Transcription
The West does not understand, and they have mistaken Russian patience for Russian weakness. And now they're in the process of finding out. Nope, uh, Russia meant what it said. So, it's, they're now, they are now hitting with greater intensity these targets, particularly in Kyiv, and we'll continue doing so. That's really what's taking place right now. It's a, it's a de facto defeat of NATO.
>> Hello, everybody. Thank you so much for joining us. I'm Lyanna Petro, with a new episode of World Affairs in Context. Today, I'm thrilled to welcome Larry Johnson back to the program. Larry is a former CIA officer and intelligence analyst, and a former advisor at the U.S. State Department's Office of Counterterrorism. Larry also runs a must-read Substack titled "Son of the New American Revolution." Our viewers will find it linked in the description below. I highly, highly recommend it. Larry, welcome back. Thank you so much for being here today.
>> Yeah, I tried to wear out my welcome last time, and you just didn't learn. So, all right. Thanks for having me back.
>> No, I'm, I'm thrilled to have you, and I've been looking forward to this conversation because there's so much going on. And as we just discussed, it's hard to even know where to begin with the recent developments and the new escalation in the proxy war on Russia via Ukraine. But for, you know, several months now, we have been hearing NATO states calling for strikes on Russia. According to Politico, Lithuania is now in talks with the United States to host NATO nuclear weapons on its territory. So things are just escalating. And after the Ukrainian strike on the college dorm in Starobelsk a couple of weeks ago that killed more than 60 college students, there has been a noticeable shift in the Russian military approach. We have already seen two massive strikes on Kyiv's industrial and military-related infrastructure. Larry, has there been a strategic change in the Russian political approach toward the war in Ukraine? And how will that manifest itself in the coming weeks?
>> Yes. No, the, the, the simple answer is yes, there has been. We, we saw the start of the shift again. It was after, um, it actually, it preceded, uh, I think it preceded the attack on Starobelsk when, uh, Ambassador, uh, Dmitri Polyanski was on Danny Davis's podcast, and boy, this is now four, four weeks ago.
>> Um, and he indicated that the, that there was now a shift underway in Russia's policy, that, um, that no longer was Europe going to be given a pass, that Europe was, it was taking provocative actions that were going to require a Russian response. Uh, that message. And so when I heard that, I, you know, my ears perked up. I, I know Dmitri. I like him. He's a great, great guy, great representative of Russia. But I also know he's not the kind of guy that's going to go out there and say, "Hey, I got this great idea. You know what? I think I'm gonna just offer my opinion." Oh, no. No. He, he reads from the script. Uh, and he, he takes the script and says, "Okay, uh, this is what we're going to say." Two days later, uh, Sergey Ryabkov, who is also the deputy foreign minister of Russia, uh, foreign ministry, uh, he, he reiterated basically the same message. And then it was, now I guess two weeks ago that Sergey Lavrov, he doubled down. And this was in the, in the wake of the Starobelsk attack and made it quite clear that, you know, this, the Europeans were basically going to be targets, um, and that the, the Russian response is going to be devastating. And it was followed up with clear warnings to Western diplomats to get the hell out of Kyiv. This, Russia does not make idle threats. Russia's, they're not, you know, I know you're of Russian heritage, but you know, the Russians I've met in person in Moscow and St. Petersburg and around, they're not bullshitters, you know, they're not liars or exaggerators. They're pretty matter-of-fact people. And so when I heard that, I said, "Okay." And and some people are saying, "Well, why is Russia doing this now? Why didn't they do this four years ago?" Well, one of the reasons they didn't do it four years ago is, uh, I don't think Russia was ready to militarily face NATO if NATO decided to attack in, in force. Uh, and I think Russia adopted a policy of not attacking every possible military target because there were foreigners, there were Americans and Europeans at those locations that would have been killed, that then could have created an incident that would have, you know, spread this, widened the war. Uh, now, you know, four years and three months after the start of the special military operation, let's say Russia's tanned, rested, and ready. They have ample supplies of a variety of missiles, hypersonic missiles. They have ample supplies of artillery. They have boosted their actual numbers of soldiers that are, uh, on duty, um, and reserves that are trained. So they're now, they're at a stage where they could take this action and be ready for the, for the fallout consequences. Now, I don't think the consequences from Europe will be as severe as the Russian General Staff is anticipating or planning for, but, you know, that's, that's why they get paid the big bucks as military planners. They plan for the worst case and they plan for scenarios that may be considered unthinkable. And so the, the, the, they are, they are not reckless. And that's, uh, you know, that's a point I think the West does not understand. And that they have mistaken Russian patience for Russian weakness. And now they're in the process of finding out. Nope, uh, Russia meant what it said. So it's, they're now, they are now hitting with greater intensity these targets, particularly in Kyiv, and will continue doing so. And, uh, I, I anticipate at some point Russia will reoccupy Kyiv. They may do so and with the assistance of Belarus and some North Korean soldiers, but they'll, they'll come down from the north, and they're going to be coming from the south and Zaporizhzhia. Uh, and ultimately, they're going to take Odessa, too. This, this is not going to end with a negotiated settlement.
