Transcription
There's this phenomenon that's extremely prevalent yet completely boggles the mind, and that is Arab normalization with Israel. For many decades now, the Arab states, which obviously are run by dictators, have been getting closer and closer to an entity that, by all means, is the natural enemy of any state in the region.
So, to discuss this seemingly insane phenomenon, I'm joined in this two-part series by Dr. Maha Aam. Dr. Aam received her DPhil from Oxford University in the study of Islamist movements in the Sadat era in Egypt. She's also the head of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council. Please enjoy.
Well, Egypt has always been considered, um, a leading state in the region in terms of its geographic position, its political position, um, its potential both economically and socially, in, uh, being a, if you like, a powerhouse in the region. Um, of course, when we speak about 1948, we speak about a time before the coup of 1952 and, uh, the, uh, prevalence of a monarchy in Egypt and at a time when there was great turbulence because of the British occupation in Egypt and, uh, the establishment, um, of the Zionist state, uh, in 1948.
So there is often a kind of confusion about where Egypt was politically on the map in 1948 and where it saw itself, and the region saw it post-1952 with the rise of Arab nationalism, with the rhetoric of Nasser and so on. But in 1948, at the time of the establishment of the Zionist state and following the partition of Palestine, um, on the behest of the United Nations and British machinations, uh, the reality was that Egypt, um, after the fall of the Caliphate, um, was, in many ways, in turmoil both as a society and politically. Um, the Muslim Brotherhood at the time was a very important player on the ground as a social and political movement, and they took up the cause of Palestine first and foremost before anyone else, to defend the rights of the Arabs and the Palestinians to the land. They were the ones who sent fighters to Palestine. And in reality, the Arab armies and the Arab, uh, states surrounding Palestine failed to really take up their proper and called-for role at the time.
So in 1948, Egypt, in a, in a sense, did not play the major role that it should have played because it was politically in turmoil, as I've said, and because it had a, a, a limited kind of space for social movements and political movements and political parties to maneuver. And first and foremost among those, because there was some kind of political space, those that moved were from among the Muslim Brotherhood. Thereafter the partition, uh, thereafter the establishment of the state in 1948, we see a failure all around in terms of the exodus of the Palestinians because of the massacre, the massacres that happened, uh, like Deir Yassin, and the refugee issue, uh, becoming a major issue, and the Arab states really being unable or unwilling, uh, to really, uh, uh, confront, uh, the Zionist onslaught in Palestine at the time.
And after the coup, uh, we had a rise of a particular form of Arab nationalism with the, uh, the highly lorded or highly praised Jamal Abdul Nasser, Nasserism. And he had a kind of particular, uh, uh, kind of idea about what it meant to be an Arab, about what the Arab world should look like. How did Israel fit into that? Was he totally at odds with Israel? Was there something, you know, uh, behind the scenes happening since the coup of 1952?
Um, we saw the rise of Arab nationalism, the idea, uh, that Arab unity was central, the rhetoric of, um, Arab socialism, and there was a growing sense throughout the Arab world that, um, Egypt and other countries, uh, uh, like Syria and, and, uh, countries across the region, bar those of course of the Gulf, were, uh, going to fight the war of liberation and, uh, uh, Nasser's own stance during, uh, the Suez Canal crisis, uh, fed into this idea that somehow a charismatic leader would be able to carry the mantle and, uh, deliver victory. Uh, there was much rhetoric. There was, uh, a great deal of, um, dictatorship and, uh, ostentatious dictatorial rhetoric, uh, that made people believe that victory was round the corner. In reality, there was no preparation for, uh, confronting the enemy. There was no, there was the nation, the Egyptian nation and the Arab peoples were sold lie after lie in terms of the capabilities of Egypt militarily, and ultimately, uh, we had an officer class in power that could neither deliver militarily, politically, or economically to the nation, uh, and we saw one of the worst military disasters, uh, in the region in 1967 with the occupation of Sinai, the Golan Heights, uh, and East Jerusalem.
Uh, and what we, um, discovered over the years and decades is that the Arab peoples were sold the lie both of socialism, of, uh, victory against Israel, and of unity. Uh, in reality, these remain aspirations, I believe, of the majority of the Arab peoples. But, uh, in Nasser and in, um, subsequent Egyptian leaders and, of course, Arab leaders, none of them were really, um, uh, focused on these goals. They were focused on the goals of survival of their regimes and of keeping their populations under control.
