Transcription
This round, they are shooting and not stopping, shooting and then shooting continuously, back and forth, until Trump sent a letter. If looking at it from a legal perspective, it can be determined that the war has already begun. I think it is a new round of war already, but this round of war may not have expanded much beyond Hormuz. Iran's most important weapon in the first round was the economic weapon. If the United States can make the Strait of Hormuz open and allow ships to pass through, then Iran's powerful weapon will lose its effectiveness. In terms of geography, for a narrow strait like this, there are actually two things: first, you have to make sure that the other side has little or no capability to attack passing ships, because closing the strait is not about parking a ship to block it; closing the strait means that when you sail through, we can shoot and sink your ship, and that alone is considered the strait closed, because ships cannot run 24 hours a day continuously for months; they have to come in to load weapons, replenish ammunition, and give the crew rest. Right now, I'm not sure if the United States has that much naval power. Meanwhile, overall, the U.S. shipbuilding and ship repair industry, and the U.S. Navy, are experiencing the most severe ship maintenance problems in many years—some even say since World War. As far as I can see now, the United States does not yet have this force in hand in the Middle East up to this point. So that means the situation is not ready to do anything like this. If it is not ready to do something like this, then it must fall back to the original approach, which is to try to use airstrikes. If you know where there is a missile launcher or where there is a command post to attack, destroy them one by one—and frankly, go ahead and destroy them. But what the United States must do to truly open it is to make the world believe that even if Iran tries to shoot, the United States can retaliate. Right now, frankly, we haven't reached that point yet, not even close. So even if Trump talks, what Trump must demonstrate is that Trump can actually do it.
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>> I think it is a new round of war already, but this round of war may not have expanded much beyond Hormuz. Let me put it this way: it might sound like answering a question with a question, but I'm trying to say that the first round was an attack and a counterattack at a regional level, but this round of war I consider it a war, but it is still limited to the issue of the Strait of Hormuz. Notice that Iran's attacks focus only on small military targets, and the U.S. attacks focus only on forces related to the Strait of Hormuz; it hasn't expanded very far yet. So I feel it is still a limited war, but it must be said that the war has returned, from both Trump's posture and Iran's posture.
>> The point you, Yoshiwat, say that the war has returned—what posture of Trump and what posture of Iran are the symbols that this is not just a retaliatory attack but a war?
>> First of all, if you notice, during the tail end of the war or before the ceasefire agreement, there would be a back-and-forth shooting and then a ceasefire, then a ceasefire after just one or two rounds. That shows that each side was doing it to maintain bargaining advantage and leverage in negotiations. But this round, they are shooting and not stopping, shooting and then shooting continuously, back and forth, until Trump sent a letter. If looking at it from a legal perspective, that is an indicator that the war has already begun. And if looking at it from a behavioral perspective, the war started about 2 days ago already. So if this round is to be called a war, I think it can be called that—the second war.
>> In this round, the United States says the target of the attack is to destroy Iran's capability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz area. You, Yoshi, do you see this as the real target, or does the United States have other strategies or goals in launching this new round of war?
>> I think what the United States is doing is correcting mistakes. And if we were to say they lost in terms of opening or closing the Strait of Hormuz, that can be said in the first round—that is, the United States could not make the whole world confident that the Strait of Hormuz was open. So in this round, the United States is like saving face, like restoring its reputation, in one aspect. And another aspect is to ensure that Iran's most important weapon in the first round—the economic weapon—which is making the Strait of Hormuz impassable, causing 20-30% of oil to disappear from the global market, that is Iran's most powerful weapon. If the United States can make the Strait of Hormuz open and allow ships to pass through, then Iran's powerful weapon will lose its effectiveness. So I feel there are these two issues that I think are on Trump's mind. Whether he succeeds or not is another matter, but I feel this is what he is doing, and this is what the CENTCOM deployment and Trump's strategy, expressed through various letters and statements, focus on: making the Strait of Hormuz open.