>> Ukraine just carried out drone strikes within the past 24 hours on Russia's northern capital, St. Petersburg, just as Russia's St. Petersburg International Economic Forum opens. And this is a very similar event to, let's say, Davos. Um, and of course, Ukraine also, uh, conducted strikes on the Russian Navy in Kronstadt, which is also a northern city, very close to St. Petersburg. Some Russian experts, um, believe that there is involvement of the Baltic states in these strikes as well. Um, Larry, how do you interpret these strikes during such a high-profile event with thousands and thousands of guests from around the world who are gathered in the city of St. Petersburg right now?
>> Yeah. So the, the Ukrainians, ultimately this was a Ukrainian operation, facilitated though by NATO, which NATO countries. Yeah, I think the Baltics are, uh, you know, prime suspects. But, but they, they didn't attack at the site where SPIEF is being held, which is out by the airport. I've been fortunate to attend it once back in 2014. Um, and, uh, this is more on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, and they did hit, uh, you know, caused the fire at an oil refinery, but those get put out pretty quickly, and it's not lasting damage. But it is, I think it's, it's going to again elicit another response. If there's any evidence, if Russia has any evidence that those came out of, uh, Lithuania, Estonia, or Latvia, I would not be surprised to see Russia now respond by hitting those sites in Estonia, Lithuania, near Latvia, where this, those, um, drones originated from. So, Russia's past the stage of patience now. It's not going to strike out wildly or blindly. You know, if you, uh, I'm not suggesting you hang out at bars, but if you've, if you've ever been in a bar and see two guys get into a bar fight and they're just, you know, flailing away, uh, you realize that's not Russia. Russia is going to be very deliberate and precise and punish those who actually, uh, were responsible. So this is, you know, you've got 130 countries at SPIEF right now. And so, you know, this notion that Russia's really isolated. And I got to tell you, the, the cost of going to SPIEF, I don't know if you looked at the tickets.
>> So, you know, $16,000 a person. I mean, it's, it is a pricey ticket. I mean, I got invited, but I said, I don't have that kind of money. Um, but when you multiply, you say, you know, you easily got 4,000 people there, you know, multiple. So, that they're raking in some big, big bucks. Uh, and I imagine they're accepting it in Chinese yuan instead of US dollars. So.
>> Yes, I think so. So, but, but, uh, so the NATO and Ukraine run a real risk that if, if they somehow expand it or end up attacking and killing any of the foreigners, uh, this, this will further escalate the war against Ukraine.
>> NATO seems to be betting on drone warfare, and that's sort of changed the course of, of, of, of military actions on the battlefield. Ukraine has been increasing its attacks on, on Russia, and I think over the course of the past 24 to 48 hours, Russia reported that it took down 750 Ukrainian drones or more. So, it seems that it's growing exponentially. Does the growing reach of Ukrainian long-range drone capabilities actually alter Russia's strategic calculations?
>> Well, no. It's, it's going to lead to Russia attacking the production facilities in the UK and France and Germany. That's where it's headed. So they're, they're not, they're not going to sit back and continue to be a punching bag. And so, you know, the Ukraine has very, very limited options anyway. So to the extent that they continue to pursue this, like, uh, to pursue this course of action, uh, then it raises, uh, it increases the likelihood that Russia is going to attack, uh, some NATO members. Uh, the UK and France, I think are the two prime candidates. Germany is right there as well. Uh, so, you know, the, the old, the new, the new acronym that's out there on the, uh, internet, social media, F.A.F.O., you know, "fool around and find out." That's, we, that's the cleaned-up version. That's, that's, that's what I think the Europeans are in the process of getting ready to discover that they, they have pushed Russia too far, and they will, they will be hurt because of it. You've, you mentioned, uh, the involvement of NATO on, um, in attacks on Russian territory and effectively, uh, in coordinating Ukrainian military strikes on Russian territory. Now, on June the 3rd, NATO Secretary Mark Rutte clearly felt very safe and comfortable to visit Zelensky in Kyiv. Um, of course, NATO provides intelligence and targeting data, and in many cases, Western operators provide direct assistance with using Western weapons. So, you know, Russia, as you said, has shown tremendous restraint by not responding to such strikes, but clearly, it must recognize that there is a need to reestablish deterrence and to strengthen deterrence. So, you, you mentioned that strikes on European assets might be on the table now, but how far do you feel the Russian leadership might actually go in order to reestablish deterrence? Because we've seen NATO countries, and Mark Rutte in these, in, in this particular case, they're just willing to go as far as they can. They're willing to cross all red lines. So, just what would be, uh, President Putin's response to yet another red line crossed?
