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Well, boots on the ground, if we're talking about a large-scale invasion of Iran, similar to what we did in Iraq, I think that is unthinkable. I think Trump could not get away with that, and I don't think he would do that to begin with. Uh And you want to remember that the temptation is there because almost everybody recognizes that you can't get regime change uh simply through bombing a country. You have to put boots on the ground if you want regime change. The record's quite clear on that. You can get regime change in Iran, but it requires boots on the ground, which is of course what prompts your question cuz they haven't gotten regime change with air power alone. So, now maybe time to send in the ground troops. That's not going to happen.
They are talking about two possible contingencies where we send in ground troops. One has to do with the nuclear material that is in the possession of the Iranians that is enriched up to 60%. As you know, you only have to enrich uranium to 90% to get weapons-grade material. And the Iranians have a large amount of Iranian that it Iranian enriched uranium that is enriched up to 60%, and we're very worried about that, and there's talk about maybe sending special forces teams into Iran to capture that 60% enriched uranium. So, that's one scenario people are talking about. And the other is talking about using the 82nd Airborne, which has apparently been mobilized to maybe conquer or capture this small island Kharg Island that belongs to Iran and is located in the Persian Gulf and has uh a lot of Iran's oil infrastructure located there. So, we're talking about possibly doing that as well.
To be honest, I would be surprised if we did either one of those operations, but they're small-scale in nature, and they're not going to produce success in any meaningful way, and I think the Iranians are smart enough to have figured out that those are possibilities, and they've built a defensive capability to deal with them. So, I don't think we have a ground forces option here, and I think that President Trump would be, to put it bluntly, I think he'd be nuts to send ground forces into Iran. And what that tells you then and is that he's going to have to rely on air power, which is what we've been doing up to now. And if you look at the historical record on what air power can do for you, there's no real cause for optimism here.
Yeah, well, your good colleague and actually one-time student back in 1982, Robert Pape, has written very eloquently on that subject with his book of "Bombing to Win". And wouldn't this whole mess just simply mobilize Arabs and Iranians against US military hegemony and actually Israeli hegemony in the Middle East? There's no question about that. It will certainly mobilize the Shia in places like Iraq, and Iran, of course, is basically a Shia country, and Bahrain, where the population is 70-plus percent Shia, and in all sorts of other places. I think even more generally it's enraged people in the Arab and Islamic world. And you want to remember, Ian, we're not just talking about Iran, we're talking about the genocide in Gaza. I mean, one thing that's happened as a result of the Iran war is that we pay hardly any attention to the Ukraine war. It's really quite remarkable. Every day I say to myself, "What's going on in the Ukraine war?" And it's very difficult to find any information in the mainstream media and even in a lot of the alternative media about what's going on in Ukraine. And with regard to the Gaza genocide, hardly any attention is paid to these day is paid these days to what's going on in Gaza or what's going on in the West Bank. But people in the Arab and Islamic world have not forgotten the Gaza genocide. So, it's not just Iran, it's the Gaza genocide as well.