Uh, that brings me on to one of the, uh, events that undermines the narrative about Arab unity, which is that in the 60s, the Egyptians were, uh, kind of at war with the Saudis in Yemen, as far as I understand it. What were the Egyptians doing in Yemen as opposed to figuring out how to deal with the situation on their border?
I think in reality, again, like a lot of dictators before him, Nasser wanted to occupy his army with conflicts that really, um, were detrimental, uh, to the nation and to neighboring nations, uh, the idea that somehow, uh, the, you know, Nasser and socialist in quotes Egypt, uh, was, um, you know, an alternative to the monarchies of, uh, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and it was there to defend, uh, you know, some kind of vision of, of, of, of socialism, and in some ways its relation with the Soviet Union at the time was also key for Egypt. Um, all this was, in a sense, part of the game that Nasser was playing, both in Yemen, that cost the lives of Egyptian soldiers, of, of, of many others as well, and, uh, really, uh, just was a game of manipulation. Uh, both, uh, not this is not in defense of the monarchies of the Gulf, but was a game of manipulation, uh, where you had a presidential socialist system in Egypt countering, uh, the, the, the archaic Gulf states and and their monarchies. In both instances, uh, they both proved themselves to fail their nations, uh, one in the 60s and ongoing now, the system in Egypt and of course those of the Gulf as well. Uh, they were neither the guardians of a different system that could deliver either. Uh, they were at loggerheads for different reasons, but they both failed their peoples. They failed Yemen. They failed the Gulf. And they failed Egypt.
How has the officer class managed to survive this long considering for about 60 years or even more, they failed to deliver on anything tangible to the Egyptian people?
In reality, um, Egypt is a very poor country. The vast majority of its population, uh, till this day, lives on less than $2 a day. Um, and, uh, it is a large percentage of its population, 30%, uh, live on the poverty line. Um, and Egyptians, um, in many ways, um, believed that somehow the military, uh, could deliver in 1952 when it overthrew the the monarchical system. But the security state, in reality, the military state, the police state that was established then in the 60s continues till this day. Um, it has manifested itself, um, in society at large. We have a nation of conscripts, um, and a nation where there is a huge bureaucracy, um, a country where, um, in reality, people live day-to-day in order just to feed their families. Um, and the military, uh, engendered, um, a, a nation that was afraid to rise up in order to, um, ensure that its rights were respected. It controlled from day one, uh, many of the structures of the state, uh, the institutions of the state rather, the most important being the media and the other being the judiciary. There is much talk that the judiciary came particularly under the manipulation of the military post-2013 under Abdul Fattah el-Sisi. But in reality, the judiciary did have some components that were independent, but it was from day one, under the control of, from the 50s onwards, under the control of the military.
So when you have a state that controls the judiciary, it controls the media, it controls political space through, um, uh, arrests, through, uh, uh, security, a security system, through intelligence, it is very difficult, uh, to rise against that state. There have been numerous attempts, small and large, particularly in 2011, to do so. But in reality, the military is, uh, one of the most difficult, um, institutions to oppose. We've seen this in Latin America where it took many, uh, decades to overthrow and get rid of the military. We saw it in Spain under Franco. We saw it in Portugal and in Greece. Um, and therefore the Arab world in some ways is no different. It may be taking a bit longer, but, uh, I believe the change will happen.
I'd like to go back to normalization. The normalization between Egypt and Israel occurred in 1974 after Egypt, uh, well some say won, some might agree, but they fought a war, the the Yom Kippur War, and then they regained back Sinai. Now Sadat is blamed for this, what some would call a great betrayal. But was this the first time that Egyptians and maybe Arabs sought normalization? Was there any talks behind the scenes whilst Jamal Abdel Nasser was still around? Or was it just simply, uh, a, uh, a development post-1973?