>> Well, uh, once a red line is clearly established, if it's crossed, then there needs to be action. If there is no action, then you, you, you know, you've proven yourself to be just a loudmouth making threats with no backup behind it. Um, so far, um, Russia has not issued a public threat along the lines of saying, um, from this point forward, you, we're, we're putting you, the United Kingdom, you, France, and you, Germany, on notice that any drone attacks after such and such date that are launched inside of Russia, we're holding you responsible for, and we will attack and destroy facilities in your country. You have, you, we're putting you on notice. Be aware. And at that point, it gives those countries the chance to say, "Let's clean this up. Let's stop the flow, whatever." And if they don't, Russia needs to follow through. And yeah, the war expands. We've got the risk, the potential risk of nuclear war, but I really don't think it would go to that because these countries aren't really capable of that. And Russia's, Russia's, uh, capabilities far exceed. But, you know, this goes back, you know, it's the message that Sergey Karaganov has been talking about over the last couple of weeks about, you got to reestablish, uh, deterrence. And, you know, I think a credible case could be made that Russia has allowed its deterrence capability to erode over the course of the last four years. Uh, I, you know, I, I don't pretend to know what the General Staff is thinking. Uh, and, and, uh, and again, the risk calculation. I, I know that, uh, Vladimir Putin is always acting in the best interest of Russia. But, you know, I would start, for example, by, uh, telling the United States and NATO that we're not going to accept, we're not going to allow any more surveillance, reconnaissance flights, even if they're in international airspace that are near our borders. We're going to take them down. We're warning you now. If you fly there, we're going to consider you a hostile threat. We're going to take you out. And is that, uh, is that going to be viewed as aggressive? Oh, yes. But it'll put a stop to this, you know. And the same with the Starlink terminals, what's being used, you know, these, these drones just don't find their way. You know, they're not like sitting there. Well, and you're too young to remember this, but back in the day, 40 years ago, uh, in 1978, actually, you know, that's almost, uh, 48 years ago, uh, my wife and I were driving through Guatemala, and she's got the map, and I'm driving, and I'm yelling at her, "Where are we?" And, you know, you're trying to figure out on, you got a paper map. Okay.
>> Mhm.
>> The drones aren't using that. You know, it's not a husband and wife team flying a drone.
>> Yes.
>> They've got electronic information, GPS mapping, etc. And that's how they, that's how they get there. And that, and that GPS, man, it means satellites are involved. And if satellites are involved, the US is involved, or Elon Musk is involved.
>> Uh, I'm not sure that the Brits and, and the French have, you know, a robust satellite capability for this kind of operation. So that's where, you know, the United States, you put the US on notice. This is, this is going to stop, or we're going to take out your satellites. I mean, there, there are a variety of escalation steps that Russia could take. And, you know, I wish, uh, you know, I think in the past, uh, Putin wanted to avoid escalating it. But, I think Russia is now, the Russian people by and large are, they want to escalate it because they're getting tired of this. And I think there's a good argument to be made that, uh, for example, if we take the war in Iran, Iran just retaliated. It didn't make the initial strikes, but it retaliated against the United States, striking, um, the vessel that was heading toward Hark Island. Iran retaliated by striking Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, I believe. So there is a case to be made that the asymmetric warfare could be conducted in a way that actually targets the states that either allow a hostile nation to launch attacks from its territory or possibly effectively, um, you know, manufacture weapons, which I know is against international law. But there, there's a case to be made that the Baltic states are now directly involved in attacks on Russian territory. So do you think Russia, and, and the Russian military strategists will now take Iran's experience and say, "Well, you know what? This actually works. It does establish deterrence."
>> Yeah. Yeah. The, very, very well could. I think, I think that is a very much relevant point. Of course, again, what we've seen is, and it's contradictory. The, uh, Iran is responding quickly and decisively against, uh, the points of origin of the attacks launched against it. But that has not, at yet, dissuaded the United States from launching those attacks.