>> But during the 4 months of war that have passed, the Strait of Hormuz has been an issue the whole time, and in the end, America still could not open the Strait of Hormuz. This time, Mr. Trump says he will blockade again and will become the guardian angel of the Strait of Hormuz area. There must be some operation. You, Yoshi, how do you see America doing something with the Strait of Hormuz? Theoretically, to make the Strait of Hormuz open, given its narrow geographical nature, there are actually two things. First, you have to make sure that the other side has little or no capability to attack passing ships, because closing the strait is not about parking a ship to block it; closing the strait means that when you sail through, we can shoot and sink your ship, and that alone is considered the strait closed. So if you reduce that capability or make it no longer a threat, then it can be considered open. That's the first point. The second point is to show the world, or show the ships passing through, that there is protection—that is, having naval forces to escort. Normally, for this kind of strait closure, you would place warships like a head and tail closure. If a missile comes, you shoot it down with interceptor missiles. You have to do both of these things. It sounds easy, but actually it's very difficult. Because first, with Iran's capability, they don't need large forces; they only need a few missiles, and the confidence of passing ships is already damaged. The opening or closing of a strait depends on the confidence, the belief of the ships, not on Trump's words or the IRGC's words. So as long as passing ships still believe the strait is impassable because they get shot, the strait is not open. Conversely, the naval force trying to open it must be large and have enough ships for rotation, because ships cannot run 24 hours a day continuously for months; they have to come in to load weapons, replenish ammunition, and give the crew rest. Right now, I'm not sure if the United States has that much naval power. Meanwhile, overall, the U.S. shipbuilding and ship repair industry, and the U.S. Navy, are experiencing the most severe ship maintenance problems in many years—some even say since World War. U.S. ships are deployed less. So we notice that ships in operation have to extend their deployments longer. For example, the USS Lincoln has been there since the first round until now without returning, or the USS Ford, which was extended for a year until the bathroom caught fire, until it finally got to return, and so on. So this matter—no matter how you talk about it—but what the United States must do to truly open it is to make the world believe that even if Iran tries to shoot, the United States can retaliate. Right now, frankly, we haven't reached that point yet, not even close. So even if Trump talks, what Trump must demonstrate is that Trump can actually do it. But with several ships being attacked like this, it raises doubts whether what Trump does and says can really be that way. That remains to be seen.
>> Are there any battle tactics or military deployment patterns that can provide protection for navigation or can actually protect the Strait of Hormuz area that America hasn't used before and might use?
>> Actually, to make it more effective, the United States would have to land troops on the beaches along Iran's coast and open a line—what they call a "safety line"—by striking deep about 40-50-60 kilometers to ensure that Iran cannot set up coastal missiles to attack cargo ships passing through. But on the other hand, as we always say, landing troops is a huge deal—a massive undertaking. It requires hundreds of thousands of troops, hundreds or thousands of tanks, and much more than that. As far as I can see now, the United States does not yet have this force in hand in the Middle East up to this point. So that means the situation is not ready to do anything like this. If it is not ready to do something like this, then it must fall back to the original approach, which is to try to use airstrikes. If you know where there is a missile launcher or where there is a command post to attack, destroy them one by one—and frankly, go ahead and destroy them. They might not all be eliminated because Iran can produce replacements. Or secondly, the U.S. must bring ships to form a head and tail closure, set up a convoy—it's really like that, like we walk as a tour group, the tour leader holds a flag, everyone follows, and there is a tail-end person. The front and rear people carry missiles; if someone shoots, they intercept and shoot down. It's not easy—it sounds easy, but actually it's not easy at all. So if the United States is going to do it, I think there isn't much more than this, because if there were more, it would require land power, and the situation is certainly not ready for that.
>> In the latest letter explaining to Congress, President Trump said there will definitely be no deployment of ground forces. The operation will be limited, carefully planned, aimed at minimizing civilian casualties, but will only destroy military capabilities that threaten U.S. forces and the U.S. homeland. The issue is: does this explanation in the letter sent to Congress represent the final word? In real military operations, in actual combat strategy, can it be adjusted from this document?
>> I think if adjustments are to be made, the U.S. must notify something additional, and it might have to reach the point where—if it is bigger than this—it would have to ask Congress for a war declaration, like the Iraq war in the past. Because this is the maximum that naval and air forces in the forward area—I use the term "forward area," meaning not forces stationed in the U.S., but forces stationed in CENTCOM in the Middle East—can do. The forward forces can only do this much, as we see. If it wants to do more than this, it certainly needs to ask Congress, like when they were about to invade Iraq. So if it reaches that point, okay, it's a big, long story for sure. But I still feel the same—I don't believe the U.S. is ready to go that far. I don't believe the U.S. is ready to send ground forces in, given the oil price crisis, domestic political problems, and various issues—Americans are war-weary. So ultimately, with the U.S.'s own political constraints, it will force the U.S. to only do this much: use air power and naval power.