No, I think, uh, Jamal Abdel Nasser, as we've said, um, raised, uh, the, the, the level of rhetoric and narrative against Israel, but in reality, uh, Egypt was never in a real position, uh, to fight a war with Israel. The preparations and the strategy was not there. Even the vision was not there. But post-67, I think that defeat laid the ground for, um, subsequent surrender. And I see Camp David and what Sadat did as that subsequent surrender. Um, I believe it was a, it was unnecessary to surrender in that way because you can be in a weak position militarily and politically, but not surrender. Uh, what Sadat did with the Camp David Accords was surrender. Sinai was returned, but it was a demilitarized Sinai. Uh, the October War, the Egyptian, 73 war, heralded as a victory, I believe tied the Egyptians to, um, a relationship with Israel which was in which they remain the weak party, in which Israel has, uh, the right to, uh, maneuver as it pleases, and where ultimately we see that Egypt, Egypt, um, really, uh, gained very little from the Camp David Accords. It's been a cold peace. It was a cold peace under Mubarak, but nonetheless, it was a peace that served Israel first and foremost. Um, and we have seen, um, where Egypt is now with its, um, position vis-à-vis what is happening in Gaza.
So was Mubarak more of the same? I mean, Sadat obviously didn't last very long once he signed that agreement, but, uh, Mubarak was perfectly happy to go along with, with, with, w with the agreement, very much so. He, um, endorsed it even more through his relations with Israel, through, um, close ties with Israel, and Egypt really is bound, very closely bound in terms of intelligence, in terms of security matters, uh, with, with Israel, and politically, uh, in a sense, Egypt, uh, lost what independence it had, uh, through the Camp David Accords and through, uh, the, the, the Mubarak regime, and today, um, Egypt is very closely aligned, uh, with Israel, whatever the rhetoric may be. The reality is that if we hear, um, a narrative that opposes Israel, it's because Egypt or its leadership feels it is being squeezed for more by Israel and is trying to find a balance, but ultimately it is serving Israeli interests, um, systematically since the Camp David Accords and, uh, till this day as we speak.
Between the Mubarak era and the current era, we had a brief period of democracy in Egypt. The first and only democratically elected Egyptian leader who was also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. And you mentioned earlier that the Muslim Brotherhood were possibly the only kind of, uh, social group or social movement that promoted struggling for liberation of Palestine or against a Zionist invasion of Palestine rather. Did the relationship between Egypt and Israel change during that time? Was there any tensions?
I think there were, um, many underlying tensions. I believe, uh, the first democratically elected civilian president of Egypt, the first democratically elected president full stop, uh, President Mohamed Morsi, uh, created a great deal of unease in Tel Aviv because they knew full well that, uh, the Egyptian people, um, were, uh, as a whole, critical of Israel, uh, they were pro-Palestinian, and you mentioned that the Brotherhood, um, just now was maybe the only ones that took action in '48, but in reality, society as a whole as well is sympathetic and pro the Palestinian cause, and it's something we see today. So, President Morsi and his government were a reflection of the Egyptian people, the people, the majority of whom voted, voted him in. Um, his position vis-à-vis Gaza was very strong. He, uh, uh, was for opening the border, with ensuring that aid, uh, was re, was received in Gaza. Um, and I personally, uh, from visits, um, after the coup, uh, to the United States, learned, uh, through officials that, um, Morsi would not budge, and he would not budge over security issues. Um, he, uh, was an important component in defending, uh, both Egypt's rights but also with not giving leeway, uh, more leeway to Israel. He knew that, uh, that the Camp David Accords were a treaty that was signed, that, um, needed to be respected at that particular time. But it didn't mean that he was going to be, um, a sellout. And the Israelis knew it, the United States knew it. And, um, it didn't serve him well. But, uh, history will remember, and I believe the Egyptian people will remember who stood with the Palestinian cause and, um, and who didn't. And definitely President, the late President Morsi did, and he was not a sellout.
And after Morsi was, uh, ousted by the current president el-Sisi, it seems like Egypt has, uh, taken not a stumble but rather, uh, you know, jumped off a cliff. Uh, it seems to me that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been employed by some sort of nefarious foreign actor to do everything in his power to completely dismantle any form of, I don't know the word in English, he, you know, that Egypt used to have, and we see Egypt today in a state which I don't know, well, which 20, 30 years ago you would not, never have imagined Egypt to be. How would you, I mean, apart, how I preempted this question, but how would you assess how things have been going for Egypt, uh, over the last, was it 12 years?