>> They keep trying to claim that these are defensive actions, but clearly, they're not defensive actions. These are, these are actions that are taken, um, in, in, uh, with, you know, knowledge and prior planning, and targeting. So, uh, it is, um, you know, there's, there's sort of a parallel universe here where, you know, the United States is engaged in, uh, attacking Russia from two angles because the attack, the attack on, uh, on Iran is an indirect attack on Russia because of Iran's role in the North-South Corridor, its role as an economic partner of Russia, and because of its strategic location.
>> Do you feel that Russia might be compelled to accelerate its military action in Ukraine because it sees the United States and European states getting more and more actively involved in Armenia and in Azerbaijan, and of course, uh, you know, threatening Iran? Do you feel that that sort of pushes them to, to consider the opening of a second front at some point, you know, in the near future?
>> Well, I, I, I think they recognize that as a potential threat. Yes.
>> Um, but, uh, I, I, I do think that the, the timeline for defeating, uh, Ukraine, it's already, it's already baked in. In other words, they've, they've got a plan. They're following the plan. And at this point, they say, "No need to deviate from that plan." I, I think we're going to see a lot more accelerated success, both the, the final, uh, you know, freeing all territory in Donetsk from Ukrainian control, making significant advances in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, as well as, uh, taking, taking control of Sumy. Uh, so you could have, uh, you could have Russia, you know, on the outskirts of, uh, you know, full control of Sumy, full control of Donetsk, and sitting on the outskirts, literally the suburbs of Zaporizhzhia, by, by August, if not sooner. So this is, uh, you know, I think we're entering a stage where this war is going to accelerate. And these other, other considerations about, um, you know, the, there, there may be less concern about the United States simply because it's become apparent that U.S. capabilities have been drained and weakened as a consequence of the war with, um, with Iran.
>> Let's turn to drone warfare. The Russia-Ukraine war increasingly resembles, effectively, a laboratory for the future of warfare. And there's a good argument to be made that the West, um, you know, that's ready to fight till the last Ukrainian, is also using Ukraine as a testing ground for AI-powered weapons. And of course, the corrupt and illegal regime of Zelensky is facilitating this. It is allowing it to happen. Um, one of the most frequently asked questions that I see now being discussed in, uh, in, in, in media, in sort of the alternative media, and I would love to get your thoughts on this, is why is Russia not using the decapitation strategy that the United States and Israel default to in Ukraine?
>> Well, do you have any evidence that it works? I mean, you know, uh, if, if there was evidence that, uh, and we, we see the tendency of, of the West, in particular, with wars is we personalize it. Mhm.
>> We get it that, God, just if, if we just got rid of Adolf Hitler, or just got rid of Stalin, or just got rid of Bibi Netanyahu, or kill Donald Trump, or kill Zelensky, or kill Putin, that that would solve the problem. And, and, you know, let's take Bibi Netanyahu as a prime example. Uh, if he's taken out, that doesn't change the belief of the majority of the population in Israel who are ardent Zionists that believe that they have a religious right to this land, and the Palestinians must be expelled. So even if you get rid of Bibi, that war goes on. Or at least the, the premise of it. And similarly in Ukraine. Zelensky is just the highest-paid actor in the world. Mhm.
>> He's not the mastermind behind this. Uh, he is serving a variety of very powerful, wealthy interests. That's why this war has continued so long. They, they're making money out of it. And so, uh, I, I think what the reason you don't decapitate is bureaucracies inherently, like military units, they're built in echelons, and that if someone goes down, there's someone to step in to replace them. We've seen that happen dramatically in Iran. Uh, in fact, you look at how, look at how counterintuitive this has turned out to be that by, uh, attacking the Iranian leadership, you know, taking out that layer, that what you thought was the top layer, they've now created a leadership in Iran that's more united and stronger than any Iranian government in the last 47 years. Why do I say that? Because when you go down the list of, of the key members of the government, President Raisi, you know, he was an army medic that worked with and served with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the, during the war with Iraq back in the 1980s. Foreign minister Amirabdollahian, how about him? He also was a medic with the IRGC. Ghalibaf, the head of the parliament, he was a soldier. Fought with the IRGC. Khamenei, the new Ayatollah. He was a 17 and 18-year-old kid fighting with the IRGC for two years. Fought in at least four major campaigns. And then the head of the IRGC. So instead of these guys being divided, man, they all share a common bond. You've never, you've never had all members of the government where they all come out of that same, they all serve together in the military. Not, not in the same unit.
>> Mhm.
>> But they had that shared experience. So there's, there's that decapitation strategy. How did that work out? It's not, it's, it's a, it's a stupid strategy. And I think, and I think frankly, that's why Russia doesn't do it.
