find anecdotal evidence to prove their case. But, but I only look at macro numbers. I mean, if you look at the survey data, you look at the Pew Research numbers, I mean, there's no credible, you can't find one credible public survey data to says the Chinese are not happy or not optimistic about the future. I mean, it's complete opposite. That means this is the most optimistic people on earth, if you believe, if you believe public survey data out of China. Yeah, I don't, I don't know. Well, maybe I don't. But I don't know what else to believe. I mean, so you have to base your judgment on something. You have to face your judgment.
So, before we're really out of time, before we end, just I just like to pose one question. I think this is a very lively debate. There's a lot of food for thought. But are we closer than we we think? I mean, are there some commonalities in terms of values? Maybe just a one or two words. What do you think that is? What is the commonality?
Eric, I think the West, Westerners, especially America, need to worry about their own problems. They, they need to move a little bit towards caring for the collective and not worry too much about not focused so much on the individual. I think you, America has let its country stagnate because it cares too much about the individual, at too much about liberty, and less about the collective. And, and that's, and the Chinese probably need to care a little bit more about the individual. I would say.
Oh, okay. I was just about to say his last point. I think as China grows and develops and China rises, becomes a world power, I think commensurate with that, they have to start giving a little bit more openness to their own people. They have to start letting people read a little bit more what they want. They have to start letting people be able to do what they want, move around the way they want. I mean, it's, you know, if somebody wants to go on the internet and check out some foreign website for something, they have to allow more creativity. They have to allow people to, you know, to experiment in fields they don't. Yeah, why are you censoring movie scripts? Where are you censoring artistic expression? They have to start. If there's a reason why you get so much innovation coming out of the US and why so many people go to Silicon Valley to invent things, because there's a lot more openness to, you know, and in the education system. And that's another big area that they need to look on. So, you know, it's, yes, but maybe that, maybe the US could use a little more collectivity. But I think unless you allow more individual interpretation, individual expression, they're going to be stunting where China could be.
All right, we're really out of time. So thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed. Again, gentlemen, Mr. Chai, Dr. Li, and Professor Richburg for a very entertaining panel session. If they are looking forward changing TV in careers, they could go on TV because I think I'd watch them all day long. Ladies and gentlemen, it's now time for lunch. You can go fetch your lunch outside, and we'll see you at 2:15, so around 90 minutes from now. Thank you very much indeed, everyone. Thank you.
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