I think, um, Egypt, um, represents the broader region and it always has in one way or another. Um, it is a catastrophe. Uh, Egypt represents, uh, the weakness of, um, a country that ought to have far more clout. Uh, it represents, uh, a weak, uh, state that, um, um, has a military dictatorship that is trying to hold on to power that has exploited the nation through a great deal of corruption. Uh, the military is in control of the economy. Some say as much as 60% of the economy. Uh, the, um, management of the economy has been, uh, disastrous. Um, it lives on borrowed money. Um, I won't go into the level of inflation and all the, the, the, the collapse of the Egyptian pound, all the things that others may say to me, but it's happened in other countries. But the difference is that in Egypt, it has been 12 years of one disaster after another, um, and a political system that really doesn't, is not even worth the term system. It is a, um, elite in power headed by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his cronies, uh, that have, um, sucked the country dry. The, the, the disparity between the haves and have-nots is greater than ever before. While the majority of Egyptians, uh, suffer, there is no middle class to speak of. Uh, poverty in Egypt is rife. Um, there is, uh, there has been a disastrous strategy as regards, uh, Egypt's national security, whether it comes to whe, whether it, it's about Egypt's rights to the waters of the Nile because of, um, a disastrous, um, agreement with Ethiopia, uh, uh, whether it is to do with its right to the gas in the Mediterranean and its reliance on, um, imports of gas from Israel. Um, Egypt has, uh, really, um, is on the brink. It is on the brink, and people say, well, why isn't there any change? In reality, uh, when there is that level of poverty and that level of, um, uh, lethargy and fear because of the consequences of speaking out, the majority don't speak out, and the military class, um, and I say the military class, and it's their cronies, not just Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, have played havoc with the country. They have done so since 1952. Um, the corruption levels in Egypt, whether under Sadat or Mubarak or today, um, just continue. Uh, and the country is in the worst state ever. Um, but that is a reflection of Egypt on its own independently. But the failure of regimes throughout the region, um, it requires serious change from the bottom.
For all Mubarak's faults, and you mentioned that he was completely on board with Camp David. He didn't flood the, uh, uh, the tunnels allowing food and stuffs and and goods to enter into Gaza. He at least allowed some movement in and out of Gaza. Yet here today we have a president Abu Fattah el-Sisi who's completely blocked off, uh, uh, kind of aid and and goods going into Gaza, whether it's flooding the tunnels, destroying the networks, whether it's, uh, the smuggling tunnels, I mean, whether it's blocking off, uh, the access, people to go in and out through the Rafah crossing. What's made that, what's what's spurred on that change? Why is el-Sisi so much more brutal towards the Palestinians than his predecessors?
Probably because he is in tandem with Israel and increasing Israeli brutality. Israeli brutality was always there. The blockade, in one form or another, on Gaza was always there. But as the situation in Gaza changed, those who head the regime in Egypt respond in like so. I think the idea that one regime is better than another or one worse than another, what I believe they represent a single continuum, and ultimately, el-Sisi, yes, maybe worse than Mubarak or co-worse than Sadat or whatever, but I'm not sure that it is a useful, um, um, you know, description or, uh, comparison because had Mubarak been in power now, I believe he would have done the same. Well, I think we have regimes in power, uh, that are allied to Israel's interests, and the component here that we have to assess and concentrate on is the nature of that alliance and the nature of that regime, not personalities. El-Sisi has played a, um, the, the role of a, um, a lackey, a lackey of Israel. Uh, but so did Sadat, and I believe in a sense it is the nature of those that come to power and are allowed to remain in power in, in Egypt. Um, in a way, the what determines their survival in many ways is their, uh, close relationship with Israel.
Is the fact that Hamas, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, the fact that they're in power in Gaza, does that play into how el-Sisi views and how el-Sisi, uh, responds to and treats the Palestinians of Gaza?
I am sure that, uh, el-Sisi, um, would respond to any independent leadership in Gaza in the same way. Any leadership that wants, um, independence, that wants to confront, uh, the, the Zionist aggression. Uh, any leadership that wants, uh, uh, liberation. Um, in reality, el-Sisi, as we said, is closely aligned to the Israeli and Zionist project. Um, and, um, therefore he will promote and, uh, oppose, um, uh, he will promote an agenda that is not in the interests of the Palestinians and also oppose any attempt to achieve real self-determination. Uh, the idea that el-Sisi or any other Arab regime, uh, wants an independent Palestinian state, um, has to be approached with great caution because what is the nature of that state, uh, and, uh, um, who is going to be allowed to lead that state and what is its relationship going to be with the Zionist state? I think those are key questions. We don't want, uh, Bantustans. Uh, if anyone wants to speak about the Palestinian state, they must be fully aware that, um, that is going to come with major restrictions from the international order and from regional states as well. I think the Palestinians want real independence. They don't want, uh, a small piece of territory that they can just call Palestine.