>> Right. And I think it also makes sense because Ukraine is not a sovereign state. So Iran is, is a sovereign state because, as you said, it's, now its leadership has been actually strengthened by the United States and Israel decapitating it, um,
>> Right.
>> in February. But Ukraine is not a sovereign state. It is being effectively run by Western actors. And so, you know, another Zelensky would, would probably be, uh, brought in in a matter of hours, and that wouldn't really change the course of Ukrainian politics or, uh, their unwillingness to, uh, to discuss a negotiated political settlement of the conflict.
>> Right. Yeah. No. No. So, it's going to, um, the settling, the settling the war in Ukraine ultimately involves with reaching an agreement with NATO and, and the effective defeat of NATO by Russia. And that's, that's really what's taking place right now. It's a, it's a de facto defeat of NATO because it's showing NATO that even if NATO decided to declare an Article 5 and all the countries in NATO lined up said, "Okay, yeah, we're going to, we're going to go to war with, uh, with Russia," they'd find out that, uh, they would collapse politically, and they do not have the industrial base to sustain such a campaign. Yet, we see Germany openly discussing the need to prepare for an open, direct military confrontation with Russia by 2030, by some reports. I've also seen 2028 and other reports. And I get a sense that, um, NATO is sort of planning to exhaust Russia via continued drone strikes and then, you know, they will try to cause economic damage while Europe is preparing for war. So, is Russia effectively being trapped by refusing, for, you know, one reason or another, by refusing to carry out a decisive military campaign to control Donbas and to take control of, of the territories that it possibly deems necessary beyond Donbas?
>> Yeah. No, they're, look, they, they are going to, uh, and probably by the end of this year, it will be apparent. They, they will have completely completed the economic castration of Ukraine. That Ukraine will no longer have access to the Black Sea because Russia will control Odessa. And Ukraine, therefore, will be, it's, it's a landlocked, trapped country. That the vast, it's, you know, most of its productive farmland is now fully under the control of Russia because it's farmland that is there east of the River Dnieper. So, uh, Ukraine will be in a situation where it's, its very survival as a state will be in question. And the Europeans, again, they do not have the economic growth or the industrial base to sustain military operations on the scale that we've witnessed in, in Ukraine over the last four years. They just don't. And they can talk about it, but, you know, it's like, I can sit around and say, "Oh, you know, I'm going to run the marathon." Well, do you, are you going to go out and run 10 miles today as part of your training? "Oh, no. I'm pretty busy. I'll have to do that later." So, I never train, but my God, I'm going to run the marathon. You know, so it means it's not going to talk. Talk is cheap. It's the action that counts. And we're not seeing the action take place in Europe that would back up the tough words.
>> Larry, maybe the last question. So, we're definitely seeing an escalatory, um, pattern in, in the war in, in Ukraine. And it is also clear that U.S.-Russia-Ukraine diplomatic efforts have failed and they've sort of been put on pause. Now, midterms elections are just several months away, and, uh, the elections may or may not lead to a change in the U.S. engagement in the war going forward. So, what is your prediction in terms of whether there is still a diplomatic element to the U.S.-Russia relations, or are we going to see a focus on the resolution on the battlefield without getting engaged in more negotiations to resolve it diplomatically?
>> Um, I, I think that actually, you will see a closer economic relationship between the United States and Russia, not at Russia's initiative, but at the initiative of the United States because of a global economic crisis that is likely to descend and and hit full, full fury in July and August, that the United States will need Russia. Currently, there's nothing that the United States makes, produces, manufactures, use whatever word you want, that, uh, that Russia needs. But in contrary to that, uh, Russia makes a couple of things that the United States needs, particularly with nuclear fuel for nuclear reactors that are providing power that needs to be produced to fuel AI data centers, fertilizer. Fertilizer is a huge component. Diesel, you know, heavy crude that is needed to produce diesel, which the United States is a net importer of. So, I could see out of this economic chaos that I think is going to descend, it would actually be a foundation where the United States would recognize it's going to be better off having economic and having trade relations with Russia than keeping Russia at arm's length as an adversary.
>> Well, it would have to probably remove sanctions on Russia first.
>> Yes. Yes. Well, they've already sort of de facto removed sanctions or at least temporarily deleted some. But I think, I think we're going to see more of that down the road, not less. The United States is going to, going to realize the limitations of its, of its ability to coerce other countries.
>> Larry, thank you so much for joining us and for helping us unpack the most recent events. Please give Larry a follow. I will link his, uh, blog, SonofTheNewAmericanRevolution.com, as well as his Substack in the video description below. I highly, highly recommend both. Thank you so much, Larry.
>> Hey, thank you, Elena. Bye-bye.