And then I would add to that, if you are a person who lives in one of the Gulf states, you have to ask yourself the question, "How do you think about dealing with the West?" Uh and especially the United States because it's the United States for that is responsible for the fact that you're being bombed and your country may be ruined. If you live in the UAE or you live in Bahrain or you live in Saudi Arabia, and you think about where you are today compared to where you were before February 28th, the situation is obviously much worse today. And there is a possibility your country will be destroyed. I mean, literally destroyed. And you then have to say to yourself, "Who's responsible for this?" And in a way you can blame Iran, but if you think long and hard about it, the Iranians are not responsible for this fiasco. It's the Americans and the Israelis. And the Americans and the Israelis, one could argue, are the real threat to you. So, I think when this war is finally over with, it's going to be very interesting to see what the Gulf states do in terms of their relationship with the United States. There's no question that they're going to still fear Iran for all the obvious reasons, and that's going to push them towards the United States. But there are countervailing forces at play here, and that is that if you get too close to the United States, you see what happens. We're seeing it right now, and again, it could get much worse. So, I think you're going to see countries like Saudi Arabia, for example, move closer to China and Russia and do everything they can to distance themselves from the United States. And indeed, before this war started, before February 28th, the Saudis had reached a strategic agreement with Pakistan, where Pakistan had promised to put its nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia. And then you saw that the Turks wanted in on that deal, that alliance. The Turks want to create a Pakistani-Turkish-Saudi alliance because the Turks understand that you really can't rely on the Americans. The Turks don't have nuclear weapons, either, and the Turks also understand that if Iran is finished off, they're the next target. Naftali Bennett, the former Israeli Prime Minister, has made it some comments recently about Turkey make it clear that once Israel's done with Iran, the Israelis will put their crosshairs on Turkey, which is exactly what you would expect from that ruthless regime. Uh so, I think that when all is said and done, this war is going to have done will have done really huge damage to America's position in the Arab and Islamic world. And not only in the Arab and Islamic world, by the way, also in countries like India as well. We could go on about that. This war is a catastrophe for the United States. There's no question about that.
Yeah, I completely agree, and I always say that foreign policy begins and ends with from domestic considerations and domestic sort of limitations. Now, this war is already almost as unpopular as the US war in Iraq was 10 years after that war finished. Uh you know, can Trump break all historical precedent and get the American people on board with this endeavor, do you think? No, I think if anything, what happens is that uh the uh public opinion in the United States goes south from this point forward. I mean, I think he's at a high watermark now. I think more and more people are beginning to realize this was a foolish enterprise. You want to remember that he took us into this war. He took the United States into this war when roughly 20% of the people supported going to war. Roughly 20%. Now, once he got into the war, there was a rally around the flag effect, which is what always happens, and then you get around 40% of the people who will support the war. So, you went from 20% supporting war beforehand to around 40% supporting the fight once you're in it. That sort of thing always happens, but that will now begin to fall off, and people will begin to ask themselves, "What's going on here? Why are we doing this?" Uh I think it was the Wall St- either the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times had an article before the war's Excuse me, slightly after the war started that said, "This is the first time a US president has taken the United States into a war where public opinion was decidedly against the conflict before it started." Uh you remember the Iraq war in 2003, uh the propagandizing by the Bush administration was so successful that most Americans thought it was a good idea, and they were enthusiastic about the war. But as you point out, public opinion went south over time, and today that decision is widely considered to be the most disastrous decision in American foreign policy. Uh Foreign Affairs, the magazine Foreign Affairs, uh did a a poll of American diplomatic historians recently and asked the question, "Well, what was the biggest folly uh that any American president has made uh with regard to uh US foreign policy?" And number one on that list was the decision to to invade Iraq in 2003. Uh yeah, no, absolutely uh agree with that. I think it's between 71 and 75% US public support for the war in Iraq in 2003 and 90% in 1991 for the for the Gulf War.