I want to move on from Egypt because Egypt, Egypt is far from the only normalizing Arab state. But a question that's on my mind while listening to, uh, your analysis
Of the situation is: why would any Egyptian leader uh be content with being Israel's lackey? I mean, you have one of the largest uh, you know, resources, you know, sources of human capital in the region, right? You've got over 100 million uh uh people among your population. These are individuals that could raise your status up right to becoming the most powerful country in the region, if not further than that. And yet, you as a president, you as an officer class, as an establishment elite, are okay with being the lackey for this cancerous Zionist entity. What explains that kind of behavior and that kind of thinking?
I think it is um, if you like, the the disease of all authoritarian regimes and dictators. Uh, it doesn't just apply to Egypt. It's a major question as to why uh those in power seek more power and do not seek to share in the wealth of their nation uh equally or fairly. Uh, it's greed. It is um the fact that uh there are people who come to power that are supported and remain in power because of outside forces uh that are not independent. And the reality is the history also of our part of the world. Um, despite the idea that we are independent states, I believe we still remain colonized uh, colonized politically uh and colonized culturally. Uh, and therefore, um the those that are at the helm of Egypt and the helm of other Arab states really represent the continued um occupation, if you like, of our part of the world. A neoc-colonialism uh that um uh feeds on the greed and the desires of those who want to remain in power, to become wealthier, to keep uh uh circles of influence um u around them and to ensure that they are happy and rich and wealthy.
Uh, that is the case in Egypt and in other parts of the world uh, particularly in our region. Um, and until there is um a real um uh response to that that comes from the bottom up um uh and from different uh even from different classes and different sectors of society, um then this situation will continue. Uh, yes, we are a nation in Egypt of over a 100 million. Uh, and there are millions across the Arab world that have suffered from um these um lackeys in power, from uh from the the greed uh of these lackeys, from their policies of imprisonment and torture of anyone who speaks out, and the killing and murder of innocent people who speak out. But unless there is um organized resistance to those in power, um then they have uh a free reign to do as they wish uh with their societies and uh to forge alliances that are harmful and are in the interests of ultimately a poison in the middle of the Arab world; a um a poison that is Zionism.
Uh, a poison that I believe, as we have seen in the last few months and weeks, uh more and more people across the world recognizing the danger of Zionism and um the ugly features of Zionism that have promoted uh the killing of uh innocent people, uh that has promoted the killing of um and genocide of uh a population in Gaza and um the killing and um of of children, of babies, and that has uh thousands upon thousands, and that has initiated a response worldwide. Now it's time that people in our part of the world, in Egypt and across the Arab world, also wake up to that realization that um that poison in our midst. Um, and I'm not talking about the Jewish people. So we are, I'm not mis-quoted. I'm not accused of being anti-Semitic. Uh, we are Semites ourselves. Uh, I'm talking about an ideology that is dangerous, an ideology um that exists um in Palestine but has spread its tentacles to other parts of the region, and that Zionism is a form of uh of fascism. It is, it represents itself as apartheid um in Palestine and it needs to be fought. It needs to be fought ideologically, and the peoples of the region need to also stand up to those leaders that have been protecting that ideology and allowing it to flourish and allowing it ultimately to threaten not only the Palestinians but its expansionist uh aspirations go beyond Palestine.
Considering what you just told me about how evil and how destructive and genocidal this Zionist entity has become. Uh, not that it hasn't been like that from the beginning, from the first day, but we're currently at a stage where we've seen the official count is over 53,000 dead. It's possibly upwards of 200,000 at this point. And these countries that have normalized, such as Egypt, such as Jordan, and others that are in the periphery, somehow it doesn't seem that they see the dangers that this entity poses to them. For example, in Egypt, should the people in Palestine, people of Gaza be forced into Sinai, that creates all sorts of problems for the for for the Egyptian administration. Uh uh the least of which is now you have a population of Palestinians who uh want to go home, who you're not allowing to go home, and who you can't control uh what kind of uh resources they they get access to from uh the from the Red Sea, for example, because Sinai is is is quite large, just not, you know, it's much easier to smuggle things in. So, it could cause some really great problems for Egypt and for Jordan, for example. Why have they not used the uh the normalization card as some sort of leverage? You know, why don't they, for example, say, "Okay, we need you to stop. We need you to calm this down. Otherwise, we will have to rip up our agreement."