Um Uh so, >> [laughter] >> a question that often sort of plays on my mind is, is there I mean, to me, uh as as I see it, the White House seems to be packed with yes people, yet mostly yes men, but some yes women, uh you know, as well. Is there anyone in the White House who can tell uh Emperor Trump that he has no clothes? It's hard to say. Uh I I would think the one person who could do that is J.D. Vance. Uh I I think Vance uh has had reservations about this operation from the beginning. I think there's no no doubt that Vance is very smart, and uh he's capable of figuring out where we are and thinking hard about what to do moving forward. How much influence he has is another matter. He's in a very delicate position because he wants to be president someday, and he understands that to achieve that goal, uh he has to have President Trump's support. So, he's not in a position where he can challenge Trump in any meaningful way. But I think once you get beyond Vance and you sort of look at who the other key players are in the decision-making process, you know, people like Marco Rubio, Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, uh and especially Pete Hegseth, it's hard to have much confidence in those people. Uh they either don't know much about foreign policy. I mean, if you think about Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner being Trump's principal negotiators on Iran, uh the Palestinian issue, and uh the Russia-Ukraine war, you really just say, "How can this be?" Uh I mean, these two know hardly anything uh about foreign policy, and uh they have no diplomatic experience, and you're giving them three big portfolios to handle. Again, they're handling the Palestine issue, they're handling the Iran issue, and they're handling the Ukraine-Russia issue. Uh these are amateurs, uh and with regard to Iran and with regard to uh the Palestine issue, uh and here we're talking mainly about the genocide in Gaza, these are two uh you know, ultra-Zionists. I mean, these are two people who are profoundly committed to Israel. Uh they should not be handling negotiations involving Israel, and that, of course, uh means the Iran and the Palestine portfolios, but they're handling those uh portfolios, and they're handling the Russia-Ukraine portfolio again, and they just don't know very much. These are inexperienced people. These are neophytes, and uh and they have President Trump's ears. Uh they're people who give him advice on what to do. So, it's hardly surprising that we're in so much trouble. And then you look at people like Marco Rubio. I mean, Marco Rubio is not an impressive uh strategist, in my opinion. Uh and uh he serves as both national security advisor and secretary of state. Uh so, uh I don't know who's there giving Trump smart advice, but I hope that Vance is and maybe a handful of other people who we don't know about.
Yeah. Uh do you think the Israeli stranglehold I mean, you're you're the kind of the expert on this this topic more than anyone, really. Will the Israeli stranglehold over the US foreign policy establishment survive uh this catastrophic war in Iran? It'll survive it, uh but it'll be weakened, for sure. There's no question about it, and how much it's weakened remains to be seen. Uh it's really quite amazing how many people understand uh that the Israelis have basically uh led us into this war, that uh uh Prime Minister Netanyahu has been the key force uh pushing President Trump uh to go to war against Iran, uh and all sorts of people understand now the power of the lobby. Uh this is the Israel lobby or the Zionist lobby inside the United States. And because the war is not going well, this is bad news for Israel and bad news for the lobby in terms of uh how much influence it has inside of the United States. Uh we're in a fundamentally different world today when it comes to the Israel lobby uh than we were back in 2006, uh roughly 20 years ago, when uh Steve Walt and I wrote the original article on the Israel lobby that appeared in the London Review of Books. Uh many, many more people understand uh that the lobby is out there influencing US foreign policy in the Middle East, and those people also understand that it's not in the American national interest. Uh but still, the lobby is enormously powerful, uh especially in Congress and especially on President Trump. So, it remains to be seen moving forward just how much diminishment or how much the the lobby is diminished uh and Israel is diminished in terms of its influence. I would make one final on this, Ian. And that is that I think a lot depends on how this war plays out. If you read the media carefully these days, it's quite clear that the Americans are beginning to get cold feet in Iran, and they want to limit the amount of damage that we inflict on Iran. Uh as I think I said before, uh the Americans are not interested in going after the oil infrastructure in Iran, and the Israelis are. Uh and it's quite clear that the Americans are now looking for an off-ramp, and the Israelis are not looking for an off-ramp. Uh so, it is possible that you could have a big fight in public between the Israelis on one side, uh with the lobby, of course, and uh uh and the Americans on the other side, and here we're talking about the Trump administration. If Trump and company get desperate and they want to bring this war to an end short of victory or anything that could be described as victory, and the Israelis are opposed to that, you could have an open fight. Uh and that would further damage the lobby, and it would further damage Israel's position in the United States. But whether that happens remains to be seen because we really don't know how this war is going to play out, and then what the aftermath is going to look like.