It's a very good question because in reality they haven't used any leverage. They're sitting scared and um Egypt doesn't want the Gazans in the Sinai. Uh, CC said they can go to the negative. Uh, he knows uh the consequences and the dangers of that, although everything is open to discussion and bribes. Uh, so he can say that, but we don't know what may come next. Um, in reality, um both Jordan um and Egypt, its leadership is inept. It is uh all it seeks is to maintain good relations as much as possible with Israel in order that it remains in power. It's Egypt. Uh, the Israelis and the Americans have a noose, and the Gulf States have a noose around the neck of these leaders, whether in Jordan or Egypt. They can only maneuver so much because their priority is to remain in power. It their priority is not to do what is beneficial either for their peoples or for the Palestinians. They have complete disregard to the rights of their peoples and to the rights of the Palestinians. And this is the problem with dictatorship. It is the problem with a one-man show in power that comes to power wanting to stay in power forever, that it doesn't accept being held accountable and where all mechanisms of accountability have been removed. Therefore, yet again, in order to have policies that are beneficial for the peoples of the region and to be able to stand up to occupying powers, you need representative regimes, representative governments that can be held accountable. It doesn't mean they will achieve victory overnight, but they will not be working on their own and working in alliance with the enemies of the peoples themselves, which is what is happening in our part of the world.
How do we achieve that? I mean, we are currently witnessing these terrible crimes going on, and the people of Egypt and the people of Jordan are still sat at home. They're watching. Okay. They're they're making their prayers and they're they're hoping that the genocide ends, but they're not moving. And you you mentioned that people in Egypt, the have-nots don't have anything to lose. I mean, okay, they they they may be punished, but in terms of materially speaking, their their lives are already kind of uh devoid of kind of the the nicities and and and the the luxuries that someone might hope to protect. So if you have nothing to lose and you're seeing this great crime being perpetrated uh only on your border and you know that your government is completely complicit and is allowing for it to happen, why are you sat at home?
I think for the majority of people the barrier of fear is so great, and it has been entrenched more and more by the regime, particularly in Egypt since 2013. Uh, Egypt has um possibly over 100,000 in prison. According to human rights organizations and even um this has been um ratified by the US State Department, there are 80,000 political prisoners and 40,000 pre-trial prisoners. That amounts to about 116 uh imprisoned to every 1,000 in the population. That's high. Uh, and there is a rotating system of imprisoning uh uh holding people uh and then there is no trial. Uh, and um there is a continuous um uh, you know, cases of um disappearances. Uh, we saw um in the earlier period during the CC um CC's rule uh the level of executions um or verdicts of executions that were unprecedented in the history of Egypt. So there's a huge barrier of fear. That barrier of fear needs to be broken because ultimately it is a population of over 100 million and you have a small class of military in power. They have the access to weapons and security and the police force. But ultimately when a population rises, it rises, and you can bring about change um and shake the system um as we saw with the Arab Spring throughout the Arab world if people decide to break that barrier of fear.
I think also often when people are so destitute and hungry they don't move, and that is why the regime also makes sure that around the top echelons there are there is a coterie that is so well-fed and so happy that it will protect the system and that the for the majority of people the situation is so bad they don't go completely hungry, maybe. Although in Egypt there is poverty and they live below the poverty line, but it is they're just about managing, and then the very poor can't raise their heads. It's a very complicated situation, and it's one that I believe has been um created by the regime knowingly, and one regime after the other has tried to ensure that the Egyptian people keep um their head low, that they live in fear, and that they know that the military are their masters. That needs to change. That barrier of fear needs to be broken. And honestly, I believe that the military has never been as unpopular in Egypt as it is today. The military was always looked up to as the guardian of the nation, um as uh, you know, there are, you know, they they represent something honorable and and and great and so on. That is no longer the case. Uh, I believe CC's Egypt is one in which the military is extremely unpopular, and the coup of 2013 um although it happened um on the back of a great deal of rhetoric and a great deal of fanfare that somehow uh the the 30th of June uh which saw uh many on the streets represented a popular counter-revolution, in reality, it was a show, and many people afterwards realized uh the mistake that they made by supporting the military comeback and not supporting the democratically elected uh president of Egypt, and they're paying a very high price for it today.
Have you read 1984? Yes. So, you're probably familiar with the um quote or rather the the the thing that the main character Winston, I think it's called, he says over and over again is uh something along the lines of we have faith in the pearls, right? Or it's it's the the the revolution or the the change that needs to happen will come from within this underclass. But at the end, he's disappointed when he learns that he's not able to move the class, the underclass uh as he hopes they would move. Are we at a stage in Egypt where we can no longer expect those who need change the most will actually move towards attaining their own rights?
I think in Egypt it isn't just the underclass that is suffering; it is um the majority across all classes. Um, I believe that in Egypt different sectors of society, educated um um workers um, you know, uh the poor have all suffered under this regime. And ultimately, um what we're seeing is control by a minority of the majority. Uh, that minority does wield the military power and the relations with outside regional and international powers. But it also cannot sustain a country of over 100 million without delivering. The situation is becoming more dire both economically and uh socially, and eventually we will see this house of cards fall. It may fall also because of the fissures within itself. It will be prompted maybe by the population moving, but the population may move also because the house of cards itself begins to collapse from inside. And that is often what happens with these types of regimes. You might see overnight a collapse of a regime that seemed very strong but actually um collapses within itself because of either divisions or either because it actually has to feed the millions and is unable to do so.
Are there any cracks showing in the officer class in terms of their views on what's going on in Gaza and Egypt's role? Are there any members of that class that have a beating heart and may either do something or have said something that shows that there are some members who actually want to help Gaza and they believe that it's gone too far?
It's difficult to say. There is um some talk that uh CC has had to up the rhetoric, particularly lately, precisely because there are those in the military that um do not want to um seem like a complete sellout. Now is that coming from a genuine place or is it because they fear the danger um in terms of appearing as if they have completely sold out? It's difficult to say, but I think it's also being too hopeful to assume that the military class um will in itself want to change CC at this precise point. For 13 years, they have on the whole stood with him. He has maneuvered very well. He keeps uh removing some generals and putting others. He uh there's a kind of chess game going on constantly. Uh, so yes, he's able to control the situation. He's able to bribe uh a large component of that class or the military establishment uh the upper echelons of the military establishment and has kept them happy. Uh, therefore, I would be uh skeptical um uh in terms of thinking that there is any kind of um widespread opposition to his policies. But change can happen from a few succeeding against the the the the military elite. This is how a coup happens, you know, unexpectedly. Um, this is something we can't predict. And is it necessarily in the interest of the Egyptian people to see uh another coup that reinforces the military state? Some would say that uh a coup from among people within the military, from those in within the military that uh um want to change and see the harm that CC has brought about could be an opening to some degree of uh political opening up, some degree of uh uh stepping back of the military from the control of the economy. But this is all speculation in terms of the future of Egypt.
You spoke about what needs to happen. You've spoken about why it needs to happen. Now, in terms of how it can happen, a lot of the leaders of of of social movements are in prison or in the ground, uh as you mentioned earlier, is there a source of new leadership from within Egyptian society today that can possibly change the tide?
I believe that each generation does produce um a new leadership, a youth that want to see a different world. Again, in the case of Egypt, because of the level of political control, the fact that we don't have a free media, the fact that we have journalists in prison, the fact that even um social media uh those who speak out on social media are picked up, um uh those who may be running a blog are picked up. Um, it is very difficult to see um how things may manifest themselves over the months and years to come. But clearly each generation, particularly after I believe the Arab Spring, will have aspirations for itself and so and for society both in Egypt and across the Arab world. uh, I don't believe that the youth um don't believe in a better future for themselves, and you know, we have a generation that that dreams of a better world uh, you know, for themselves and for their children. Um, it is uh the reality of politics, and we know this as a fact that change does come, but when and how is the question. Uh, in the case of Egypt and the case of the Arab world, I believe that we have lived with um uh the the the the scourge of dictatorship and authoritarianism for a very long time. And ultimately that system is very old. Even the people who lead it are old. And they are going to either die or be removed in one way or another. And what comes after um provides an opening and a potential. But it is up to the youth of our region to organize, to strategize, and to forge a different future for themselves. It's not going to be handed to them by the regimes in power. They have to rid themselves of these regimes that are old and archaic and brutal. And the youth of our region are the ones who have who suffer under that brutality more than any other.
In the interest of time, I'm going to have to end it there. Thank you so much uh for joining us today, Dr. Thank you very much indeed.