Yeah, I completely agree. I think I saw a report from Jinnsa. Uh I think that they were making the case for for boots on the ground. I think that's what what it said. It sort of popped up on my screen just a a day or so ago, but anyway, um so, I mean, you know, in in tiny, faltering steps, the Europeans are kind of distancing themselves, you know, from the US over this. In an entirely predictable way, uh Russia's going to benefit in terms of the elevated oil price. I mean, that's absolutely clear and completely predictable. What does all this mean for the for the Ukraine war? Well, I think it's bad news for the Ukrainians. Almost everybody agrees on that point. Uh as you say, excuse me again. As you said, there is no question uh that the Russian economy is going to benefit in a big way from what's happening in the oil markets. Uh you see this with India, right? The Americans put great pressure on the Indians to cut back on the amount of oil they imported from Russia. We've now done a 180-degree turn on that, and we're telling the Indians that it's fine if they buy Russian oil. Uh this is good news for the Russian economy. Our efforts to strangle the Russian economy uh are clearly failing. Uh so, that'll make it easy for the Russians uh to continue waging this war from an economic perspective. But I would also think uh it's hard to get details on this, but I would also think that all of the ammunition and weaponry that we're expending in the Gulf War, and here I'm talking about the Iran war, uh is going to cause problems uh in terms of us providing weaponry for Ukraine. As you know, the United States no longer directly provides weaponry for Ukraine. The Europeans buy that weaponry from the United States and then they send it on to Ukraine. I would imagine that there are limits now that were not there before February 28th in terms of what we can put in the pipeline to Ukraine. Exactly again, exactly what those limits are is hard to say, but I would note to you that the United States is now pulling THAAD and Patriot missiles out of East Asia and sending them to the Middle East. This is causing huge problems in South Korea. The South Koreans don't want those THAAD missiles taken out, but we're taking them out because we have no choice. This is one of the consequences of getting into a protracted war in the in the Middle East. And by the way, you want to remember Ian that before the war started General Keane, who's the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told President Trump that we did not have the stocks of ammunition and weaponry to fight and win a long war in the Middle East. So what's happening here as we fall into a long war is that we're robbing Peter to pay Paul. We're taking forces out of East Asia and sending them to the Middle East. And this same basic logic is surely going to apply to Ukraine. So Ukraine's going to get less weaponry after this war started than it would have gotten had the war not started. So I think Ukraine is in bad shape as a result of this war. It was already in bad shape as you know. But it's going to be in worse shape and the Russians are in better shape because their economy will benefit from the war. So in terms of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, this is a net positive for the Russians and a net negative for the Ukrainians.
Yeah, no, I completely agree. >> [laughter] >> And actually, you know, don't need to get into this, but the Europeans have already said, "Well, this is no time to buy cheap Russian >> [laughter] >> energy." More self-defeating policy, but that's an aside. Final question, I know we don't know how much longer this this war will go on. Hopefully not too much longer. Uh but staying down the ballot in November and midterms, you know, do you think the Republicans are going to take a shellacking? Well, it was quite clear before February 28th when the war started that the Republicans were in serious trouble and most people thought that the the Republicans would lose the House for sure and might even lose the Senate. The economy was not going in Trump's way for sure and many people expected thing that things would get worse before the election in November and that the affordability issue would really cause significant problems for President Trump and for the Republican Party more generally. When you throw the war in on top of that and when you look at what's happening to gas prices and you look at what's happening on the inflation front and so forth and so on. And then when you realize that this war is not over and the negative effects are not over and the negative effects may get much worse you can see where the Republicans stand a really good chance of getting shellacked in the November election to use your rhetoric. But as you know, November is a long time off and politics is a crazy business and anything can happen. Uh but it's also, you know, when you talk about anything can happen, it's also possible that things could get much, much worse for President Trump. And if you had to bet whether you think things are going to get much worse for President Trump or they're going to get much better, I think you'd almost axiomatically bet that they're likely to get much worse rather than much better. So in terms of the November elections, I think the the Republicans and President Trump are playing with fire. And you want to remember that if the Democrats get large majorities in the House and in the Senate it's likely that they will move to impeach President Trump. He's been impeached twice now and it's hard to imagine that the Republicans wouldn't face a third effort at impeachment by the Democrats. And that's the nightmare scenario for President Trump.